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  Union	  FIDH	   International	  Federation	  for	  Human	  Rights	  FLS	   Front	  Line	  States	  FRELIMO	   Frente	  de	  Libertação	  de	  Moçambique	  GLR	   Great	  Lakes	  Region	  GPA	   Global	  Partnership	  Agreement	  GTZ	   Gesellschaft	  für	  Technische	  Zusammenarbeit	  HRW	   Human	  Rights	  Watch	  ICG	   International	  Crisis	  Group	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ICPs	   International	  Cooperating	  Partners	  IDASA	   Institute	  for	  Democracy	  in	  Africa	  (South	  Africa)	  IGAD	   Intergovernmental	  Authority	  on	  Development	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  Review	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  Commission	  (Kenya)	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  Diplomacy	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   Institute	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  Studies	  (South	  Africa)	  JOMIC	   Joint	  Monitoring	  and	  Implementation	  Committee	  KHRC	   Kenya	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  KIDDP	   Karamoja	  Integrated	  Disarmament	  and	  Development	  Programme	  KPTJ	   Kenyans	  for	  Peace,	  Truth	  and	  Justice	  LDUs	   Local	  Defence	  Units	  LEAs	   Law	  Enforcement	  Agencies	  LPA	   Lagos	  Plan	  of	  Action	  LRA	   Lords	  Resistance	  Army	  MDC	   Movement	  for	  Democratic	  Change	  MDC-­‐M	   Movement	  for	  Democratic	  Change-­‐Mutambara	  MDC-­‐T	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  for	  Democratic	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   National	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  Point	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  of	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  ODM	   Orange	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  Movement	  OPDSC	   Organ	  on	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  Defence	  and	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  Cooperation	  PEAP	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  of	  Eminent	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   Party	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  POSA	   Public	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  and	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  (Zimbabwe)	  PSC	   Peace	  and	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  Council	  PTA	   Preferential	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  Area	  RCC	   Regional	  Coordinating	  Committee	  (on	  SALW	  in	  the	  SADC	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  RECSA	   Regional	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  on	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  RENAMO	   Resistência	  Nacional	  Moçambicana	  SADC	   South	  African	  Development	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  SADCC	   Southern	  African	  Development	  Coordination	  Conference	  SADF	   South	  African	  Defence	  Forces	  SALW	   Small	  Arms	  and	  Light	  Weapons	  SAPS	   South	  African	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  Service	  SARPCCO	   Southern	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  Regional	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  Chiefs	  Cooperation	  Organization	  SIPO	   Strategic	  Indicative	  Plan	  for	  the	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  SOPs	   Standard	  Operating	  Procedures	  (for	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  SADC	  Firearms	  Protocol)	  TAE	   Transformacão	  das	  Armas	  em	  Enxadas	  (Transforming	  Weapons	  into	  Ploughshares)	  TANANSA	   Tanzania	  National	  Action	  Network	  on	  Small	  Arms	  UCDP	   Uppsala	  Conflict	  Data	  Program	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Abstract	  	  Die	  meisten	  regionalen	  und	  subregionalen	  Organisationen	  in	  Afrika	  sind	  konfrontiert	  mit	  mehr	  oder	  weniger	  ähnlichen	  Formen	  von	  Sicherheitsbedrohungen.	  Obwohl	  ein	  Potential	  für	   zwischenstaatliche	   Konflikte	   besteht,	   bestehen	   wenig	   Zweifel,	   dass	   die	   heute	  auffälligsten	  Herausforderungen	  für	  die	  Sicherheit,	  denen	  die	  Mehrheit	  der	  Staaten	  Afrikas	  sich	   gegenüber	   sieht,	   sich	   hauptsächlich	   in	   zwei	   Formen	   darstellen,	   nämlich	  transnationalen	  Bedrohungen	  oder	  innenpolitischen	  Krisen.	  Im	  Falle	  des	  Ausbleibens	  der	  richtigen	  Maßnahmen	  tragen	  beide	  das	  Potential	  in	  sich,	  die	  regionale,	  bzw.	  sub-­‐regionale	  Stabilitätweiter	   zu	   gefährden.	   Die	   Ausgangsannahme	   war,	   dass	   subregionale	  Organisationen	   bewußt	   eingesetzt	  wurden,	   nicht	   nur,	   um	   ein	   kollektives	   Forum	   für	   den	  Einsatz	   von	   Krisenmechanismen	   im	   Falle	   transnationaler	   Bedrohung	   bereitzustellen,	  sondern	   dass	   sie	   auch	   eine	   wichtige	   Rolle	   zur	   Lösung	   von	   Konfliktsituationen	   in	   den	  Mitgliedsstaaten	  einnehmen	  können.	  	  	  Folglich	   fragt	   die	   Studie	   danach,	   wie	   subregionale	   Organisationen	   mit	  Sicherheitsmandaten	   sich	   faktisch	   koordinieren	   und	   auf	   	   kollektive	   Sicherheitsprobleme	  reagieren.	   Wichtig	   war	   hier	   zu	   vergleichen,	   wie	   jede	   der	   zwei	   unterschiedlichen	  	  	  Sicherheitsprobleme,	   nicht	   nur	   innerhalb	   einer,	   sondern	   im	   Vergleich	   zweier	  subregionaler	  Organisationen	  angegangen	  wird.	  Die	  vorliegende	  Untersuchung	  war	  daher	  bestrebt,	   unter	   Benutzung	   einer	   qualitativen	   vergleichenden	   Methode,	   die	   jeweilige	  sicherheitspolitische	   Rolle	   der	   Eastern	   African	   Community	   und	   der	   Southern	   African	  Development	  Community	  zu	  untersuchen,	  bezogen	  auf	  den	  Zeitraum	  zwischen	  2000	  und	  2011.	  	  Im	  Bewusstsein	  der	  Tatsache,	   dass	   eine	  Reihe	   von	  Akteuren	   in	   einem	  mehrstufigen	  und	  dynamischen	  Prozess	   involviert	   ist,	  was	  zunehmend	  auch	  die	  Forderung	  nach	  Steuerung	  auf	   subregionaler	   Ebene	   unterstützt,	   ging	   die	   Studie	   darüber	   hinaus,	   lediglich	   die	  Unterschiede	   und	   Ähnlichkeiten	   herauszuarbeiten	   und	   hinterfragte,	   wie	   während	   der	  Ausübung	  der	  Koordinations-­‐	  und	  Steuerungsfunktionen	  die	  Interaktionen	  der	  Akteure	  auf	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die	   Wirksamkeit	   der	   Organisationen	   in	   Bezug	   auf	   die	   diskutierten	   Gefährdungen	  regionaler	  Sicherheit	  auswirken.	  	  	  Die	   sich	   aus	   der	   Untersuchung	   ergebenden	   Erfahrungen	   der	   EAC	   und	   SADC	   und	   ihrer	  Reaktionen	   auf	   die	   Sicherheitsgefährdungen	   	   bei	   mit	   Kleinwaffen	   ausgetragenen	  Konflikten	   und	   innenpolitischen	   Krisen	   bestätigen	   die	   Hypothese	   der	   Studie,	   dass	   die	  Koordination	  und	  Lenkung	  der	  subregionalen	  Sicherheitspolitik	  abhängig	   ist	  von	  der	  Art	  der	   kollektiven	   Sicherheitsbedrohung.	   Die	   beobachteten	   Entwicklungen	   und	   Praktiken	  innerhalb	  der	  EAC-­‐	  und	  SADC-­‐Sicherheitsarchitekturen	  zeigen	  auch	  auf,	  dass	  die	  hier	   im	  Fokus	  stehenden	  subregionalen	  Organisationen	  als	  vergleichsweise	  effektivere	  Akteure	  im	  Bereich	   der	   Kleinwaffen	   erscheinen,	   	   und	   tendenziellweniger	   in	   Fällen	   innenpolitischer	  Krisen	  in	  Mitgliedsstaaten.	  	  
Abstract	  (English	  Version)	  	  Most	   regional	   and	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   confront	   more	   or	   less	   similar	   forms	   of	  security	   threats.	   Indeed,	   while	   there	   is	   still	   potential	   for	   inter-­‐state	   conflict,	   it	   is	   well	  documented	  that	  the	  most	  salient	  security	  challenges	  confronting	  the	  majority	  of	  states	  in	  Africa	   to	   date	   are	   mainly	   of	   two	   forms,	   namely	   transnational	   threats	   and	   internal	   or	  domestic	   political	   crises.	   These	   security	   challenges	   if	   not	   properly	   addressed	   have	   the	  potential	   to	   turn	   stability	   into	   sub-­‐regional	   or	   regional	   anarchical	   order.	   It	  was	   assumed	  that	   sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  are	  adeptly	  placed	  not	  only	   to	  provide	  a	   collective	   forum	  for	  facilitating	  response	  mechanisms	  to	  transnational	  threats,	  but	  also	  can	  play	  important	  roles	   resolving	   conflict	   situations	   within	   their	   members.	   The	   study,	   thus,	   set	   out	   to	  establish	  how	  sub-­‐regional	  arrangements	  with	  security	  mandates	  actually	  coordinate	  and	  manage	  their	  responses	  to	  these	  collective	  security	  challenges	  in	  their	  delineated	  areas.	  It	  was	   deemed	   important	   to	   compare	   not	   only	   how	   each	   of	   the	   two	   forms	   of	   security	  challenges	  are	  addressed	  within	  one,	  but	  also	  across	  two	  sub-­‐regional	  arrangements.	  The	  study,	   therefore,	  with	  a	   comparative	  emphasis	   and	  using	  a	  qualitative	  method,	   sought	   to	  examine	   the	   roles	   of	   the	   EAC	   and	   SADC	   in	   their	   attempts	   to	   address	   these	   security	  challenges	  confronting	  their	  respective	  sub-­‐regions	  covering	  the	  period	  from	  2000	  to	  2011.	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  Cognizant	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  an	  array	  of	  actors	  engaged	  in	  a	  multilevel	  and	  dynamic	  process,	  which	   increasingly	   underpins	   security	   governance	   in	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   level,	   the	  study	   moved	   beyond	   fleshing	   out	   disparities	   and	   resemblances	   and	   interrogated	   how	  actors’	   interactions	   during	   coordination	   and	   management	   functions	   reflect	   on	   the	  organization’s	   overall	   effectiveness	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   security	   challenges.	   The	   emerging	  patterns	  from	  the	  examination	  of	  the	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  experiences	  in	  reacting	  to	  the	  security	  challenges	  of	  small	  arms	  and	  domestic	  political	  crises	  confirm	  the	  study’s	  hypothesis	  that	  the	   coordination	   and	   management	   of	   sub-­‐regional	   security	   governance	   depends	   on	   the	  type	  of	  collective	  security	  challenge.	  The	  observed	  developments	  and	  practices	  within	  the	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  security	  architectures	  also	  reveal	  that	  the	  security	  dimensions	  facing	  their	  Member	   States	   and	   the	   mitigating	   tasks	   of	   these	   sub-­‐regional	   groupings	   vary.	   In	  comparative	   terms	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   under	   focus	   here	   appear	   as	   more	  effective	  actors	  in	  the	  small	  arms	  issue-­‐area	  and	  less	  so	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  cases	  of	  domestic	  political	  crises.	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   the	   same	   office,	   were	  generous	  hosts	  and	  offered	  immense	  support	  during	  my	  brief	  visit	  to	  Harare.	  	  I	   also	   note	   with	   deep	   appreciation	   the	   indispensable	   cooperation	   of	   Esaka	   Mugasa,	  Assistant	   Commissioner	   of	   Police-­‐National	   Focal	   Point	   and	   Commanding	   Officer	   at	   the	  Arms	  Management	  and	  Disarmament	  Department	  of	  the	  Tanzania	  Police	  Force	  as	  well	  as	  Lutenta	   Mwauzi,	   Assistant	   Commissioner	   of	   Police	   in	   the	   same	   department;	   Wolfgang	  Leidig,	  Head	  of	  Programme,	  and	  Margrit	  Mueller,	  Corporate	  Communication	  Officer	  at	  the	  German	   Technical	   Cooperation	   office	   in	   Arusha;	   Leonard	   Onyonyi,	   SALW	   Programme	  Coordinator	  at	  the	  EAC	  Secretariat,	  and	  Francis	  K.	  Wairagu,	  Head	  of	  RECSA’s	  Research	  and	  Gender	  Unit	  in	  Nairobi,	  for	  providing	  additional	  information	  and	  data	  that	  proved	  valuable	  for	   this	   study.	   The	   following	   individuals	   proved	   to	   be	   of	   tremendous	   help	   in	   accessing	  archived	   data:	   Maria	   Tali,	   Librarian	   at	   the	   SADC	   Headquarters	   in	   Gaborone;	   Costa	  Mashauri,	   Library	   Assistant,	   and	   Emmanuel	   Diah,	   Data	   Entry	   Assistant,	   both	   at	   the	   EAC	  Headquarters	  in	  Arusha.	  	  	  Finally,	   I	   am	   very	   grateful	   for	   my	   entire	   family’s	   support,	   understanding	   and	   patience	  while	   I	   was	   pursuing	   this	   academic	   endeavour.	   Special	   thanks	   go	   to	   my	   wife,	   Talha	  Mohamed,	  whose	   love,	   encouragement	   and	   unwavering	   support	  made	   it	   all	   possible,	   as	  well	  as	  our	  daughters,	  Tazmina	  and	  Taysha,	  who	  provided	  a	  constant	  source	  of	  inspiration.	  I	  also	  owe	  my	  parents	  a	  great	  deal	  for	  their	  unlimited	  affection	  and	  support.	  
	  Chapter	  One	  
Introduction	  	  Most	   regional	   and	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   confront	   more	   or	   less	   similar	   forms	   of	  security	   threats.	   Indeed,	   while	   there	   is	   still	   potential	   for	   inter-­‐state	   conflict,	   it	   is	   well	  documented	  that	  the	  most	  salient	  security	  threats	  facing	  the	  sub-­‐regions	  call	  for	  measures,	  which	   require	   collaborative	   response.	   While	   it	   is	   widely	   acknowledged	   that	   security	  concerns	  of	  African	  states	   largely	  come	   from	  within	   rather	   than	  between	  states	   (Franke,	  2009;	  Hentz,	  2009;	  Hurrell,	  1995),	  it	  is	  also	  the	  case	  that	  security	  threats	  confronting	  most	  states	  today	  are	  almost	  regional	  in	  nature,	  and	  regions	  are	  increasingly	  the	  locus	  of	  conflict	  and	  cooperation,	  and	  thus	  salient	  units	  of	  analysis	  (Lake	  and	  Morgan,	  1997:	  6-­‐7;	  Buzan	  and	  Weaver,	  2003:	  10-­‐11;	  Flemes	  and	  Radseck,	  2009:	  6).	  	  Long	   before	   IR	   scholars	   characterised	   the	   regional	   level	   as	   the	   locus	   of	   conflict	   and	  cooperation	   and	   as	   the	   level	   of	   analysis	   for	   scholars	   seeking	   to	   explore	   contemporary	  security	   threats,	   the	   United	   Nations	   (UN)	   envisaged	   the	   engagement	   of	   state	   actors	  organized	   in	  what	   it	  refers	  as	  regional	  arrangements	  and	  agencies	   in	   the	  maintenance	  of	  peace	   and	   security	   within	   their	   geographical	   territories1.	   More	   importantly,	   the	   noble	  aspirations	  of	   the	   international	  community	  expressed	   in	   the	  UN	  Charter	  were	   to	  witness	  more	  pacific	  settlement	  of	  conflicts	  and	  other	  security	  threats	  through	  such	  arrangements	  and	  agencies2.	  	  	  Views	  may	   still	   be	   divided	   over	   the	   actual	   contribution	   of	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   to	  peace	   and	   security	   but	   there	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   consensus	   that	   these	   arrangements	   enjoy	  relatively	   more	   comparative	   advantages	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   management	   of	   security	  challenges	  within	   their	   localities	   than	   international	  actors.	  The	  proximity	  of	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	   to	   trouble	   spots	   lends	   them	   important	   advantages:	   a	   much	   closer	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Article	  52	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter.	  2	  The	  current	  study	  makes	  a	  distinction	  between	  regional	  and	  sub-­‐regional	  arrangements/organizations	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understanding	  of	  the	  specific	  dynamics	  of	  the	  prevailing	  security	  threats,	  key	  players	  and	  context-­‐specific	  management	  and	  resolution	  options.	  	  In	  Africa,	   sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  begun	   to	  seriously	  consider	  security	  matters	  due	   to	  the	   growing	   recognition	   that	   their	   ability	   to	   concentrate	   on	   the	   initial	   mandate	   of	  promoting	   economic	   prosperity	   in	   their	   geographical	   areas	   would	   be	   constrained	   by	  insecurity.	  This	  followed	  periods	  of	  instability	  and	  conflicts	  in	  many	  areas	  of	  the	  continent	  that	  were	  coupled	  with	  the	  dwindling	  interest	  of	  the	  international	  community	  in	  Africa	  in	  the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   Cold	   War.	   This	   study,	   henceforth,	   gives	   particular	   attention	   to	  practical	   experiences	   of	   two	   of	   several	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   in	   the	   sub-­‐Sahara	  African	   context,	   where	   circumstances	   for	   security	   coordination	   and	   management	   are	  compelling,	  but	  the	  collective	  security	  challenges	  are	  also	  among	  the	  most	  daunting.	  These	  are	  the	  East	  African	  Community	  (EAC)	  and	  the	  Southern	  Africa	  Development	  Community	  (SADC).	  The	  study	  covers	  the	  period	  from	  2000	  to	  2011	  and	  as	  hinted	  earlier,	  is	  confined	  to	  the	  security	  realm.	  	  While	  it	  is	  certainly	  true	  that	  these	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  (i.e.	  the	  EAC	  and	  SADC)	  have	  had	   some	   of	   their	  Member	   States	   embroiled	   in	   devastating	   civil	   wars	   in	   the	   1990s	   and	  2000s,	   it	   is	   equally	   true	   that	   they	   have	   also	   served	   as	   important	   collective	   forums	   for	  increased	  interaction	  between	  different	  actors.	  Setting	  concrete	  peace	  and	  security	  goals	  in	  the	  form	  of	  SADC’s	  Strategic	  Indicative	  Program	  for	  the	  Organ	  (SIPO)	  and	  EAC’s	  Regional	  Strategy	   for	   Peace	   and	   Security	   and	   adoption	   of	   related	   security	   and	   defence	   protocols	  bears	  testimony	  to	  efforts	  of	  bringing	  together	  an	  evolving	  array	  of	  actors	  and	  institutions.	  	  Indeed,	   the	   current	   study	   is	   not	   the	   first	   and	   only	   one	   on	   the	   topical	   issue	   of	   African	  regional	   and	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations’	   engagement	   in	   security	   matters.	   An	   equally	  increasing	  volume	   in	  research	  works	  accompanied	  the	  surge	   in	  security	  undertakings	  by	  regional	   and	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   that	   gained	  momentum	   in	   the	   1990s.	   There	   are	  several	   comparative	   research	  works	   that	   offer	   valuable	   contribution	  and	   clarification	  on	  different	  dynamics	  of	  the	  security	  endeavours	  of	  these	  organizations	  albeit	  with	  a	  variation	  in	  focus	  as	  well	  as	  cases	  covered.	  These	  works	  can	  be	  categorized	  into	  five	  main	  groups.	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  First,	   post-­‐Deutschian	   scholars	   (Adler	   and	   Barnett,	   1998;	   Acharya	   1998,	   2009;	   Sridhan,	  2008,	   to	   mention	   a	   few)	   who	   have	   primarily	   been	   concerned	   with	   explaining	   and	  comparing	  how	  regional	  arrangements	  have	  been	  able	  to	  keep	  their	  respective	  regions	  free	  of	   violent	  hostilities.	   	   Their	  main	   interest	  has	  been	   fixed	  on	   the	  potential	   of	   regions	   and	  sub-­‐regions	   to	   develop	   into	   security	   communities,	   focusing	   more	   on	   regional	   stability	  based	  on	  management	  of	   inter-­‐state	   conflicts.	   Second,	   studies	  which	  offer	  a	   comparative	  analysis	   of	   the	   integral	   capacities	   of	   regional	   organizations	   with	   a	   security	  mandate.	   In	  mind	  here	  are	  the	  studies	  conducted	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  University	  (UNU-­‐CRIS)	  in	  2007	  and	  2008	  and	  the	  well-­‐researched	  volume	  by	  Tavares	  (2009).	  	  	  Third,	   researchers	   have	   also	   designed	   studies	   with	   a	   comparative	   focus	   on	   the	   role	   of	  African	   regional	   and	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   in	   security	   matters.	   The	   work	   by	  Soderbaum	   and	   Tavares	   (2010)	   presents	   a	   comparative	   analysis	   of	   the	   role	   of	   the	   AU,	  ECOWAS,	   IGAD,	   ECCAS	   and	   SADC	   in	   one	   volume.	   As	   can	   be	   noted	   the	   volume	   combines	  regional	   and	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   in	   one	   comparative	   assessment,	   specifically	  focusing	   on	   their	   advantages	   and	   disadvantages;	   the	   official	   and	   unofficial	   reasons	   to	  intervene,	  and	  whether	  their	  peace	  activities	  establishes	  security.	  	  	  Fourth,	   a	   few	   studies	   have	   come	   to	   offer	   sober	   reflections	   on	   compilation	   of	   individual	  cases	  of	  regional	  organizations	  but	  with	  the	  main	  focus	  on	  the	  AU’s	  security	  architecture.	  Baseda’s	  edited	  volume	  is	  one	  such	  work	  that	  highlights	  practical	  experiences	  of	  and	  the	  complementary	  roles	  played	  by	  the	  AU,	  UN,	  EU,	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  and	  individual	  leading	  states	  in	  Africa’s	  security	  dynamics	  (Baseda,	  2010).	  In	  this	  group	  also	  is	  the	  work	  that	   offers	   a	   critical	   analysis	   of	   the	   operationalization	   of	   the	   AU’s	   peace	   and	   security	  architecture	  and	  Africa’s	  Regional	  Economic	  Communities	  (REC)	  (Engel	  and	  Porto,	  2010).	  	  Fifth,	   some	   studies	   ventured	   into	   comparing	   the	   EU	   as	   supposedly	   most	   sophisticated	  integration	   project	   with	   organizations	   operating	   in	   developing	   countries	   (SADC	   and	  MERCOSUR),	   exploring	   conditions	   under	   which	   a	   regional	   organization	   intervenes	   to	  defend	  democratic	  principles	  (Van	  Der	  Vleuten	  and	  Hoffmann,	  2010).	  Nathan	  (2012)	   is	  a	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single	  case	  volume	  but	  with	  a	  brief	  dose	  of	   comparative	  analysis	  of	  SADC	  and	  EU.	  While	  such	  comparisons	  bring	  to	  the	  fore	  important	  insights,	  and	  are	  often	  made	  because	  of	  the	  African	  tendency	  to	  seek	  to	  reproduce	  European	  institutions	  (Nathan,	  2012:	  110),	  still	  we	  can	  better	  understand	  African	  regional	  and	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  in	  their	  own	  terms	  in	   light	   of	   their	   challenges	   and	   circumstances	   (Acharya	   and	   Johnston,	   2007:	   244-­‐7),	   and	  not	  through	  the	  EU	  prism.	  Comparing	  an	  African	  sub-­‐regional	  organization	  with	  the	  EU	  is	  risky	   intellectually	   as	   they	   thrive	   under	   quiet	   different	   conditions	   and	   contexts.	   Alden	  (2011)	   on	   his	   part	   completed	   comparing	   cases	   of	   SADC	   in	   relation	   to	   Zimbabwe	   and	  ASEAN	  in	  relation	  to	  Myanmar	  to	   investigate	  the	  dilemmas	  posed	  by	  western-­‐designated	  pariah	  regimes	  for	  regional	  organizations	  and	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  these	  organizations	  seek	  to	  address	  this	  problematic.	  	  	  	  In	   the	   backdrop	   of	   this	   widely	   spread	   collection	   of	   literature,	   where	   do	   we	   situate	   the	  current	  study	  As	  can	  be	  noticed	  from	  the	  brief	  review	  of	  the	  existing	  literature,	  studies	  are	  premised	  on	  different	  angles	  of	  focus	  and	  often	  with	  divergent	  emphasis.	  This	  study	  is	  not	  focusing	   on	   capacity	   aspects	   of	   organizations	   nor	   is	   it	   bent	   on	   illuminating	   further	   the	  sharing	   of	   roles	   between	   the	   AU’s	   Peace	   and	   Security	   Architecture	   and	   sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  or	  motivations	  for	  interventions.	  	  	  The	  present	   study	   clearly	  distances	   itself	   from	  previous	   literature	  on	   the	   topic	   in	   that	   it	  allows	  a	  comparative	  examination	  of	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations’	  practical	  experiences	   in	  dealing	   with,	   not	   only	   one,	   but	   two	   of	   the	   most	   pernicious	   security	   challenges	   in	   one	  inquiry.	  It	  is	  not	  entirely	  agreeable	  intellectually	  to	  completely	  dismiss	  or	  wholly	  appraise	  the	   functioning	   and	   efficacy	   of	   African	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   based	   on	   singly	  assessing	   their	   peace-­‐enforcement	   experiences	   only,	   or	   their	   capability	   or	   lack	   of,	   in	  mounting	  military	  interventions.	  A	  parallel	   focus	  on	  cases	  of	  domestic	  political	  crises	  but	  which	  are	  short	  of	  an	  open	  violent	  conflict	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  DRC	  and	  the	  transnational	  threat	  of	  Small	  Arms	  and	  Light	  Weapons	  (SALW),	  both	  with	  regional	  ramifications	  are	  yet	  to	  attract	  comprehensive	  scholarly	  attention.	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How	   do	   particular	   organizations	   fare	   with	   regard	   to	   their	   treatment	   of	   both	   forms	   of	  security	   challenges?	   Is	   there	   any	   variation	   in	   responses	   to	   a	   similar	   form	   of	   security	  challenge,	  and	  what	  explains	  it?	  But	  mapping	  differences	  and	  similarities	  can	  only	  produce	  an	   incomplete	   picture.	   There	   is	   an	   array	   of	   actors	   engaged	   in	   a	  multilevel	   and	   dynamic	  process,	  which	  increasingly	  underpins	  security	  governance	  in	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  level.	  It	   is,	  thus,	  imperative	  to	  move	  beyond	  fleshing	  out	  disparities	  and	  resemblances	  and	  interrogate	  how	   actors’	   interactions	   during	   coordination	   and	   management	   functions	   reflect	   on	   the	  organization’s	  overall	  effectiveness	  in	  relation	  to	  collective	  security	  challenges.	  This	  actor-­‐oriented	   dimension	   is	   not	   only	   important	   in	   capturing	   the	   respective	   roles	   of	   the	  assortment	   of	   security	   actors	   but	   also	   challenges	   posed	   by	   them	   to	   the	   sub-­‐regional	  organization’s	  functioning	  and	  effectiveness.	  	  The	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  have	  been	  selected	  because	  they	  share	  certain	  features	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  enrich	  analysis	  in	  this	  study.	  They	  are	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  with	  a	  security	  mandate,	  which	   allows	   for	   an	   examination	   of	   their	   role	   on	   a	   broad	   range	   of	   security	   issues.	  Additionally,	  while	  acknowledging	  the	  contribution	  of	  earlier	  studies,	  it	  is	  noted	  that	  they	  have	   tended	   to	   focus	  more	   on	   the	   substantive	   practices	   of	   the	   AU,	   ECOWAS,	   and	   SADC.	  Moreover,	  most	  of	  these	  works	  appear	  to	  be	  motivated	  more	  by	  the	  aspect	  of	  management	  of	   armed	   conflicts	   by	   these	   regional	   and	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   to	   the	   minimal	  treatment	   of	   more	   perennial	   non-­‐military	   transnational	   security	   threats	   like	   SALW	  proliferation	   and	   related	   cross	   border	   crimes.	   The	   interest	   of	   most	   scholarship	   on	  regionalism	   in	   Africa	   has	   been	   confined	   predominantly	   to	   the	   highly	   institutionalized	  forms	  of	   inter-­‐state	   co-­‐operation.	  This	  partly	   explains	   the	   reason	  why	   the	  EAC	   is	  hugely	  absent	  from	  the	  literature	  on	  matters	  of	  security.	  As	  more	  than	  ten	  years	  have	  now	  elapsed	  since	   its	   inception,	   there	   are	   quiet	   a	   number	   of	   developments	   which	   have	   taken	   place	  within	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  EAC	  to	  deserve	  special	  attention.	  	  Security	   challenges,	   such	   as	   SALW	   proliferation	   and	   domestic	   political	   crises	   pose	   a	  destabilising	  effect	  especially	  to	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  development	  goals	  of	  regional	  or	  sub-­‐regional	  arrangements.	  These	  security	  challenges	   if	  not	  properly	  addressed	  have	  the	  potential	   to	   turn	   sub-­‐regional	   stability	   into	   ‘regional	   or	   sub-­‐regional	   anarchical	   order’.	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Accordingly,	  regional	  and	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  acknowledge	  that	  peace	  and	  security	  are	  pre-­‐requisites	  to	  social	  and	  economic	  development,	  and	  therefore,	  they	  cannot	  afford	  to	  be	   indifferent	   to	   security	   challenges	   confronting	   their	  partner	   states	   territories.	  What	  remains	  unclear	  is	  how	  relevant	  have	  security	  architectures	  of	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  been	  in	  tackling	  the	  most	  salient	  security	  challenges	  facing	  them	  in	  their	  respective	  areas,	  namely	   transnational	   threats	   and	   domestic	   political	   crises.	   This	   study,	   therefore,	   with	   a	  comparative	  emphasis	  seeks	  to	  examine	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  in	  their	  attempts	  to	  address	  these	  security	  challenges	  confronting	  their	  respective	  sub-­‐regions.	  	  As	   both	   forms	   of	   security	   challenges	   have	   ramifications	   beyond	   one’s	   national	   frontiers,	  and	   thus,	   threatening	   to	   impact	   negatively	   on	   the	   general	   integration	   agenda	   of	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations,	   one	   expects	   these	   challenges	   to	   receive	   same	   level	   of	   attention	  from	  sub-­‐regional	  arrangements.	  It	  is,	  therefore,	  important	  to	  comparatively	  establish	  how	  sub-­‐regional	  arrangements	  with	  security	  mandates	  actually	  coordinate	  and	  manage	  their	  responses	   to	   the	   collective	   security	   challenges	   in	   their	   delineated	   areas.	   It	   was	   deemed	  important	   to	   compare	   not	   only	   how	   each	   of	   the	   two	   forms	   of	   security	   challenges	   are	  addressed	   within	   one,	   but	   also	   across	   two	   sub-­‐regional	   arrangements.	   One	   of	   the	  advantages	  of	  a	  comparative	  study	  is	  that	  it	  can	  capture	  emerging	  patterns	  of	  international	  interaction,	  which	  are	  of	  approximately	  similar	  activity	  (Axline,	  1994).	  The	  main	  point	  of	  interest	   was	   to	   understand	   how	   the	   two	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations,	   both	   with	   security	  mandates,	   practically	   respond	   to	   the	   collective	   security	   challenges	   in	   their	   delineated	  areas.	  The	  study	   thus	  posed	   the	   following	  question:	  What	  is	  the	  relevance	  of	  sub-­‐regional	  
security	   governance	   in	   addressing	   collective	   security	   challenges	   facing	   participants	   of	   sub-­‐
regional	  organizations?	  	  The	  entire	  work	  is	  organized	  into	  nine	  chapters.	  Following	  this	  introduction,	  chapter	  two	  offers	  an	  overview	  on	  the	  genesis	  of	  African	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  and	  their	  eventual	  shift	  in	  focus	  to	  security	  matters,	  with	  a	  bias	  on	  the	  two	  organizations	  of	  special	  interest	  to	  the	  current	  study,	  i.e.	  the	  EAC	  and	  SADC.	  The	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  are	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  in	   Sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   striving	   to	   pool	   resources	   of	   their	   members	   together	   to	   achieve	  economic	   development	   in	   their	   respective	   regions.	   Both	   organizations	   share	   the	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realization	  that	  peace	  and	  security	  are	  the	  linchpins	  for	  sustainable	  development	  in	  their	  regions.	  This	  recognition	  that	  gains	  of	  their	  integration	  initiatives,	  i.e.	  principally	  widening	  and	   deepening	   economic	   integration,	   could	   only	   be	   protected	   in	   an	   environment	   that	   is	  peaceful,	  stable	  and	  secure,	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  vision	  of	  the	  two	  organizations.	  The	  vision	  of	  the	  EAC	  is	  “to	  have	  a	  prosperous,	  competitive,	  secure	  and	  politically	  united	  East	  Africa”3.	  The	  SADC	  vision	   is	   the	  “shared	   future	   in	  an	  environment	  of	  peace,	   security	  and	  stability,	  regional	  cooperation	  and	  integration	  based	  on	  equity,	  mutual	  benefit	  and	  solidarity”4.	  	  	  In	  both	  the	  EAC	  and	  SADC,	  cooperation	  in	  defence	  and	  security	  matters	  had	  set	  the	  pace	  for	  the	   integration	   processes.	   In	   the	   East	   African	   region,	   consideration	   of	   various	   forms	   of	  defence	   and	   security	   cooperation	   began	   ahead	   of	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	   Permanent	  Tripartite	   Commission	   for	   East	   African	   Co-­‐operation	   (established	   in	   1993)	   into	   a	   full-­‐fledged	  East	  African	  Community	  in	  2000.	  In	  1998,	  the	  three	  pioneer	  countries	  of	  the	  EAC,	  Kenya,	  Tanzania	  and	  Uganda,	  signed	  a	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  for	  Co-­‐operation	  in	  Defence	  Matters5.	  Within	  the	  Southern	  African	  region,	   inter-­‐state	  cooperation	  on	  defence	  and	  security	  took	  place	  before	  the	  establishment	  of	  SADC	  in	  1992,	  through	  the	  Inter-­‐State	  Defence	   and	   Security	   Committee	   (ISDSC).	   The	   ISDSC6	  was	   forum	   established	   under	   the	  aegis	  of	   the	  Frontline	  States	  (FLS),	  which	  played	  a	  crucial	  role	   in	   the	   liberation	  struggles	  against	  colonial	  and	  racist	  regimes	  and	  in	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  national	  sovereignty	  and	  territorial	  integrity	  of	  the	  Member	  States.	  	  	  Chapter	   three	   covers	   the	   review	  of	   literature.	   It	   reviews	   the	  main	   IR	   theoretical	   strands	  and	   their	   contributions	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   security	   and	   explains	   in	   detail	   the	   preferred	  security	   governance	   perspective	   for	   this	   study.	   The	   main	   assumption	   of	   the	   security	  governance	   perspective	   is	   that	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   actors	   is	   presently	   involved	   in	   the	  governance	  of	  security,	  and	  that	  the	  state	  is	  one	  actor,	  albeit	  a	  very	  important	  one,	  among	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  EAC	   Treaty	   1999.	   The	   EAC	   Strategy	   on	  Regional	   Peace	   and	   Security	   has	   a	   Vision:	   “a	   secure	   and	   peaceful	  environment	   for	   development”	   and	   the	   Mission,	   for	   which	   this	   cooperation	   exists,	   is	   “to	   provide	   security	  within	  the	  region	  through	  enhanced	  co-­‐operation”.	  4	  Article	   1.1	   of	   the	   Southern	   African	   Development	   Community	   Strategic	   Indicative	   Plan	   for	   the	   Organ	   on	  Politics,	  Defence	  and	  Security	  Cooperation	  (OPDSC),	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  26	  August	  2003.	  5	  The	  MOU	  was	  revised	  in	  2001.	  6	  The	  ISDC	  has	  become	  a	  sub-­‐structure	  within	  the	  OPDSC.	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various	   actors	   (non-­‐state	   actors	   such	   as	   NGOs,	   international	   institutions,	   regional	   and	  international	   organizations)	   at	   multiple	   levels	   who	   supplement,	   augment,	   or	   enrich	   the	  state’s	   efforts	   to	   counter	   security	   threats.	   Security	   governance	   has	   the	   intrinsic	   value	   of	  neither	  precluding	  nor	  necessitating	  the	  privileging	  of	  the	  state	  or	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  the	  security	   domain.	   Certainly,	   though	   state	   actors	   have	   not	   abdicated	   their	   role	   as	   far	   as	  regional	   or	   sub-­‐regional	   security	   is	   concerned,	   they	   are	   both	   challenged	   and	  complemented	  on	  several	  fronts	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors	  (O’Neil	  et.	  al.,	  2004:	  168).	  The	  security	  concerns	  of	  SALW	  and	  domestic	  political	  crises	  are	  two	  examples	  of	  those	  fronts.	  	  	  	  Chapter	  four	  lays	  out	  the	  research	  design	  and	  methods	  employed	  in	  the	  study.	  The	  current	  study	  was	  pursued	   through	  a	  qualitative	   research	  method,	  which	   is	  best	   suited	   to	   study	  situations	  where	  little	  is	  known	  about	  what	  is	  going	  on	  with	  regard	  to	  one	  or	  both	  of	  the	  cases	  studied.	  The	  qualitative	  method	  was,	  therefore,	  obvious	  given	  the	  research	  situation	  discussed	  earlier	  and	  the	  limited	  availability	  of	  data	  and	  knowledge	  on	  EAC,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	   much-­‐publicized	   SADC’s	   practices	   particularly	   in	   the	   DRC	   and	   Lesotho	   military	  interventions.	  Therefore,	  there	  was	  an	  exploratory	  element	  to	  the	  current	  research	  design.	  Relatedly,	   the	   preference	   for	   a	   qualitative	   method	   was	   prompted	   by	   the	   lack	   of	  standardised	   data	   from	   which	   sufficient	   number	   of	   cases	   could	   be	   derived	   to	   allow	   a	  comprehensive	  quantitative	  analysis	  of	   the	   findings.	  The	  bulky	  of	   the	  data	   for	   this	   study	  were	   derived	   from	   documents.	   The	   study	   also	   employed	   interviews	   in	   attempting	   to	  supplement	   gaps	   in	   the	   course	   of	   conducting	   documentary	   and	   archival	   analysis.	  Interviews	   were	   conducted	   with	   key	   informants	   working	   or	   associated	   with	   the	   sub-­‐regional	  organizations’	  security	  arrangements	  and	  institutions	  relevant	  to	  this	  study.	  	  The	   next	   four	   chapters	   (5-­‐8)	   constitute	   the	   empirical	   part	   of	   the	   study.	   The	   two	   most	  prevalent	  collective	  security	  challenges	  of	  SALW	  and	  domestic	  political	  crises	  in	  East	  and	  Southern	  Africa	   form	  the	  main	   focus	   in	   this	  part.	  The	  UN	  considers	  small	  arms	  to	  be	   the	  most	  destabilizing	  conventional	  weapons	  as	  it	  is	  the	  single-­‐most	  devastating	  transnational	  threat.	   Small	   arms	  have	   the	  potential	   to	  escalate	   conflicts,	  undermine	  peace	  agreements,	  aggravate	   violence,	   and	   impede	   overall	   development	   endeavours.	   The	   threat	   of	   SALW	  proliferation	  to	  human	  life	   is	  palpable.	  Likewise,	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  there	  has	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been	  an	  increased	  salience	  of	  intra-­‐state	  conflicts	  compared	  to	  inter-­‐state	  conflicts.	  In	  the	  past	  decade	  (2001-­‐2010),	  there	  were	  only	  2	  inter-­‐state	  conflicts	  out	  of	  the	  total	  29	  major	  armed	   conflicts	   worldwide	   (SIPRI,	   2011:	   4).	   A	  more	   interesting	   feature	   of	   the	   reported	  internal/intra-­‐state	  conflicts	  is	  that	  conflicts	  over	  government	  (i.e.	  where	  the	  control	  of	  the	  whole	   state	   authority	   is	   the	  major	   bone	   of	   contention	   or	   cause	   of	   incompatibility)	   have	  always	  outnumbered	   those	  over	   territory	   in	  every	  year	  of	   the	  period	  2001-­‐2010,	   except	  for	  the	  year	  2007	  (ibid.).	  Analyses	  of	  the	  EAC	  coordination	  and	  management	  of	  the	  security	  challenges	  of	  SALW	  and	  domestic	  political	  crisis	  in	  Kenya	  are	  covered	  in	  chapters	  five	  and	  six,	  respectively.	  In	  similar	  vein,	  chapters	  seven	  and	  eight	  respectively	  deal	  with	  the	  SADC	  experience	  in	  addressing	  the	  SALW	  threat	  and	  the	  Zimbabwe	  political	  crisis.	  	  	  The	  final	  chapter	  comparatively	  presents	  the	  key	  findings	  of	  the	  study.	  Besides	  exploring	  the	   converging	   and	   diverging	   patterns	   and	   developments,	   the	   concluding	   chapter	   also	  synthesizes	  the	  general	  trends.	  	  As	  it	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  this	  concluding	  chapter,	  the	  emerging	  patterns	  from	  the	  examination	  of	  the	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  experiences	  in	  reacting	  to	  the	  security	  challenges	  of	  SALW	  and	  domestic	  political	   crises	  confirm	  the	  study’s	  hypothesis	   that	   the	  coordination	  and	  management	  of	  sub-­‐regional	  security	  governance	  depends	  on	  the	  type	  of	  collective	  security	  challenge.	  The	  observed	  developments	  and	  practices	  within	  the	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  security	  architectures	  also	  reveal	  that	  the	  security	  dimensions	  facing	  their	  Member	  States	   and	   the	  mitigating	   tasks	   of	   these	   sub-­‐regional	   groupings	   vary	   in	   their	   respective	  geographical	  areas.	  The	  study	  interrogated	  whether	  actors	  other	  than	  states	  are	  accorded	  substantive	  room	  and	  roles	  to	  play	  in	  dealing	  with	  the	  aforementioned	  security	  challenges	  within	  the	  frameworks	  set	  by	  sub-­‐regional	  arrangements.	  It	  also	  gauged	  the	  effectiveness	  of	   efforts	   employed	   in	   addressing	   those	   security	   challenges	   and	   finally	   drew	   theoretical	  lessons.	  Indeed,	  security	  is	  among	  the	  highly	  charged	  subjects	  in	  the	  integration	  agenda	  of	  sub-­‐regional	   arrangements	   but	   it	   is	   also	   an	   inescapable	   feature	   of	   sub-­‐regional	   and	  regional	   politics,	   one	   that	   is	   still	   worth	   reviewing	   and	   analysing	   in	   light	   of	   the	   rapidly	  evolving	  security	  architectures	  of	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa.	  Mindful	  of	  this	  fact,	  henceforth,	  with	  a	   comparative	   focus,	   the	   current	   study	   ventures	   into	   this	   mission	   of	   assessing	   the	  relevance	   of	   sub-­‐regional	   security	   governance	   in	   dealing	   with	   collective	   security	  challenges.	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Chapter	  Two	  
2.	  African	  Sub-­‐Regional	  Organizations	  as	  Security	  Actors	  	  The	   idea	   of	   forging	   inter-­‐state	   links,	   in	   the	   form	   of	   cooperation	   and	   integration	  arrangements,	  dominated	  African	  politics	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  independence	  particularly	  after	  the	  independence	   of	   Ghana	   in	   1957.	   At	   the	   dawn	   of	   independence	   there	   was	   a	   general	  realization	  by	  African	  leaders	  that	  African	  unity	  was	  an	  enviable	  project	  but	  they	  differed	  on	  how	  to	  achieve	  it.	  On	  one	  hand,	  there	  were	  strong	  proponents	  of	  immediate	  creation	  of	  a	  united	  African	  State.	  The	  prominent	  figure	  in	  this	  group	  was	  the	  then	  president	  of	  Ghana,	  Kwame	  Nkrumah.	  Nkrumah	  was	  of	   the	  view	   that	  post-­‐independence	  African	  states	  were	  too	  weak	  to	  stand	  on	  their	  own,	  hence	  must	  go	  for	  outright	  unity.	  As	  far	  as	  Africa’s	  security	  is	   concerned,	   Nkrumah	   proposed	   setting	   up	   an	   African	   High	   Command	   (AHC)	   and	   an	  African	   Legion	   during	   the	   All-­‐African	   People’s	   Conference	   in	   1958	   (Franke,	   2008:317).	  Nkrumah	  specifically	  voiced	   the	   idea	  of	  a	  common	  defence	  system	  with	  a	  single	  military	  high	   command	   as	   an	   important	   element	   of	   the	   outright	   political	   unification	   (Touray,	  2005:637).	  Nkrumah’s	  proposal	  encountered	  fierce	  opposition	  from	  other	  African	  leaders,	  such	  as	  President	  Tubman	  of	  Liberia,	  who	  supported	  a	  more	  gradual	  approach	  to	  African	  unity.	   This	   latter	   group	  whose	   leading	   voice	   was	   the	   then	   President	   of	   Tanzania,	   Julius	  Nyerere,	   preferred	   a	   stage-­‐by-­‐stage	   approach,	   in	   particular	   using	   sub-­‐regional	   economic	  groupings	   as	   building	   blocks	   to	   continental	   unity.	   A	   compromise	   was	   later	   reached	  between	  the	  enthusiasts	  of	  Nkrumah’s	  idea	  of	  immediate	  political	  unification	  (the	  so-­‐called	  Casablanca	  group	  of	  states)	  and	  the	  proponents	  of	  a	  more	  gradual	  approach	  (the	  so-­‐called	  Monrovia	  group	  of	  states),	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  OAU	  in	  May	  1963	  in	  Addis	  Ababa,	  Ethiopia.	  	  	  	  In	   Africa,	   regional	   integration	   arrangements,	   herein	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘sub-­‐regional	  organizations,’	  had	  existed	  prior	  to	  the	  1976	  decision	  by	  the	  Organization	  of	  African	  Unity	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(OAU)	   to	   divide	   the	   continent	   into	   five	   regions7.	   The	   defunct	   EAC	   (1967-­‐1977)	  was	   the	  oldest,	   followed	  by	   the	  Economic	  Community	  of	  West	  African	  States	   (ECOWAS)	   in	  1975.	  The	  economic	  crisis	  of	   the	   late	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s,	  manifested	  by	  declining	   terms	  of	  trade	   and	   a	   dwindling	   share	   of	   global	   trade	   gave	   added	   impetus	   to	   the	   formation	   of	  regional	   integration	   initiatives.	   Continental	   efforts	   to	   face	   the	   crisis	   resulted	   in	   the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Lagos	  Plan	  of	  Action	  (LPA)	  at	  the	  second	  extraordinary	  session	  of	  African	  heads	  of	  State	  and	  Government	  of	  the	  OAU	  in	  Lagos	  in	  July	  1980.	  	  Among	  other	  goals,	  the	  LPA	   aimed	   at	   creating	   sub-­‐regional	   and	   regional	   institutions	   and	   supporting	   existing	  arrangements,	   leading	   to	   the	   eventual	   creation	   of	   a	   single	   economic	   community	   (OAU,	  1981).	  Despite	  espousing	  noble	  objectives	  that	  were	  viewed	  as	  a	  blue	  print	  to	  get	  African	  countries	  out	  of	  the	  crisis,	  the	  LPA	  remained	  largely	  on	  the	  drawing	  board.	  It	  took	  another	  decade	  for	  Africa	  to	  rekindle	  her	  efforts	  to	  forge	  a	  continental	  economic	  community.	  The	  Treaty	  Establishing	  the	  African	  Economic	  Community	  (AEC)-­‐the	  Abuja	  Treaty	  was	  adopted	  in	  June	  1991	  at	  the	  27th	  OAU	  Summit	  of	  Heads	  of	  State	  and	  Government	  (OAU,	  1991).	  The	  Abuja	  Treaty	  envisioned	  the	  creation	  of	  AEC	  by	  the	  year	  2025,	  and	  to	  that	  end,	  reaffirmed	  the	  need	  to	  consolidate	  and	  revitalize	  sub-­‐regional	  economic	  communities,	  a	  move	  which	  will	   also	   make	   their	   impact	   felt.	   More	   importantly,	   the	   Abuja	   Treaty	   stressed	   that	   sub-­‐regional	   economic	   communities	   would	   become	   constitutive	   elements	   of	   the	   continent’s	  integration	  agenda	  (Powell,	  2005:	  16).	  	  A	  year	  prior	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Abuja	  Treaty,	  the	  OAU	  through	  a	  Declaration	  recognized	  the	   prevalence	   of	   conflicts	   in	   Africa	   as	   hampering	   efforts	   to	   address	   the	   continent’s	  economic	   woes.	   It	   has	   to	   be	   noted	   that	   even	   though	   the	   OAU	   Charter	   provided	   for	   a	  Commission	   of	   Mediation,	   Conciliation	   and	   Arbitration	   to	   deal	   with	   conflicts,	   it	   never	  became	  operational.	  The	  mandate	  of	  this	  Commission	  which	  was	  envisaged	  to	  serve	  as	  the	  main	   peace	   and	   security	   organ	   of	   the	   OAU,	   was	   limited	   to	   inter-­‐state	   conflicts	   (Touray,	  2005:	   638).	   OAU’s	   member	   states	   preferred	   to	   address	   conflicts	   in	   other	   states	   in	   an	  informal	  way,	  either	  through	  ad	  hoc	  dispute	  settlement	  committees,	  composed	  by	  heads	  of	  state	  or	  ministers	  (Faria,	  2004:	  13;	  Touray,	  2005:	  638).	  Intervention	  in	  intra-­‐state	  conflicts	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  OAU,	  Resolution	  CM/Res.	  464	  (xxvi),	  adopted	  at	  the	  twenty-­‐six	  Ordinary	  Session	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers,	  Addis	  Ababa,	  23	  February-­‐1	  March	  1976.	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was	  further	  limited	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  organization’s	  Charter	  emphasized	  principles	  of	  territorial	   integrity	   and	   non-­‐interference	   in	   each	   other’s	   internal	   affairs	   (Franke,	   2009:	  214).	  	  	  At	  its	  Summit	  of	  Heads	  of	  State	  and	  Government	  in	  Dakar,	  Senegal	  in	  1992,	  OAU	  once	  again	  acknowledged	  the	  link	  between	  security,	  stability,	  development	  and	  cooperation.	  This	  was	  spelt	  out	   in	   the	  Summit’s	  Communiqué.8	  This	  position	  was	  picked	  up	  and	  built	  on	   in	   the	  gathering	   of	   African	   Leadership	   Forum,	  which	   in	   conjunction	  with	   the	  OAU,	   and	   the	  UN	  Economic	   Commission	   for	   Africa	   through	   the	   Conference	   on	   Security,	   Stability,	  Development	  and	  Cooperation	  in	  Africa	  (CSSDCA),	  drafted	  the	  famous	  Kampala	  Document9.	  Among	   other	   policy	   proposals,	   the	   document	   promulgated	   the	   principle	   of	   good	  neighbourliness	  and	  a	  peaceful	  resolution	  of	  conflicts	  and	  called	  for	  “measures	  to	  prevent	  or	  contain	  crisis	  before	  an	  eruption	  into	  violent	  confrontation”10.	  In	  actual	  sense,	  to	  be	  able	  to	  fulfil	  the	  recommendations	  of	  the	  Kampala	  initiative	  new	  institutions	  and	  mechanisms	  had	  to	  be	  put	   in	  place	  regionally.	  The	  Continental	  body’s	  recognition	  on	  the	  need	  to	  take	  practical	   measures	   to	   address	   conflicts	   was	   followed	   up	   by	   the	   establishment	   of	   its	  Mechanism	  for	  Conflict	  Prevention,	  Management	  and	  Resolution	  in	  Cairo	  in	  1993.	  With	  this	  mechanism	  in	  place,	   the	  OAU	  reacted	  to	  various	  conflicts,	   for	   instance	  deploying	  military	  observer	   missions	   in	   Rwanda	   (1991-­‐1993),	   Burundi	   (1993-­‐1996),	   the	   Comoros	   (1998-­‐2002),	   the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo	  (from	  1999),	   the	  Ethiopian-­‐Eritrean	  War	  (from	  2000),	   albeit	   to	   varying	   degree	   of	   the	   continental	   body’s	   involvement	   (Makinda	   and	  Okumu,	  2008:29;	  Touray,	  2005:	  639).	  	  	  	  It	   was	   evident	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1990s	   that	   African	   leaders	   realized	   the	   norm	   of	   non-­‐interference	  in	  member	  states’	  internal	  affairs	  did	  not	  provide	  for	  regional	  security	  when	  that	  was	  most	   needed.	   The	   initial	   expression	   of	   the	   shift	   from	   non-­‐interference	   to	   non-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Issued	  after	   its	  28th	  Ordinary	  Session	  of	  Assembly	  of	  Heads	  of	  State	  and	  Government,	  Dakar,	  Senegal,	   June	  29-­‐July	  1,	  1992,	  “Decision	  on	  a	  Mechanism	  for	  Conflict	  Prevention,	  Management	  and	  Resolution”,	  AHG/Decl.	  1	  (XXXVIII),	  p.	  10.	  	  9	  The	  African	  Leadership	  Forum,	  “The	  Kampala	  Document:	  Towards	  a	  Conference	  on	  Security,	  Development	  and	  Co-­‐operation	  in	  Africa,”	  organized	  by	  Africa	  Leadership	  Forum,	   jointly	  with	  the	  Secretariats	  of	  the	  OAU	  and	  ECA,	  Kampala,	  Uganda,	  19-­‐22	  May,	  1991,	  pp.	  1-­‐	  86.	  10	  African	  Leadership	  Forum,	  ibid.	  “Security	  Calabash”,	  p.	  6.	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indifference	   came	   through	   the	   OAU’s	   Declaration	   on	   the	   Framework	   for	   a	   Response	   to	  Unconstitutional	   Changes	   in	   Government11.	   This	   shift	   in	   focus	   on	   issues	   of	   security	  was	  further	  entrenched	  in	  the	  legal	  framework	  of	  the	  OAU’s	  successor	  organization,	  the	  African	  Union	  (AU)12.	  In	  sharp	  contrast	  to	  the	  OAU,	  the	  AU’s	  Constitutive	  Act	  allows	  the	  Union	  to	  intervene	   in	   a	   member	   state	   in	   respect	   of	   grave	   circumstances,	   namely,	   war	   crimes,	  genocide	  and	  crimes	  against	  humanity13.	  The	  same	  Act	  provides	   for	   the	  right	  of	  member	  states	   to	   request	   intervention	   from	   the	  AU	   in	  order	   to	   restore	  peace	   and	   security14.	  The	  AU’s	  inclination	  towards	  regional	  approaches	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  Peace	  and	  Security	  Council	  (PSC)	   Protocol	   whose	   Article	   16	   emphasize	   that	   mechanisms	   by	   various	   sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  will	  form	  the	  building	  blocks	  of	  the	  AU’s	  peace	  and	  security	  architecture.	  	  Revisiting	   the	   genesis	   of	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   in	  Africa,	   one	  would	   find	   a	   common	  factor	   that	   led	   to	   their	   creation:	   the	   need	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   economic	   and	   social	  development	  needs	  of	   their	  members.	  However,	  one	  major	  missing	   link	  when	   they	  were	  being	   formed,	  whether	  we	  speak	  of	   regional	  or	   sub-­‐regional	  organizations,	   is	   that	   “None	  had	   the	  vocation	   to	  deal	  with	   internal	  or	   interstate	   conflicts,	   and	  no	   serious	  attempts	   to	  include	   these	   in	   their	   remit	  were	  made	  until	   the	  1990s”	   (Faria,	  2004:	  12).	  Both	   regional	  and	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   begun	   to	   seriously	   focus	   on	   conflict	   matters	   due	   to	   the	  following	  major	   developments	   namely,	   lack	   of	   stability	   and	  high	   potential	   for	   conflict	   in	  many	  areas	  of	   the	  continent	  and	  the	  declining	   interest	  of	   the	   international	  community	   in	  Africa	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  (Faria,	  2004;	  Adebajo,	  2005).	  	  	  The	  Economic	  Community	  of	  West	  African	  States	  (ECOWAS),	  provides	  a	  good	  example	  of	  one	  of	  the	  African	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  which	  had	  not	  contemplated	  venturing	  into	  the	   security	   sub-­‐field	   at	   the	   time	   of	   its	   creation	   but	   was	   later	   compelled	   to	   pay	   close	  attention	  to	  issues	  of	  conflict	  management.	  Founded	  in	  1975,	  ECOWAS	  exclusively	  devoted	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  OAU	  Document	  AHG/Decl.	  5	  (XXXVI),	  10-­‐12	  July	  2000.	  12	  African	   leaders	  agreed	   to	   transform	  the	  OAU	   into	  AU	  at	   the	  OAU	  Extraordinary	  Summit	   in	  Sirte,	  Libya	   in	  September	  1999.	  The	  Constitutive	  Act	  to	  establish	  the	  Union	  was	  adopted	  during	  the	  2000	  Lome	  Summit.	  In	  March	  2001	   in	  Sirte,	  Libya,	   the	  AU	  was	  born	  and	  was	   formally	   launched	   in	  Durban,	  South	  Africa,	  on	   July	  8,	  2002.	  	  13	  Article	  4h	  of	  the	  AU’s	  Constitutive	  Act.	  14	  Article	  4j	  of	  the	  AU’s	  Constitutive	  Act.	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its	   efforts	   to	   economic	   integration	   among	   its	   members	   and	   this	   was	   reflected	   in	   the	  founding	   Treaty	   of	   Lagos,	  which	   had	   no	  mention	   of	   peace	   and	   security	   issues.	   ECOWAS	  States	   soon	   learned	   how	   closely	   intertwined	   development	   and	   security	   are	   as	   the	  organization	   was	   unable	   to	   attain	   economic	   and	   integration	   goals	   with	   so	   many	   of	   its	  members	   ravaged	   by	   civil	   wars 15 .	   ECOWAS,	   henceforth,	   became	   the	   first	  intergovernmental	   grouping	   of	   African	   states	   to	   sign	   a	   defence	   protocol	   that	   applied	   to	  internal	   conflicts	   and	   thus	   became	   the	   first	   sub-­‐regional	   organization	   to	   champion	   the	  creation	  of	  formalized	  security-­‐related	  structures.	  In	  1978	  ECOWAS	  adopted	  a	  ‘Protocol	  on	  Non-­‐Aggression’,	  followed	  in	  1981	  by	  a	  ‘Protocol	  Relating	  to	  Mutual	  Assistance	  in	  Defence’.	  A	  Defence	  Council,	  Defence	  Commission	  and	  A	  Stand-­‐by	  Force	  (the	  Allied	  Armed	  Forces	  of	  the	  Community,	  AAFC)	  were	  envisaged	  following	  the	  adoption	  of	  these	  protocols	  but	  never	  really	   became	   operational.	   The	   protocols	   were	   not	   invoked	   until	   the	   1990s	   when	   the	  Liberian	  civil	  war	  broke	  out	  in	  which	  case	  the	  ECOWAS	  assistance	  was	  formally	  requested	  by	  the	  Liberian	  president	  (Faria,	  2004:	  15).	  	  More	  elaborate	  steps	  and	  structures	  by	  this	  West	  African	  organization	  begun	  to	  take	  shape	  when	  an	  armed	  Monitoring	  Group	  (ECOMOG)	  was	  created	  and	  actually	  deployed	  in	  Liberia	  amid	   simmering	   tensions	   and	   divisions	   among	   member	   states,	   particularly	   Anglophone	  and	   Francophone	   countries.	   ECOMOG	   was	   set	   up	   and	   became	   embroiled	   in	   conflict	  situations	   even	   before	   the	   OAU	   had	   created	   its	   Mechanism	   for	   Conflict	   Prevention,	  Management	  and	  Resolution	  in	  1993.	  More	  importantly	  and	  partly	  drawing	  from	  growing	  instabilities	  in	  the	  sub-­‐region	  ECOWAS	  amended	  the	  Lagos	  Treaty	  in	  1993	  by	  specifically	  committing	   member	   states	   to	   matters	   of	   peace	   and	   security	   including	   establishing	   a	  regional	   peace	   and	   security	   observation	   system	   and	   peace-­‐keeping	   forces	   where	  appropriate16.	   As	   a	   concrete	   response	   to	   the	   three	   major	   civil	   conflicts	   (Liberia,	   Sierra	  Leone	  and	  Guinea-­‐Bissau)	  of	   the	  1990s	  ECOWAS	  adopted	   in	  1999	  a	  protocol	   formalizing	  its	   security	   mechanism	   comprising	   of	   the	   Mediation	   and	   Security	   Council	   and	   an	   Early	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Mamane	   Toure,	   Commissioner	   for	   Political	   Affairs,	   Peace	   and	   Security,	   ECOWAS,	   as	   cited	   in	   Stepak,	   A.,	  “African	   Organizations:	   Economic	   Integration	   and	   Conflict	   Management:	   A	   Summary	   of	   Conference	  Proceedings”,	   African	   Regional	   and	   Sub-­‐regional	   Organizations:	   Assessing	   their	   Contributions	   to	   Economic	  Integration	   and	   Conflict	   Management,	   Woodrow	  Wilson	   International	   Center	   for	   Scholars-­‐Africa	   Program,	  October,	  2008,	  p.	  10.	  	  16	  Article	  58	  (f)	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  ECOWAS	  as	  amended	  in	  Cotonou	  July	  24,	  1993.	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Warning	  System17.	  The	  mechanism	  sought	  to	  consolidate	  and	  build	  on	  the	  experiences	  of	  ECOWAS	  in	  peace	  and	  security	  matters	  (Anning,	  2007).	  	  As	   it	  was	  observed	   in	   the	   last	  decade	  African	  conflict	   resolution	  approaches	  were	  put	   to	  test	  following	  massive	  atrocities	  committed	  to	  humankind	  in	  societies	  engulfed	  in	  conflicts	  in	  Liberia	  (1990),	  Sierra	  Leone	  (1991)18,	  Somalia	  (1992)	  and	  Rwanda	  (1994).	  Specifically,	  these	   four	  cases	  produced	  a	  clarion	  call	   for	   `African	  solutions	   to	  African	  conflicts’.	  These	  aforementioned	  tragic	  cases	  which	  were	  preceded	  by	  the	  thawing	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  1989	  led	  to	  the	  realization	  that,	  a	   lasting	  solution	  to	  Africa’s	  conflicts	  has	  to	  come	  from	  within	  the	  continent	  itself.	  	  The	  UN’s	  hasty	  withdrawal	  from	  Somalia	  and	  failure	  to	  act	  on	  the	  part	  the	   Security	   Council	   in	   the	   face	   of	   unravelling	   genocide	   in	   Rwanda	   reinforced	   the	  perception	   that	   the	   UN	   was	   less	   keen	   on	   responding	   promptly	   to	   African	   security	  problems,	  while	   international	   community	   attention	   centred	   on	   emerging	   conflicts	   in	   the	  Middle	   East	   and	   the	   Balkans	   (Makinda	   and	   Okumu,	   2008:29;	   Franke,	   2009:	   216;	   Faria,	  2004:13).	   In	   the	  aftermath	  of	   these	   tragic	   cases	   the	   slogan,	   “Africans	  are	   responsible	   for	  African	   conflicts”	   gained	   prominence,	   and	   thus	   African	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	  embarked	  on	  conflict	  management	  out	  of	  sheer	  necessity	  (Stepak,	  2008:10).	  	  	  At	   the	   international	   level,	   the	   UN’s	   Charter	   recognizes	   and	   legitimizes	   the	   existence	   of	  regional	  arrangements	  and	  goes	  further	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  contribution	  they	  can	  make	  to	  maintain	  peace	  and	  security.	  Chapter	  VIII	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter,	  in	  particular,	  stipulates,	  “The	  Security	  Council	  shall,	  where	  appropriate,	  utilize	  such	  regional	  arrangements	  or	  agencies	  for	   enforcement	   action	   under	   its	   authority.”19	  Article	   52	   (2)	   specifically	   authorizes	   UN	  members,	   either	   through	   regional	   arrangements	   or	   regional	   agencies,	   to	   employ	   every	  possible	  peaceful	  means	  at	  their	  disposal	  to	  settle	  disputes	  in	  their	  areas	  before	  reporting	  them	  to	  the	  Security	  Council.	  This	  implies	  that	  that	  regional	  and	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17 	  ECOWAS,	   Protocol	   Relating	   to	   the	   Mechanism	   for	   Conflict	   Prevention,	   Management,	   Resolution,	  Peacekeeping	  and	  Security,	  signed	  on	  December	  10,	  1999,	  Lome,	  Togo.	  18	  It	   is	   estimated	   that	   the	   Liberia	   and	   Sierra	   Leone	   civil	   wars	   that	   lasted	   for	   a	   decade	   left	   about	   250,	   000	  deaths	   and	   over	   one	  million	   refugees	   in	   the	  West	   African	   region.	   Figures	   quoted	   from	  A	   September	   2002	  Report	  submitted	  by	   the	  Africa	  Program	  of	   the	   International	  Peace	  Academy	  to	   the	  Ford	  Foundation	   titled,	  “The	  Infrastructure	  of	  Peace	  in	  Africa	  Assessing	  the	  Peacebuilding	  Capacity	  of	  African	  Institutions.”	  19	  Art.	  53.1	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter.	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are	   treated	   as	   ‘first	   resort	   level’	   for	   any	   breach	   of	   peace	   and	   security	   within	   their	  geographical	  areas	  and	  when	  no	  amicable	  resolution	  has	  been	  found,	  then	  the	  assistance	  of	  extra-­‐regional	   institutions	   and	   the	   international	   community	   through	   the	   UN	   should	   be	  summoned.	   The	   former	   UN	   Secretary-­‐General	   Boutros	   Boutros-­‐Ghali	   reinforced	  implementation	  of	  the	  above	  UN	  provision	  in	  his	  1995	  supplement	  to	  An	  Agenda	  for	  Peace	  by	   calling	   for	   the	   international	   community	   to	   delegate	   greater	   responsibility	   to	   regional	  organizations	   and	   mechanisms	   for	   peace	   and	   security	   within	   their	   areas	   of	   operations	  (Boutros-­‐Ghali,	  1995).	  	  	  Acknowledging	   the	   fact	   that	   conflicts	   recurring	   in	   their	   respective	   regions	   may	   stall	   or	  impede	   integration	   as	   well	   as	   the	   realization	   of	   development	   objectives	   (Powell,	   2005;	  Mwanasali,	  2003)	  a	  number	  of	  regional	  organizations	  that	  were	  initially	  created	  solely	  for	  economic	  objectives	  increasingly	  got	  themselves	  involved	  in	  resolving	  conflicts,	  mostly	  of	  political	   nature.	   Indeed,	  African	   regional	   organizations’	   involvement	   in	   addressing	  peace	  and	   security	   issues	   is	   no	   longer	   an	   aberration.	   Almost	   all	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   in	  Africa	   today	   have	   in	   principal	   realized	   the	   explicit	   linkage	   between	   development	   goals,	  they	   are	   striving	   to	   achieve,	   and	   security.	   The	   notion	   of	   security	   as	   a	   prerequisite	   for	  sustainable	   development	   has	   thus	   been	   enshrined	   in	   the	   agreements	   defining	   the	  mandates	  of	  regional	  (the	  AU)	  and	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  (such	  as	  COMESA20,	  EAC21,	  ECOWAS,	  ECCAS22,	  IGAD	  and	  SADC)	  in	  Africa.	  	  	  Central	   to	   the	   discussion	   in	   this	   section	  was	   the	   evolutionary	   role	   of	   regional	   and	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   in	   security	  matters.	   It	   has	   been	  noted	   that	  when	  African	   regional	  and	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  started	  out,	   they	  were	  more	  pre-­‐occupied	  with	  economic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Article	  163	  of	  COMESA’s	  Treaty	  provides	  mandate	  to	  embark	  on	  the	  role	  of	  maintaining	  peace	  and	  security	  to	   this	   currently	   Africa’s	   largest	   intergovernmental	   organization,	   which	   succeeded	   the	   Preferential	   Trade	  Area	  (PTA)	  for	  Eastern	  and	  Southern	  Africa	  in	  1994.	  21	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  EAC	  the	  association	  between	  achievement	  of	  Community	  development	  goals	  and	  a	  secure	  environment	  is	  well	  reflected	  in	  Article	  124	  of	  its	  Treaty.	  22	  Established	   in	   1983	   as	   a	   vehicle	   for	   pursuing	   economic	   development	   and	   regional	   cooperation,	   ECCAS	  created	  an	  Early	  Warning	  Mechanism	  in	  1996.	  Despite	  showing	  interest	  to	  take	  on	  a	  conflict	  management	  role	  ECCAS	  has	  not	  been	  able	  to	  transform	  itself	  into	  an	  institutionalized	  sub-­‐regional	  arrangement	  leaving	  some	  important	   members	   (DRC,	   Burundi	   and	   Rwanda)	   to	   seek	   membership	   in	   other	   groupings	   and	   thus	   by	  devoting	  their	  attention	  elsewhere	  leaving	  the	  central	  African	  grouping	  a	  much	  weakened	  initiative.	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development	   and	   integration	   goals	   than	   issues	   of	   peace	   and	   security	   of	   their	   member	  states.	   It	   was	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	   and	   following	   the	   occurrence	   of	  humanitarian	   catastrophes	   in	   several	   African	   states,	   especially	   in	   Liberia,	   Sierra	   Leone,	  Somalia,	   and	   Rwanda,	   with	   the	   UN	   troops	   hastily	   withdrawing	   in	   some	   of	   the	   afflicted	  countries	   at	   a	   time	   when	   they	   were	   most	   needed,	   and	   with	   much	   of	   the	   international	  attention	   directed	   on	   emerging	   conflicts	   that	   African	   leaders	   realized	   that	   immediate	  solutions	  had	  to	  come	  from	  within	  the	  continent.	  It	  is	  against	  this	  background	  that	  a	  shift	  from	   the	   OAU’s	   norm	   of	   non-­‐interference	   (in	   internal	   affairs	   of	  member	   states)	   to	   AU’s	  non-­‐indifference	  (unconstitutional	  changes	  of	  government)	  took	  place.	  	  	  The	   shift	   was	   accompanied	   by	   growing	   recognition	   on	   the	   contribution	   sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  can	  make	  in	  the	  management	  and	  resolution	  of	  conflicts	  in	  areas	  under	  their	  spheres	   of	   influence.	   The	   OAU	   successor	   organization,	   the	   AU,	   firmly	   recognizes	   the	  potential	   role	   of	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   in	   security	  matters,	   and	   thus	   stresses	   in	   its	  peace	  and	   security	   legal	   framework	   that	   the	   latter	  would	   form	   the	  building	  blocks	  of	   its	  peace	  and	  security	  architecture,	  including	  its	  African	  Standby	  Force	  (ASF).	  The	  prominent	  role	   the	  AU	  has	  assigned	  to	  African	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  would	  allow	  the	  Union	   to	  build	   on	   their	   comparative	   advantage,	   particularly	   in	   dealing	  with	   various	   conflicts	   and	  security	   threats.	   This	   study	   concurs	   with	   the	   position	   of	   various	   analysts	   and	  commentators	   that	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   are	  well	   positioned	   to	   assist	   in	   efforts	   to	  pacify	  conflicts	  in	  their	  areas	  of	  operations	  (Francis,	  2006;	  Peck,	  2001;	  Powell,	  2005).	  Sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  proximity	   to	   the	  conflict	  zone	  provide	  them	  with	  a	  better	  vantage	  point	   to	   detect	   early	  warnings	   signs	   of	   a	   looming	   conflict,	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   its	  dynamics,	   key	   players,	   and	   context-­‐specific	   management	   and	   resolution	   options23.	   The	  next	   two	   sections	   present	   historical	   accounts	   of	   the	   two	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   that	  are	  of	  special	  interest	  to	  the	  current	  study	  that	  is	  the	  EAC	  and	  SADC.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Joe	  Clark,	  former	  Canadian	  Prime	  Minister,	  and	  Franklin	  Moore,	  Deputy	  Assistant	  Administrator	  for	  Africa,	  USAID,	   as	   cited	   in	   Stepak,	   A.	   “African	   Organizations:	   Economic	   Integration	   and	   Conflict	   Management:	   A	  Summary	  of	  Conference	  Proceedings”,	  op.	  cit.	  p.	  9.	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2.1. Rebirth	  of	  the	  EAC	  	  The	   EAC	   is	   the	   regional	   intergovernmental	   organization	   of	   the	   Republics	   of	   Burundi,	  Kenya,	  Rwanda,	  Uganda	  and	  the	  United	  Republic	  of	  Tanzania.	  The	  East	  African	  sub-­‐region	  is	   credited	  with	   one	   of	   the	   longest	   experiences	  with	   regional	   integration	   dating	   from	   as	  early	  as	  1918	  when	  Kenya	  and	  Uganda	  (still	  under	  colonialism)	  operated	  a	  Customs	  Union.	  Tanganyika	  became	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Customs	  Union	  from	  1922	  to	  1927.	  This	   long	  history	  of	  regional	   integration	  has	  gone	   through	   four	  main	  phases.	  From	  1948-­‐1961	   there	  was	   the	  East	  African	  High	  Commission.	   	  The	  1961-­‐1967	  phase	  featured	  the	  East	  African	  Common	  Services	  Organisation.	   	  The	  third	  phase	  saw	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  East	  African	  Community	  (EAC)	   (1967-­‐1977),	   and	   the	   1977-­‐1990s	   phase	   witnessed	   negotiations	   for	   division	   of	  assets	  and	  liabilities	  of	  the	  defunct	  Community	  followed	  by	  efforts	  to	  revive	  the	  EAC.	  	  	  The	  collapse	  of	  the	  EAC	  in	  1977	  came	  amid	  great	  strides	  that	  had	  been	  made	  by	  the	  former	  Community.	  Before	  its	  demise	  the	  Community	  operated	  the	  common	  services	  of	  over	  thirty	  institutions,	   including	   the	   four	   major	   corporations-­‐East	   African	   Railways,	   East	   African	  Harbours,	  East	  African	  Posts	  and	  Telecommunications	  and	  the	  East	  African	  Airways.	  The	  former	   Community	   also	   had	   an	   array	   of	   joint	   research	   institutions,	   a	   common	   customs	  administration	  authority	  and	  the	  East	  African	  Development	  Bank,	  the	  only	  institution	  that	  survived	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Community.	  	  	  	  A	  combination	  of	  political	  or	  ideological,	  administrative	  and	  economic	  factors	  were	  largely	  to	  blame	  for	  the	  eventual	  break	  up	  of	  the	  EAC	  in	  1977.	  Among	  the	  many	  reasons	  attributed	  to	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  first	  Community	  include,	  structural	  problems	  which	  impinged	  on	  the	  management	   of	   the	   common	   services,	   which	   were	   aggravated	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   Member	  States	   tended	   to	   protect	   their	   vested	   interests	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	   Community	   (Shao,	  2002:7).	  Other	  factors	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Community	  were	  low	  private	  sector	   and	   civil	   society	   involvement	   in	   the	   running	   of	   the	   community	   coupled	  with	   low	  levels	   of	   involvement	   of	   the	   people	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   processes.	   The	   current	   EAC	  Treaty’s	  allusion	  to	  the	  private	  sector’s	  role	   in	  the	  development	  of	   the	  single	  market	  and	  investment	  area	  and	  mobilization	  of	  civil	  society	  support	  are	  part	  of	  attempts	  to	  address	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the	   foregoing	  shortcomings	   that	   faced	   the	  erstwhile	  Community	   (Kiondo,	  2002:	  27).	  The	  downfall	  of	  the	  defunct	  East	  African	  Community	  was	  also	  attributed	  by	  inequalities	  in	  the	  sharing	  of	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  integration	  and	  lack	  of	  compensatory	  mechanisms	  for	  addressing	  disparities;	  ideological	  differences;	  the	  governance	  challenges,	  including	  lack	  of	  mechanisms	  to	  address	  corruption,	  non	  respect	  for	  rule	  of	  law,	  impunity	  and	  governments’	  high	  handedness;	  and	  foreign	  influence	  for	  economic	  reasons	  (EAC,	  2008:	  5;	  Kiraso,	  2009).	  	  	  In	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   collapse,	   fortunately,	   the	   former	   Member	   States	   negotiated	   a	  Mediation	  Agreement	  for	  the	  Division	  of	  Assets	  and	  Liabilities,	  which	  was	  signed	  in	  1984.	  A	  provision	   in	   the	  Mediation	  Agreement	   offered	   the	   opportunity	   to	   explore	   and	   identify	  areas	  for	  future	  co-­‐operation.24	  The	  Heads	  of	  State	  of	  Kenya,	  Tanzania	  and	  Uganda	  took	  up	  this	  opportunity,	  when	   they	  held	  a	  meeting	  of	   the	  East	  African	  Heads	  of	  State	   in	  Harare,	  Zimbabwe	  in	  1991	  where	  they	  unanimously	  agreed	  to	  revive	  cooperation	  in	  the	  sub-­‐region	  (EAC,	   2008).	   This	   decision	   culminated	   in	   the	   signing	   of	   the	   Agreement	   for	   the	  Establishment	   of	   the	   Permanent	   Tripartite	   Commission	   for	   East	   African	   Cooperation	   on	  November	  30,	  1993.	  	  	  On	  March	  14	  1996,	  the	  Secretariat	  of	  the	  Permanent	  Tripartite	  Commission	  was	  launched	  in	   Arusha,	   Tanzania.	   The	   Commission	   was	   mandated	   to	   inter	   alia,	   identify	   areas	   of	   co-­‐operation	   and	   to	   propose	   the	   most	   appropriate	   regional	   arrangement.	   The	   process	   of	  identifying	   areas	   of	   co-­‐operation	   was	   reinforced	   by	   the	   launching,	   in	   1997,	   of	   the	   East	  African	   Co-­‐operation	   Development	   Strategy	   (1997-­‐2000).	   This	   strategy	   focused	   on	   the	  development	   of	   the	   policy	   framework	   for	   regional	   co-­‐operation.	   The	   same	   year,	   in	   line	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Development	  Strategy,	  the	  Summit	  of	  Heads	  of	  State	  of	  the	  East	  African	  Cooperation	  saw	  the	  need	  to	  give	  more	  substance	  to	  the	  scope	  of	  cooperation,	  and	  thus	  directed	  that	  the	  Agreement	  be	  upgraded	  into	  a	  Treaty	  (Kaahwa,	  2003).	  A	  Treaty-­‐making	  process	  involving	  the	  Secretariat,	  experts	  from	  the	  three	  initial	  Member	  States	  and	  the	  general	  public	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Treaty	  for	  the	  re-­‐establishment	  of	  the	  East	  African	  Community	  on	  30th	  November	  1999,	  by	  the	  Heads	  of	  State	  of	  Kenya,	  Uganda	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Article	  14.02	  of	  the	  1984	  Mediation	  Agreement	  on	  Sharing	  the	  Assets	  and	  Liabilities	  of	  the	  Community.	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and	  Tanzania	  signed.	  The	  Treaty	  entered	   into	   force	  on	   July	  7th,	  2000	  after	  ratification	  by	  the	  respective	  national	  Parliaments.	  The	  EAC	  was	  then	  inaugurated	  in	  January	  2001.	  	  	  The	   second	   Development	   Strategy	   (2001-­‐2006)	   covering	   a	   broad	   range	   of	   areas	   of	   co-­‐operation	  and	  implementation	  of	  prioritized	  projects	  was	  then	  launched.	  Headquartered	  in	  Arusha,	   the	  current	  EAC	  expanded	  on	   June	  18,	  2007	   to	   include	   the	  Republics	  of	  Burundi	  and	  Rwanda	   as	   full	  members.	   The	  EAC	   is	   currently	   implementing	   its	   third	  Development	  Strategy	  (2006-­‐2010)	  whose	   focus	   is	  on	  consolidating	  the	  different	  phases	  of	   integration	  as	  well	  as	  continue	  to	  implement	  critical	  regional	  projects	  and	  programmes.	  The	  vision	  of	  the	  EAC	  is	  to	  have	  a	  prosperous,	  competitive,	  secure	  and	  politically	  united	  region.	  To	  that	  end,	   the	   EAC	   Partner	   States25	  established	   a	   Customs	   Union	   in	   2005	   and	   launched	   a	  Common	  Market	  in	  July	  2010.	  	  	  For	  purposes	  of	   guiding	  Partner	  States,	  Article	  6	  of	   the	  Treaty	  provides	   for	   fundamental	  principles	  to	  guide	  the	  integration.	  These	  principles	  include	  mutual	  trust,	  political	  will	  and	  sovereign	  equality;	  peaceful	  co-­‐existence	  and	  good	  neighbourliness;	  peaceful	  settlement	  of	  disputes;	  good	  governance	  including	  adherence	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  democracy,	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	   accountability,	   transparency,	   social	   justice,	   equal	   opportunities,	   gender	   equality,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   recognition,	   promotion	   and	   protection	   of	   human	   and	   peoples	   rights	   in	  accordance	   with	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	   African	   Charter	   on	   Human	   and	   Peoples’	   Rights;	  equitable	  distribution	  of	  benefits;	  and	  co-­‐operation	  for	  mutual	  benefit.26	  	  In	   the	   East	   African	   sub-­‐region,	   cooperation	   in	   defence	   and	   security	  matters	   had	   set	   the	  pace	  for	  the	  integration	  processes.	  In	  1998,	  the	  three	  pioneer	  countries	  of	  the	  EAC,	  Kenya,	  Tanzania	   and	   Uganda,	   signed	   a	   Memorandum	   of	   Understanding	   for	   Co-­‐operation	   in	  Defence	   Matters.27	  At	   the	   time	   of	   adoption,	   the	   Memorandum	   was	   envisaged	   to	   later	  develop	   into	   a	   military	   pact	   but	   the	   three	   founding	   states	   could	   not	   agree	   on	   sensitive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  According	  to	  the	  Treaty	  for	  the	  Establishment	  of	  the	  EAC,	  Article	  1	  "Partner	  States”	  means	  the	  Republic	  of	  Uganda,	   the	   Republic	   of	   Kenya	   and	   the	   United	   Republic	   of	   Tanzania	   and	   any	   other	   country	   granted	  membership	  to	  the	  Community	  under	  Article	  3	  of	  that	  Treaty;	  26	  Article	  6	  of	  the	  EAC	  Treaty.	  27	  The	  MOU	  was	  revised	  in	  2001.	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issues	  like	  command	  structures.	  It	  can	  be	  noted	  that	  despite	  the	  reluctance	  to	  move	  into	  a	  common	  defence	  structure	  the	  EAC	  countries	  established	  a	  Defence	  Liaison	  unit	  within	  the	  secretariat	  with	  each	  state	  represented	  by	  a	  military	  defence	  attaché.	  The	  MOU	  entails	  an	  elaborate	  programme	  of	  activities,	  largely	  of	  confidence	  building	  among	  the	  defence	  forces,	  including	   military	   training,	   joint	   operations,	   technical	   assistance,	   visits,	   information	  exchange,	   sports	  and	  cultural	  activities	  and	  regular	  meetings	  of	  defence	  chiefs	  and	  other	  cadre	  of	   the	  defence	   forces.	   In	  1999	  the	   three	  countries	  signed	  another	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  on	  Foreign	  Policy	  Co-­‐ordination,	  which	  has	  been	  upgraded	  into	  a	  Protocol.	  	  	  The	  Heads	  of	  State	  of	  the	  EAC,	  during	  its	  5th	  Extra-­‐Ordinary	  Summit	  held	  on	  18th	  June	  2007	  admitted	  the	  Republic	  of	  Burundi	  and	  the	  Republic	  of	  Rwanda	  into	  the	  Community	  thereby	  bringing	   the	   membership	   to	   five	   countries.	   Burundi	   and	   Rwanda	   acceded	   to	   the	  Community	   “as	   is”	   and	   became	   party	   to	   the	   EAC	   Treaty,	   Tripartite	   Agreements	   and	  Memoranda	  of	  Understandings	  (EAC,	  2011:17).	  The	  two	  new	  members	  accepted	  the	  EAC	  Treaty	  without	  reservations,	  and	  upon	  their	  accession	  and	  subsequent	  admission	  into	  the	  Community	   were	   mainstreamed	   into	   EAC’s	   projects	   and	   programmes	   including	   those	  related	  to	  inter-­‐state	  defence	  and	  security	  cooperation.	  For	  instance,	  specific	  sensitization	  and	   awareness	  programmes	  were	   extended	   to	  Burundi	   and	  Rwanda	   to	   prepare	   them	   to	  fully	  participate	  in	  the	  Community’s	  programme	  on	  cooperation	  in	  defence	  in	  July	  200828.	  Besides	  accepting	  in	  principle	  the	  MOU	  on	  Cooperation	  in	  Defence,	  the	  new	  entrants	  also	  agreed	  to	  and	  have	  been	  participating	  in	  the	  EAC’s	  programme	  on	  inter-­‐state	  security,	  i.e.	  cross	   border	   crime,	   EAC	   position	   on	   combating	   terrorism,	   combating	   drug	   trafficking,	  disaster	   and	   refugee	  management,	   and	   prevention,	   control	   and	   reduction	   of	   small	   arms	  and	  light	  weapons29.	  	  2.2. Evolution	  of	  the	  SADC	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  EAC,	  July	  2008.	  The	  East	  African	  Community	  Defence	  Sector	  Sensitisation	  of	  Stakeholder	  in	  the	  Republic	  of	  Burundi	  and	  Rwanda.	  29	  At	  the	  time	  of	  their	  admission	  into	  the	  Community,	  Burundi	  and	  Rwanda,	  like	  the	  other	  three	  founders	  of	  the	  EAC,	  were	  already	  parties	  to	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol	  for	  the	  Prevention,	  Control	  and	  Reduction	  of	  Small	  Arms	  and	  Light	  Weapons	  in	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  Region	  and	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa.	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The	  Southern	  African	  Development	  Community	   (SADC)	  was	  established	   through	  a	   treaty	  signed	  at	  the	  Summit	  of	  Heads	  of	  State	  and	  Government	  on	  August	  17,	  1992	  in	  Windhoek,	  Namibia.	   The	   Community	   was	   founded	   by	   the	   Southern	   African	   countries	   of	   Angola,	  Botswana,	   Lesotho,	   Malawi,	   Mozambique,	   Swaziland,	   Tanzania,	   Zambia	   and	   Zimbabwe.	  South	  Africa	  joined	  in	  1994,	  Mauritius	  joined	  in	  1995;	  The	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo	  (DRC)	  and	  the	  Seychelles	  became	  the	  thirteenth	  and	  fourteenth	  members	  in	  1997.	  	  	  The	  Declaration	  and	  the	  SADC	  Treaty	  defines	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  organization’s	  vision	  as	  the	  shared	  future	  in	  an	  environment	  of	  peace,	  security	  and	  stability,	  regional	  cooperation	  and	  integration	   based	   on	   equity,	   mutual	   benefit	   and	   solidarity.	   The	   SADC	   Treaty	   commits	  member	   states	   to	   the	   fundamental	   principles	   of:	   sovereign	   equality	   of	   member	   states;	  solidarity,	   peace	   and	   security;	   human	   rights,	   democracy	   and	   rule	   of	   law;	   equity,	   balance	  and	  mutual	  benefit.	  The	   treaty	  has	  common	  economic,	  political,	  peace	  and	  security	  goals	  for	   its	  members,	   as	   is	   evident	   in	   its	   first	   three	  objectives:	   “	   to	   achieve	  development	   and	  economic	  growth;	  evolve	  common	  political	  values,	  systems	  and	  institutions;	  promote	  and	  defend	   peace	   and	   security”	   (SADC	  Treaty,	   1992).	   SADC	   currently	   has	   15	  member	   states	  representing	  a	  population	  of	  nearly	  240	  million	  people.	  	  	  The	   formation	   of	   SADC	   was	   the	   culmination	   of	   a	   long	   process	   of	   consultations	   by	   the	  leaders	  of	  independent	  Southern	  African	  states.	  SADC’s	  origins	  lie	  in	  the	  Southern	  African	  Development	   Coordination	   Conference	   (SADCC),	   which	   was	   formed	   in	   Lusaka	   in	   1980.	  SADCC	   grew	   out	   of	   the	   coordination	   of	   the	   diplomatic	   and	   political	   activities	   of	   the	  Frontline	  States	   (FLS)	  of	  Angola,	  Botswana,	  Mozambique,	  Zambia	  and	  Tanzania.	  The	  FLS	  emerged	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1970s	   at	   a	   time	   when	   the	   anti-­‐apartheid	   struggle	   was	   the	   most	  important	   concern	   in	   the	   region.	   	   It	  was	   started	   in	  1975	   through	  a	   consultative	  process,	  particularly	   between	   presidents	  Nyerere	   of	   Tanzania	   and	  Kaunda	   of	   Zambia.	   	   The	   other	  founding	   presidents	   were	   Sir	   Seretse	   Khama	   of	   Botswana	   and	   Samora	   Machel	   of	  Mozambique.	  As	  other	   countries	   in	   the	   region	  gained	   independence,	   they	   joined	   the	  FLS	  grouping	   in	   its	   resistance	   to	   colonial	   and	   minority	   white	   rule.	   	   Angola	   joined	   in	   1976,	  Zimbabwe	  in	  1980	  and	  Namibia	  in	  1990.	  	  South	  Africa	  briefly	  joined	  in	  1994	  before	  the	  FLS	  dissolution	  later	  that	  same	  year.	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  Initially,	  the	  FLS	  alliance	  was	  formed	  to	  negotiate	  and	  press	  for	  Zimbabwe’s	  independence.	  	  That	   is	   to	   say,	   the	  primary	  objective	  was	   to	   coordinate	   the	   liberation	  process.	  However,	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  destabilization	  of	  neighbouring	  nationalist	  movements	  and	  independent	  countries	   in	   the	   region	   by	   South	   African	   Defence	   Forces	   (SADF),	   the	   FLS	   had	   to	   take	   a	  defence	  role.	  The	  FLS	  regional	  security	  role,	  therefore,	  can	  be	  summarized	  as	  (a)	  support	  for	   the	   nationalist	  movements	   against	   colonial	   and	  white	  minority	   rule,	   and	   (b)	   defence	  and	  security	  against	  South	  Africa's	  destabilization	  campaigns	  mainly	  through	  strategies	  of	  confrontation	  and	  disengagement	  (Anglin,	  1985:246-­‐66;	  Khadiagala,	  1994:	  10-­‐11).	  	  It	  was	  the	  positive	  experiences	  gained	  in	  working	  together	  in	  the	  group	  of	  Frontline	  States,	  to	  advance	  the	  political	  struggle,	  which	  had	  to	  be	  translated	  into	  broader	  co-­‐operation	  in	  pursuit	   of	   economic	   and	   social	  development.	   It	  was	  argued	   that,	  while	   there	  might	  have	  been	  genuine	   reasons	   for	   regional	  economic	  coordination	  and	  development,	   the	   impetus	  behind	  the	  creation	  of	  SADCC	  was	  the	  desire	  to	  mount	  a	  direct	  response	  to	  a	  South	  African	  proposal	   for	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   Constellation	   of	   Southern	   African	   States	   (CONSAS)	  (Hill,	  1983;	  Galaydh,	  1987;	  Khadiagala,	  1994;	  Goncalves,	  1995).	  The	   idea	  of	  CONSAS	  was	  formally	  announced	  by	  P.W.	  Botha,	  then	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  South	  Africa	  in	  November	  1979,	  with	   an	   explicit	   aim	   of	   expanding	   South	   Africa’s	   economic	   links	   with	   the	   independent	  states	  of	  Southern	  Africa.	  The	  CONSAS	  strategy	  was	  to	  be	  made	  of	  the	  countries	  south	  of	  the	  Zambezi	  and	  the	  Kunene	  rivers,	  including	  the	  South	  African	  homelands.	  The	  formation	  of	   SADCC	   pre-­‐empted	   the	   CONSAS	   strategy,	   which	   by	   then	   was	   viewed	   as	   a	   move	   to	  frustrate	  the	  liberation	  of	  Zimbabwe	  and	  Namibia	  (Galaydh,	  1987).	  	  	  Apart	  from	  signalling	  to	  be	  a	  reliable	  means	  of	  supplementing	  the	  diplomatic	  and	  political	  co-­‐operation	   that	   had	   been	   a	   common	   feature	   of	   the	   FLS	   alliance,	   the	   establishment	   of	  SADCC	  served	  to	  expand	  regional	  relationships	  that	  took	  on	  board	  all	   independent	  states	  in	  Southern	  Africa.	   	  Hence,	  broadening	  of	  the	  membership	  was	  viewed	  as	  the	  best	  way	  of	  mobilizing	   local	   efforts	  and	  resources	   so	  as	   to	   strengthen	   the	  economic	   capacities	  of	   the	  FLS	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  South	  Africa.	  Moreover,	   in	  the	  process	  of	  disengaging	  from	  South	  Africa,	  the	  establishment	  of	  SADCC	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  timely	  venture,	  as	  it	  served	  the	  FLS	  with	  a	  potential	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institutional	   conduit	   for	   enlisting	   external	   assistance.	   For	   example,	   the	   United	   States	   of	  America	  provided	  approximately	  US	  $175-­‐200	  million	  annually	   in	   food	  and	  development	  assistance	  to	  SADCC	  and	  member	  countries	  (SADCC,	  1987).	  	  	  In	  general,	  although	  the	  initiative	  to	  establish	  SADCC	  came	  from	  within	  the	  FLS	  itself,	  the	  regional	   situation	   obtaining	   at	   the	   time	   can	   be	   identified	   as	   the	   driving	   force.	   	   The	  independence	   of	   Zimbabwe	   in	   1980	  meant	   that	   the	   FLS	   could	   now	   turn	   its	   attention	   to	  counter	  South	  Africa's	  regional	  dominance.	  	  The	  decolonization	  of	  Rhodesia	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  serious	  considerations	  of	  economic	  issues	  in	  the	  face	  of	  economic	  difficulties	  among	  the	  FLS	  members.	  But	  as	  long	  as	  Namibia	  and	  South	  Africa	  were	  still	  under	  minority	  regimes,	  the	  SADCC	  and	  the	  FLS	  remained	  separate	  forums,	  respectively	  accepting	  responsibility	  for	  economic	  co-­‐ordination	  and	  for	  mutual	  political	  and	  military	  support.	  	  The	   SADCC	   or	   the	   Conference,	   was	   formed	   with	   four	   principal	   objectives,	   namely:	   the	  reduction	   of	   economic	   dependence,	   particularly	   on	   the	   Republic	   of	   South	   Africa,	   the	  forging	  of	  links	  to	  create	  a	  genuine	  and	  equitable	  regional	  integration,	  the	  mobilization	  of	  national,	  interstate	  and	  regional	  policies,	  and	  concerted	  action	  to	  secure	  international	  co-­‐operation	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   strategy	   for	   economic	   liberation	   (Khadiagala,	  1990).	  As	  was	  the	  case	  with	  the	  FLS,	  SADCC	  initially	  functioned	  without	  a	  legal	  framework,	  treaty	   or	   protocol.	   It	   operated	   as	   an	   informal	   organization	   based	   mainly	   on	   a	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  (MOU).	  The	  founders	  of	  SADCC	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  dismal	  record	  of	  regional	  economic	  integration	  schemes	  in	  Africa,	  and	  therefore,	  preferred	  a	  loose	  organization	   to	   promote	   co-­‐operation	   and	   coordination	   rather	   than	   formal	   integration	  (Malan,	  February	  1,	  1998).	  	  In	  response	  to	  the	  end	  of	  Apartheid,	  it	  became	  logical	  to	  restructure	  SADCC	  as	  a	  forum	  for	  regional	  economic	  co-­‐operation,	   this	   time,	  with	   the	   inclusion	  of	  South	  Africa.	  SADCC	  was	  then	   transformed	   into	   the	   Southern	   African	  Development	   Community	   (SADC)	   through	   a	  treaty	   signed	   in	  Windhoek,	   Namibia	   in	   August	   1992.	   South	   Africa	   became	   the	   eleventh	  member	   of	   SADC	   in	   1994.	   This	   is	   after	   it	   had	   experienced	   three	   major	   changes,	   which	  largely	  contributed	  to	  its	  transformation	  from	  a	  position	  of	  enemy	  to	  that	  of	  a	  collaborator.	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Firstly,	   South	   Africa	   suffered	   major	   reverses	   on	   the	   main	   fronts	   of	   its	   destabilization	  campaign	   in	  Angola	  and	  Mozambique	   in	   the	   late	  1980s.	  Secondly,	  South	  Africa’s	  military	  strategy	  of	  engaging	   in	   total	  war	  against	   “communism’s	   total	  onslaught”	   lost	   justification	  with	   the	   demise	   of	   the	   communist	   threat	   globally.	   Thirdly,	   in	   August	   1989	   P.W.	   Bortha,	  then	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  South	  Africa,	  was	  removed	  from	  office	   in	   favour	  of	  F.W.	  De	  Klerk,	  who	  lifted	  a	  ban	  on	  liberation	  movements	  and	  advocated	  a	  policy	  of	  good	  neighbourliness,	  reconstruction	  and	  reconciliation	  in	  the	  sub-­‐region.	  	  	  With	   the	   independence	  of	  Namibia	   (1990)	   and	  majority	   rule	   in	   South	  Africa	   (1994),	   the	  FLS	   saw	   part	   of	   its	   work	   complete	   and	   was	   eventually	   dissolved	   on	   30th	   July	   1994	   to	  become	  the	  political	  and	  security	  wing	  of	  SADC	  (Malan,	  1998).	  	  In	  its	  place	  a	  proposal	  was	  made	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Association	  of	  Southern	  African	  States	  	  (ASAS).	  	  The	  idea	  of	  association,	  which	  was	  envisioned	  to	  be	  comprised	  of	  the	  political	  and	  military	  sectors,	  and	   to	   confine	   itself	   to	   matters	   of	   preventive	   diplomacy,	   conflict	   management	   and	  resolution	  was	  mooted	  at	  the	  1995	  SADC	  meeting	  in	  Johannesburg.	  Matlosa	  (1999)	  argues	  that	  the	  ASAS	  proposal	  presented	  a	  deliberate	  attempt	  to	  preserve	  the	  key	  feature	  of	  the	  previous	  Frontline	  States	  arrangement	  namely,	  an	   informal	  and	  flexible	  modus	  operandi.	  Uncomfortable	  with	  the	  ASAS	  proposal,	  particularly	  the	  idea	  that	  two	  specialized	  sectors,	  one	  dealing	  with	  political	  affairs	  and	  the	  other	  with	  military	  security,	  would	  be	  accorded	  to	  individual	  member	  states,	  the	  1995	  SADC	  summit	  abandoned	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  ASAS.	  	  	  	  After	  the	  failure	  to	  transform	  the	  FLS	  into	  ASAS,	  discussions	  commenced	  on	  the	  future	  of	  the	   Inter-­‐State	   Defence	   and	   Security	   Community	   (ISDSC)	   and	   its	   relationship	   with	   the	  SADC	   secretariat.	   It	   was	   at	   this	   point	   that	   the	   SADC	   Heads	   of	   States	   and	   Governments	  accepted	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  political	  and	  security	  wing	  of	  SADC.	  At	  the	  28th	  June	  1996	  summit	  in	   Gaborone,	   Botswana	   the	   summit	   created	   what	   came	   to	   be	   known	   as	   the	   Organ	   on	  Politics,	  Defence	  and	  Security	  (OPDS).	  	  The	  summit	  defined	  a	  number	  of	  political,	  defence	  and	  security	  objectives	  to	  be	  pursued.	  The	  establishment	  of	  the	  OPDS	  officially	  signalled	  a	  break	  with	   the	   informality	  of	   the	  FLS.	  Since	   then	  the	  regional	  body	  had	   in	  2001	  adopted	  the	   Protocol	   on	   Politics,	   Defence	   and	   Security	   Co-­‐operation,	   which	   provides	   an	  institutional	   framework	  by	  which	  Member	  States	  coordinate	  policies	  and	  activities	   in	  the	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areas	  of	  politics,	  defence,	   and	  security.	   Since	  2003	  SADC	  has	  had	  a	  Mutual	  Defence	  Pact,	  which	  entails	  commitment	  to	  military	  cooperation	  and	  integration.	  	  	  In	   2004,	   SADC	   members	   adopted	   the	   Strategic	   Indicative	   Plan	   for	   the	   Organ	   (SIPO),30	  which	  would	  provide	  guidelines	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Protocol	  on	  Politics,	  Defence	  and	   Security	   Cooperation.	   Moreover,	   in	   order	   to	   support	   the	   effective	   conduct	   of	   peace	  support	  operations	  in	  the	  region	  the	  ISDSC	  established	  a	  Regional	  Peacekeeping	  Training	  Centre	   in	   Zimbabwe.	   The	   SADC	   Protocol	   on	   Politics,	   Defence	   and	   Security	   Cooperation	  whose	  general	  objective	  is	  to	  promote	  peace	  and	  security	  in	  the	  region31,	  henceforth	  spells	  out	   the	   mandate	   for	   the	   regional	   body	   to	   fulfil	   that	   objective	   covering	   issues	   like	  prevention,	  containment	  and	  resolution	  of	  inter-­‐and	  intra-­‐state	  conflict	  by	  peaceful	  means;	  co-­‐ordination	  and	  co-­‐operation	  on	  matters	   related	   to	   security	  and	  defence;	   cross	  border	  crime;	  peacekeeping;	  disaster	  management	  and	  humanitarian	  assistance;	  arms	  control	  and	  disarmament.	  	  The	  next	   chapter	  performs	   two	  basic	   functions:	   firstly,	   it	   revisits	   the	  main	   IR	   theoretical	  strands,	   highlighting	   their	   contributions	   and	   shortcomings	   in	   relations	   to	   the	   central	  concept	  of	  security,	  and	  secondly	  presents	  the	  security	  governance	  perspective,	  which	  sets	  the	  ground	  for	  description	  of	  the	  research	  design	  in	  chapter	  four.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  The	  Strategic	  Indicative	  Plan	  for	  the	  Organ	  is	  based	  on	  the	  objectives	  and	  common	  agenda	  of	  SADC	  stated	  in	  Article	  5	  of	  the	  Treaty	  as	  amended	  on	  14	  of	  August	  2001	  in	  Blantyre,	  Malawi.	  31	  Article	  5	  of	  the	  SADC	  Treaty	  and	  Article	  2	  of	  the	  Protocol	  on	  Politics,	  Defence	  and	  Security.	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Chapter	  Three	  	  
3.	  The	  Security	  Discourse	  Revisited	  
	  	  	  3.1	  Introduction	  	   The	  literature	  on	  regional	  integration	  has	  indeed	  burgeoned	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  last	  decade	  following	  a	  marked	  shift	  from	  geopolitical	  considerations	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  to	  a	  focus	  on	   proliferation	   of	   regional	   integration	   schemes	   and	   their	   contribution	   to	   issues	   of	  economic	   development,	   peace	   and	   security.	   One	   scholarly	   challenge	   facing	   students	   of	  regional	  integration	  to	  date	  is	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  existing	  enormous	  body	  of	  theoretical	  literature	  on	  regionalism,	  which	  is	  also	  uneven	  and	  fragmented	  (Hurrell,	  1995).	  Studies	  on	  regionalism	   draw	   heavily	   from	   traditional	   International	   Relations	   (IR)	   theories	   that	   are	  characterized	   by	   subtle	   differences	   in	   emphasis	   as	   well	   as	   scope	   of	   their	   conceptual	  frameworks.	   The	   challenge	   becomes	  more	   complex	  when	   one	   attempts	   to	   employ	   those	  theories	   to	   a	   study	   on	   security	   cooperation	   at	   the	   regional	   and	   sub-­‐regional	   levels.	   This	  stems	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  existing	  literature	  does	  not	  constitute	  a	  monolithic	  approach	  to	  security	  and	  is	  comprised	  of	  divergent	  views,	  which	  are	  too	  often	  conflicting.	  	  	  This	   review,	   therefore,	   is	   prompted	  by	   two	  main	   reasons.	   First,	  while	  we	   also	   share	   the	  view	   that	   theories	   cannot	   cover	   everything	   relevant	   to	   a	   particular	   phenomenon	   or	  dynamic	   being	   studied,	   they	   are	   still	   central	   to	   the	   construction	   of	   definitions,	   concepts,	  and	  are	  important	  analytical	  tools	  for	  comprehension	  of	  various	  assumptions	  on	  issues	  of	  interest.	  Second,	  a	  review	  of	  the	  dominant	  IR	  theories	  is	  important	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  their	  explanations	  on	  how	  security	  can	  actually	  be	  achieved,	  their	  focus	  on	  security	  threats,	  what	   they	   propose	   to	   be	   the	   main	   actors	   or	   unit	   of	   analysis	   as	   well	   as	   methods	   or	  mechanisms	   utilized	   in	   the	   process	   of	   promoting	   security.	   The	  main	   theories	   that	   have	  been	   reviewed	   here	   are	   realism,	   neo-­‐liberal	   institutionalism	   and	   constructivism.	   The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  chapter	  presents	  a	  conceptual	  framework	  adopted	  and	  enriched	  by	  the	  review	  of	  theories.	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   3.2.	  	  Dominant	  Theories	  and	  Approaches	  on	  Security	  	  3.2.1	  Realist-­‐Inspired	  Approaches	  	  Undoubtedly,	  as	  one	  of	  the	  dominant	  theoretical	  perspectives	  in	  the	  study	  of	  international	  relations	   in	   general,	   and	   scholarship	   in	   the	   security	   field	   in	   particular,	   realism	   is	   not	   a	  monolithic	  approach.	  It	  contains	  various	  approaches	  one	  of	  which	  is	  neorealism.	  We	  start	  by	   outlining	   the	   central	   tenets	   of	   the	   general	   theory	   of	   realism.	   First	   and	   foremost,	   the	  sovereign	  state	  is	  the	  principal	  if	  not	  the	  most	  important	  actor	  in	  the	  international	  system.	  Realists	   recognize	   existence	   of	   other	   actors	   like	   international	   institutions,	   but	   these	   are	  deemed	   to	   play	   insignificant	   role.	  Moreover,	   the	   character	   of	   the	   state	   is	   described	   as	   a	  unitary	  rational	  actor	  capable	  of	  weighing	  costs	  and	  benefits	  as	  it	  is	  governed	  by	  rational	  decision-­‐makers.	   The	   emphasis	   on	   the	   rationality	   of	   states	   and	   their	   decision-­‐makers	   is	  reflected	   in	   the	  writings	   of	   the	   influential	  work	   of	   Thucydides.	   For	   Thucydides,	   rational	  decisions	  are	  made	  by	  those	  acting	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  state	  after	  a	  process	  of	  calculating	  risks	   and	   advantages	   for	   taking	   a	   particular	   course	   of	   action	   versus	   the	   goal	   to	   be	  achieved.32	  	  	  However,	  unlike	  liberals,	  realists	  depict	  man	  as	  a	  flawed,	  egoistic,	  selfish	  and	  self-­‐absorbed	  being.33	  	  	  It	  is	  from	  this	  gloomy	  depiction	  of	  human	  nature	  realists	  stress	  on	  the	  next	  tenet:	  ensuring	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  state	  and	  its	  people.	  The	  state	  has	  to	  make	  use	  of	  whatever	  means	  at	  its	  disposal,	  mostly	  through	  military	  capability,	  to	  ensure	  the	  security	  of	  the	  state	  itself	  and	  its	  people	   from	   threats	   posed	   by	   other	   states.	   In	   this	   sense,	   national	   security	   is	   tied	   with	  military	   capability	   and	   takes	   precedence	   over	   all	   other	   issues.	   Pursuing	   security	   for	   the	  sake	   of	   state	   survival	   overrides	   all	   other	   policy	   considerations,	   with	   national	   security	  snatching	   a	   major	   share	   of	   limited	   government	   resources	   (Sheehan,	   2005).	   It	   follows,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Cited	   in	   Karen	  Mingst,	   1999,	  Essentials	   of	   International	  Relations,	   New	   York	   &	   London:	  W.	  W.	   Norton	   &	  Company,	  Inc.	  p.71.	  33	  Reflected	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  philosophers	  like	  Nicolo	  Machiavelli,	  1940.	  The	  Prince	  and	  the	  Discourses,	  New	  York:	   Random	   House;	   Thomas	   Hobbes,	   1968.	   Leviathan,	   C.	   B.	   Macpherson	   (ed.),	   Harmondsworth,	   Eng.:	  Penguin.	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therefore,	  that	  realists	  hold	  a	  very	  narrow	  and	  limited	  view	  of	  security,	  one	  that	  is	  confined	  to	   the	   state	   as	   the	   all-­‐important	   object	   of	   security	   and	  military	   capability	   as	   the	   major	  means	  of	  achieving	  state	  survival.	  This	  was	  the	  thinking	  that	  rarely	  deviated	  from	  military	  considerations	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  This	  takes	  us	  to	  the	  third	  central	  tenet	  of	  the	  realist	  school.	  Realists	  argue	  that	  states	  exist	  in	   an	   international	   system,	  which	   is	   anarchic.	   International	   anarchy,	  which	   is	   shared	   by	  virtually	   all	   realists,	   refers	   to	   a	  world	  without	   a	  higher	  overarching	  authority,	   or	   central	  government	   analogous	   to	   the	   municipal	   system	   within	   states	   that	   are	   capable	   of	  maintaining	   law,	   administer	   justice,	   and	   prevent	   outbreaks	   of	   violence	   (Jackson	   and	  Sorensen,	   2010).	   A	   self-­‐help	   strategy	   is	   then	   deemed	   as	   the	   only	   option	   for	   states.	   To	  survive	   in	   such	   an	   anarchical	   and	   hostile	   environment	   states	   are	   compelled	   to	   look	   for	  themselves	   by	   maintaining	   military	   capabilities.	   Hans	   Morgenthau,	   in	   his	   seminal	   work	  
Politics	   Among	   Nations,	   echoed	   this	   ‘Hobbesian	   view’	   of	   the	   international	   system	   by	  positing	  that	   international	  politics	   is	  a	  struggle	  for	  power	  (Knopf,	  1978;	  Morgenthau	  and	  Thompson,	  1985).	  	  	  The	  notion	  of	  power	  is	   invariably	   linked	  to	  military	  power.	  And	  to	  early	  classical	  realists	  like	   E.H.	   Carr	   and	   Hans	   Morgenthau,	   power	   is	   treated	   as	   both	   a	   means	   and	   an	   end	  (Sheehan,	  2005).	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  higher	  authority	  above	  states	  to	  put	  the	  competition	  to	   an	   end	   states	   employ	   a	   balance	   of	   power	   technique	   to	   manage	   power	   itself.	   The	  containment	  policy	  by	  the	  United	  States	  against	   the	   former	  Soviet	  Union	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  a	  practical	  interpretation	  of	  balance	  of	  power.	  The	  policy	  basically	  meant	  exerting	  all	   sorts	   of	   leverage	   over	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   through	   balancing	   American	   power,	   thereby	  ‘containing’	  the	  former	  within	  its	  Eastern	  Europe	  sphere	  of	  influence.	  	  	  The	   implication	   for	   states	   caught	   in	   acts	   of	   ‘balancing	   power’	   is	   giving	   rise	   to	   a	   security	  
dilemma	   situation,	   another	   key	   element	   in	   the	   realist	   thinking.	   Simply	   put,	   it	   arises	   as	  states	   find	  themselves	  compelled	  to	  maintain	  a	  watchful	  eye	  on	  the	  military	  capability	  of	  actual	  or	  potential	  adversaries.	  A	  military	  build-­‐up	  by	  one	  state,	  even	  for	  purely	  defensive	  reasons,	  will	   trigger	   a	   sense	   of	   insecurity	   on	   others	   (Jervis,	   1976;	   1978).	   The	   inevitable	  
	   30	  
outcome	  of	  this	  is	  an	  arms	  race	  and	  an	  increasing	  sense	  of	  insecurity.	  For	  realists	  however,	  it	   is	   this	   atmosphere	   of	   insecurity	   that	   impedes	   cooperation.	   According	   to	   realists,	  possibilities	  for	  mutual	  cooperation	  within	  an	  anarchic	  system	  are	  logically	  slim.	  For	  them,	  insurmountable	  atmosphere	  of	  security	  competition	  cannot	  be	  overcome	  by	  any	  amount	  of	  cooperation	  (Mearsheimer,	  1990	  in	  Sheehan,	  2005:10).	  	  	  This	  point	  brings	  us	  to	  a	  later	  equally	  influential	  variant	  to	  classical	  realism,	  neorealism	  (or	  structural	  realism).	  Like	  classical	  realists,	  structural	  realists	  share	  the	  view	  that	  states	  are	  core	   actors	   and	   exist	   in	   a	   situation	   of	   international	   anarchy	   in	   which	   their	   primary	  objective	   is	   survival.	  However,	   proponents	   of	   this	   school	   of	   thought,	   like	  Kenneth	  Waltz	  oppose	  the	  classical	  realists’	  account	  of	  human	  nature	  as	  responsible	  for	  security	  dilemma.	  For	   Waltz	   (1995),	   the	   main	   point	   of	   interest	   is	   the	   international	   structure,	   which	   he	  describes	  as	  a	  force	  in	  itself.	  It	  is	  very	  capable	  of	  constraining	  state	  behaviour	  in	  which	  case	  the	  latter	  are	  helpless.	  Waltz	  holds	  that	  it	  is	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  international	  system	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  balance	  of	  power	  rather	  than	  characteristics	  of	  individual	  states.	  Gilpin	  (1981)	  also	   shares	   the	  view	   that	   it	   is	   the	   international	   system	  structure	   that	   largely	  determines	  the	  distribution	  of	  power.	  	  	  In	  short,	  realism	  is	  not	  a	  single	  monolithic	  tradition	  as	  has	  been	  presented	  here.	  Classical	  realism	  (traditional	  realism)	  and	  structural	  realism	  (neorealism)	  differ	  in	  their	  explanation	  of	   factors	   triggering	   the	   security	   dilemma,	   and	   thus	   offer	   differing	   implications	   when	  considered	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  security	  policy	  (Elman,	  2008:27).	  The	  two	  variants	  of	  realism,	  however,	   share	  key	  assumptions.	  They	  hold	  common	  positions	  on	   the	  status	  of	   states	  as	  unitary	   principal	   actors	   in	   an	   anarchic	   international	   system	   and	   the	   primacy	   of	  military	  power	  as	  an	  instrument	  of	  state	  policy.	  The	  classical	  realist	  and	  neo-­‐realist	  approaches	  of	  the	  mainstream	  international	  relations	  hold	  key	  insights	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  way	  states	  as	  pre-­‐eminent	  actors	   in	   the	   international	  system	  deal	  with	  security.	  However,	  as	  a	  general	  theory	  realism	  has	  limited	  contribution	  in	  a	  number	  of	  areas.	  First,	  realism	  has	  tended	  to	  over-­‐emphasize	  the	  anarchic	  nature	  of	  the	  international	  system	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  domestic	  threats	   in	   its	   consideration	   of	   security	   issues	   (Baldwin,	   1995:	   131).	   In	   this	   sense,	   what	  happens	   inside	  a	   state	  barely	   receives	  attention	   than	  on	  what	   transpires	  between	   it	   and	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other	   states.	   This	   implies	   that	   there	   is	   no	   appreciation	   of	   the	   importance	   of	   managing	  domestic	   political	   turmoil	   or	   crises	   which	   can	   also	   affect	   a	   state’s	   capability	   to	   defend	  against	  outside	  aggression,	  which	  is	  the	  realists’	  main	  pre-­‐occupation.	  	  Second,	   realists’	   criticism	  of	   Intergovernmental	  Organizations	  (IGOs)	  as	  simply	  proxy	   for	  power	   is	   also	   flawed	   (Boehmer	   et	   al.,	   2004:30).	   For	   realists,	   regional	   and	   sub-­‐regional	  organizations	   that	  are	  a	   form	  of	   IGOs	  are	  of	   little	   interest.	  Drawing	   from	  realist	   thinking	  such	  organizations	  merely	  reflect	  national	  vested	  interests	  and	  cannot	  constrain	  powerful	  states	  (Mearsheimer,	  1995;	  Strange,	  1983).	  	  	  	  To	  a	  great	  extent	  realists	  are	  right	  to	  hold	  the	  view	   that	   states	   structure	   such	   intergovernmental	   organizations	   to	   further	   their	   own	  interests	  but	  they	  fail	  to	  appreciate	  the	  fact	  that	  even	  powerful	  states	  must	  do	  so	  in	  a	  way	  that	  induces	  other	  weaker	  states	  to	  participate	  (Abbot	  and	  Snidal,	  1998:8;	  Sterling-­‐Folker,	  2010:	  132).	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  disputable	  to	  maintain	  that	  states	  are	  always	  in	  conflict.	  When	  states	  form	  IGOs	  to	  deal	  with	  security	  matters,	  among	  others,	  it	  is	  also	  one	  of	  the	  signs	  that	  they	   share	   common	   interests	   and	   look	   forward	   to	   observe	   common	   rules,	  which	   confer	  mutual	   rights	   and	   duties	   (Jackson	   and	   Sorensen,	   2010:	   88).	   This	   entails	   inter-­‐state	  cooperation	  in	  managing	  security	  threats	  instead	  of	  conflict	  among	  state	  actors	  can	  prevail.	  	  	  Another	   limitation	   of	   realism	   is	   its	   tendency	   to	   over-­‐emphasize	   on	   the	   use	   of	   force	   in	  dealing	   with	   security	   threats.	   Realists	   give	   much	   attention	   to	   the	   use	   of	   force,	   hence	  military	  strategies	  like	  deterrence,	  armed	  intervention,	  alliances,	  counter-­‐alliances,	  power	  balancing	   and	   so	   forth,	   occupy	  much	   of	   their	   thoughts	   on	   security.	   In	   so	   doing,	   realism	  loses	   focus	   on	   the	   “active”	   functions	   of	   intergovernmental	   organizations,	   like	   facilitating	  negotiations,	  mediation,	  implementation	  of	  agreements	  between	  disputing	  parties,	  and	  in	  general	   the	   management	   and	   resolution	   of	   conflicts	   by	   diplomatic	   means	   (Abbot	   and	  Snidal,	   1998:5).	   It	   is	   no	   surprise,	   therefore,	   that	   development	   and	   elaboration	   of	   norms	  such	   as	   peaceful	   resolution	   of	   conflicts	   by	   intergovernmental	   organizations	   has	   barely	  been	  acknowledged	  by	  realists.	  	  Although	   neo-­‐realism	   has	   been	  much	   criticized	   for	   its	   statist	   focus	   on	   security	  matters,	  there	  are	  still	  important	  insights	  on	  regionalism	  that	  may	  be	  deduced	  from	  this	  theoretical	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strand.	  Indeed,	  no	  theory	  explains	  all	  aspects	  of	  regionalism,	  but	  realist-­‐inspired	  theories,	  in	   the	  main	  view	  regionalism	  by	   looking	  at	   the	   region	   from	   the	  outside	   in.	  Realists	  view	  formation	  of	  regional	  groupings	  as	  a	  response	  to	  external	  challenges	  (Hurrell,	  1995).	  Even	  though	  Hurrell	   (ibid.)	   admits	   that	   the	   links	   between	   hegemony	   and	   regionalism	   remain	  under-­‐theorized,	  he	  underscores	  four	  power-­‐oriented	  interpretations	  of	  regionalism	  from	  realism.	  The	  presence	  of	  a	  regional	  hegemony,	  notes	  Hurrell	  (ibid.),	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  viewed	  only	  as	  a	  stumbling	  block	  to	  efforts	   to	  construct	  regional	  arrangements.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  hegemony	  may	  act	  as	  a	  powerful	  stimulus	  to	  regionalism	  and	  eventually	  to	  the	  creation	  of	   regionalist	   institutions	   in	   the	   following	   ways:	   First,	   “sub-­‐regional	   groupings	   often	  develop	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  actual	  or	  potential	  hegemonic	  power”	  (Hurrell,	  1995:	   50).	   There	   is,	   therefore,	   a	   fear	   factor	   among	   a	   group	   of	   relatively	   small	   or	   weak	  states	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  a	   locally	  dominant	  state.	  As	   intimated	  by	  Hurrell	   (ibid.)	  and	  recounted	   in	  chapter	  two,	  it	  is	  against	  this	  background	  that	  SADC	  came	  into	  being	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  threatening	  position	  of	  South	  Africa.	  	  	  A	   second	   possibility,	   which	   also	   reflects	   the	   vulnerability	   aspect	   of	   a	   group	   of	   states,	   is	  when	   regionalism	   is	   designed	   as	   an	   attempt	   to	   restrict	   the	   free	   exercise	   of	   hegemonic	  power.	  Regional	  institutions	  are,	  thus,	  created	  as	  a	  means	  to	  mitigate	  a	  hegemonic	  power.	  From	   the	   hegemonic	   power’s	   perspective,	   regionalism	   can	   provide	   the	   all-­‐important	  multilateral	   cover	   with	   which	   it	   can	   re-­‐establish	   its	   influence.	   Hurrell	   (ibid.)	   cites	   the	  example	  of	  how	  Europe	  and	  Germany	  needed	  each	  other	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  recovery	  period.	  A	   third	  possibility	   as	   a	   reaction	   to	   the	  presence	  of	   a	   local	  hegemon	   is	  when	   regionalism	  reflects	   a	   strategy	   of	   bandwagoning	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   weaker	   states	   in	   a	   region,	   i.e.	  “accommodation	  with	  the	  local	  hegemon	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  receiving	  special	  rewards”	  (Hurrell,	  1995:	  52).	   Indeed,	  regionalism	  may	  be	  borne	  out	  of	  purely	  vulnerability	  concerns,	  but	  at	  the	   same	   time	   there	  might	   be	   few	   or	   non	   alternatives	   to	   accommodation	  with	   the	   local	  hegemon.	  Welcoming	   the	   hegemon	   to	   take	   a	   central	   role	   in	   the	   creation	   of	   sub-­‐regional	  security	   architectures	   becomes	   a	   much	   desirable	   strategy	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   relatively	  weak	  states	  that	  look	  forward	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  material	  benefits.	  The	  military	  mighty	  of	  a	   local	   hegemon	   may	   offer	   the	   much-­‐needed	   logistical	   and	   training-­‐related	   support	  necessary	  for	  combating	  common	  security	  challenges.	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  Fourth,	   from	   the	   local	   hegemon’s	   perspective,	   creation	   of	   regional	   institutions	  may	   also	  serve	  in	  its	  favour	  by	  allowing	  it	  to	  pursue	  its	  interests	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  conveniently	  making	   it	   possible	   “to	   share	   burdens,	   to	   solve	   common	   problems,	   and	   to	   generate	  international	  support	  and	  legitimacy	  for	  its	  policies”	  (Hurrell,	  1995:	  52).	  These	  are	  equally	  important	   considerations	   that	   are	   often	   overlooked	   by	   critics	   of	   hegemonic	   theory.	  Confronted	   by	   resource-­‐demanding	   economic	   and	   social	   program,	   and	   in	   the	   face	   of	  competing	   priorities	   domestically,	   the	   regional	   hegemon	   would	   also	   welcome	   the	  possibility	   of	   sharing	   costs	   of	   maintaining	   security	   on	   its	   borders	   as	   well	   as	   regional	  stability.	   The	   hegemon	   would	   very	   much	   be	   interested	   in	   overseeing	   a	   stable	  neighbourhood	  in	  its	  region.	  It	  ought	  to	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  actions	  or	  inactions	  of	  states	  like	  South	  Africa	  and	  Nigeria	  in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  have	  on	  different	  occasions	  and	  in	  several	  security-­‐related	   situations	   elicited	  much	   interest	   among	   their	   regional	   peers	   because	   of	  their	  economic	  as	  well	  as	  military	  preponderance.	  	  	  3.2.2	  Neo-­‐Liberal	  Institutionalism	  	  Neo-­‐liberalism	  is	  a	  variant	  of	  liberal	  perspective	  to	  International	  Relations	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  fundamental	  role	  of	  international	  institutions	  in	  contemporary	  global	  politics;	  hence	  it	  is	   often	   called	   ‘Neo-­‐liberal	   Institutionalism’	   (Sterling-­‐Folker,	   2010).	   It	   is,	   therefore,	  important	   to	   revisit	   the	   liberal	   perspective	   from	   which	   the	   neo-­‐liberal	   institutionalist	  school	  owes	  its	  origin	  before	  embarking	  on	  the	  latter’s	  prepositions	  on	  our	  key	  concept	  of	  security.	   As	   a	   theory,	   liberalism	   origins	   are	   traced	   back	   to	   the	   nineteenth-­‐century	  Enlightenment	   thinking	  when	   individuals	   came	   to	  be	   regarded	  as	   rational	  human	  beings	  capable	   of	   mastering	   their	   environment	   through	   universally	   applicable	   laws.	   The	  Enlightenment	  thinking	  presented	  a	  positive	  image	  of	  human	  nature	  as	  striving	  to	  create	  a	  just	  and	  civil	  society.	  When	  things	  go	  wrong	  as	  social	  order	  crumbles	  and	  society	  succumb	  to	  war,	  such	  an	  outcome	  should	  not	  be	  blamed	  on	  the	  individual	  but	  the	  society	  itself.	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According	  to	  this	   line	  of	   thinking,	  man	  is	  not	   inherently	  a	  war-­‐mongering	  being.	  Some	  of	  the	  ideas	  forming	  the	  core	  of	  Enlightenment	  thinking	  include	  the	  writings	  of	  philosophers	  Montesquieu	   and	   Immanuel	  Kant.	   They	   both	   believed	   that	   humans	   could	   take	   charge	   of	  their	   affairs	   and	   overcome	   international	   anarchy	   via	   collective	   action.	   Thus,	   in	   the	  nineteenth-­‐century	   liberalism	   shared	   the	   Enlightenment’s	   optimistic	   view	   of	   human	  nature	  by	  continuing	  to	  portray	  man	  as	  capable	  of	  meeting	  his	  needs	  and	  wants	  in	  rational	  ways	  (Mingst,	  1999:	  67).	  Liberalism	  found	  some	  of	   its	   ideas,	  specifically	  on	  how	  to	  avoid	  war,	  getting	  more	  pronounced	  by	  the	  twentieth-­‐century	  ‘Wilsonian	  Idealism’34	  during	  the	  creation	  of	   the	  League	  of	  Nations.	  The	  eventual	   failure	  of	   the	  League	   to	  effectively	   carry	  through	   its	   much-­‐touted	   ‘collective	   security’ 35 	  system	   meant	   that	   liberalism	   as	   a	  theoretical	   perspective	   lost	   its	   appeal.	   The	   liberal	   perspective	  waned	  but	   its	   unrelenting	  faith	  on	  international	  institutions	  especially	  in	  managing	  anarchical	  situation	  was	  given	  a	  new	  lease	  of	  life	  under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  neo-­‐liberal	  institutionalism.	  	  	  The	   neo-­‐liberal	   institutionalism	   offered	   insightful	   contributions	   on	   the	   all-­‐important	  aspect	  of	  the	  rationale	  for	  states	  to	  cooperate	  amid	  prevalence	  of	  an	  anarchic	  international	  system.	   Neo-­‐liberal	   institutionalists	   shared	   the	   classical	   liberals’	   viewpoint	   that	   it	   is	  possible	  for	  cooperation	  among	  states	  to	  occur	  in	  such	  an	  uncertain	  environment	  but	  they	  differ	   in	   their	   account	   of	   why	   it	   emerges.	   As	   summed	   up	   by	   Mingst	   (1999:	   69),	   “For	  classical	   liberals,	   cooperation	   emerges	   from	  man	   establishing	   and	   reforming	   institutions	  that	   permit	   cooperative	   interactions	   and	   prohibit	   coercive	   actions.	   For	   neo-­‐liberal	  institutionalists,	   cooperation	   emerges	   because	   for	   actors	   having	   continuous	   interactions	  with	  each	  other,	  it	  is	  in	  the	  self-­‐interest	  of	  each	  to	  cooperate.”	  	  	  The	   significance	   of	   the	   neo-­‐liberal	   institutionalist	   paradigm	   is	   not	  merely	   because	   of	   its	  stark	   contrast	   to	   the	   widely	   critiqued	   realist	   and	   neo-­‐realist	   orientations	   but	   more	  importantly	  its	  key	  elements.	  Its	  central	  elements	  are	  the	  prominence	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  and	  international	  institutions,	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  cooperation	  in	  international	  politics.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  This	  term	  was	  coined	  after	  the	  American	  president	  Woodrow	  Wilson,	  a	  great	  proponent	  of	  idealism	  during	  that	  time.	  35	  As	   a	   provision	   in	   the	   covenant	   of	   the	   League	   of	   Nations,	   the	   notion	   of	   collective	   security	   implied	   that	  aggression	  by	  one	  state	  would	  attract	  collective	  action	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  society	  of	  states.	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Neo-­‐liberal	  institutionalism	  shares	  the	  realists’	  assertion	  that	  states	  are	  critical	  actors	  but	  goes	  far	  to	  recognize	  existence	  of	  other	  important	  actors,	  such	  as	  international	  institutions	  and	   Non	   Governmental	   Organizations.	   The	   theory	   embraces	   a	   broader	   definition	   of	  institutions	   in	   both	   formal	   and	   informal	   sense.	   Formal	   institutions	   refer	   to	   multilateral	  organizations	  with	  physical	  locations,	  buildings,	  staffs	  and	  budgets	  (Sterling-­‐Folker,	  2010).	  Informal	   institutional	  arrangements	  consist	  of	  sets	  of	  governing	  arrangements	  that	  bring	  into	   play	   “implicit	   and	   explicit	   principles,	   norms,	   rules	   and	   decision	  making	   procedures	  around	  which	  actors’	  expectations	  converge”	  (Krasner,	  1983:2).	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  leading	  proponents	  of	  neo-­‐liberal	   institutionalism,	   like	  Oran	  Young	  and	  Robert	  Keohane,	  have	  criticized	  this	  definition	  by	  an	  influential	  adherent	  of	  the	  Neorealist	  School,	  it	  is	  still	  preferred	  in	  attempting	  to	  comprehend	  the	  nature	  and	  scope	  of	  regimes	  and	  any	  change	  in	  it	   (Tarzi,	  2004:	  124).	  The	  depiction	  of	   state	  practices	   steered	  by	  principles,	  norms,	   rules	  and	   decision-­‐making	   procedures	   pointed	   to	   recognition	   that	   not	   all	   institutions	   had	   to	  have	  physical	  headquarters	  and	  staffs	  (Milner,	  2009:	  6).	  	  	  On	   the	   whole,	   we	   can	   extrapolate	   the	   general	   proposition	   from	   the	   neo-­‐liberal	  institutionalism.	   In	   the	   first	   place,	   it	   shares	   the	   realist	   position	   that	   states	   are	   rational	  actors	  striving	  to	  maximize	  national	   interests	  under	  conditions	  of	  anarchy	  but	  part	  ways	  with	  the	  realists	  on	  the	  role	  of	  norms	  and	  regimes.	  In	  essence,	  neo-­‐liberal	  institutionalists	  hold	   the	   view	   that	   the	   states	   can	   have	   their	   self-­‐	   interests	   (i.e.	   relative	   gains	   concerns)	  better	   served	   by	   complying	   with	   norms	   and	   regimes,	   partly	   because	   the	   benefit	   of	  compliance	  outweighs	  the	  cost	  of	  violating	  them	  (Tarzi,	  2004:	  125-­‐126).	  Second,	  the	  neo-­‐liberal	  institutionalist	  school	  places	  premium	  on	  the	  value	  of	  cooperation	  among	  states	  in	  explaining	   why	   regimes	   persist.	   As	   rational	   actors	   states	   consciously	   enter	   into	  cooperation	   to	   respond	   to	   their	   national	   interest,	   thereby	   making	   regime-­‐building	   an	  eventual	  outcome	  of	  a	  cooperative	  undertaking.	  	  	  	  The	   theory	   highly	   considers	   institutions	   as	   very	   instrumental	   in	   promoting	   security	   by	  providing	   a	   guaranteed	   framework	   of	   interactions	   (Mingst,	   1999:	   69).	   Neo-­‐liberal	  Institutionalists	  maintain	  that	   institutions	  help	  make	  security	  possible	  in	  two	  main	  ways.	  First,	   institutions	   help	   promote	   cooperation	   between	   states	   (Keohane,	   1989:	   4).	   Second,	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international	   institutions	   provide	   a	   flow	   of	   information	   between	   their	   member	   states	  thereby	  leaving	  them	  much	  less	  in	  dark	  about	  what	  other	  states	  are	  doing.	  This	  goes	  a	  long	  way	  to	  alleviate	  problems	  concerning	  lack	  of	  trust	  between	  states	  and	  reduce	  states’	  fear	  of	  each	  other	  (Jackson	  and	  Sorensen,	  2010:	  108).	  From	  neo-­‐liberal	   institutionalism	  point	  of	  view,	   therefore,	   institutions	   are	   purposively	   created	   by	   states	   to	  manage	   growing	   inter-­‐dependence	   and	   overcome	   collective	   action	   problems	   (Hurrell,	   1995;	   Solingen,	   2008).	  Besides	  serving	  as	  a	  means	  of	  providing	  information,	  institutions	  reduce	  transactions	  costs	  associated	  with	  rule-­‐making,	  negotiating,	  implementing,	  information	  gathering	  and	  conflict	  resolution	   (Navari,	   2008:	   29-­‐43).	   Regional	   norms,	   rules	   and	   institutions,	   henceforth,	   are	  not	  merely	  fashionable	  endeavours	  generated	  for	  their	  own	  sake,	  but	  are	  created	  because	  they	   assist	   states	   to	   deal	  with	   common	   problems	   (Hurrell,	   1995:	   62).	   Unlike	   neo-­‐realist	  assumptions,	   therefore,	   neo-­‐liberal	   institutionalism	   does	   not	   preclude	   promotion	   of	  regionalism	   through	   creation	   of	   regional	   institutions.	   To	   neo-­‐liberalists,	   regional	  institutions	   matter,	   as	   succinctly	   summed	   up	   by	   Pedersen,	   “Neo-­‐liberal	   institutionalism	  has	  a	   certain	  prima	  facie	  usefulness,	  when	   it	   comes	   to	  explicating	  high	   levels	  of	   regional	  institutionalisation…The	  central	  concern	  of	  neo	   liberalists	   is	   the	  capacity	  of	   international	  (including	  regional)	  institutions	  to	  reduce	  transaction	  costs,	  provide	  information	  and	  serve	  as	  mechanisms	  of	  enforcement	  and	  monitoring”	  (2002:	  679).	  	  The	  main	  shortcoming	  of	  the	  neo-­‐liberal	  institutionalism	  is	  that	  of	  placing	  much	  emphasis	  on	   institutions	   thereby	   implying	   that	   once	   established	   they	   are	   sure	   to	   guarantee	  cooperation.	  Institutions	  may	  affect	  possibility	  for	  cooperation	  but	  they	  do	  not	  guarantee	  cooperation	  (Mingst,	  1999).	  It	  is	  a	  credible	  argument	  to	  assert	  that	  institutions	  can	  provide	  continuity	  and	  a	   sense	  of	   stability	   and	  can	   foster	   cooperation	  between	   states	   for	  mutual	  advantage	  (Jackson	  and	  Sorensen,	  2010:	  97),	  but	  they	  can	  also	  collapse	  or	   fail	   to	  achieve	  security	   as	   a	   collective	   outcome	   (Sterling-­‐Folker,	   2010)36.	   Nevertheless,	   neo-­‐realists	   are	  also	  correct	  to	  claim	  that	  promotion	  of	  security	  through	  inter-­‐state	  cooperation	  becomes	  a	  distant	  reality	  when	   institutions	   formed	  only	  serve	  as	  arenas	  where	  power	  play	  by	  state	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36 	  Jennifer	   Sterling-­‐Folker.	   2010,“Neoliberalism“,	   in	   Tim	   Dunne,	   Milja	   Kurki	   and	   Steve	   Smith	   (eds.),	  
International	  Relations	  	  Theories:	  Discipline	  and	  Diversity,	  Second	  Edition,	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  pp.	  116-­‐134.	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actors	   unfolds.	   Moreover,	   implicit	   in	   neo-­‐liberal	   institutionalist	   analysis	   is	   its	   failure	   to	  offer	   adequate	   explanation	   on	   how	   the	   same	   institutions	   structured	   by	   states	   deal	  with	  management	  of	  problematic	  areas	  within	  individual	  states,	  such	  as	  intra-­‐state	  conflicts	  that	  can	  easily	  hamper	  or	  diminish	  possibilities	  of	  inter-­‐state	  cooperation	  in	  non-­‐security	  areas	  like	   economic	   integration.	   The	   bottom	   line	   is	   that	   this	   theory	   tends	   to	   focus	   more	   on	  question	  of	  inter-­‐state	  cooperation	  and	  the	  persistency	  of	  international	  institutions	  rather	  than	  issues	  of	  intra-­‐state	  security	  (Jackson,	  2009:	  174).	  	  3.2.3	  Constructivism	  	  Constructivism	  is	  a	  recent	  invention37	  in	  the	  study	  of	  IR	  that	  has	  gained	  prominence	  for	  the	  theoretical	   insights	   it	  has	  provided	   in	  an	  attempt	   to	  address	   limitations	  of	   the	  dominant	  rationalist-­‐systemic	   theories	   (realism	   and	   neo-­‐liberal	   institutionalism).	   It	   is	   viewed	   as	   a	  theory	  that	  attempts	  to	  complement	  the	  inadequacies	  of	  the	  rationalist-­‐systemic	  theories	  whose	   numerous	   propositions	   differ	   on	   conditions	   favourable	   for	   cooperation	   to	   take	  place,	   the	   process	   by	   which	   cooperative	   action	   take	   place	   and	   the	   overall	   propensity	   of	  states	   to	   cooperate	   (Franke,	   2009).	   Constructivism	   which	   mainly	   focuses	   on	   aspects	   of	  ‘regional	  awareness’,	   ‘regional	   identity’	  and	  the	  shared	  sense	  of	  belonging	  to	  a	  particular	  community	   (Hurrell,	   1995),	   views	   normative	   and	   ideational	   structures	   as	   equally	  significant	   as	   material	   structures	   particularly	   in	   shaping	   the	   identities	   and	   interests	   of	  actors	  in	  world	  politics	  (Reus-­‐Smit,	  2001).	  	  	  Benedikt	   Franke	   has	   made	   an	   emphatic	   claim	   for	   the	   superiority	   of	   constructivist	  perspectives	   in	   understanding	   security	   co-­‐operation	   in	   Africa	   in	   his	   book	   Security	   Co-­‐
operation	   in	   Africa:	   A	   Reappraisal,	   2009.	   Franke	   has	   made	   the	   argument	   that	  constructivism	  is	  best	  suited	  as	  an	  alternative	  analytical	  framework	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  dynamics	  of	  security	  co-­‐operation	  in	  Africa	  because	  it	  transcends	  the	  major	  limitation	  of	  rationalist-­‐systemic	   theories,	   namely	  over-­‐emphasis	  on	   the	   international	   system	  and	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  The	   concept	   first	   appeared	   in	  Nicholas	  Onuf’s	  book	  World	  of	  Our	  Making:	  Rules	  and	  Rule	   in	  Social	  Theory	  
and	  International	  Relations,	  Columbia:	  University	  of	  South	  Carolina	  Press,	  1989.	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state	  as	  level	  of	  analysis	  to	  the	  neglect	  of	  social	  processes.	  According	  to	  him,	  both	  schools	  (realism	  and	  neo-­‐liberal	  institutionalism)	  “fail,	  albeit	  to	  different	  degrees,	  to	  appreciate	  the	  importance	  of	  inter-­‐subjective	  factors,	  including	  ideas,	  norms	  and	  beliefs	  and	  their	  role	  in	  the	   emergence	   and	   deepening	   of	   security	   co-­‐operation”	   (2009:	   17).	   	   Another	   attack	   on	  systemic	   theories	   is	   that	  as	   they	   largely	   reflect	   the	  western	  circumstances	   in	  which	   they	  were	   formulated,	   they	   are	   fraught	   with	   theoretical	   flaws	   especially	   in	   explaining	  happenings	  in	  the	  African	  context.	  	  	  The	  main	  focus	  of	  constructivism	  as	  an	  approach	  in	  IR	  is	  on	  consciousness	  and	  its	  place	  in	  world	  affairs.	  In	  sharp	  contrast	  to	  traditional	  IR	  theories,	  especially	  neorealism	  that	  mainly	  focuses	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  material	  power,	  such	  as	  military	  forces	  and	  balance	  of	  power	  calculations,	   constructivism	   makes	   the	   claim	   that	   the	   most	   prominent	   aspect	   of	  international	  relations	  is	  social,	  not	  material	  (Jackson	  and	  Sorensen,	  2010:	  160).	  In	  other	  words,	  constructivist	  theories	  of	  IR	  reject	  the	  materialist	  view	  espoused	  by	  neorealists,	  and	  to	   some	   extent	   neoliberals,	   which	   emphasizes	   power	   and	   national	   interest	   as	   driving	  forces	  in	   international	  politics.	  Constructivism	  instead	  insists	  that	  the	  focus	  should	  be	  on	  ideas	   ad	   beliefs	   that	   inform	   as	   well	   as	   shape	   actions	   of	   the	   actors	   on	   the	   international	  scene.	  It	  follows,	  thus,	  one	  of	  the	  central	  shared	  assumptions	  for	  constructivists	  is	  not	  only	  that	  security	  is	  a	  social	  construction,	  but	  also	  non-­‐material	  or	  ideational	  factors	  are	  key	  to	  the	   construction	   and	  practices	   of	   security	   in	   international	   politics	   (McDonald,	   2008:	   60-­‐61).	  This	  ideational	  view	  held	  by	  constructivists	  has	  been	  widely	  stressed	  and	  popularized	  by	  its	  leading	  proponent,	  Alexander	  Wendt.	  Wendt	  (1992)	  posits	  that	  ideas	  always	  matter	  and	   ought	   to	   be	   accorded	   same	   level	   of	   attention	   as	   that	   given	   to	   issues	   of	   power	   and	  national	  interest.	  	  	  According	  to	  Wendt,	  ideas	  are	  neither	  more	  important	  than	  nor	  autonomous	  from	  power	  and	  interest,	  but	  rather	  “power	  and	  interest	  have	  the	  effects	  they	  do	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  ideas	  that	  make	  them	  up”	  (1999:135-­‐6).	  In	  constructivist	  thinking,	  ideas	  are	  broadly	  defined	  as	  “mental	  constructs	  held	  by	  individuals,	  sets	  of	  distinctive	  beliefs,	  principles	  and	  attitudes	  that	   provide	   broad	   orientations	   for	   behaviour	   and	   policy”	   (Tannenwald,	   2005:15).	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Tannenwald	  has	  gone	   further	   to	  specify	   four	   types	  of	   ideas,	  namely	   ideologies	  or	  shared	  belief	  systems,	  normative	  beliefs,	  cause-­‐effect	  beliefs	  and	  policy	  prescriptions	  (2005:15).	  	  	  As	   an	   alternative	   approach	   to	   both	   neorealism	   and	   neo-­‐liberalism,	   constructivism	   does	  offer	   some	   insights	   on	   state’s	   security.	   In	   the	   first	   place,	   it	   offers	   insights	   on	   how	   the	  emergence	  of	  wars	  and	  conflicts	  can	  breach	  a	  state’s	  or	  rather	  society’s	  security.	  According	  to	  constructivism,	  conflict	  can	  be	  socially	  constructed	  when	  two	  conditions	  are	  met.	  First,	  identity-­‐be	   it	   individual,	   group	   or	   national,	   is	   critical	   in	   the	   construction	   of	   wars	   and	  conflicts	   through	   the	   use	   of	   fear,	   threat,	   hatred,	   victimhood	   and	   dehumanization	   of	   the	  other	  (Jackson,	  2009:177-­‐178).	  Second,	  the	  presence	  of	  political	  elites	  who	  are	  committed	  to	  ferment	  and	  use	  grievances	  generated	  by	  existing	  structural	  conditions,	  such	  as	  poverty,	  unemployment,	  discrimination,	  corruption	  and	  state	  incapacity,	  to	  inflame	  and	  manipulate	  identities	   and	   perceptions	   of	   threat	   and	   victimhood,	   thereby	   laying	   the	   foundation	   for	  legitimizing	   violent	   retaliation	   (Kapferer,	   1988).	   Constructivists	   therefore	   view	   the	  presence	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  debilitating	  structural	  conditions	  as	  providing	   important	  ground	   for	   initiating	   and	   sustaining	   organized	   violence	  within	   states.	   This	   constructivist	  insight	  provides	   an	   important	   clue	   as	   to	   the	   factors	   that	  propel	   conflicts	   to	  break	  out	   at	  particular	   junctures,	  principally	  when	  enabling	  structures	  and	  purposeful	  agents	  (actors)	  interact	   to	   provide	   the	   necessary	   conditions	   to	   spark	   wars	   or	   society-­‐wide	   conflicts	  (Jackson,	   2009:	   179).	   In	  most	   of	   African	   countries	   political	   elites	   take	   advantage	   of	   bad	  structural	   conditions	   to	   instigate	   large	   numbers	   of	   unemployed	   youths	   during	   political	  campaigns	  and	  after	  elections	  (Branch,	  2011).	  	  	  	  As	   observed	   by	   Jackson	   (2009:	   173),	   one	   of	   the	   arguably	   essential	   contributions	   of	   the	  constructivist	   approach	   to	   security	   is	   its	   emphasis	   on	   the	   aspect	   of	   conflict	   analysis.	   It	  reiterates	  that	  resolution	  of	  conflicts	  within	  and	  between	  states	  has	  to	  be	  preceded	  by	  an	  in-­‐depth	  diagnosis	  of	   their	  nature	  and	  causes.	  Without	   in-­‐depth	  knowledge	  or	  account	  of	  the	   role	   of	   agents	   and	   structures	   in	   deliberately	   constructing	   war	   and	   conflict,	   any	  mechanisms	   to	   restore	   security	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   ad	   hoc	   or	   ineffectual.	   In	   brief,	   the	   broad	  implication	  of	  constructivism	  is	  that	  it	  presents	  a	  comprehensive	  understanding	  of	  conflict	  formation,	   which	   is	   an	   essential	   initial	   step	   towards	   conceptualizing	   conflict	   resolution	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(Jackson,	   2009:	   182).	   A	   related	   implication	   of	   constructivism	   to	   security	   is	   thus	   on	   the	  importance	  of	   focusing	  on	  Early	  Warning	  Systems	  (EWS)	  that	  would	  help	  to	  monitor	  the	  process	   of	   violent	   conflict	   construction,	   which	   is	   spearheaded	   by	   ‘conflict	   agents’,	   or	  variously	  described	  as	  ‘conflict	  or	  ethnic	  entrepreneurs’	  (Lemarchand,	  1994).	  	  With	   regard	   to	   the	   role	   of	   inter-­‐governmental	   organizations	   in	   promoting	   security,	  constructivists	   argue	   that	   norms	   supported	   by	   them	   can	   decisively	   influence	   national	  policies	  (Finnemore,	  1996:	  128).	  Besides,	  IGOs	  do	  play	  the	  role	  of	  agenda	  setting	  (Barnett	  and	  Finnemore,	  2005:	  162),	  by	  determining	  and	  defining	  problems	  during	  meetings	  and	  conferences	  held	  under	   their	   auspices.	   This	   partly	   explains	  why	   some	   security	   issues	   or	  threats	  make	  it	  into	  the	  security	  agenda	  of	  regional	  and	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations.	  	  Constructivism	   also	   is	   not	   free	   from	   criticism.	   Neo-­‐realists,	   in	   particular,	   are	   sceptical	  about	   the	   importance	   that	   constructivists	   attach	   to	   international	   norms,	   which	   are	  routinely	   disregarded	   by	   states	   that	   are	   unsurprisingly	   egoistic	   (Krasner,	   1994:	   16-­‐17).	  Furthermore,	   constructivism	   does	   not	   offer	   much	   in	   terms	   of	   how	   state	   and	   non-­‐state	  actors	  interact	  in	  a	  regional	  or	  sub-­‐regional	  setting	  in	  managing	  intra-­‐state	  conflicts	  as	  well	  as	  transnational	  security	  threats.	  Moreover,	  despite	  constructivist	  shared	  assumption	  that	  security	   is	  a	  social	  construction	  that	  has	  generally	  eschewed	  a	  focus	  on	  power	  politics	  of	  security	  most	  constructivists	  eluded	  questions	  of	  explicitly	  stating	  how	  security	  works	  and	  how	  we	  might	  study	  its	  construction	  (McDonald,	  2008:	  67).	  It	  is	  the	  Centre	  for	  Peace	  and	  Conflict	  Research38,	  established	  in	  Copenhagen	  in	  1985	  and	  thus	  dubbed	  the	  ‘Copenhagen	  School’	   (McSweeney,	  1996),	  which	  attempted	   to	  answer	   these	  questions	  by	  developing	  a	  more	  coherent	  theory	  for	  the	  study	  of	  security,	  and	  is	  therefore	  worth	  revisiting	  albeit	  in	  brief.	  	  The	   Copenhagen	   School,	  which	   largely	   draws	   upon	   social	   constructivism,	   is	   credited	   for	  widening	  the	  debate	  about	  international	  security	  by	  adding	  to	  military	  security	  five	  other	  security	  sectors.	  Building	  on	   the	  1983	  path	  breaking	  work	  of	  Barry	  Buzan,	  People,	  States	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  It	  was	  later	  known	  as	  Conflict	  and	  Peace	  Research	  Institute	  (COPRI)	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and	  Fear,39	  the	  Copenhagen	  School	  incorporated	  political,	  economic,	  societal	  and	  ecological	  security	  as	  new	  sectors.	  When	   the	  Buzan	  book	  came	  out,	   the	  main	  emphasis	  was	  on	   the	  state	   as	   the	  main	   referent	   object	   for	   security.	   But	   in	   a	   series	   of	   publications	   shared	   by	  Buzan	  and	  his	  colleagues,	  most	  notably	  Ole	  Waever,	  a	  shift	  in	  focus	  from	  state	  security	  that	  had	  sovereignty	  as	  its	  ultimate	  criterion	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  societal	  security,	  which	  was	  held	  together	  by	  concerns	  on	  identity,	  was	  observed.40	  The	  idea	  was	  not	  to	  let	  societal	  security	  substitute	  state	  security	  but	  to	  make	  sure	  the	  former	  becomes	  more	  the	  centre	  of	  analysis.	  Henceforth,	  the	  debate	  in	  the	  1990s	  came	  to	  reflect	  this	  feature	  of	  duality	  of	  state	  security	  and	  societal	  security.	  	  It	  is	  at	  this	  juncture	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  look	  at	  another	  innovative	  concept	  and	  insight	  from	  the	  Copenhagen	  School.	   	  Supposedly	  a	  distinctive	  feature	  of	  the	  Copenhagen	  School	  has	  been	   the	  concept	  of	   ‘securitization’	  developed	  by	  Ole	  Waever.	  Waever	  presented	   the	  notion	   of	   security	   as	   a	   discursive	   or	   speech	   act	   meaning	   labelling	   a	   phenomenon	   as	   a	  security	  issue	  leading	  to	  instilling	  a	  sense	  of	  importance	  and	  urgency	  prompting	  measures	  to	  deal	  with	   it	  outside	   the	  purview	  of	  usual	  political	  process	   (Buzan	  et	  al.,	  1998:	  23-­‐26).	  Simply	  put,	   securitization	  entails	   the	  construction	  of	  a	  security	  problem	  by	  means	  of	   the	  speech	  act	  of	  security.	  In	  this	  sense,	  certain	  issues	  become	  categorized	  as	  security	  issues,	  and	  as	  such,	  are	  expected	   to	  be	  addressed	  through	  security	  solutions.	   It	  has	   to	  be	  noted,	  however,	   that	   Waever	   was	   advocating	   for	   ‘desecuritization’	   of	   issues,	   that	   is,	   removing	  them	  from	  the	  security	  agenda	  instead	  of	  the	  securitization	  agenda	  (Waever,	  1995:	  46-­‐86).	  	  	  The	   ‘securitization’,	   and	   its	   opposite	   ‘desecuritization’	   agenda,	   sparked	   considerable	  debates	  and	  numerous	  reviews	  most	  of	  which	  did	  not	  look	  to	  reject	  or	  invalidate	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Copenhagen	  School,	  but	  rather	  to	  pinpoint	  how	  it	  encapsulates	  several	  questionable	  claims.	   Hereunder,	   we	   summarize	   some	   of	   the	   major	   criticisms	   levelled	   against	   the	  assumptions	   of	   the	   Copenhagen	   School.	   In	   the	   first	   place,	   the	   widening	   agenda	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Barry	  Buzan.	   1983.	  People,	  States,	  and	  Fear,	   Brighton:	  Harvester	  Wheatsheaf;	  People,	  States,	  and	  Fear:	  An	  
Agenda	   for	   International	   Security	   Studies	   in	   the	   Post-­‐Cold	   War	   Era,	   2nd	   ed.	   Hemel	   Hempstead:	   Harvester	  Wheatsheaf	  40	  Ole	   Waever,	   Barry	   Buzan,	   Morten	   Kelstrup	   and	   Pierre	   Lemaitre.	   1993.	   Identity,	  migration,	   and	   the	   New	  
Security	  Order	  in	  Europe,	  London:	  Printer;	  Barry	  Buzan,	  Ole	  Waever	  and	  Jaap	  de	  Wilde.	  1998.	  Security:	  A	  New	  
Framework	  for	  Analysis,	  Boulder:	  Lynne	  Rienner.	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school	  has	  merely	  presented	  a	  sophisticated	  neorealist	  account	  of	  security	  (Smith,	  2000).	  This	   attack	   stems	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Buzan	   et	   al.	   group	   had	   succeeded	   to	   extend	  security	   to	   encompass	   the	   five	   sectors	   as	   previously	   mentioned,	   and	   thus,	   centre	   their	  discussions	   of	   security	   on	   three	   levels	   of	   the	   sub-­‐state,	   the	   state	   and	   the	   international	  system,	   but	   could	   not	   break	   away	   from	   analyzing	   the	   state	   as	   the	   referent	   object	   in	   all	  these	  levels.	  Others	  like,	  Ken	  Booth	  (1991)	  preferred	  instead	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  individual	  as	  the	  primary	  referent	  object.	  	  	  A	  second	  criticism	  centres	  on	   the	  vagueness	  of	   the	   ‘securitization’	  concept.	  According	   to	  Knudsen	   (2001),	   the	   concept	   is	   ambiguous	   as	   it	   refers	   to	   two	   things	   at	   once.	   Knudsen	  opined	  “On	  the	  one	  hand,	   it	  refers	   to	   the	  act	  (or	  process)	  of	  removing	  an	   issue	   from	  and	  raising	  it	  above	  politics,	  taking	  it	  out	  of	  the	  limelight.	  On	  the	  other,	  it	  points	  to	  the	  act	  (or	  process)	   of	   taking	   an	   issue	   out	   of	   obscurity	   or	   neglect	   and	   placing	   it	   on	   the	   political	  agenda”	  (Knudsen,	  2001:	  361).	  	  	  Besides	  these	  criticisms,	  it	  is	  nonetheless	  the	  case	  that	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Copenhagen	  School	  defines	   an	   interesting,	   not	   least	   complex	   research	   agenda	   for	   security	   studies.	   The	  contribution	   of	   the	   Copenhagen	   School	   to	   the	   widening	   and	   deepening	   of	   the	   security	  agenda,	  in	  particular	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  multiple	  security	  sectors	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  latest	   attempts	   by	   regional	   and	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   to	   form	   consensus	   on	  which	  issues	   come	   to	   be	   viewed	   and	   treated	   as	   security	   threats.	   A	  multi-­‐approach	   to	   security	  encompassing	   political,	   economic,	   societal,	   and	   ecological	   concerns	   in	   addition	   to	   the	  military	  has	  virtually	  been	  welcome	  by	  regional	  and	  sub-­‐regional	  arrangements	  geared	  on	  addressing	  the	  multifaceted	  nature	  of	  security	  concerns	  in	  Africa.	  The	  idea	  of	  securitization	  succeeded	   in	   bringing	   useful	   insights	   into	   security	   studies	   how	   security	   agenda	   setting	  takes	  shape.	  The	  Copenhagen	  School,	  however,	  left	  an	  important	  question	  unanswered	  in	  its	   framework,	   and	   that	   is	   how	   do	   we	   know	   when	   an	   issue	   has	   been	   successfully	  ‘securitized’?	  (McDonald,	  2008:	  70).	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3.2.4	  The	  Case	  for	  the	  Security	  Governance	  Perspective	  
	  Having	  gone	  through	  different	  strands	  of	  theories	  that	  focus	  on	  security,	  it	  appears	  clearly	  that	  each	  theory	  reviewed	  in	  the	  foregoing	  sections	  holds	  key	  insights	  but	  they	  also	  have	  their	  limitations.	  In	  brief	  the	  following	  major	  limitations	  have	  been	  observed	  as	  related	  to	  how	   sub-­‐regional	   arrangements	   address	   security	   challenges	   in	   their	   delineated	   areas.	  These	  are	  over-­‐emphasis	  on	  the	  international	  system	  (anarchic	  or	  not)	  and	  the	  state	  as	  the	  level	  of	  analysis	  to	  the	  neglect	  of	  domestic	  threats	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  consideration	  of	  security	   issues;	  and	  over-­‐emphasis	  on	  the	  use	  of	   force	  in	  dealing	  with	  security	  threats	  to	  the	  neglect	  of	  pacific	  or	  peaceful	  methods	  which	  are	  increasingly	  preferred	  by	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations.	   Since	   there	   is	   no	   single	   monolithic	   theory	   that	   can	   adequately	   explain	  security	   dynamics	   on	   its	   own,	   it	   suffices	   to	   say	   that	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   inter-­‐governmental	  organizations	  at	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  level	  deal	  with	  security	  aspects	  can	  be	  best	  understood	  through	  a	  perspective	  that	  both	  accommodates	  an	  eclectic	  mix	  of	  insights	  from	  rationalist-­‐systemic	  theories	  and	  constructivism,	  and	  transcends	  their	  major	  limitations.	  	  The	  security	  governance	  perspective,	  henceforth,	  is	  preferred,	  as	  its	  focus	  is	  not	  dominated	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  states,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  in	  other	  perspectives.	  As	  it	  is	  applied	  as	  a	  heuristic	  devise	  than	  a	  general	  theory,	  security	  governance	  goes	  further	  by	  bringing	  in	  a	  multi-­‐level	  or	  multiple-­‐actor	  setting.	  For	  instance,	   it	   incorporates	  states,	  non-­‐state	  organizations	  and	  individual	  or	  group	  actors.	  The	  concept	  of	  security	  governance	  has	  been	  adopted	  not	  only	  for	   the	   reason	  of	   applying	   it	   to	   a	   broader	   comparative	   empirical	   study	   in	   a	   sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	   setting	  but	   also	  because	   it	   appears	   to	  provide	   a	   useful	   perspective	   from	  which	   to	  approach	  security	   issues	  at	  the	  regional	  as	  well	  as	  sub-­‐regional	   levels	  as	   it,	   firstly,	  draws	  attention	   to	   the	   multiple	   actors	   and	   multiple	   levels	   of	   security	   engagement,	   and	   thus	  highlights	  the	  need	  for	  greater	  coordination	  and	  cooperation	  among	  key	  actors	  in	  security.	  The	   plurality	   of	   actors	   and	   overlapping	   networks	   resulting	   from	   their	   collaboration	   is	  grasped	  by	  the	  concept	  of	  security	  governance.	  	  	  As	   summed	   up	   by	   Hänggi	   (2005:	   9),	   “security	   governance	   is	   an	   analytical	   perspective	  which	  helps	  to	  capture	  complex	  governing	  mechanisms	  in	  a	  given	  issue-­‐area	  characterized	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by	   constellation	  of	  different	  actors	  operating	  at	  different	   levels	  of	   interaction”.	   Secondly,	  the	   security	   governance	   perspective	   provides	   a	   framework	   for	   analyzing	   policy-­‐making	  and	   policy	   implementation	   in	   the	   security	   field	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   integration	   of	  various	   actor-­‐types	   in	   decision-­‐making	   and	   policy	   implementation	   can	   create	   new	  cooperation	  problems	  leading	  to	  unintended	  consequences	  (Daase	  and	  Friesedorf,	  2010).	  Thirdly,	   it	   provides	   a	   helpful	   heuristic	   device	   to	   analyze	   forms	   of	   interaction	   and	   to	  conceptualize	   the	   coordination,	   management	   and	   regulation	   of	   security	   within	   an	  intergovernmental	   grouping	   in	   a	   meaningful	   way.	   And	   as	   such	   it	   captures	   the	   different	  categories	   of	   cooperation	   and	   coordination	   arrangements.	   As	   justified	   in	   the	   empirical	  study	   by	   Kirchner	   and	   Sperling	   (2007:18)	   security	   governance	   perspective	   can	   be	  employed	  “as	  a	  heuristic	  device	  for	  recasting	  the	  problem	  of	  security	  management	  in	  order	  to	  accommodate	  the	  different	  patterns	  of	  interstate	  interaction,	  the	  rising	  number	  of	  non-­‐state	   security	   actors,	   the	   expansion	   of	   the	   security	   agenda,	   and	   conflict	   regulation	   or	  resolution.”	  They	  further	  noted	  the	  following	  advantages	  of	  using	  this	  perspective:	  	  	   Security	  governance	  possesses	  the	  virtue	  of	  conceptual	  accommodation:	  it	  allows	   for	   hierarchical	   patterns	   of	   interaction	   as	   well	   as	   the	   disparate	  substantive	   bundling	   and	   normative	   content	   of	   security	   institutions.	  Security	  governance	  possesses	  the	  additional	  virtues	  of	  neither	  precluding	  nor	   necessitating	   the	   privileging	   of	   the	   state	   or	   non-­‐state	   actors	   in	   the	  security	  domain;	  it	  leaves	  open	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  states	  are	  able	  to	  provide	   security	   across	   multiple	   levels	   and	   dimensions	   unilaterally	   or	  whether	  states	  are	  compelled	  to	  work	  within	  multilateral	  or	  supranational	  institutional	  frameworks	  (2007:18-­‐19).	  	  	  IR	  scholarship	  that	  has	  generally	  paid	  attention	  to	  the	  security	  governance	  perspective	  can	  be	   put	   into	   three	   main	   groups.	   The	   first	   group	   of	   studies,	   of	   course	   not	   mentioned	   in	  specific	   order	   of	   preference,	   analyses	   security	   governance	   from	   a	   conceptual	   viewpoint	  (Krahmann,	   2003).	   The	   second	   examines	   security	   governance	   approaches	   from	   a	  comparative	   perspective	   (Kirchner	   and	   Sperling,	   2007).	   The	   third	   group	   of	   studies	  examines	   unintended	   consequences	   of	   the	   security	   governance	   paradigm	   (Daase	   and	  Friesedorf,	  2010).	  By	  focusing	  on	   ‘unintended	  consequences’	  this	  cluster	  of	  studies	  is	  not	  fixing	  its	  attention	  to	  problems	  of	  effectiveness,	  efficiency	  or	  side	  effect.	  Rather,	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  unintended	  outcomes	  of	  security	  governance,	  defined	  as	  an	  “effect	  of	  purposive	  social	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action	  which	  is	  different	  from	  what	  was	  wanted	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  carrying	  out	  the	  act,	  and	  the	  want	  of	  which	  was	  a	  reason	  for	  carrying	   it	  out”	  (Baert,	  1991	  as	  quoted	   in	  Daase	  and	  Friesedorf,	  2010:	  9).	  	  	  	  The	  prominence	  of	  the	  security	  governance	  perspective	  partly	  derives	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  favourably	   captures	   landmark	   transformation	   in	   the	   security	   paradigm.	   The	   shift	   from	  traditional	   security	   policy,	   referred	   to	   as	   inter-­‐state	   relations	   mainly	   in	   the	   military	  domain	  with	  major	  pre-­‐occupation	  on	  defending	   territorial	   integrity,	   to	   the	  expansion	  of	  the	   security	   agenda	   with	   new	   problems	   to	   be	   regulated	   (arms	   proliferation,	   terrorism,	  organized	   crime	   and	   environmental	   degradation)	   as	   well	   as	   new	   referent	   objects	   to	   be	  considered	   (societies	   and	   individuals).	   With	   such	   a	   wider,	   complex	   and	   demanding	  security	  agenda,	  new	  actors	  had	  to	  be	  drafted	  in	  to	  share	  responsibilities,	  hence	  a	  plurality	  of	   actors	   in	   the	   coordination,	   management	   and	   regulation	   of	   security	   policies.	   Security	  governance	   can	   also	   simply	   be	   understood	   by	   looking	   at	   the	   forms	   in	   which	   it	   takes	  according	   to	   the	   role	   of	   national	   governments	   (Daase	   and	   Friesedorf,	   2010:3-­‐4):	   (a)	  Governance	   by	   government	   denoting	   institutionalized	   forms	   of	   inter-­‐state	   cooperation	  that	  was	   long	   taken	   too	   lightly	   by	   realist	   theorists;	   (b)	   governance	  without	   government	  referring	  to	  the	  self-­‐regulation	  of	  private	  actors	  such	  as	  NGOs	  and	  businesses	  who	  conduct	  security-­‐related	  activities	  without	  state	  agencies	   interference.	  Specific	  example	  would	  be	  where	  multinational	  companies	  hire	  their	  own	  private	  security	  contractors	  to	  protect	  their	  property	  abroad;	  (c)	  governance	  with	  government	  entailing	  joint	  action	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors.	  This	  is	  the	  most	  common	  form	  in	  recent	  years.	  As	  succinctly	  put	  by	  Daase	  and	  Friesedorf:	  	  	   The	   transnational	   nature	   of	   contemporary	   security	   issues	   calls	   for	  enhanced	  transnational	  cooperation.	  A	  state,	  even	  a	  powerful	  one,	  cannot	  mitigate	   climate	   change	   or	   terrorism	   on	   its	   own.	   But	   interstate	  cooperation	   is	   not	   sufficient.	   To	   prevent	   an	   unwanted	   effect	   or	   limit	   its	  consequences,	   states	   must	   draw	   on	   the	   resources	   of	   international	  organizations,	   NGOs,	   and	   private	   businesses.	   While	   governments	   often	  remain	  the	  central	  actors,	  they	  are	  no	  longer	  the	  only	  ones	  (2010:4-­‐5).	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3.3.	  Security	  Governance	  Conceptual	  Framework	  	  Security	   governance	   is	   a	   recent	   concept,	   which	   consists	   of	   two	   elements:	   security	   and	  governance.	  The	  concept	  of	   security	  has	   received	  various	   interpretations	  and	  definitions	  (as	   shown	   in	   the	   preceding	   sections,	   and	   therefore	   its	   elaboration	  will	   not	   be	   repeated	  here).	  Governance	  has	  been	  treated	  in	  the	  governance	  literature	  as	  a	  phenomenon	  distinct	  from	   ‘government’.	   While	   government	   suggests	   presence	   of	   centralized	   authority	   with	  ability	   to	   impose	   policy	   preferences,	   governance 41 ,	   by	   contrast,	   is	   concerned	   with	  understanding	  how	  the	  regulation	  of	  societies	  or	  the	  international	  system	  has	  given	  space	  for	   the	   involvement	   of	   political	   actors	   besides	   governments	   (Pierre,	   2000:	   3-­‐4).	  	  Governance	   is	   specifically	   epitomized	   by	   the	   policymaking,	   which	   is	   fragmented	   among	  state	   and	   non-­‐state	   actors,	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   an	   overarching	   political	   authority	   and	   in	  several	   dimensions	   (Krahmann,	   2003:	   11).	   According	   to	   Krahmann	   (2008:	   200-­‐201),	  fragmentation	  of	  policymaking	  is	  taking	  place	   in	  seven	  dimensions,	  namely:	  geographical	  fragmentation	   to	   local	   agencies,	   regional	   or	   global	   organizations	   and	   private	   actors;	  functional	  fragmentation	  involving	  the	  regulation	  of	  different	  issue	  areas	  by	  multiple	  and	  separate	   authorities;	   resource	   fragmentation	  which	   refers	   to	   dispersion	   of	   policymaking	  and	  implementation	  capabilities;	  fragmentation	  not	  only	  in	  the	  making	  of	  policies	  but	  also	  their	   implementation;	   and	   finally	   interest	   and	  normative	   fragmentation,	  with	   the	   former	  pointing	   to	   the	   heterogeneous	   and	   sometimes	   conflicting	   interests	   of	   different	   actors	  (mainly	   public	   versus	   private),	   and	   the	   latter	   typified	   by	   the	   emergence	   of	   norms	   of	  neoliberalism	   and	   the	   new	   public	   management,	   which	   in	   essence	   favours	   a	   state	   with	  limited	  sovereignty.	  	  Webber	   et	   al.	   (2004:	   4)	   define	   security	   governance	   as	   involving	   the	   “coordinated,	  management	   and	   regulation	   of	   issues	   by	   multiple	   and	   separate	   authorities,	   the	  interventions	   of	   both	   public	   and	   private	   actors	   (depending	   upon	   the	   issue),	   formal	   and	  informal	   arrangements,	   in	   turn	   structured	   by	   discourse	   and	   norms,	   and	   purposefully	  directed	   toward	   particular	   policy	   outcomes.”	   	   From	   the	   foregoing	   definition,	   there	   is	   an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  According	  to	  Webber	  et	  al.	  (2004:4)	  the	  term	  governance	  in	  IR	  studies	  has	  been	  used	  in	  so	  many	  different	  ways,	  for	  instance,	  environmental	  governance,	  trade	  governance,	  international	  monetary	  governance,	  that	  its	  analytical	  precision	  has	  been	  blunted.	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appreciation	   of	   engagement	   of	   actors	   other	   than	   states	   relevant	   to	   three	   key	   security	  dimensions	   of	   coordination,	   management	   and	   regulation	   even	   though	   states	   have	  remained	   resilient	   units	   in	   security	   matters	   (Flemes	   and	   Radseck,	   2009;	   Webber	   et	   al.	  2004).	   The	   concept	   of	   governance	   has	   been	   applied	   to	   different	   levels	   (global,	   regional,	  state	  and	  sub-­‐state),	  and	  to	  different	  types	  and	  constellation	  of	  actors.	  At	  the	  global	  level,	  global	   security	   governance	   involves	   the	   UN	   multilateral	   system	   and	   henceforth	   is	  dominated	  by	  state	  and	  intergovernmental	  actors	  but	  there	  is	  also	  a	  growing	  influence	  of	  NGOs	   in	  areas	  of	  disarmament,	  non-­‐proliferation	  of	   small	   arms,	  peacekeeping	  and	  peace	  building	  (Hanggi,	  2005:	  8).	  	  	  Regional	   security	   governance	   relates	   to	   broad	   dynamics	   in	   the	   development	   of	   security	  arrangements	   in	   a	   given	   region.	   As	   far	   as	   regional	   security	   is	   concerned,	   security	  governance	   has	   been	   conceived	   as	   an	   order-­‐creating	   mechanism	   (Adler	   and	   Greve,	  2009:65;	  Flemes	  and	  Radseck,	  2009:7).	  	  In	  their	  analytical	  framework	  developed	  to	  explain	  regional	  security	  dynamics	   in	  South	  America,	  Flemes	  and	  Radseck	  (2009:7)	  have	  offered	  the	  following	  definition	  of	  regional	  security	  governance:	  	  	   Regional	   security	   governance	   denotes	   formal	   and	   informal	   structures	   of	  authority	  that	  coordinate,	  manage	  and	  rule	  collective	  responses	  to	  threats	  to	  the	  security	  of	  states	  in	  a	  delineated	  region	  or	  common	  efforts	  of	  these	  states	   to	   promote	   security	   and	   stability	   outside	   the	   region.	   Collective	  security	   challenges	   can	   be	   subdivided	   into	   interstate	   conflicts,	   domestic	  crises	  affecting	  regional	  stability,	  and	  transnational	  threats.	  The	  unilateral,	  bilateral	   and	   multilateral	   structures	   of	   authority	   can	   be	   codified	   in	  formally	  binding	  institutional	  forms,	  but	  they	  may	  also	  be	  identified	  in	  the	  norms	   of	   behaviour	   and	   action	   accepted	   informally	   among	   the	   regional	  states.	  	  To	  assess	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  security	  governance	  entails	  appraising	  how	  it	  actually	  performs	  the	  key	   functions	  of	   coordination,	  management	  and	   regulation	  of	   collective	   responses	   to	  security	  threats	  facing	  Member	  States	  in	  its	  delineated	  region.	  Henceforth,	  the	  study	  lends	  its	   focus	   on	   the	   two	   core	   components	   of	   security	   governance,	   namely	   coordination	   and	  management.	   As	   referred	   in	   the	   governance	   literature	   coordination	   relates	   primarily	   to	  how	   actors	   interact	   and	   who	   drives	   or	   sets	   the	   agenda	   in	   policy-­‐making	   (Kirchner,	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2006:953).	  Specifically,	  coordination	  here	  is	  understood	  as	  the	  interaction	  of	  actors	  within	  a	  sub-­‐regional	  arrangement	  culminating	  into	  the	  development	  of	  operational	  support	  tools	  (such	   as	   protocols,	   rules,	   laws,	   guidelines,	   standards	   etc.)	   and	   relevant	   coordinating	  structures.	  These	  operational	  tools	  and	  structures	  provide	  a	  mechanism	  by	  which	  security	  cooperation	  can	  be	  undertaken	  but	  also	  constitutes	  a	  framework	  through	  which	  all	  the	  key	  players	   are	   brought	   together	   and	   their	   activities	   coordinated	   and	   combined	   in	   order	   to	  promote	  a	  collective	  approach	  to	  security	  challenges.	  	  	  It	  is	  through	  rules,	  laws	  and	  norms	  addressing	   specific	   security	   challenges	   that	   national	   and	   sub-­‐regional	   structures	   of	  authority	  would	  seek	  to	  determine	  the	  nature	  and	  extent	  of	  collective	  security	  challenges	  and	  develop	  appropriate,	  coordinated	  policy	  responses.	  	  Management	  relates	  to	  how	  policies	  are	  carried	  out,	  administered	  or	  controlled	  (Kirchner,	  2006).	  On	  the	  security	  challenge	  of	  transnational	  threat	  of	  Small	  Arms	  and	  Light	  Weapons	  (SALW)	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  two	  major	  management	  tasks,	  namely	  review	  and	  harmonization	  of	  legislation	   and	   control	   measures	   (collection	   and	   destruction,	   marking	   and	   record	  keeping)42.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  domestic	  political	  crisis,	  attention	  is	  on	  efforts,	  whether	  through	  peaceful	   initiatives	   such	   as	   mediation,	   negotiation,	   conciliation	   and	   adjudication	   or	  military	  intervention,	  undertaken	  within	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  arrangement	  aimed	  at	  managing	  domestic	  political	  instability	  in	  a	  Member	  State.	  	  Henceforth,	  of	  interest	  here	  are	  all	  those	  efforts	  to	  help	  conflicting	  parties	  to	  ensure	  escalation	  of	  the	  crisis	  is	  averted	  and	  seize	  the	  opportunity	  to	  bring	  sustainable	  peace.	  	  The	  third	  component	  of	  security	  governance,	  regulation,	  has	  been	  deliberately	   left	  out	  of	  the	   ensuing	   analysis.	   Regulation	   as	   a	   component	   of	   security	   governance	   reflects	   the	  cumulative	  effect	  of	  a	  policy	  output.	   It	  relates	  to	  policy	  outcome	  in	  security	  dimension	  in	  terms	  of	   impact	  of	  policies	  on	  the	  desired	  objectives	  or	  targets.	  The	  decision	  to	  leave	  out	  regulation	   is	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   is	   rather	   difficult	   to	   find	   a	   convenient	   yardstick	   for	  which	  to	  measure	  the	  policy	  outcome	  (impact)	  of	  sub-­‐regional	  arrangement	  in	  response	  to	  a	   certain	   security	   challenge.	   For	   instance,	   in	   assessing	   the	   regulation	   of	   the	   security	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Issues	   of	   training	   (i.e.	   operational	   capacity	   building)	   and	   public	   education	   and	   awareness	   are	   discussed	  under	  the	  control	  measures	  of	  collection	  and	  destruction,	  and	  marking	  and	  record	  keeping,	  respectively.	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challenge	   of	   transnational	   threats	   it	   would	   require	   measuring	   the	   rates	   of	   change	   in	  transnational	  criminal	  acts	  within	  each	  member	  state	  and	  then	  determine	  the	  impact	  that	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  organization	  have	  had	  on	  that	  range	  of	  change.	  This	  could	  not	  be	  sufficiently	  fulfilled	  within	  the	  timeframe	  of	  the	  current	  study.	  Operationalization	  of	  coordination	  and	  management,	  and	  other	  concepts	  forms	  part	  of	  the	  next	  chapter.	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Chapter	  Four	  
4.	  Research	  Design	  and	  Methods	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.1. Introduction	  	  The	  theoretical	  discussions	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  indicate	  a	  clear	  preference	  for	  security	  governance	   as	   an	   appropriate	   framework	   with	   which	   we	   can	   better	   understand	   an	  evolving	  plurality	  of	  actors,	  institutional	  arrangements,	  and	  their	  interaction	  in	  addressing	  security	  challenges	   in	   the	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  context.	  This	  chapter,	  accordingly,	   features	  the	   research	   design	   and	   the	   methods	   that	   state	   the	   conceptual	   and	   methodological	  structure	   within	   which	   this	   research	   had	   been	   conducted.	   The	   chapter	   is	   critical	   for	  explaining	   the	   study’s	   research	  question	   and	  hypothesis,	   as	  well	   as	   operationalizing	   key	  concepts.	   It	   also	   offers	   justification	   for	   the	   selection	   of	   cases	   (i.e.	   EAC	   and	   SADC),	   and	  specifies	  the	  scope	  of	  study,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  timeframe	  and	  selection	  of	  security	  challenges.	  It	   finally	  demonstrates	   the	  means	  of	  obtaining	  data	  and	  explanation	  of	   the	  way	   in	  which	  selected	  means	  of	  obtaining	  information	  were	  organized	  and	  the	  reasoning	  leading	  to	  the	  selection.	  	  	  4.2. Research	  Questions	  	  Consistent	   with	   reports	   compiled	   by	   various	   international	   data	   sets43,	   since	   the	   1990s	  security	  challenges	   in	  the	   form	  of	   inter-­‐state	  conflicts	  have	  been	  on	  a	  decline	  around	  the	  globe.	  The	  most	  prominent	  security	  challenges	  confronting	  majority	  of	  states	   in	  Africa	  to	  date	   are	   mainly	   of	   two	   forms,	   namely	   transnational	   threats	   and	   internal	   or	   domestic	  political	  crises.	  Given	  their	  proximity	  (physically	  and	  culturally)	  to	  the	  areas	  facing	  these	  security	   challenges,	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   are	   expected	   to	   assume	   primary	  responsibility	   to	   respond	   to	   both	   sets	   of	   challenges	   within	   their	   geographical	   areas	  (Francis,	  2006;	  Merrils,	  1998).	  Sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  are	  adeptly	  placed	  not	  only	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Referred	  here	  are	  the	  well-­‐known	  UCPD	  (Uppsala	  Conflict	  Data	  Program)	  based	  at	  the	  Uppsala	  University;	  CSP	  (Center	  for	  Systemic	  Peace)	  based	  at	  George	  Mason	  University;	  COW	  (Correlates	  of	  War)	  Project	  at	  the	  Penn	  State	  University;	  ECP	  (Escola	  de	  Cultura	  de	  Pau)	  based	  at	  the	  Autonomous	  University	  in	  Barcelona;	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provide	  a	  forum	  for	  facilitating	  early	  warning	  and	  response	  mechanisms	  to	  transnational	  threats,	  but	  also	  can	  play	  important	  roles	  in	  isolating	  as	  well	  as	  resolving	  conflict	  situations	  within	  their	  members	  (Ramsbotham	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  	  	  As	   both	   forms	   of	   security	   challenges	   have	   ramifications	   beyond	   one’s	   national	   frontiers,	  and	   thus,	   threatening	   to	   impact	   negatively	   on	   the	   general	   integration	   agenda	   of	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations,	   one	   expects	   these	   challenges	   to	   receive	   same	   level	   of	   attention	  from	  sub-­‐regional	  arrangements.	  It	  is,	  therefore,	  important	  to	  comparatively	  establish	  how	  sub-­‐regional	  arrangements	  with	  security	  mandates	  actually	  coordinate	  and	  manage	  their	  responses	  to	  the	  collective	  security	  challenges	  in	  their	  delineated	  areas.	  It	  will	  equally	  be	  interesting	   to	   compare	   not	   only	   how	   each	   of	   the	   two	   forms	   of	   security	   challenges	   are	  addressed	   within	   one,	   but	   also	   across	   two	   sub-­‐regional	   arrangements.	   The	   study	   thus	  poses	  the	  following	  question:	  	  
What	   is	   the	   relevance	   of	   sub-­‐regional	   security	   governance	   in	   addressing	   collective	   security	  
challenges	  facing	  participants	  of	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations?	  	  In	  attempting	   to	  answer	   the	   foregoing	  question	  by	  seeking	   to	  provide	   first,	  a	  descriptive	  account	  of	   the	  nature	  and	  magnitude	  of	   the	  security	  challenges	  under	  consideration,	  and	  second	   analytical	   comparisons	   of	   how	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   have	   coordinated	   and	  managed	   their	   responses	   to	   those	   security	   challenges,	   the	   following	   sub-­‐questions	  were	  developed:	  	  
1. What	  is	  the	  nature	  and	  extent	  of	  collective	  security	  challenges	  facing	  Member	  States	  of	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations?	  	  
2. In	  what	  ways	  do	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  undertake	  the	  coordination	  and	  management	  of	  collective	  security	  challenges	  facing	  their	  Member-­‐States?	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4.3. Study’s	  Hypothesis	  	  It	  is	  widely	  acknowledged	  that	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  actors	  is	  presently	  involved	  in	  governance	  of	   security	   (Hänggi,	   2005;	   Krahmann,	   2003	   &	   2008;	   Caparini,	   2006;	   Kirchner,	   2006;	  Webber	  et.	  al.	  2004).	  Security	  governance	  essentially	  suggests	  deliberate	  efforts	  to	  shape	  and	  influence	  the	  behaviour	  and	  field	  of	  action	  of	  multiple	  actors	  in	  support	  of	  responses	  to	  security	  challenges.	  The	  state	  is,	  therefore,	  one	  actor,	  albeit	  a	  very	  important	  one,	  among	  various	   actors	   (non-­‐state	   actors	   such	   as	   NGOs,	   intergovernmental	   institutions,	   regional	  and	   international	   organizations)	   at	  multiple	   levels	  who	   supplement,	   augment,	   or	   enrich	  the	   state’s	   efforts	   to	   counter	   security	   threats	   (Caparini,	   2006).	   This	   means	   besides	  implying	   involvement	   of	   more	   than	   a	   single	   set	   of	   actors	   (such	   as	   state	   political	  institutions)	   in	  shaping	  the	  behaviour	  of	  states	  and	  a	   field	  of	  action,	  security	  governance	  suggests	   a	  move	   away	   from	   state-­‐centricism,	   to	   attention	   on	   the	   sum	  of	   the	  many	  ways	  institutions,	   non-­‐state	   actors,	   international	   organizations	   as	  well	   as	   the	   state	   coordinate	  and	  manage	   their	   common	   affairs	   (Webber	   et.	   al.	   2004).	   It	   is	   also	   assumed	   the	   growing	  involvement	   of	   actors	   other	   than	   states	   in	   security	   governance	   helps	   to	   lower	   the	  pressures	  on	  the	  state	  (Krahmann,	  2008).	  	  	  Security	  governance,	  henceforth,	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  appropriate	  framework	  with	  which	  we	  can	   better	   understand	   an	   evolving	   array	   of	   actors,	   institutional	   arrangements,	   and	   their	  interaction	   in	   the	  making	   (coordination)	   and	   implementation	   (management)	   of	   security	  policies.	  Thus,	  the	  relevance	  of	  security	  governance	  at	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  level	  hinges	  on	  how	  an	  evolving	  plurality	  of	  actors	  and	   institutions	  actually	  coordinate	  and	  manage	  collective	  responses	   to	   security	   threats.	   Yet,	   the	   coordination	   and	   management	   of	   responses	   to	  collective	  security	  challenges	  are	  likely	  to	  differ.	  It	  is	  expected	  that	  the	  security	  governance	  components	  might	  produce	  differing	  outcomes	  in	  guiding	  the	  behaviour	  of	  states	  and	  their	  responses,	   depending	   on	   the	   security	   challenge	   at	   hand.	   As	   hinted	   before,	   sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  in	  Africa,	  and	  in	  particular	  Sub-­‐Sahara	  Africa,	  have	  come	  to	  deal	  more	  with	  two	   clusters	   of	   collective	   security	   challenges	   since	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Cold	   War,	   namely	  transnational	   threats	   and	   domestic	   political	   crises.	   Both	   transnational	   threats	   and	  domestic	  political	  crises	  require	  equal	  attention.	  However,	  coordination	  and	  management	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of	   responses	   to	   these	   security	   challenges	   will	   not	   practically	   be	   uniform.	   It	   has,	   for	  instance,	  been	  observed	  elsewhere	  that	  actors	  at	  the	  regional	  level	  are	  severely	  limited	  to	  act	  as	  agents	  in	  resolving	  internal	  or	  domestic	  crises	  (Ramsbotham,	  2011).	  Assuming	  this	  assertion	   is	   accurate,	   security	   governance	   would	   appear	   to	   be	   more	   appropriate	   for	  addressing	   certain	   security	   challenges,	   and	   less	   so	   for	   other	   sets	   of	   security	   challenges.	  This	   leads	   to	   the	   following	  Hypothesis:	   the	  coordination	  and	  management	  of	  sub-­‐regional	  
security	  governance	  depends	  on	  the	  type	  of	  collective	  security	  challenge.	  	  4.4. Operationalization	  of	  Concepts	  	  This	   section	   operationalizes	   the	   central	   concepts	   of	   the	   study,	   starting	   with	   the	   terms	  ‘security’,	  collective	  security	  challenges,	  followed	  by	  the	  two	  core	  components	  of	  security	  governance	  namely,	  coordination	  and	  management	  that	  are	  used	  as	  the	  central	  parameters	  for	  comparing	  the	  two	  sub-­‐regional	  arrangements	  under	  focus.	  	  4.4.1.	  Security	  	  As	   observed	   in	   the	   preceding	   chapter,	   the	  main	   theoretical	   discourses	   and	   independent	  analysts	  differ	  in	  their	  explanations	  of	  security.	  Realists,	  liberals	  and	  constructivists	  define	  security	  differently.	  Realists,	   for	   instance,	  define	  security	   in	   terms	  of	  war,	   the	  survival	  of	  the	   state,	   and	   the	   role	   of	  military	   power	   in	   settling	   international	   conflicts.	   Liberals	   and	  critical	   theorists	   define	   security	   more	   broadly	   to	   encompass	   non-­‐military	   features	   but	  differ	   among	   themselves	   about	  what	   reference	  objects	   of	   security	   should	  be.	  They	   insist	  cooperation	  between	  states	  can	  improve	  security	  and	  that	  international	  organizations	  can	  act	  as	  instruments	  for	  attaining	  security.	  	  Independent	  analysts	  also	  offer	  different	  explanations	  of	  what	  constitutes	  security44.	  And	  yet	  most	  other	  security	  analysts	  within	  IR	  work	  with	  a	  definition	  of	  security	  that	  involves	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Makinda	  (1998),	  for	  instance,	  links	  security	  directly	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  sovereignty.	  Makinda	  refers	  to	  security	  as	  “the	  preservation	  of	  society’s	  norms,	  rules,	  values	  and	  institutions,	  including	  the	  state	  system”	  (1998:286).	  	  
	   54	  
the	  “	  alleviation	  of	  threats	  to	  cherished	  values”	  (Hout,	  1999:	  16;	  Franke,	  2009:8;	  Williams,	  2008:15),	   especially	   those,	   which,	   if	   left	   unchecked,	   pose	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   survival	   of	   a	  particular	  referent	  object.	  	  	  There	   is,	   thus,	   a	   danger	   that	   the	   observed	   expansion	   and	   proliferation	   of	   definitions	   of	  security	   could	   end	   up	   rendering	   the	   term	   itself	   as	   of	   no	   analytical	   value.	   To	   avoid	   this	  pitfall,	  this	  study	  concurs	  with	  Väyrynen’s	  (1999)	  suggestion	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  threat	  be	  used	  as	  the	  main	  unifying	  element	  in	  the	  study	  of	  security45.	  There	  is,	  therefore,	  the	  need	  to	  define	  and	  operationalize	  the	  term	  ‘threat’	  as	  there	  are	  still	  several	  kinds	  of	  situations	  that	  can	  be	   considered	   threats	   to	   individuals.	  One	   observation	   from	   scholars	   view	   threats	   as	  violent	   acts	   to	   individuals,	   thus	   placing	   the	   ‘freedom	   from	   fear’	   aspect	   at	   the	   core	   of	  consideration	   (Mack,	   2005;	   Lodgaard,	   2000;	   Petersen,	   2005).	   Another	   observation	  embraces	   a	   broader	   definition	   of	   threats	   that	   includes	   hunger,	   disease,	   and	   natural	  disasters	  (freedom	  from	  want),	  arguing	  that	  these	  have	  caused	  more	  deaths	  than	  war	  and	  violent	  conflict	  (Thakur	  and	  Newman,	  2000;	  Alkire,	  2003).	  	  The	  realization	  of	  threat	  is	  defined	  as	  “the	  product	  of	  the	  actor’s	  capability	  and	  intention	  to	  deprive	  the	  target	  of	  specific	  values”	  (Väyrynen,	  1999:52).	  This	  definition,	  however,	  covers	  all	   types	  of	   threats	  (i.e.	   intentional	  and	  unintentional)	   to	  security.	   Intentional	   threats	  are	  those	   purporting	   to	   produce	   deprivation	   and	   harm	   in	   the	   target.	   ‘Direct	   violence’	   in	  Galtung’s	   (1990)	   perspective	   fits	   this	   category.	   Direct	   violence	   includes	   murder,	   ethnic	  cleansing,	   armed	   aggression,	   and	   so	   forth.	   Unintentional	   threats	   like	   natural	   disasters,	  epidemics	   and	   other	   similar	   hazards	   also	   jeopardize	   human	   life	   but	   they	   carry	   an	  additional	  character,	  i.e.	  they	  are	  typically	  beyond	  human	  control.	  	  The	   ‘values’	   mentioned	   in	   our	   adopted	   definition	   of	   security	   (alleviation	   of	   threats	   to	  cherished	   values)	   also	   need	   clarification.	   	   The	   values	   that	   are	   threatened	   by	   intentional	  acts	   are	   survival	   (respect	   for	   life),	   well-­‐being	   (access	   to	   material	   entitlements),	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  To	   Makinda,	   therefore,	   security	   cannot	   be	   detached	   from	   sovereignty.	   Security	   actually	   revolves	   around	  sovereignty,	  both	  juridical	  and	  empirical.	  This	  is	  a	  very	  expansive	  definition	  of	  security.	  45	  Buzan	  also	  noted	  way	  back	   in	  1991	  that	   the	  discussion	  on	  security	   is	   ‘about	   the	  pursuit	  of	   freedom	  from	  threat’.	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identity	   (right	   to	   human	   self-­‐realization)	   (Väyrynen,	   1999:53)46.	   All	   intentional	   acts	   to	  deprive	  these	  values	  pose	  threats	  to	  individual	  and	  collective	  security.	  	  The	  UN	  Secretary-­‐General’s	  High-­‐Level	  Panel	  on	  Threats,	  Challenges	  and	  Change	   identified	  six	  clusters	  of	  threats	  confronting	  the	  world’s	  governments	  in	  its	  report,	  namely	  “economic	  and	   social	   threats,	   including	   poverty,	   infectious	   disease	   and	   environmental	   degradation;	  inter-­‐state	   conflict;	   internal	   conflict,	   including	   civil	   war,	   genocide	   and	   other	   large-­‐scale	  atrocities;	   nuclear,	   radiological,	   chemical	   and	   biological	   weapons;	   terrorism;	   and	  transnational	   organized	   crime”	   (2004:2).	   As	   can	   be	   observed,	   the	   list	   is	   long	   and	   is	  susceptible	   to	   more	   sub-­‐lists.	   This	   study	   narrows	   its	   focus	   to	   two	   clusters	   of	   security	  threats	   (hereunder	   referred	   to	   as	   collective	   security	   challenges)	   notably	   ‘transnational	  threats’	   and	   ‘internal/intra-­‐state	   conflicts’.	   Operational	   definitions	   of	   the	   same	   follow	   in	  the	  next	  sub-­‐section.	  	  	  	  4.4.2.	  Collective	  Security	  Challenges	  	  Collective	   security	   challenges	   entail	   all	   those	   factors	   that	   engender	   insecurity	   in	   both	  individual	  states	  and	  the	  entire	  sub-­‐region.	  These	  security	  challenges	  are	  treated	  as	  those	  threats	  that	  may	  endanger	  or	  have	  the	  potential,	  either	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  to	  constrain	  individual	  and	  collective	  efforts	  to	  achieve	  sub-­‐regional	  and	  regional	  security	  goals.	  As	  can	  be	   observed,	   there	   are	   numerous	   situations	   that	   can	   qualify	   to	   be	   in	   the	   category	   of	  collective	  security	  challenges.	  Collective	  security	  challenges	  are	  thus	  classified	   into	   inter-­‐state	  conflicts,	  intra-­‐state	  conflicts,	  and	  transnational	  threats.	  The	  study	  focuses	  on	  the	  last	  two	   security	   challenges,	   transnational	   threats	   and	   intra-­‐state	   conflicts,	   which	   have	  predominantly	  featured	  in	  the	  list	  of	  threat	  clusters	  in	  contemporary	  world.	  The	  decision	  to	  narrow	  my	  focus	  on	  these	  two	  sets	  of	  security	  challenges	  is	  grounded	  on	  the	  explanation	  provided	  in	  the	  later	  section	  (scope	  of	  study)	  of	  this	  chapter.	  Operational	  definitions	  of	  the	  collective	   security	   challenges	   of	   transnational	   threats	   and	   domestic	   political	   crises	   form	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  next	  two	  sub-­‐sections.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  It	  can	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  classification	  of	  values	  centres	  on	  the	  targets	  of	  threats,	  as	  a	  distinction	  has	  to	  be	  made	  between	  sources	  and	  targets	  of	  threats.	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4.4.2.1. Transnational Threats 	  The	  concept	  of	  ‘transnational	  threats’	  is	  made	  up	  of	  two	  terms,	  transnational	  and	  threats.	  The	   term	   ‘transnational’	   is	   very	   important	   here	   as	   it	   suggests	   regular	   interactions,	  activities	   or	   forces	   across	   national	   frontiers	   undertaken	   mostly	   by	   non-­‐state	   actors	  (Williams	   and	   Haacke,	   2008:	   120).	   Borrowing	   from	   the	   Princeton	   Project	   on	   National	  Security	  (2005:	  3),	  transnational	  threats	  are	  defined	  as	  those	  characterized	  by	  an	  event	  or	  phenomenon	   of	   cross-­‐border	   scope,	   the	   dynamics	   of	   which	   are	   significantly,	   but	   not	  necessarily	   exclusively	   driven	   by	   non-­‐state	   actors,	   e.g.	   crime	   syndicates,	   terrorists,	  activities	   (global	   economic	   behaviour	   like	   the	   1997	  Asian	   financial	   crisis)	   or	   forces	   (e.g.	  microbial	  mutations).	  	  These	   threats	   disrupt	   peoples’	   lives	   regardless	   of	   where	   they	   live	   (national	   borders),	  political	   inclination	   and	   ideologies	   they	   ascribe	   to,	   their	   race,	   religious	   affiliation	   and	  ethnic	   identity.	   As	   described	   in	   recent	   scholarship	   on	   security	   issues,	   they	   are	   ‘threats	  without	   enemies’	   (or	   clearly	  defined	  enemies)	   and	  as	   such	  would	   call	   for	   “a	  multilateral	  response	  stemming	  from	  an	  acceptance	  of	  regional	  interdependence	  and	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	   futility	   of	   action	   within	   a	   purely	   national	   context”(Hamill,	   1998:	   2).	   The	   trans-­‐boundary	   nature	   of	   these	   security	   concerns	   does	   not	   only	   render	   functional	   and	  geographical	   borders	   as	   somewhat	   irrelevant	   owing	   to	   the	   way	   they	   reveal	   the	   nexus	  between	   internal	   and	   external	   security,	   but	   also	   go	   a	   long	  way	   to	   affect	   a	  wide	   range	  of	  referent	   objects.47	  Due	   to	   the	   porous	   nature	   of	   borders	   in	   developing	   countries	   and	   the	  interconnectedness	  of	  the	  threats	  themselves,	  it	  becomes	  necessary	  for	  state	  apparatuses	  to	  mount	  joint	  responses,	  and	  in	  a	  more	  systematic	  way,	  coordinate	  their	  efforts	  at	  the	  sub-­‐regional	   and	   regional	   levels.	   The	   devastating	   effects	   caused	   by	   flow	   of	   arms,	   organized	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  See	   Eriksson	   and	   Rhinard.	   2009.	   “	   The	   Internal-­‐External	   Security	   Nexus:	   notes	   on	   Emerging	   Research	  Agenda,”	  Cooperation	  and	  Conflict,	  44(3):	  243-­‐267.	  From	  Kwesi	  Anning.	  2007.	  “Africa:	  Confronting	  Complex	  Threats,	   International	  Peace	  Academy,	  Coping	  with	  Crisis	  working	  Series,	  point	  of	  view,	  Africa	   is	   facing	   the	  nexus	   between	   ‘old’	   (perennial	   armed	   conflicts)	   and	   ‘new’	   (such	   as	   Transnational	   Organized	   Crime-­‐TNC)	  security	  challenges.	  The	  ‘new’	  challenges	  being	  nourished	  by	  the	  ‘old’.	  “Africa:	  Confronting	  Complex	  Threats”,	  February.	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crime	  syndicates,	  illegal	  immigration,	  drug	  trafficking,	  money	  laundering,	  flows	  of	  refugees	  and	  internally	  displaced	  people,	  and	  environmental	  degradation	  are	  real	  and	  can	  no	  longer	  be	   treated	  as	   ‘soft	   issues’48	  in	   the	  national	   and	   foreign	  policies	  of	   states.	   In	   recent	  years,	  besides	   acts	   of	   terrorism	   both	   the	   EAC	   and	   SADC	   had	   come	   to	   terms	  with	   the	   threat	   of	  maritime	  piracy	  along	   the	  eastern	  and	   southern	  African	   coastlines	   and	   the	  Gulf	   of	  Aden.	  Piracy	  is	  not	  only	  a	  security	  threat	  but	  also	  impact	  negatively	  on	  imports	  and	  exports	  that	  pass	   through	   the	   Somalia	   coast	   and	   the	   fishing	   and	   tourism	   industries	   of	   Indian	   Ocean	  countries49.	   The	  EAC	   sub-­‐region	   also	   faces	   piracy	   on	   inland	  water	   bodies	   particularly	   in	  Lake	  Victoria.	  There	  are	  numerous	   transnational	   threats	  as	  enumerated	  above;	  however,	  the	  current	  study	  focuses	  on	  the	  threat	  of	  proliferation	  of	  Small	  Arms	  and	  Light	  Weapons	  (SALW).	  	  In	   the	   1997	   UN	   Report,	   SALW	   are	   defined	   as	   those	  weapons	   “manufactured	   to	  military	  specifications	   for	   use	   as	   lethal	   instruments	   of	   war”50.	   However,	   SALW,	   which	   by	   their	  nature	  are	  light,	  easy	  to	  carry	  and	  relatively	  cheap,	  are	  not	  only	  designed	  as	  instruments	  of	  war	   but	   also	   for	   individual	   use.	   The	   category	   of	   small	   arms	   include	   revolvers	   and	   self-­‐loading	  pistols,	  fully	  automatic	  rifles,	  semi-­‐automatic	  rifles,	  assault	  rifles,	  and	  sub-­‐machine	  guns51.	  Light	  weapons	  category	  are	  those	  designed	  for	  use	  by	  several	  persons	  serving	  as	  a	  crew	  and	   comprise	  of	  hand-­‐held	  under-­‐barrel	   and	  mounted	  grenade	   launchers,	   portable	  anti-­‐aircraft	  guns,	  portable	  anti-­‐tank	  guns,	  recoilless	  rifles,	  portable	  launchers	  of	  anti-­‐tank	  missile	  and	  rocket	  system;	  portable	  launchers	  of	  anti-­‐aircraft	  missile	  systems,	  and	  mortars	  of	   calibres	   of	   less	   than	   100mm.	   Ammunitions	   and	   accessories	   including	   cartridge	   cases,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Shibashis	  Chatterjee.	  2003.	   “Neo-­‐realism,	  Neo-­‐liberalism	  and	  Security”,	  has	  questionably	   categorized	   this	  complex	  web	  of	  security	  concerns	  as	  soft	  issues	  and	  has	  treated	  nuclear	  security,	  international	  terrorism	  and	  Weapon	  of	  Mass	  Destruction	  (WMD)	  as	  critical	  issues.	  It	  is	  hereby	  observed	  that	  such	  a	  spurious	  dichotomy	  of	  threats	  tends	  to	  belittle	  certain	  forms	  of	  security	  concerns.	  49	  See	  EAC	  Brief	  Note	  to	  UN	  Member	  States	  on	  “The	  EAC	  Peace,	  Security	  and	  Good	  Governance	  Initiatives	  and	  Strategies	  for	  a	  Sustainable	  Integration”,	  New	  York,	  18th	  October,	  2010;	  Also	  see	  SADC	  Briefing	  Note	  for	  SADC	  Double	   Troika,	   SADC-­‐EU	   Senior	   Officials	  Meeting,	   Phakalane	   Golf	   Estate	   Resort,	   Gaborone,	   17th	   November,	  2010;	  and	  The	  Guardian	  (Tanzania),	  “EAC	  Seeks	  Joint	  Piracy	  Patrol”,	  24th	  February	  2010.	  50	  The	  Panel	  of	  Experts	  on	  Small	  Arms	  A/52/298,	  27th	  August	  1997,	  p.	  26-­‐27.	  51	  In	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol	  for	  the	  Prevention,	  Control	  and	  Reduction	  of	  Small	  Arms	  and	  Light	  Weapons	  in	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  Region,	  The	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  and	  Bordering	  States,	  hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  the	   ‘Nairobi	  Protocol’	  ‘Small	  arms’	  are	  defined	  as	  “weapons	  designed	  for	  personal	  use”	  and	  include	  the	  category	  of	  arms	  mentioned	  above.	  See	  Article	  1	  [Definitions]	  of	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol.	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primers,	   propellant	   powder,	   bullets	   or	   projectiles,	   that	   are	   used	   in	   a	   small	   arm	   or	   light	  weapon	  also	  form	  part	  of	  the	  SALW	  threat.	  	  	  
4.4.2.2. Domestic Political Crises 	  In	   the	   current	   study,	   an	   intra-­‐state	   conflict	   is	   understood	   to	   involve	   lethal	   violence	   and	  armed	   combat	  within	   state	   boundaries	   among	   two	   or	  more	   parties	   pursuing	   conflicting	  political	  goals	  that	  results	  in	  fatalities.	  This	  definition	  offers	  sufficient	  generality	  such	  that	  it	  encompasses	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  violent	  conflicts.	  There	  is,	  therefore,	  necessity	  to	  provide	  clarification	   regarding	   the	   scope	   or	   dimensions	   of	   ‘domestic	   political	   crises’	   as	   a	   sub-­‐category	   of	   intra-­‐state	   conflicts.	   This	   will	   be	   done	   by	   relying	   on	   benchmarks	   or	  classifications	   of	   intra-­‐state	   conflicts	   provided	   by	   other	  works,	   namely	   Small	   and	   Singer	  (1982);	  Regan	  (1996);	  Brecke	  (1999);	  the	  Uppsala	  Conflict	  Data	  Program	  (UCDP),	  and	  the	  Center	  for	  Systemic	  Peace	  (CSP).	  	  	  From	   the	   operational	   definition	   above,	   domestic	   political	   crises	   as	   forms	   of	   intra-­‐state	  conflicts	  are	  classified	  based	  on	  the	  following	  criteria:	  (a)	  that	  they	  take	  place	  within	  the	  internal	  boundaries	  of	  a	  state	  (Small	  and	  Singer,	  1982;	  Brecke,	  1999),	  (b)	  that	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  parties	  be	  the	  government	  in	  power52	  (Small	  and	  Singer,	  1982;	  UCDP,	  2011).	  This	  means	   the	   focus	   here	   is	   on	   ‘state-­‐based	   conflicts’,	   as	   opposed	   to	   ‘non-­‐state	   conflicts’	   in	  which	   none	   of	   the	   conflicting	   parties	   is	   a	   government	   (UCDP,	   2011),	   (c)	   that	   the	   use	   of	  arms	  in	  order	  to	  promote	  the	  parties’	  general	  position	  is	  also	  an	  important	  feature	  in	  such	  conflicts.	   ‘Arms’	   includes	   anything	  material,	   e.g.	   manufactured	   weapons	   and	   also	   sticks,	  stones,	   fire,	   etc.	   (UCDP,	   2011),	   (d)	   that	   the	   crisis	   is	   an	   intra-­‐state	   one	   (i.e.	   between	   a	  government	   and	   a	   non-­‐governmental	   party)	   with	   no	   interference	   from	   other	   countries.	  This	  is	  actually	  distinct	  from	  an	  intra-­‐state	  conflict	  with	  foreign	  involvement,	  which	  is	  an	  “armed	  conflict	  between	  a	  government	  and	  non-­‐government	  party	  where	  the	  government	  side,	  the	  opposing	  side,	  or	  both	  sides,	  receive	  troop	  support	  from	  other	  governments	  that	  actively	  participate	  in	  the	  conflict”	  (UCDP,	  2011),	  (e)	  since	  there	  is	  use	  of	  arms,	  the	  conflict	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Primary	  parties	  are	  parties	  that	  have	  formed	  the	  conflict	  or	  incompatibility.	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results	   in	   fatalities	   to	   any	   or	   both	   disputing	   parties;	   (f)	   the	   resulting	   violence	   must	   be	  directly	   related	   to	   government	   incompatibility,	   i.e.	   the	   conflict	   usually	   concerns	   the	  structure	  or	  distribution	  of	  state	  authority53.	   In	  such	  incompatibilities	  concerning	  type	  of	  political	   system,	   one	   party	   strives	   for	   a	   change	   of	   the	   political	   system	   (i.e.	   looking	   to	  introduce	   something	   new)	   and	   the	   other	   party	   struggles	   to	   maintain	   status	   quo,	   and	  normally	  that	  would	  be	  the	  government	  (UCDP,	  2011).	  	  	  This	  means	  the	  very	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  government	  is	  under	  question,	  and	  in	  most	  cases	  the	  domestic	   laws	  (constitution	  and	  electoral	   laws)	  are	  viewed	  to	  have	  been	  breached	  as	  the	  incompatibility	   is	   related	   to	   the	   management	   of	   the	   electoral	   process	   with	   one	   party	  resisting	   attempt	   by	   another	   to	   subvert	   the	   outcome	   of	   that	   process	   which	   was	   in	   its	  favour.	  Henceforth,	  commission	  of	  violent	  acts	   to	  obtain	  or	  maintain	  power	   is	  one	  of	   the	  defining	   features	   of	   these	   types	   of	   conflicts54,	   and	   finally	   (g)	   the	   stalemate	   situation	  resulting	   from	   the	   employment	   of	   violence	   as	   a	   tool	   of	   political	   competition	   not	   only	  renders	  severe	  strains	  to	  its	  political	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  landscape,	  but	  its	  impact	  is	  also	  felt	  outside	  the	  national	  frontiers.	  The	  domestic	  political	  crisis	  in	  this	  sense,	  therefore,	  has	  the	   potential	   to	   send	   far-­‐reaching	   repercussions	   to	   communities	   and	   countries	   in	   close	  proximity	  to	  the	  affected	  country.	  	  Numerous	  conflicts	  have	  occurred	  and	  some	  continue	  to	  confront	  the	  two	  case	  studies,	  i.e.	  EAC	  and	  SADC,	  but	  could	  not	  feature	  in	  my	  sample	  of	  ‘domestic	  political	  crises’.	  This	  means	  the	  population	  of	  armed	  internal/intra-­‐state	  conflicts	  can	  become	  too	   large	  to	  receive	  an	  adequate	  and	  balanced	  treatment	  in	  a	  single	  inquiry,	  like	  the	  current	  study.	  It	  is,	  therefore,	  crucial	   to	   point	   out	   albeit	   briefly	   a	   series	   of	   conflicts	   left	   out	   of	  my	   sample	   of	   ‘domestic	  political	   crises’.	   Starting	   with	   the	   EAC	   sub-­‐region,	   the	   protracted	   conflict	   in	   Northern	  Uganda	  that	  began	  in	  1986	  soon	  after	  the	  National	  Resistance	  Army/Movement	  (NRA/M)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  According	   to	   the	   UCDP	   incompatibility	   is	   the	   stated	   (in	   writing	   or	   verbally)	   generally	   incompatible	  positions.	  54	  Borrowing	  from	  the	  Social	  Conflict	  in	  Africa	  Database,	  violent	  acts	  can	  be	  waged	  primarily	  by	  government	  authorities,	   or	   by	   groups	   acting	   in	   explicit	   support	   of	   government	   authority,	   targeting	   individuals,	   or	  collective	  individuals,	  members	  of	  an	  alleged	  opposition	  group	  or	  movement	  (i.e.	  pro-­‐government	  violence).	  They	   can	   as	   well	   be	   waged	   primarily	   by	   a	   non-­‐state	   group	   against	   government	   authorities	   or	   symbols	   of	  government	  authorities,	  e.g.	  transportation	  or	  other	  infrastructures	  (i.e.	  anti-­‐government	  violence).	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came	  to	  power	  also	  does	  not	   feature	   in	   this	  study	  because	   it	  has	   involved	   foreign	  troops	  support.	  At	  various	  stages	  of	  the	  conflict	  the	  Sudan	  government	  offered	  direct	  support	  to	  rebels	  of	  the	  Lords’	  Resistance	  Army	  (LRA)	  whilst	  the	  Ugandan	  government	  supported	  the	  Sudanese	   People’s	   liberation	   Army/Movement	   (SPLA/M)	   of	   Southern	   Sudan	   (Atkinson,	  2009:	  7),	  and	  thus	  really	  blurring	  the	  intra/inter-­‐state	  character	  of	  the	  armed	  conflict.	  	  	  Excluded	  also	  is	  the	  1994	  Rwanda	  genocide	  that	  occurred	  before	  the	  designated	  timeframe	  for	   the	  current	   study	   (i.e.	   January	  2000-­‐	  February	  2011).	  Moreover,	   the	  political	   turmoil	  took	  place	  when	  the	  country	  had	  not	  yet	  become	  a	  member	  of	  the	  EAC,	  which	  is	  one	  of	  the	  units	  of	  analysis	   in	  the	  current	  research.	  The	  same	  can	  be	  said	  about	  Burundi,	  which	  has	  been	   embroiled	   in	   intractable	   civil	   war	   with	   strong	   ethnic	   connotations	   following	   the	  overthrow	  of	  a	  duly	  elected	  government	  in	  1993.	  The	  Burundi	  Peace	  Negotiations	  and	  the	  resultant	  Arusha	  Peace	  Accords	  of	  2000	  took	  place	  outside	  the	  EAC	  framework.	  	  On	   the	   side	   of	   the	   SADC	   sub-­‐region,	   the	   foregoing	   operational	   definition	   excludes	   the	  conflict	  in	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo	  (DRC),	  which	  has	  seen	  involvement	  of	  troops	  from	  several	  neighbouring	  countries55	  at	  different	  stages.	  The	  Lesotho	  political	  crisis	  since	  1994	  is	  also	  omitted	  on	  the	  same	  ground	  of	  foreign	  troops	  involvement56.	  Even	  though	  the	  regional	   and	   sub-­‐regional	   bodies	   (i.e.	   the	   AU	   and	   SADC,	   respectively)	   were	   actively	  involved	  since	  June	  2009	  when	  the	  Madagascar	  conflict	  escalated,	  it	  has	  not	  been	  selected	  for	   this	   study	   because	   it	   was	   simply	   a	   case	   of	   military	   coup.	   The	   AU	   and	   SADC	   rightly	  considered	   the	   March	   2009	   army	   mutiny	   as	   unconstitutional	   seizure	   of	   power	   by	  opposition	  leader	  Andry	  Rajoelina.	  	  	  The	  conceptualization	  of	  domestic	  political	  crises,	  therefore,	  leaves	  out	  numerous	  isolated	  types	  of	  intra-­‐state	  conflicts	  taking	  the	  form	  of	  armed	  raids	  to	  steal	  livestock,	  which	  is	  the	  most	  prevalent	  form	  of	  rural	  crime.	  These	  are	  often	  tied	  up	  with	  ethnic	  feuds	  and	  clashes	  between	  rival	  clans,	   like	  those	  between	  the	  Pokomo	  and	  Orma	  of	  River	  Tana	  District	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Armed	  forces	  from	  Angola,	  Namibia,	  Zimbabwe,	  Rwanda	  and	  Uganda	  were	  deployed	  in	  the	  DRC	  conflict	  in	  1998.	  56	  The	  Lesotho	  experience	  saw	  the	  deployment	  of	  defence	  forces	  from	  South	  Africa,	  Botswana	  and	  Zimbabwe.	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those	   in	  Northern	  Tanzania;	  cultivators	  against	  pastoralists	  over	   land	  disputes;	  and	   local	  miners	   against	   Foreign	   Companies	   that	   have	   invested	   in	   the	   flourishing	   mining	   sector.	  Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   such	   conflicts	   take	   place	   within	   a	   country’s	   borders,	   and	   involve	  violence	  and	  in	  most	  cases	  result	  in	  the	  loss	  of	  lives,	  they	  do	  not	  meet	  the	  other	  criteria	  of	  being	   state-­‐based;	  without	   external	   government	   involvement;	   and	   the	   resulting	   violence	  directly	  related	  to	  government	  incompatibility.	  	  The	  two	  classic	  cases	  of	  intra-­‐state	  conflicts	  that	  fit	  the	  foregoing	  operational	  definition	  of	  domestic	  political	  crises	  are	  the	  Kenyan	  and	  Zimbabwean	  post-­‐election	  crises	  of	  2007	  and	  2008,	  respectively.	  As	  pointed	  out	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  the	  study	  focuses	  on	  a	  decade-­‐long	  period	  (January	  2000	  to	  February	  2011)	  of	  conflict	  associated	  with	  electoral	  politics	  in	  the	  two	  countries	  albeit	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  highest	  points	  of	  the	  crises	  were	  observed	  after	  the	  2007	  and	  2008	  elections	  in	  Kenya	  and	  Zimbabwe,	  respectively.	  	  4.4.3.	  Coordination	  	  As	  hinted	  earlier,	   the	  security	  governance	  perspective	  draws	  attention	  to	  multiple	  actors	  and	  different	  levels	  of	  security	  engagement,	  which	  calls	  for	  greater	  cooperation	  among	  the	  actors	  in	  security.	  The	  perspective	  neither	  precludes	  nor	  necessitates	  the	  privileging	  of	  the	  state	  or	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  the	  security	  domain.	  It	  is	  thus	  assumed	  here	  that	  states	  are	  not	  the	  only	  actors	  working	  within	  sub-­‐regional	  arrangements	   in	   the	  security	  domain.	  Other	  actors-­‐types	  that	  forge	  cooperative	  relations	  with	  states	  within	  sub-­‐regional	  arrangement	  in	   response	   to	   collective	   security	   challenges	   are	   non-­‐governmental	   organizations,	   and	  other	   regional	   and	   sub-­‐regional	   intergovernmental	   organizations.	   Coordination,	   thus,	  primarily	  refers	  to	  how	  the	  constellation	  of	  different	  actors	  operating	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  interaction	   takes	   place	   (Hänggi,	   2005;	   Kirchner	   and	   Sperling,	   2007).	   Henceforth,	  coordination	   looks	   at	   the	   integration	   of	   various	   actor-­‐types	   and	  who	   drives	   or	   sets	   the	  agenda	   in	   policy-­‐making	   (Kirchner,	   2006).	   The	   foregoing	   definition	   is	   reflective	   of	   the	  traditional	  conception	  of	  coordination	  as	  “a	  process	  in	  which	  two	  or	  more	  parties	  take	  one	  another	  into	  account	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  bringing	  together	  their	  decisions	  and/or	  activities	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into	  harmonious	  or	  reciprocal	  relation”	  (Kernaghan	  and	  Siegel,	  1987:	  263).	  The	  task	  here	  is	   to	   explore	  which	   actors	  within	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   (i.e.	   EAC	   and	   SADC)	   do	  most	  of	  the	  coordination	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  two	  collective	  security	  challenges	  (proliferation	  of	  SALWs	  and	  domestic	  political	  crises).	  In	  this	  way,	  it	  will	  be	  possible	  to	  establish	  whether	  there	  are	  certain	  actors	  that	  play	  the	  ‘lead’	  role	  in	  a	  given	  security	  threat,	  and	  also	  whether	  there	  is	  coherence	  between	  the	  two	  collective	  security	  challenges.	  	  	  It	  ought	  to	  be	  noted	  also	  that	  the	  coming	  together	  or	  rather	  interaction	  of	  actors	  to	  address	  common	  challenges	  is	  a	  form	  of	  international	  cooperation.	  “But	  all	  efforts	  at	  international	  cooperation	  take	  place	  within	  an	  institutional	  context	  of	  some	  kind,	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  facilitate	  cooperative	  endeavours”	  (Keohane,	  1988:	  380).	  Henceforth,	  analyzing	  how	  actors	  coordinate	   security	   policies	   means	   also	   extending	   the	   inquiry	   into	   how	   international	  institutions,	  defined	  “as	  explicit	  arrangements,	  negotiated	  among	  international	  actors,	  that	  prescribe,	  proscribe,	  and/or	  authorize	  behaviour”	  (Koremenos	  et.	  al.	  2001:	  762),	  operate	  along	  side	  actors	  and	  how	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  problems	  states	  face,	  i.e.	  institutions	  as	  focal	  points	   for	  coordination	  (Keohane	  and	  Martin,	  1995).	  Conceptualized	   this	  way,	   it	  denotes	  two	  things.	  One,	  institutions	  are	  an	  outcome	  of	  agreements	  by	  states	  and	  other	  actors	  who	  design	   them	   purposefully	   to	   advance	   their	   joint	   interests,	   and	   two,	   institutional	  arrangements	  may	  require,	  prohibit	  or	  simply	  permit	  certain	  behaviour.	  Notable	  also	  is	  the	  fact	   that	   institutions,	   just	   like	   actors,	   evolve	   in	   response	   to	   changing	   conditions.	  Institutions	  may	  evolve	  as	  states	  and	  other	   international	  actors	   favour	   them	  over	  others	  because	  they	  are	  better	  suited	  to	  new	  conditions	  or	  new	  problems	  (Koremenos	  et.	  al.	  2001:	  767).	  	  It	  is	  also	  acknowledged	  that	  lack	  of	  coordination	  is	  one	  of	  the	  practical	  governance	  failures,	  which	  can	   thus	  undermine	   the	  efficiency	  of	  security	  governance	  (Krahmann,	  2008;	  212).	  As	  expounded	  by	  Krahmann	  (ibid.),	  coordination	  failures	  in	  security	  governance	  can	  arise	  from	   a	   lack	   of	   institutional	   structures	   that	   ensure	   sufficient	   communication	   and	  coordination	  among	  various	  actors.	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To	   analyze	   this	   security	   governance	   component,	   interaction	   of	   actors	   and	   institutional	  arrangements	   would	   be	   looked	   at	   from	   two	   dimensions:	   vertical	   and	   horizontal.	   For	  purposes	   of	   this	   study,	   vertical	   coordination	   refers	   to	   the	   relationship	  between	   the	   sub-­‐regional	  organization’s	  organs	  and	  Member-­‐States,	  while	  horizontal	  coordination	  refers	  to	  the	   interface	   between	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   organization	   and	   other	   strategic	   actors	   (i.e.	   civil	  society	   organizations	   and	   other	   intergovernmental	   organizations	   at	   sub-­‐regional	   and	  regional	   levels)57.	  Horizontal	   coordination,	   thus,	   promote	   inter-­‐agency	   collaboration	   and	  cooperation	   between	   institutions	   and/or	   organs	   of	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   organization	   and	  actors	  outside	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  arrangement	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  security	  goals.	  The	  following	  specific	  forms	  of	  relationships	  or	  partnership	  avenues	  will	  be	  examined:	  A)	  formal	  and/or	  informal	  working	  relationship	   in	  the	  development	  of	  doctrine	  and	  policy	   instruments	   for	  addressing	   particular	   security	   challenges	   (i.e.	   development	   of	   operational	   support	   tools	  such	   as	   protocols,	   rules,	   laws,	   guidelines,	   standards,	   etc.).	   There,	   however,	   other	   forums	  that	   actors	   striving	   to	   address	   a	   particular	   security	   threat	   can	   interact	   besides	  working	  closely	   together	   to	   develop	   policy	   instruments.	   B)	   Formal	   communication	   channels	  through	   regular	  meetings,	  workshops	   or	   institutional	   representation	   as	   avenues	   to	   take	  stock	  of	  progress	  and	  share	  experience,	  or	  to	  address	  wider	  partnership	   issues	   including	  funding	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  support.	  	  	  4.4.4.	  Management	  	  The	   term	   management,	   as	   used	   by	   one	   of	   the	   proponents	   of	   the	   security	   governance	  perspective	   has	   been	   referred	   as	   to	   how	   policies	   are	   carried	   out,	   administered	   or	  controlled	   (Kirchner,	   2006).	   To	   say	   how	   policies	   are	   carried	   out,	   administered	   or	  controlled	   suggests	   focusing	   on	   implementation	   of	   certain	   policies.	   The	   focus	   here	   is	   on	  how	  and	  by	  whom	  (i.e.	  which	  actors)	  management	  tasks	  in	  response	  to	  the	  two	  collective	  security	  challenges	  are	  carried	  out.	  It	  is	  often	  the	  case	  multiple	  actors	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  This	  vertical	  and	  horizontal	  or	  lateral	  coordination	  distinction	  is	  a	  modified	  version	  of	  the	  one	  adopted	  in	  the	  AU’s	  Report	  on	  African	  Peace	  and	  Security	  Architecture	  (APSA)	  Assessment	  Study,	  which	  was	  adopted	  in	  November,	  2010,	  Zanzibar,	  Tanzania.	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management	  tasks	  that	  can	  be	  completely	  different	  from	  those	  who	  had	  been	  engaged	  in	  the	  coordination	  component.	  	  
 
4.4.4.1. Management of SALW 	  The	  following	  management	  tasks	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  relation	  to	  efforts	  at	  addressing	  the	  security	  challenge	  of	  SALW):	  review	  and	  harmonization	  of	  SALW	  legislations	  and	  control	  measures	  (collection,	  destruction,	  marking	  and	  record	  keeping).	  	  a) Review	  and	  harmonization	  of	  SALW	  legislations:	  	  The	  review	  and	  harmonization	  of	  national	  legislations	  is	  important	  because	  countries	  may	  have	   legislations,	   which	   are	   out-­‐dated,	   and	   thus	   do	   not	   capture	   the	   trans-­‐national	  character	   of	   the	   SALW	  problem	   (de	  Caris,	   2002).	   In	   the	   event	   important	   issues	   that	   can	  lead	  to	  firearms	  crossing	  national	  borders	  like	  brokering	  and	  export	  of	  SALW	  may	  not	  be	  covered	  in	  any	  provisions	  of	  domestic	  legislation.	  Flew	  and	  Urquhart	  (2004)	  maintain	  that	  “If	   comprehensive	   legislation	   is	   not	   in	   place,	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   other	   measures,	   for	  instance	  to	  tighten	  border	  controls,	  raise	  awareness	  of	  the	  dangers	  and	  impact	  of	  firearm	  misuse	  or	   improve	   the	  capacity	  of	   law	  enforcement	  agencies,	  will	  be	  undermined.	  At	   the	  same	  time,	  strong	  legislation	  alone	  will	  only	  have	  limited	  impact	  should	  there	  be	  a	  lack	  of	  capacity	  in	  other	  areas,	  such	  as	  law	  enforcement	  (p.	  9).”	  It	  follows	  that	  creating	  an	  enabling	  legal	   framework	   and	   improving	   capacity	   in	   other	   SALW	   control	   measures	   are	  mutually	  reinforcing.	  	  Harmonization,	   henceforth,	   entails	   having	   a	   legislation	   framework	   that	   function	   in	  harmony.	   Due	   to	   the	   transnational	   nature	   of	   the	   SALW	   problem	   states	   especially	   those	  sharing	   a	   certain	   geographical	   spread	   are	   compelled	   to	  direct	   part	   of	   their	   collaborative	  efforts	   into	   seeking	   to	   ensure	   consistency	   in	   particular	   areas	   of	   legal	   controls	   on	   illicit	  small	  arms.	  Enforcing	  common	  legal	  standards	  is	  a	  viable	  concerted	  approach	  to	  clamping	  down	   the	   proliferation	   of	   small	   arms.	   Harmonization	   of	   legislation,	   however,	   does	   not	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mean	  states	  must	  replicate	  one	  another’s	  legislation.	  It	  means	  that	  an	  offence	  recognized	  in	  one	  state	  must	  also	  be	  recognized	  as	  an	  offence	  in	  another	  while	  making	  sure	  at	  the	  same	  time	   that	   the	   legislation	  of	  a	  particular	  state	  continues	   to	  reflect	   its	  national	  context	  and	  policy	   towards	   SALW.	   Harmonization,	   therefore,	   ensures	   that	   such	   standards	   like	  brokering,	  marking	   of	   firearms,	   offences	   and	  penalties	   are	   compatible	   across	   borders	   to	  facilitate	   appropriate	   intervention	   measures	   by	   the	   (Law	   Enforcement	   Agencies)	   LEAs	  (Flew	  and	  Urquhart,	  2004:	  13-­‐14).	  	  b) Collection	  and	  Destruction	  of	  SALWs:	  	  
Collection	  of	  SALW	  refers	  to	  gathering	  of	  all	  weapons	  that	  become	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  State,	   which	   can	   be	   undertaken	   through	   a	   number	   of	   strategies	   such	   legal	   acquisition,	  seizure,	   forfeiture,	   voluntary	   surrender	   and	   disarmament,	   demobilization	   and	  reintegration	  (DDR)	  and	  amnesty	  programmes.	  The	  collection	  of	  illegal	  firearms	  is	  usually	  accompanied	   by	   another	   management	   measure-­‐destruction.	   Destruction	   is	   a	   SALW	  disposal	   method.	   Disposal	   entails	   deactivation,	   i.e.	   rendering	   all	   essential	   parts	   of	   the	  weapon	  permanently	   inoperable	  and,	   therefore,	   incapable	  of	  being	  removed,	   replaced	  or	  modified	  that	  allow	  reactivation.	  It	  may	  also	  involve	  selling	  surplus	  and	  redundant	  stock,	  and	  storage	  of	  SALW	  in	  a	  safe	  and	  secure	  location.	  Destruction	  as	  the	  preferred	  method	  of	  disposal	   is	   often	   carried	   out	   in	   a	   way	   that	   renders	   illicitly	   trafficked	   SALW	   seized	   by	  national	  authorities,	  both	  permanently	  disabled	  and	  physically	  damaged.	  	  	  c) Marking	  and	  Record	  Keeping:	  	  
Marking	   and	   record	   keeping	   are	   also	   parallel	   measures	   to	   manage	   the	   flow	   of	   firearms.	  Marking	   involves	   stamping	   a	   unique	   mark	   on	   weapons	   in	   state	   possession	   for	   easy	  traceability	   and	   identification.	   SALW	  are	   thus	   labelled	  with	   a	  unique	  marking,	   providing	  the	  name	  of	  the	  manufacture,	  country	  or	  place	  of	  manufacture	  and	  the	  serial	  number	  if	  the	  weapon	  does	  not	   already	  bear	  one.	  Markings	  on	   firearms	   can	  be	   stamped	  on	   the	  barrel,	  frame	  and	  where	  applicable,	  the	  slide.	  Marking	  of	  firearms	  goes	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  record	  keeping	  whereby	  countries	  maintain	  a	  database	  of	  information	  in	  relation	  to	  firearms	  for	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tracing	  purposes	  for	  a	  specified	  period,	  usually	  the	  international	  standard	  is	  not	  less	  than	  ten	  years.	  	  
4.4.4.2. Management of Domestic Political Crises 	  There	  are	  several	  measures	  at	   the	  disposal	  of	   sub-­‐regional	  bodies	  when	  confronted	  by	  a	  domestic	  political	  crisis	  in	  one	  of	  its	  members.	  Sub-­‐regional	  organization	  can	  carry	  out	  an	  armed	   intervention,	   which	   is	   a	   more	   direct	   and	   active	   involvement	   of	   the	   sub-­‐regional	  organization	   in	   the	   crisis	   through	   the	   application	   of	   military	   resources	   to	   contain	   and	  terminate	   the	   violence.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	   interposition	   of	   forces	   between	   belligerents	  (peacekeeping)	   is	  undertaken	   to	  prevent	   further	  violence	  and	  provide	  possible	   room	   for	  mediation	  to	  take	  place.	  Troops	  from	  other	  member-­‐states	  other	  than	  the	  facing	  the	  crisis	  are	   deployed	   to	   ensure	   stability	   and	   relative	   normalcy	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   otherwise	  extremely	  volatile	  and	  chaotic	  situations	  (Miller,	  2005).	  	  Sub-­‐regional	   arrangements,	   however,	   as	   promulgated	   in	   their	   founding	   treaties,	  underscore	  peaceful	  methods	  as	  the	  most	  preferred	  measures	  for	  management	  of	  conflicts	  within	   a	   territory	   of	   a	   Member	   State.	   These	   peaceful	   methods	   include	   preventive	  diplomacy:	  the	  resolution	  of	  disputes	  before	  they	  escalate	  or	  the	  persuasion	  of	  parties	  to	  desist	   from	   allowing	   such	   escalation	   to	   occur;	   negotiations: communication	   between	  representatives	   of	   parties	   involved	   in	   a	   conflict	   or	   dispute	   to	   de-­‐escalate	   a	   conflict	  situation,	   or	   to	   formulate	   mutually	   satisfactory	   solutions	   towards	   resolution	   of	   a	   given	  conflict;	  conciliation:	  the	  voluntary	  referral	  of	  a	  conflict	  to	  a	  neutral	  external	  party	  (in	  the	  form	   of	   an	   unofficial	   commission)	   that	   either	   suggests	   a	   non-­‐binding	   settlement	   or	  conducts	   explorations	   to	   facilitate	   more	   structured	   techniques	   of	   conflict	   resolution;	  arbitration:	   a	   mechanism	   for	   resolving	   conflicts	   whereby	   the	   disputants	   identify	   their	  grievances	   and	   demands,	   fix	   a	   procedural	   process,	   and	   willingly	   submit	   the	   decision	   of	  outcomes,	  which	  are	  to	  be	  final	  and	  binding,	   to	  an	  external	  entity;	  adjudication:	  the	   legal	  process	  by	  which	  an	  arbiter	  or	  judge	  reviews	  evidence	  and	  argumentation	  including	  legal	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reasoning	  set	  forth	  by	  opposing	  parties	  or	  litigants	  to	  come	  to	  a	  decision	  which	  determines	  rights	  and	  obligations	  between	  the	  parties	  involved58.	  	  Standing	  prominently	  in	  the	  above	  list	  of	  management	  measures	  is	  mediation.	  Mediation	  is	  the	   most	   favoured	   pacific	   method	   of	   resolving	   disputes	   and	   conflicts	   by	   sub-­‐regional	  actors.	   Mediation	   is	   a	   direct	   and	   active	   form	   of	   third-­‐party	   intervention	   in	   a	   domestic	  political	  crisis.	  However,	  it	  is	  different	  from	  the	  other	  forms	  of	  third-­‐party	  intervention	  in	  that	   it	   is	   not	   based	   on	   the	   direct	   use	   of	   force	   and	   it	   is	   not	   aimed	   at	   helping	   one	   of	   the	  participants	  to	  win	  (Zartman	  and	  Touval,	  2007:	  437).	  The	  end-­‐goal	  is	  to	  bring	  the	  crisis	  to	  a	  settlement	  that	  is	  acceptable	  to	  both	  sides.	  	  	  Zartman	  and	  Touval	  have	   identified	  three	  main	  roles	   that	  mediators	  can	  play	  to	  marshal	  the	   interests	   of	   all	   the	   involved	   parties	   toward	   a	   mutually	   acceptable	   solution	   to	   the	  conflict,	   namely	   communication,	   formulation,	   and	   manipulation	   (2007:	   446).	   As	   a	  communicator,	   the	  mediator	   acts	   as	   a	   conduit,	   opening	   contacts	   and	   carrying	  messages	  between	   the	  parties	  when	  they	  cannot	   talk	   to	  each	  other.	   In	   this	  role	   the	  mediator	  often	  spend	  time	  with	  each	  party	  to	  the	  conflict	  through	  what	  has	  come	  to	  be	  known	  as	  ‘shuttle	  diplomacy’,	  or	  ‘caucusing’,	  especially	  when	  the	  parties	  are	  unwilling	  to	  meet	  each	  other	  or	  joint	  meetings	  are	  not	   leading	  to	  progress	  (Miller,	  2005:	  49).	  International	  organizations,	  government,	  or	  non-­‐governmental	  organization	  can	  initiate	  mediation.	  	  As	  a	  formulator,	  the	  mediator	  issues	  formulas	  that	  provide	  a	  common	  understanding	  of	  the	  problem	  and	   its	  solution.	  The	  mediator	   in	   this	  case	  needs	   to	  persuade	  the	  parties	  and	  at	  the	   same	   time	   propose	   solutions	   to	   their	   incompatibility.	   This	   role	   therefore	   requires	  greater	   involvement	   than	   mere	   communication.	   As	   elaborated	   by	   Zartman	   and	   Touval,	  “Not	  only	  does	  the	  mediator	  get	  involved	  in	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  issue,	  but	  it	  must	  also	  lean	  on	   the	   parties-­‐albeit	   in	   the	   subtlest	  ways-­‐to	   adopt	   its	   perceptions	   of	   a	  way	   out”	   (ibid.).	  Manipulation	   is	   the	   maximum	   degree	   of	   involvement	   requiring	   the	   mediator	   to	   use	   its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  See	   Christopher	   E.	   Miller.	   2005.	   A	   Glossary	   of	   Terms	   and	   Concepts	   in	   Peace	   and	   Conflict	   Studies,	   Second	  Edition,	  San	  Jose:	  University	  for	  Peace.	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power	  to	  bring	  the	  parties	  to	  an	  agreement,	  which	  basically	  involves	  pushing	  and	  pulling	  them	  away	  from	  conflict	  and	  into	  resolution	  (ibid.	  pp.	  446-­‐7).	  	  4.4.5.	  Region	  and	  Sub-­‐region	  	  To	   delineate	   a	   region	   called	   ‘East/Eastern	   Africa’	   or	   even	   ‘Southern	   Africa’,	   one	   has	   to	  employ	   more	   than	   a	   geographical	   criterion	   for	   the	   sprawling	   nature	   of	   institutional	  memberships	  has	  produced	  a	   crisscross	   configuration	  of	   intergovernmental	   bodies	   (vide	  
infra).	  Using	  the	  contiguity	  criterion,	  it	  will	  seem	  logical	  to	  categorize	  Burundi	  and	  Rwanda	  as	  being	  part	  of	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  Region	  (GLR),	  but	  memberships	  of	  these	  two	  countries	  in	  the	  Economic	  Community	  of	  Central	  African	  States	  (ECCAS)	  and	  EAC	  does	  not	  offer	  much	  help	   in	   settling	   the	   issue	   of	   a	   clearly	   delineated	   boundary	   of	   a	   region.	   Should	   I	   regard	  Burundi	  and	  Rwanda	  as	  part	  of	  Central	  Africa	  or	  Eastern	  Africa?	  A	  similar	  question	  can	  be	  posed	   on	   the	   cases	   of	   the	   Democratic	   Republic	   of	   Congo	   and	   Tanzania.	   It	   would	   seem	  plausible	  under	  the	  contiguity	  criterion	  to	  place	  the	  DRC	  in	  Central	  Africa	  and	  Tanzania	  as	  part	   of	   the	   East	   African	   countries.	   Moreover,	   a	   ‘region’	   when	   denoted	   as	   a	   group	   of	  geographically	  contiguous	  states	  would	  make	  it	  simple	  to	  classify	  Angola	  as	  a	  member	  of	  Southern	   Africa	   but	   when	   the	   criteria	   of	   institutional	   membership	   is	   applied	   the	   same	  country	  will	   be	   found	   to	  be	  within	   the	  Central	  African	   constellation	  due	   to	   its	   affiliation	  with	  ECCAS.	  	  	  The	   Organization	   of	   African	   Unity	   (OAU)	   anticipated	   this	   difficulty	   and	   thus,	   in	   1976	  attempted	   to	   bypass	   it	   by	   declaring	   “there	   shall	   be	   five	   Regions	   of	   the	   OAU	   namely,	  Northern,	  Western,	  Central,	  Eastern	  and	  Southern.”59	  The	  OAU,	  however,	  did	  not	  explicitly	  state	  individual	  member	  countries	  of	  each	  region.	  Henceforth,	  current	  AU’s	  delimitation	  of	  regions	   does	   not	   conform	   to	   the	   current	   institutional	   ensembles.	   For	   instance,	   in	   the	  continental	   body’s	   classification	   Eastern	   Africa60	  is	   composed	   of	   the	   Comoros,	   Djibouti,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  OAU,	  1976:	  CM/Res.	  464	  (XXVI).	  60	  For	  Gilbert	  M.	  Khadiagala,	   the	   term	  “Eastern	  Africa”	  denotes	   the	  geographical	   area	  comprising	   the	   seven	  member	  states	  of	  the	  Intergovernmental	  Authority	  on	  Development	  (IGAD):	  Djibouti,	  Eritrea,	  Ethiopia,	  Kenya,	  Somalia,	  Sudan,	  and	  Uganda,	  and	  Tanzania	  because	  of	  its	  long	  historical	  and	  political	  interactions	  with	  Kenya	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Eritrea,	   Ethiopia,	  Kenya,	  Madagascar,	  Mauritius,	  Rwanda,	   the	   Seychelles,	   Somalia,	   Sudan,	  Tanzania	   and	   Uganda.	   As	   shown	   in	   the	   table	   below,	   The	   AU	   regards	   Southern	  Africa	   as	  composed	   of	   Angola,	   Botswana,	   Lesotho,	   Malawi	   Mozambique,	   Namibia,	   South	   Africa,	  Swaziland,	  Zambia,	  and	  Zimbabwe.	  This	  AU	  jumbled-­‐up	  subdivision	  has	  in	  effect	  ‘chopped-­‐off’	   SADC	   members	   and	   slotted	   them	   into	   the	   Eastern	   and	   Central	   African	   sub-­‐regions	  ending	  up	  producing	  more	  paradoxes	  than	  answers.	  	  
	  
Table	  1:	  Africa’s	  Sub-­‐regions	  According	  to	  the	  AU	  	  
	  
Northern	   West	   Central	   East	   Southern	  Algeria	  Egypt	  Libya	  Mauritania	  Tunisia	  Sahrawi	   Arab	  Democratic	  Republic	  (SADR)	  
Benin	  Burkina	  Faso	  Cape	  Verde	  Cote	  d’Ivoire	  Gambia	  Ghana	  Guinea	  Guinea	  Bissau	  Liberia	  Mali	  Niger	  Nigeria	  Senegal	  Sierra	  Leone	  Togo	  
Burundi	  Cameroon	  Central	  African	  Republic	  (CAR)	  Chad	  Republic	  of	  Congo	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo	  (DRC)	  Equatorial	  Guinea	  Gabon	  Sao	  Tome	  &	  Principe	  	  
Comoros	  Djibouti	  Eritrea	  Ethiopia	  Kenya	  Madagascar	  Mauritius	  Rwanda	  Seychelles	  Somalia	  Sudan	  Tanzania	  Uganda	  
Angola	  Botswana	  Lesotho	  Malawi	  Mozambique	  Namibia	  South	  Africa	  Swaziland	  Zambia	  Zimbabwe	  
	  It	   follows	   therefore,	  none	  of	   the	  several	  delimitation	  criteria	  would	  appear	  more	  correct	  than	  others	  (Møller,	  2005).	  The	  terminology	  of	  region	  is	  a	  social	  construct	  that	  is	  not	  solely	  confined	   to	   the	   delimitation	   criteria	   of	   physical	   proximity,	   but	   also	   has	   its	   roots	   in	   the	  social	  and	  political	   ties	   resulting	   from	  historical	   interactions	  among	  people,	   and	   in	   some	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  and	  Uganda	  within	  the	  rubric	  of	  the	  East	  African	  Cooperation	  (EAC).	  See	  Gilbert	  M.	  Khadiagala.	  October	  2008.	  “Eastern	   Africa:	   Security	   and	   the	   Legacy	   of	   Fragility,”	   Africa	   Program	  Working	   Paper	   Series,	   International	  Peace	   Institute.	   The	   Africa	   Institute	   of	   South	   Africa	   has	   opted	   for	   the	   geographical	   criterion	   and	   thus	   the	  ensembles	   ‘Horn	   of	   Africa’	   and	   ‘Eastern	   Africa’	   have	   been	   collapsed	   into	   ‘North-­‐Eastern	   Africa’	   (Djibouti,	  Eritrea,	  Ethiopia,	  Kenya,	  Somalia,	  Sudan,	  Tanzania,	  Uganda).	  Comoros,	  Madagascar	  Mauritius,	  Seychelles	  have	  been	  put	  into	  the	  Indian	  Ocean	  region	  while	  Burundi,	  DRC	  and	  Rwanda	  are	  in	  the	  Central	  Africa	  region.	  For	  further	   details	   see	   Africa	   at	   a	   Glance.	   Facts	   and	   Figures	   2001/2	   (Pretoria:	   Africa	   Institute	   of	   South	   Africa,	  2002),	  p.	  7.	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circumstances	   it	   incorporates	   the	   constructivist	   notion	   of	   ‘regional	   awareness’.61	  One	  definition	  that	  has	  captured	  both	  the	  geographical	  and	  political	  connotations	  of	   the	   term	  has	  been	  suggested	  by	  Tavares	  (2004).	  According	  to	  Tavares	  a	  ‘region’	  (or	  macro-­‐region)	  is	   “a	   cognitive	   construction	   that	   spills	   over	   state	   borders,	   based	   on	   territoriality,	  with	   a	  certain	  degree	  of	  singularity,	  socially	  moulded	  by	  a	  body	  of	  different	  actors,	  and	  motivated	  by	   different	   (sometimes	   contradictory)	   principles”	   (2004:	   26).	   MacFarlane	   and	   Weiss	  (1994:	  19)	  also	  ascribe	  to	  the	  conceptualization	  of	  ‘region’	  as	  a	  geographical	  entity	  defined	  apparently	  by	  shared	  attributes	  or	  interactions	  that	  distinguish	  it	  from	  entities	  beyond	  its	  boundaries.	  By	  subscribing	  to	  this	  definition,	  then	  it	  may	  appear	  less	  controversial	  to	  treat	  Africa	  as	  a	   region	   (and	   thus	  distinguish	   it	   from	  any	  denoted	  subset	   such	  as	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	   which	   is	   born	   out	   of	   geopolitical	   and	   economic	   considerations).	   	   	   For	   analytical	  purposes	   as	   manageable	   entities,	   I	   shall	   treat	   Africa	   as	   a	   ‘region’	   and	   move	   down	   to	   a	  further	   sub-­‐division	   and	   thus	   regard	   EAC	   and	   SADC62	  groupings	   as	   East	   and	   Southern	  Africa	  ‘sub-­‐regions’	  respectively.	  	  4.5. Selection	  of	  Cases	  	  The	   current	   study	   was	   designed	   to	   carry	   out	   a	   comparative	   analysis	   of	   sub-­‐regional	  security	  cooperation	  as	  undertaken	  by	  the	  EAC	  and	  SADC.	  The	  usefulness	  of	  this	  approach	  lies	  in	  identifying	  characteristics	  that	  can	  provide	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  analysis.	  It	  is	  observed	  that	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  cannot	  be	  identical	  in	  all	  aspects.	  As	  noted	  by	  Axline	   (1994:	   11),	   “While	   recognizing	   that	   every	   example	   of	   regional	   cooperation	   is	   sui	  
generis,	   it	   is	   still	   possible	   to	   discern	   relevant	   similarities	   among	   examples	   that	   permit	  useful	   generalizations.”	   	  Henceforth,	   it	   is	   feasible	   for	   the	  EAC	  and	  SADC	   to	  be	   treated	  as	  comparable	  cases.	  	  The	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  have	  been	  selected	  because	  they	  share	  certain	  features	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  enrich	  analysis	  in	  this	  study.	  First,	  both	  the	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  are	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  According	  to	  Andrew	  Hurrell.	  1995.	  “Regionalism	  in	  Theoretical	  Perspective,”	  in	  L.	  Fawcett	  and	  A.	  Hurrell	  (eds.),	   Regionalism	   in	   World	   Politics.	   Regional	   Organizations	   and	   International	   Order,	   Oxford:	   Oxford	  University	  Press,	  the	  term	  implies	  ‘the	  shared	  perception	  of	  belonging	  to	  a	  particular	  community’.	  62	  From	  SADC	  Treaty,	  Article	  1:	  “Region"	  means	  the	  geographical	  area	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  of	  SADC.	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with	  a	  security	  mandate,	  which	  allows	  for	  an	  examination	  of	  their	  role	  on	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  security	   issues.	   Moreover,	   the	   fact	   that	   cooperation	   on	   security	   issues	   in	   the	   two	   sub-­‐regions	   has	   always	   set	   the	   pace	   for	   integration	   efforts	   on	   the	   economic	   front	   offers	   yet	  another	  raison	  d'être	  for	  treating	  them	  as	  important	  sub-­‐regional	  security	  actors.	  	  Second,	  both	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  are	  near,	  and	   in	   fact	   incorporate	  member	  states	  that	  are	  situated	  in	  areas	  of	  protracted	  conflicts.	  Both	  the	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  are	  close	  to	  the	  conflict	   ridden	   Great	   Lakes	   Region	   (GLR).	   Two	   member-­‐states	   of	   the	   EAC	   (Kenya	   and	  Uganda)	   share	   borders	  with	   the	   troubled	   Horn	   of	   Africa.	   This	   geo-­‐scenario	   presents	   an	  opportunity	   to,	   among	   others,	   capture	   security	   dynamics	   resulting	   from	   the	   spill	   over	  impact	  of	  neighbouring	  security	  problems	  given	   the	  porous	  nature	  of	  borders	   in	  most	  of	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa.	  	  Third,	   selecting	   the	   EAC	   and	   SADC	   for	   a	   comparative	   analysis	   is	   significant	   in	   that	   it	  unravels	   how	   various	   actors	   within	   these	   sub-­‐regional	   arrangements	   in	   Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  context	  has	  practically	  attempted	  to	  forge	  cooperative	  frameworks	  to	  deal	  with	  not	  only	   non-­‐military	   transnational	   security	   threats	   whose	   devastating	   effects	   know	   no	  cognitive	  borders	  but	  also	  intra-­‐state	  threats	  (for	  e.g.	  domestic	  instability),	  which	  are	  more	  salient	   than	   inter-­‐state	   threats.	   The	   two	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   constitute	  members	  that	  face	  the	  two	  collective	  security	  challenges	  under	  focus	  here	  namely,	  the	  proliferation	  of	  SALW	  and	  domestic	  political	  crises.	  	  Fourth,	  while	  acknowledging	  the	  contribution	  of	  earlier	  studies,	  it	  is	  noted	  that	  they	  have	  tended	   to	   focus	   more	   on	   the	   substantive	   practices	   of	   the	   AU,	   ECOWAS,	   and	   SADC.	  Moreover,	  most	  of	  these	  works	  appear	  to	  be	  motivated	  more	  by	  the	  aspect	  of	  management	  of	   armed	   conflicts	   by	   these	   regional	   and	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   to	   the	   minimal	  treatment	   of	   more	   perennial	   non-­‐military	   transnational	   security	   threats	   like	   SALW	  proliferation	   and	   related	   cross	   border	   crimes.	   The	   interest	   of	   most	   scholarship	   on	  regionalism	   in	   Africa	   has	   been	   confined	   predominantly	   to	   the	   highly	   institutionalized	  forms	  of	   inter-­‐state	   co-­‐operation.	  This	  partly	   explains	   the	   reason	  why	   the	  EAC	   is	  hugely	  absent	  from	  the	  literature	  on	  matters	  of	  security.	  As	  more	  than	  ten	  years	  have	  now	  elapsed	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since	   its	   inception,	   there	   are	   quiet	   a	   number	   of	   developments	   which	   have	   taken	   place	  within	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  EAC	  to	  deserve	  special	  attention.	  	  4.6. Scope	  of	  Study	  	  The	   current	   study	   focuses	   on	   the	   EAC	   and	   SADC	   as	   sub-­‐regional	   groupings	   undertaking	  security	  roles.	  The	  study	   is,	   therefore,	  confined	  to	   the	  security	   field.	  Economic	  aspects	  of	  integration	  are	  referred	  only	  where	  there	  is	  need	  to	  do	  so.	  It	  covers	  the	  period	  from	  2000	  to	  2011.	  The	  start	  date	  of	  the	  study	  period	  (i.e.	  the	  year	  2000)	  has	  been	  chosen	  based	  on	  the	  following	  reasons:	  first,	  the	  treaty	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  EAC,	  one	  of	  the	  cases	  in	  this	   study,	   entered	   into	   force	   in	   2000.	   It	   is,	   accordingly,	   sensible	   to	   start	   looking	   at	  developments	  on	  the	  security	  realm	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  EAC	  from	  this	  date	  onwards,	  and	  not	  before.	  Relatedly,	  even	  though	  SADC	  was	  established	  in	  1992,	  and	  its	  Organ	  on	  Politics,	  Defence	  and	  Security	  created	  four	  years	  later,	  the	  deadlock	  over	  the	  Organ	  (the	  so-­‐called	  ‘Organ	  impasse’)	  over	  its	  functioning	  was	  resolved	  only	  as	  late	  as	  2001.	  	  Second,	   concrete	   efforts	   to	   address	   the	   two	   sets	   of	   collective	   security	   challenges	   as	  conceptualized	   in	   this	  study	  begun	  to	  unfold	   in	  year	  2000.	  For	   instances,	  on	   the	  security	  challenge	  of	  SALWs,	  the	  Nairobi	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Problem	  of	  Illicit	  Proliferation	  of	  Small	  Arms	   and	   Light	   Weapons	   in	   the	   Great	   Lakes,	   of	   which	   EAC	   States	   are	   signatories,	   was	  adopted	  on	  15	  March	  2000.	  Related	  instruments	  in	  the	  Southern	  African	  sub-­‐region	  were	  adopted	   in	   2001.	   The	   year	   2000	   also	  marks	   the	   time	  when	   one	   of	   the	   selected	   cases	   of	  domestic	  political	  crisis,	  Zimbabwe,	  received	  initial	  attention	  from	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  body,	  SADC,	  as	  well	  as	  from	  the	  international	  community.	  	  	  Third,	   the	   year	   2000	   is	   far	   back	   enough	   to	   allow	   inclusion	   of	  more	   than	   one	  multiparty	  election	  in	  the	  exploration	  of	  the	  extent	  and	  nature	  of	  domestic	  political	  crises	  in	  the	  two	  selected	  cases,	  i.e.	  Kenya	  (2002	  and	  2002)63	  and	  Zimbabwe	  (2000,	  2002,	  2005	  and	  2005).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Even	   though,	   there	   would	   not	   be	   any	   distortion	   to	   the	   findings	   by	   occasionally	   referring	   to	   previous	  elections	   (1992	   and	   1997)	   in	   Kenya	   to	   establish	   a	   fact	   and/or	   pattern	   associated	   with	   certain	   aspects	   of	  election	  processes	  in	  the	  country.	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The	   end	   date,	   2011,	   was	   the	   time	   when	   field	   research	   for	   this	   study	   was	   concluded.	   It	  follows,	  therefore,	  predecessor	  arrangements	  or	  organizations	  to	  the	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  (that	  is,	   the	   defunct	   EAC	   and	   SADCC	   respectively)	   does	   not	   feature	   in	   the	   major	   part	   of	   the	  analysis	  serve	  for	  the	  historical	  elucidation	  of	  the	  two	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations.	  	  As	  can	  be	  noted	   there	  are	  numerous	  security	  challenges	   facing	  members	  of	   sub-­‐regional	  organizations	   in	   Africa.	   I	   have,	   however,	   deliberately	   chosen	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   following	  collective	   security	   challenges:	   the	   transnational	   threat	   of	   SALW	   and	   intra-­‐state	   conflicts	  based	  on	  the	  following	  reasons.	  Starting	  with	  the	  security	  challenge	  of	  SALWs,	  which	  the	  United	   Nations	   General	   Assembly	   considers	   to	   be	   the	   most	   destabilizing	   conventional	  weapons64 ,	   because	   it	   is	   evidently	   the	   single-­‐most	   devastating	   transnational	   threat.	  According	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  Development	  Program	  (UNDP),	  SALW	  have	  been,	  on	  the	  average,	  responsible	  for	  over	  a	  quarter	  of	  a	  million	  deaths	  per	  year65.	  Their	  spread	  has	  far-­‐reaching	  effects,	  which	   if	  not	  effectively	  dealt	  with	  may	  undermine	  the	  very	   fabric	  of	   the	  societies	   concerned.	   They	  may	   indeed	   “escalate	   conflicts,	   undermine	   peace	   agreements,	  intensify	  [the]	  violence	  and	  impact	  of	  crime,	  impede	  economic	  and	  social	  development	  and	  hinder	  the	  development	  of	  social	  stability,	  democracy	  and	  good	  governance.”66	  	  	  UNDP	  notes	  that	  out	  of	  49	  major	  conflicts	  in	  the	  1990s,	  47	  were	  waged	  with	  small	  arms	  as	  the	  weapons	  of	  choice.	  Out	  of	  the	  estimated	  875	  million67	  SALW	  in	  circulation	  worldwide,	  about	  100	  million	  of	   them	  are	   said	   to	  be	   in	   the	  African	   continent68.	   The	   threat	   of	   SALW	  proliferation	   to	   human	   life	   is	   palpable.	   The	   Millennium	   Development	   Report	   2005	  estimated	  that	  between	  1994	  and	  2003,	  9.21	  million	  people	  in	  the	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  lost	  their	   lives	  as	  a	   result	  of	  armed	  conflict,	  which	   is	  about	  70	  per	  cent	  of	  all	   conflict	   related	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly	  Resolution	  A/RES/50/70	  of	  15th	  January	  1996.	  65 	  See	   “Small	   Arms	   and	   Light	   Weapons	   (SALW)	   Control“,	   accessed	   on	   September	   20th	   2011	   at	  http://www.undp.org/cpr/we_arms.shtml.	  66	  Virginia	  Gamba,	  the	  former	  director	  of	  the	  Arms	  Management	  Programme	  of	  the	  South	  Africa	  Institute	  for	  Security	  Studies,	  as	  quoted	  in	  James	  J.	  Hentz.	  2009.	  “The	  Southern	  African	  Security	  Order:	  Regional	  Economic	  Integration	  and	  Security	  Among	  Developing	  States”,	  Review	  of	  International	  Studies,	  35,	  189-­‐213,	  p.	  304.	  67	  This	  figure	  is	   from	  UNDP	  “Small	  Arms	  and	  Light	  Weapons	  (SALW)	  Control“.	  Accessed	  on	  September	  20th	  2011	  at	  http://www.undp.org/cpr/we_arms.shtml.	  68	  AU,	   “The	  Peace	  and	  Security	  Agenda,	  Small	  Arms	  and	  Light	  Weapons“.	  Retrieved	  on	   July	  10th	  2010	   from	  http://www.africa-­‐union.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/PSC/Small	  Arms.htm	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fatalities	   around	   the	   world	   (Abbott	   and	   Phipps,	   May	   2009:	   4).	   Therefore,	   the	   fact	   that	  SALW	   play	   a	   decisive	   role	   in	   armed	   conflicts	   and	   trigger	   crime	   and	   insecurity	   in	   Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  is	  undisputed	  (Che,	  2007:	  99).	  	  	  Likewise,	   decision	   to	   focus	   on	   intra-­‐state	   conflicts	   and	   not	   inter-­‐state	   ones	   was	   also	  informed	  by	   the	   emerging	   reality.	   The	   reality	  which	   is	   supported	  by	   data	   collected	   by	   a	  number	  of	   studies	   show	   that	   since	   the	  end	  of	   the	  Cold	  War	   there	  has	  been	  an	   increased	  salience	   of	   intra-­‐state	   conflicts.	   It	   has	   been	   observed,	   for	   example,	   there	  was	   a	   fourfold	  increase	   in	   the	  use	  of	  United	  Nations	  peacekeeping	   forces	   in	   intra-­‐state	   conflicts	   around	  the	  world	  between	  1987	  and	  1992	  (Regan,	  1996:	  336).	  More	  revealing	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  from	  May	  1988,	  when	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  on	  the	  horizon,	  to	  December	  2007,	  the	  UN	  intervened	  in	  47	  conflicts.	  Only	  three	  of	  those	  conflicts	  could	  be	  categorized	  as	  inter-­‐state	  (Yilmaz,	  2007:	  1)69.	  It	  can	  be	  noted	  that	  for	  a	  conflict	  to	  carry	  an	  inter-­‐state	  character,	  then	  it	  must	  be	  between	  governments	  of	  two	  or	  more	  countries70.	  	  	  More	   recent	   statistics	   from	   the	   SIPRI	   Yearbook	   2011	   show	   that	   the	   era	   of	   intra-­‐state	  conflicts	  appears	  to	  be	  holding71.	  In	  the	  past	  decade	  (2001-­‐2010),	  there	  were	  only	  2	  inter-­‐state	   conflicts	   out	   of	   the	   total	   29	  major	   armed	   conflicts	  worldwide	   (SIPRI,	   2011:	   4).	   No	  major	  inter-­‐state	  conflict	  was	  active	  in	  2010,	  a	  trend	  that	  has	  persisted	  for	  the	  past	  seven	  years	   (ibid.)72.	   The	   most	   recent	   findings	   by	   Themner	   and	   Wallensteen	   (2011)	   further	  confirm	  the	  fact	  that	   inter-­‐state	  conflicts	  have	  become	  an	  increasingly	  rare	  phenomenon.	  Only	  one	  minor	  inter-­‐state	  conflict	  between	  Djibouti	  and	  Eritrea	  in	  2008	  was	  recorded	  in	  a	  six-­‐year	   period	   (i.e.	   2004-­‐2010)	   (Themner	   and	   Wallensteen,	   2011:	   528).	   A	   more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  These	  were	  the	  Iraq	  invasion	  of	  Kuwait	  in	  1990,	  Chad-­‐Libya	  border	  dispute	  in	  1994,	  and	  Ethiopia-­‐Eritrea	  border	  dispute	  in	  1998-­‐2000.	  70	  According	   to	   the	   UCDP’s	   (Uppsala	   Conflict	   Data	   Program)	   operational	   definition,	   the	   primary	   warring	  parties,	  who	  first	  stated	  the	  incompatibility,	  must	  be	  governments	  for	  a	  conflict	  to	  be	  classified	  as	  inter-­‐state.	  Incompatibility	  can	  be	  over	  government	  or	  territory.	  71	  The	   Stockholm	   International	   Peace	   Research	   Institute	   (SIPRI)	   is	   an	   independent	   international	   institute,	  established	   in	   1966	   for	   research	   into	   problems	   of	   peace	   and	   conflict,	   especially	   those	   of	   arms	   control	   and	  disarmament.	   SIPRI	   Yearbooks	   present	   a	   combination	   of	   data	   in	   such	   areas	   as	   major	   armed	   conflicts,	  multilateral	  peace	  operations,	  and	  military	  expenditures,	  among	  others.	  72	  A	  conflict	  is	  deemed	  to	  be	  active	  if	  there	  are	  at	  least	  25	  battle-­‐related	  deaths	  per	  calendar	  year	  in	  one	  of	  the	  conflict’s	   dyads	   (a	   dyad	   is	  made	  up	  of	   two	   armed	   and	  opposing	   actors).	   A	  more	  detailed	  definition	   can	  be	  found	  on	  UCDP’s	  webpage,	  at	  http://www.ucdp.uu.se.	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interesting	   feature	   of	   the	   reported	   internal/intra-­‐state	   conflicts	   is	   that	   conflicts	   over	  government	   (i.e.	   where	   the	   control	   of	   the	   whole	   state	   authority	   is	   the	   major	   bone	   of	  contention	  or	  cause	  of	   incompatibility)	  have	  always	  outnumbered	  those	  over	  territory	   in	  every	  year	  of	  the	  period	  2001-­‐2010,	  except	  for	  the	  year	  2007	  (SIPRI,	  2011:	  4)73.	  	  	  Security	  analysts	  also	  appear	  to	  agree	  that	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  security,	  especially	  in	  Africa	  is	  domestic,	  as	  the	  major	  threats	  to	  security	  emanate	  more	  from	  within	  the	  state	  than	  from	  external	  military	  threats	  (Baldwin,	  1995:	  131;	  Buzan	  and	  Waever,	  2003:	  228;	  Che,	  2007:	  7).	   This	   has	   compelled	   states’	   policy	   makers	   who	   were	   traditionally	   concerned	   with	  national	  security	  to	  readjust	  their	  focus	  to	  include	  concern	  for	  domestic	  threats	  to	  security	  (Baldwin,	  1995:	  131).	   In	   fact,	   the	  majority	  of	   “inter-­‐state	  security	  dynamics	   in	  Africa	  are	  often	  simply	  spillovers	  of	  domestic	  dynamics”,	  which	  in	  most	  cases	  are	  sparked	  by	  refugee	  flows,	  expulsion	  of	  foreigners	  and	  civil	  wars	  (Buzan	  and	  Waever,	  2003:229;	  Russett	  et.	  al.,	  2010:	   209).	  All	   these	   facts	   provide	   the	   raison	  d'être	   for	   choosing	   to	   focus	   on	   intra-­‐state	  conflicts	   rather	   than	   inter-­‐state	   conflicts.	   Since	   majority	   of	   the	   recorded	   intra-­‐state	  conflicts	  have	  been	  over	   ‘government	  incompatibility’,	   this	  study,	  henceforth,	  narrows	  its	  focus	   to	   this	   sub-­‐category	   of	   intra-­‐state	   conflicts,	   which	   have	   been	   termed	   ‘domestic	  political	  crises’	  as	  clarified	  in	  the	  operational	  definition.	  	  	  4.7. Methods	  of	  Data	  Collection	  	  The	   current	   study	   was	   pursued	   basically	   through	   a	   qualitative	   research	   method.	  Qualitative	  research	  has	  been	  defined	  by	  Manheim	  et.	  al.	  (2008)	  as	  constituting	  means	  of	  inquiry	   that	   “provide	   a	   more	   complete,	   meaningful,	   and	   useful	   understanding	   of	   social	  phenomena	   by	   studying	   them	   in	   their	   entirety,	   in	   the	   context	   in	   which	   they	   occur,	   while	  
considering	  the	  meanings	  which	  those	  being	  studied	  give	  to	  their	  actions	  and	  to	  the	  actions	  of	  
others”	   (emphasis	   from	   the	   authors).	   The	   qualitative	   research	   method	   is	   essentially	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  SIPRI	  Yearbook	  2011	  notes	   that	  only	  4	  of	   the	  15	  active	  major	  armed	  conflicts	  around	   the	  world	   in	  2010	  were	  over	  territory,	  with	  11	  being	  fought	  over	  government.	  It	  has	  to	  be	  noted	  that	  none	  of	  the	  4	  conflicts	  over	  territory	  (Kashmir-­‐India,	  Karen-­‐Myanmar,	  Palestinian	  territories,	  and	  Kurdistan-­‐Turkey)	  were	  in	  an	  African	  country.	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descriptive	  and	  inferential	  in	  character,	  but	  all	  the	  same	  it	  is	   ‘scientific’	  and	  exceptionally	  useful	  in	  interpreting	  numerical	  results.	  	  	  The	   choice	   of	   a	   qualitative	   research	  method	  was	   prompted	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   offered	   a	  number	   of	   advantages	   to	   this	   study.	   First,	   a	   qualitative	   method	   is	   best	   suited	   to	   study	  situations	  where	  little	  is	  known	  about	  what	  is	  going	  on	  with	  regard	  to	  one	  or	  both	  of	  the	  cases	   studied.	   This	   study	   focused	   on	   two	   cases:	   EAC	   and	   SADC.	   During	   the	   preliminary	  stages,	  i.e.	  preparation	  and	  refining	  of	  the	  research	  proposal	  of	  this	  project,	  not	  a	  great	  deal	  was	   known	   about	   the	   EAC	   practical	   role	   in	   the	   security	   field	   compared	   to	   its	  accomplishments	  in	  the	  economic	  sector.	  	  Its	  founding	  Treaty	  identifies	  the	  organization’s	  aspirations	  in	  matters	  of	  peace	  and	  security	  (Chapter	  twenty-­‐three)	  but	  little	  information	  was	   publicly	   available	   to	   provide	   a	   general	   impression	   of	   how	   it	   has	   translated	   or	  implemented	  the	  aforementioned	  provisions	  of	  the	  treaty.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  EAC’s	  Southern	  African	  counterpart,	  SADC’s	  practices	  in	  security	  matters	  had	  been	  publicized	  not	  only	  by	  military	   interventions	   by	   some	   of	   its	   Member	   States	   in	   the	   DRC	   and	   Lesotho,	   but	   also	  through	  adventures	  of	  the	  ISDSC	  before	  it	  was	  subsumed	  into	  the	  current	  SADC	  Organ	  on	  Politics,	  Defence,	  and	  Security.	  Therefore,	  there	  was	  an	  exploratory	  element	  to	  the	  current	  research	  design.	  Relatedly,	   the	  preference	   for	  a	  qualitative	  method	  was	  prompted	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  standardised	  data	  from	  which	  sufficient	  number	  of	  cases	  could	  be	  derived	  to	  allow	  a	  comprehensive	  qualitative	  analysis	  of	  the	  findings74.	  	  Secondly,	  reliance	  on	  insider’s	  perspectives	  also	  led	  to	  another	  advantage:	  the	  opportunity	  to	  check	  with	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  officials	  for	  accuracy	  of	  information	  in	  some	  of	  the	  documents	  availed	   to	   me,	   as	   well	   as	   allowing	   exploration	   of	   unusual	   or	   unanticipated	   responses.	  Interaction	   with	   officials	   charged	   with	   responsibility	   of	   coordinating	   and	   implementing	  various	  security	  programs	  of	  the	  two	  organizations	  provided	  the	  opportunity	  to	  review	  the	  
processes	   leading	   to	   results	   rather	   than	   only	   focusing	   on	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   results	  themselves	  (Gillham,	  2000).	  In	  sum,	  qualitative	  research	  method	  involves	  an	  interpretive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  It	  can	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  total	  number	  of	  Member	  States	  of	  the	  two	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  is	  currently	  twenty	  (i.e.	  the	  five	  EAC	  States	  and	  fifteen	  SADC	  States).	  Even	  with	  twenty	  potential	  cases,	  not	  all	  would	  make	  it	  into	  the	  sample	  of	  countries	  experiencing	  the	  security	  challenge	  of	  domestic	  political	  crises	  in	  the	  East	  and	  Southern	  African	  sub-­‐regions.	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approach	   to	   the	   situation	   on	   the	   ground	   (Flick,	   2007).	   In	   this	   case,	   employment	   of	   this	  research	  method	  enabled	  studying	  and	  interpreting	  security	  issues	  within	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations’	  natural	  settings,	  which	  was	  helpful	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  key	  study	  findings.	  	  	  The	   bulky	   of	   the	   data	   for	   this	   study	  were	   derived	   from	  documents.	   Henceforth,	   content	  analysis	  on	  relevant	  documents	  was	  carried	  out.	  Prior	   to	  being	  used	  as	  primary	  sources,	  “documentation	  must	  meet	  certain	  standards	  if	  it	  is	  to	  serve	  a	  useful	  purpose,	  regardless	  of	  the	  techniques	  chosen	  to	  exploit	  it”(North	  et.	  al,	  1963).	  Stress	  was	  placed	  on	  reliability	  of	  the	  available	  data	  considering	  Taylor’s	  (1954)	  caution	  that	  “all	  sources	  are	  suspect”.	  This	  stems	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  information	  contained	  in	  the	  documents	  may	  be	  authoritative	  but	  not	  necessarily	  authentic.	  A	  publication	  may	  be	  derived	  from	  undoubted	  authority,	  but	  the	  documents	  contained	  therein	  can	  be	  anything	  but	  authentic75.	  	  Data	   gleaned	   from	   archival	   sources	   is,	   however,	   not	   without	   its	   limitation.	   The	   major	  limitation	   encountered	   in	   the	   course	   of	   conducting	   this	   research	   was	   that	   some	   of	   the	  records	  were	  not	  readily	  available	   to	   the	  researcher.	   	  Some	  respondents	  treated	  some	  of	  their	  documents	  as	  classified	  materials,	  and	  thus	  sealed	  them	  off	  from	  my	  access.	  Against	  this	  backdrop,	  therefore,	  the	  study	  also	  employed	  interviews	  in	  attempting	  to	  supplement	  gaps	   in	   the	   course	   of	   conducting	   documentary	   and	   archival	   analysis.	   The	   reason	   for	  employing	   the	   interview	   method,	   besides	   supplementing	   gaps	   in	   documentary	   sources,	  was	   to	   go	   beyond	   the	   collection	   of	   pre-­‐specified	   data	   and	   gather	   information	   that	   will	  assist	   in	   reconstructing	   some	   events,	   or	   discerning	   a	   pattern	   in	   specific	   behaviours	   or	  actions	  (Manheim	  et.	  al,	  2008).	  Since	  one	  of	  the	  main	  interests	  was	  to	  ascertain	  facts	  and	  patterns	   rather	   than	   measuring	   pre-­‐selected	   phenomena,	   then	   I	   used	   semi-­‐structured	  interviews.	   Interviews	   were	   specifically	   employed	   to	   explore	   more	   on	   the	   role	   of	   sub-­‐regional	   arrangements	   in	   managing	   the	   two	   prominent	   collective	   security	   challenges	  facing	   states	   in	  East	   and	  Southern	  Africa,	   i.e.	   the	   transnational	   threat	  of	   Small	  Arms	  and	  Light	  Weapons	  (SALW)	  and	  domestic	  political	  crises.	  Interviews	  were	  conducted	  with	  key	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  To	  inquire	  about	  authenticity	  of	  a	  document	  is	  to	  look	  for	  its	  genuineness,	  i.e.	  consideration	  of	  ‘soundness’	  to	  ensure	  it	  is	  an	  original	  copy	  that	  has	  not	  been	  doctored	  in	  any	  way.	  See	  Burnham,	  Peter,	  Karin	  Gilland,	  Wyn	  Grant,	   and	   Zig	   Layton-­‐Henry,	   2004,	   Research	   Methods	   in	   Politics,	   Hampshire	   and	   New	   York:	   Palgrave	  Macmillan.	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Chapter	  Five	  
	  
5.	  EAC	  Security	  Architecture	  and	  the	  Transnational	  Threat	  of	  SALW	  	  5.1. Introduction	  	  Small	   Arms	   and	   Light	  Weapons	   (SALW)	   proliferation,	   as	   one	   of	   the	  major	   transnational	  security	   challenges,	   poses	   a	   direct	   threat	   to	   security,	   political	   stability	   and	   economic	  development	  of	  people.	  The	  current	  situation	  in	  the	  East	  African	  sub-­‐region	  reveals	  an	  area	  awash	  with	  small	  arms	  and	  light	  weapons	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  have	  topped	  the	  agenda	  of	   security	   and	   crime	   control	   initiatives	   since	   the	   1990s.	   	   Sources	   of	   illicit	   SALW	   are	  multifarious	  ranging	   from	  weak	  border	  controls	   to	  poor	  management	  of	  state	  stockpiles,	  illegal	  manufacture	  and	  internal	  political	  strife.	  This	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  how	  the	  EAC	  has	  been	  coordinating,	  and	  managing	  initiatives	  against	  the	  SALW	  menace	  within	  its	  ranks	  and	  also	   between	   its	   organs	   and	   existing	   structures	   at	   the	   national	   level.	   Since	   the	   main	  regional	   instrument,	   the	   Nairobi	   Protocol	   for	   the	   Prevention,	   Control	   and	   Reduction	   of	  SALW,	  places	  responsibility	  on	  state	  parties	  to	  undertake	  the	  bulk	  of	  control	  measures	  (i.e.	  collection,	  destruction,	  marking	  and	  record	  keeping	  of	  firearms)	  the	  analysis	  also	  focuses	  on	  how	  states	  have	  played	  their	  part.	  Other	  equally	  important	  control	  measures	  of	  public	  awareness	   raising	   and	   training	   of	   Law	   Enforcement	   Agencies	   (LEAs)	   are	   discussed	   as	  components	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  interventions.	  	  	  5.2. The	  Nature	  and	  Extent	  of	  Proliferation	  of	  SALW	  in	  East	  Africa	  	  The	   scourge	   of	   SALW	   started	   to	   receive	   deserved	   attention	   from	   the	   international	  community	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  1990s	  when	  the	  United	  Nations	  released	  the	  Report	  of	  the	  Panel	  of	  Government	  Experts	  on	  Small	  Arms.	  In	  this	  1997	  UN	  Report,	  SALW	  are	  defined	  as	  those	  weapons	  “manufactured	  to	  military	  specifications	  for	  use	  as	  lethal	  instruments	  of	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war”76.	  However,	  SALW	  which	  by	  their	  nature	  are	  light,	  easy	  to	  carry	  and	  relatively	  cheap,	  are	  not	  only	  designed	  as	   instruments	  of	  war	  but	  also	   for	   individual	  use.	  The	  category	  of	  small	  arms	  include	  revolvers	  and	  self-­‐loading	  pistols,	  fully	  automatic	  rifles,	  semi-­‐automatic	  rifles,	   assault	   rifles,	   and	  sub-­‐machine	  guns77.	  Light	  weapons	  category	  are	   those	  designed	  for	  use	  by	  several	  persons	  serving	  as	  a	  crew	  and	  comprise	  of	  hand-­‐held	  under-­‐barrel	  and	  mounted	  grenade	  launchers,	  portable	  anti-­‐aircraft	  guns,	  portable	  anti-­‐tank	  guns,	  recoilless	  rifles,	   portable	   launchers	   of	   anti-­‐tank	   missile	   and	   rocket	   system;	   portable	   launchers	   of	  anti-­‐aircraft	  missile	   systems,	   and	  mortars	   of	   calibres	   of	   less	   than	   100mm.	   Ammunitions	  and	   accessories	   including	   cartridge	   cases,	   primers,	   propellant	   powder,	   bullets	   or	  projectiles,	   that	   are	   used	   in	   a	   small	   arm	   or	   light	   weapon	   also	   form	   part	   of	   the	   SALW	  threat78.	  	  	  In	   a	   2003	   Small	   Arms	   Survey,	   it	   was	   estimated	   that	   the	   population	   of	   firearms	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	   to	  be	  around	  30	  million79.	  This	   is	  quiet	  a	  huge	   figure	  considering	   the	   fact	  that	  latest	  estimates	  put	  the	  number	  of	  SALW	  circulating	  in	  Africa	  at	  about	  100	  million80.	  While	  the	  actual	  numbers	  for	  the	  various	  sub-­‐regions	  of	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  may	  differ	  and	  might	   prove	   difficult	   to	   ascertain,	   there	   is	   a	   consensus	   among	   experts,	   researchers	   on	  SALW	   issues	  and	   the	   international	   community	   in	  general	   that	   their	  proliferation	  poses	  a	  direct	   threat	   to	   the	   security,	   political	   stability	   and	   economic	   development	   of	   people.	   As	  once	   rightly	   remarked	   by	   the	   UN’s	   Secretary	   General	   there	   is	   nothing	   “small”	   or	   “light”	  about	   the	   consequences	  of	   the	  uncontrolled	   spread	  and	  misuse	  of	   SALW81.	  The	  negative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  The	  Panel	  of	  Experts	  on	  Small	  Arms	  A/52/298,	  27th	  August	  1997,	  p.	  26-­‐27.	  77	  In	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol	  for	  the	  Prevention,	  Control	  and	  Reduction	  of	  Small	  Arms	  and	  Light	  Weapons	  in	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  Region,	  The	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  and	  Bordering	  States,	  hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  the	   ‘Nairobi	  Protocol’	  ‘Small	  arms’	  are	  defined	  as	  “weapons	  designed	  for	  personal	  use”	  and	  include	  the	  category	  of	  arms	  mentioned	  above.	  See	  Article	  1	  [Definitions]	  of	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol.	  78	  The	  Nairobi	  Protocol	  Article	  1.	  	  79	  “Small	  Arms	  Survey	  2003:	  Development	  Denied”,	  2003,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  p.57.	  According	  to	  Small	  Arms	  Survey	  2007:	  Guns	  and	  the	  City,	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  SALW	  in	  circulation	  are	  estimated	  to	  be	  around	  875	  million	  worldwide.	  80	  AU,	   “The	   Peace	   and	   Security	   Agenda,	   Small	   Arms	   and	   Light	  Weapons“.	   Retrieved	   on	   10	   July	   2010	   from	  Http://www.africa-­‐union.org/root/AU/Departments/PSC/Small	  Arms.htm.	  	  81	  Foreword	  by	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  in	  a	  Report	  of	  the	  Group	  of	  Governmental	  Experts,	  established	  pursuant	  to	   the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  Resolution	  56/24	  V	  of	   24	  December	  2001,	   entitled	   “	  The	   Illicit	   trade	   in	   small	  arms	   and	   light	   weapons	   in	   all	   its	   aspects“,	   in“	   Document	   XIV“,	   UN,	   2005,	   Small	   Arms	   and	   Light	  Weapons:	  
Selected	  United	  Nations	  Documents,	  p.	  41.	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consequences	   of	   SALW	  proliferation	   are	   several	   but	  we	   can	   identity	   the	   following	   three	  broad	  categories,	  as	  far	  as	  this	  study	  is	  concerned.	  	  	  First,	   the	   proliferation	   of	   SALW	   sustains	   and	   exacerbates	   conflicts.	   These	  weapons	   have	  hampered	  peaceful	   settlement	   of	   disputes,	   fuelled	   such	  disputes	   into	   armed	   conflicts,	   or	  significantly	  contributed	  to	  the	  recurrence	  and	  prolongation	  of	  such	  armed	  conflicts	  (UN,	  2005:	   19)82 .	   It	   is	   well	   noted	   that	   the	   scourge	   of	   conflict	   has	   contributed	   more	   to	  socioeconomic	   decline	   on	   the	   African	   Continent	   and	   the	   suffering	   of	   civilian	   population	  than	  any	  other	  factor83.	  While	  globally	  fatalities	  from	  small	  arms	  dwarfs	  those	  of	  all	  other	  weapons	  (UN	  Millennium	  Report,	  2000),	   in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  an	  estimated	  9.21	  million	  people	   perished	   due	   to	   armed	   conflict	   between	   1994	   and	   2003	   (UN	   Millennium	  Development	  Report,	   2005).	  Other	   people	  who	  have	   fallen	   victim	   to	   the	   threat	   of	   SALW	  have	  been	  forced	  out	  of	  their	  homes	  into	  lives	  as	  refugees	  or	  Internally	  Displaced	  Persons	  (IDPs).	  The	  number	  of	  people	  living	  as	  IDPs	  in	  Africa	  in	  2007	  was	  estimated	  at	  around	  12.7	  million	  people84.	  	  	  	  Second,	   apart	   from	   their	   use	   in	   various	   conflicts,	   illegally	   held	   small	   arms	  weapons	   are	  increasingly	  used	  to	  spark	  waves	  of	  criminal	  activities	  including	  cattle	  rustling.	  Crime	  and	  conflict	  are	  closely	  associated,	  meaning	  the	  latter	  is	  an	  important	  correlate	  of	  the	  former	  as	  most	  contemporary	  armed	  conflicts	  involve	  widespread	  looting.	  Conflicts	  are	  likely	  to	  feed	  crime	  even	  after	  cessation	  of	  hostilities	  especially	  in	  situations	  where	  the	  majority	  of	  those	  involved	   have	   no	   alternative	   livelihoods	   in	   the	   post-­‐conflict	   era	   (UNODC,	   2005:	   15).	   To	  highlight	   the	   gravity	   of	   the	   problem	   on	   the	   Continent,	   it	   has	   to	   be	   noted	   that	   Africa	  generally	  ranks	  the	  second	  highest	  region	  for	  non-­‐conflict-­‐related	  firearms	  deaths	  with	  an	  estimated	  4.2	  to	  6.5	  such	  deaths	  per	  100,000	  (Small	  Arms	  Survey,	  2004:	  175).	  Moreover,	  according	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  Office	  on	  Drugs	  and	  Crime,	  Africa	  ranks	  second	  in	  the	  use	  of	   firearms	   in	   robberies	   (12	   per	   cent)	   and	   first	   in	   the	   use	   of	   the	   same	   in	   assaults	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  See	  Statement	  by	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  small	  arms	  at	  the	  5127th	  meeting	  of	  the	  Security	  Council,	  held	  on	  17	  February	  2005.	  83	  Protocol	  Relating	  to	  the	  Establishment	  of	  the	  Peace	  and	  Security	  Council	  of	  the	  African	  Union.	  84	  Internal	  Displacement	  Monitoring	  Centre	  (April	  2008),	   Internal	  Displacement:	  Global	  Overview	  of	  Trends	  and	  Development	  in	  2007,	  p.7.	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threats	  (UNODC,	  2005:	  14).	  Within	  the	  East	  African	  sub-­‐region,	  in	  Uganda	  for	  example,	  the	  national	  assessment	  of	  the	  small	  arms	  problem,	  which	  was	  conducted	  in	  2007,	  highlighted	  the	  major	   impact	  of	   small	  arms	  proliferation	  as	   its	   role	   in	   fuelling	  armed	  crime	   (Uganda	  Report,	  2007:27).	  In	  Kenya,	  “Studies	  have	  indicated	  that	  in	  Nairobi	  alone	  firms	  incur	  losses	  to	   the	   tune	   of	   two	  million	   shillings	   annually	   due	   to	   lost	   production	   days	   as	   a	   result	   of	  workers	  falling	  victims	  of	  crime”	  (Kenya	  Report,	  2010:	  3).	  	  	  Third,	   the	  SALW	  menace	  produces	  negative	  consequences	  on	   the	  economic	  development	  of	   Sub-­‐Saharan	   countries.	   High	   levels	   of	   insecurity	   caused	   by	   the	   illicit	   spread	   of	   SALW	  deter	  economic	  development	  sustenance	  initiatives	  (Nganga,	  2008).	  In	  Kenya,	  “firms	  spend	  about	  11%	  of	   their	   total	   costs	  on	   security	   services	  while	  households	   spend	  about	  9%	  of	  their	  budget	  on	  security	  costs.	  Noting	  that	  Nairobi	  accounts	   for	  44%	  of	   the	  national	  GDP	  production,	  the	  security	  cost	  to	  the	  economy	  is	  thus	  astronomical”(Kenya	  Report,	  2010:	  3).	  	  The	   situation	   in	   the	  East	  African	   sub-­‐region	   reveals	   an	   area	   awash	  with	   small	   arms	  and	  light	   weapons	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   they	   have	   remained	   in	   the	   top	   agenda	   of	   security	   and	  crime	  control	  initiatives	  since	  the	  1990s.	  Firearms	  trafficking	  was	  identified	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  common	  cross	  border	  crimes	  in	  the	  sub-­‐region	  during	  the	  second	  meeting	  of	  police	  chiefs	  held	   in	  Nairobi,	   June	  1999.	  To	  cite	  an	  example	  of	   the	  extent	  of	  spread	  of	  SALW,	   in	  just	   one	   East	   African	   country	   of	   Uganda,	   between	   2005	   and	   2008,	   a	   total	   of	   63,000	  assorted	   SALW	   and	   over	   34,000	   rounds	   of	   ammunition	   were	   destroyed.	   Moreover,	  between	  December	  2008	  and	  March	  2009,	  over	  700	  tons	  of	  un-­‐exploded	  ordinances	  were	  destroyed85.	   The	   Regional	   Centre	   on	   Small	   Arms	   and	   Light	   Weapons	   (RECSA)	   puts	   the	  figure	   of	   SALW	   destroyed	   (i.e.	   excluding	   Un-­‐exploded	   Ordinances	   or	   UXOs),	   in	   the	   EAC	  Member	  States	  in	  the	  ten	  years	  of	  implementing	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol	  at	  around	  184,	  695	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  Speech	   by	   President	   of	   Uganda,	   Yoweri	   Kaguta	   Museveni,	   at	   the	   destruction	   of	   small	   arms	   and	   light	  weapons	   on	   the	   occasion	   to	   commemorate	   the	   10th	   Anniversary	   of	   East	   African	   Community,	   at	   the	  Commonwealth	  Speke	  Resort	  Munyonyo,	  Uganda,	  5th	  October	  2009.	  
	   83	  
(Burundi:	   22,578;	   Kenya:	   22,000;	   Rwanda:	   53,766;	   Tanzania:	   10,568,	   and	   Uganda:	  75,783)86.	  	  The	  Small	  Arms	  Survey	  2003	  provided	  a	  probable	   range	   for	   the	   total	  number	  of	   civilian	  firearms	  in	  three	  of	  the	  EAC	  countries	  (Kenya,	  Tanzania	  and	  Uganda)87.	  As	  seen	  in	  table	  2,	  if	   calculations	  are	  made	  on	  both	   the	   lowest	  and	  highest	  estimates	   for	  each	  country,	   then	  the	  amount	  of	  civilian	  firearms	  was	  between	  1.2	  million	  and	  2.4	  million.	  
Table	  2:	  Civilian	  Small	  Arms	  inventories	  in	  three	  East	  African	  Countries	  	  	  (approximate)	  
	  
Country	   Civilian	  firearms	  Kenya	   430,000	  -­‐	  860,000	  Tanzania	   	  	  	  	  500,000	  -­‐	  1,000,000	  Uganda	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  310,000	  –	  620,000	  	  Source:	  adapted	  from	  the	  Small	  Arms	  Survey,	  2003,	  p.	  84.	  	  The	  average	  total	  of	  civilian	  firearms	  provided	  in	  the	  Small	  Arms	  Survey	  of	  2007,	  including	  Burundi	  and	  Rwanda,	  was	  close	  to	  2	  million	  (i.e.	  1,	  948,	  000	  as	  seen	  in	  table	  3).	  This	  gives	  a	  general	  picture	  that	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  problem	  has	  largely	  remained	  the	  same.	  	  
Table	  3:	  Civilian	  Firearms	  Ownership	  in	  EAC	  Countries	  in	  2007	  
	  Country	   Average	  total	  all	  civilian	  firearms	  Kenya	   740,000	  Tanzania	   550,000	  Uganda	   400,000	  Burundi	   200,000	  Rwanda	   58,000	  
Total	   1,948,000	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  RECSA,	   ‘Implementing	   the	   UNPoA	   to	   Prevent,	   Combat	   and	   Eradicate	   the	   Illicit	   Trade	   in	   SALW	   in	   all	   Its	  Aspects:	   Status	   Report	   on	   the	   Implementation	   of	   the	   Nairobi	   Protocol	   for	   the	   Prevention,	   Control	   and	  Reduction	  of	  SALW	  in	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  Region,	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  and	  Bordering	  States’,	  May	  2010,	  p.21.	  87	  Note	  by	  2003,	  Burundi	  and	  Rwanda	  had	  not	  yet	  joined	  EAC.	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Source:	   Figures	   extracted	   from	   Karp,	   Aaron.	   2007.	   “Completing	   the	   Count:	   Civilians	  Firearms,”	  Small	  Arms	  Survey	  2007:	  Guns	  and	  the	  City,	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Annex	  04.	  	  What	  then	  are	  the	  sources	  of	  these	  illicit	  SALW?	  Several	  factors	  can	  be	  identified	  as	  behind	  the	  demand	  for	  these	  weapons.	  One	  of	  the	  major	  contributing	  factors	  to	  the	  proliferation	  of	  illicit	   SALW	   is	   “State	   failure	   to	   control	   the	   flow	   of	   SALW	   across	   their	   borders	   due	   to	  political	   and	   institutional	   weaknesses”88.	   Illicit	   firearms	   easily	   find	   their	   way	   through	  porous	   borders.	   State	   enforcement	   capacity	   to	   control	   vast	   borders	   is	   limited,	   and	   is	  mostly	   confined	   to	   urban	   centres	   while	   it	   weakens	   especially	   as	   one	   approaches	   the	  borders	  (Nying’uro,	  2007).	  Limited	  surveillance	  of	  border	  points	   is	   largely	  due	  to	   lack	  of	  necessary	   equipment	   and	   trained	   manpower.	   In	   such	   a	   situation	   arms	   brokers	   and	  smugglers	  exploit	  the	  unpatrolled	  areas	  in	  between	  checkpoints.	  	  	  Apart	  from	  weak	  border	  control,	  the	  small	  arms	  proliferation	  is	  further	  aggravated	  by	  poor	  management	  of	  state	  stockpiles	  of	  weapons.	  	  Leakage	  from	  state-­‐owned	  firearms	  is	  one	  of	  the	  principal	   sources	  of	   illicit	  weapons	   in	  circulation.	  Experience	  shows	   that	  most	  of	   the	  illicit	   small	  arms	   that	  are	  available	   in	   the	  world	  started	  as	   licit	  belonging	   to	  government	  stocks89.	   Accounts	   of	   leakages	   of	   arms	   from	   legal	   sources	   has	   also	   centred	   on	   the	  operations	  of	  quasi-­‐formal	  security	  arrangements,	  such	  as	  the	  Local	  Defence	  Units	  (LDUs),	  Anti	  Stock	  Theft	  Units	  and	  militias	  in	  Uganda	  and	  police	  reservists	  in	  Kenya90.	  This	  shows	  that	   there	   are	   still	   weaknesses	   in	   the	   use	   of	   local	   defence	   units	   and	   auxiliary	   security	  forces.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  RECSA’s	   Implementation	  Strategy	  2009-­‐2014	  developed	   in	  2008	  and	  approved	   in	  2009	  by	   its	  Council	   of	  Ministers,	  p.	  5.	  89	  Interview	  with	  Francis	  K.	  Wairagu,	  Head	  Research	  and	  Gender	  at	  RECSA	  Secretariat,	  Timau	  Plaza,	  Arwings	  Kodhek	  Road,	  Nairobi,	  24th	  January	  2011.	  See	  also	  Dominique	  Dye,	  July	  2008,	  “	  East	  Africa:	  Making	  A	  Mark”,	  
ISS	  Newsletter,	  Arms	  Control:	  Africa,	  Volume	  1	  Issue	  3,	  p.7.	  Also	  Uganda:	  Mapping	  the	  Small	  Arms	  Problem,	  2007,	  p.23.	  90	  LDUs	   provide	   support	   to	   both	   the	  Ugandan	   police	   and	   the	   army.	   About	   55	   per	   cent	   of	   law	   enforcement	  officials	   surveyed	   during	   the	   national	   assessment	   of	   the	   small	   arms	   problem	   in	   Uganda	   cited	   LDUs	   to	   be	  irresponsible	   in	   handling	   and	   storing	   arms.	   See	   also	   Mkutu,	   2006,	   “Small	   Arms	   Among	   Pastoral	   Groups”,	  
African	  Affairs,	  p.	  52-­‐54.	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Another	  source	  of	   illicit	  weapons	   is	   the	   illegal	  manufacture	  of	   the	  same.	  Evidence	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  domestic	  capacity	  to	  produce	  what	  is	  known	  as	  ‘home-­‐made	  firearms’	  in	  the	  East	  African	  sub-­‐region.	  A	  number	  of	  home-­‐made	  firearms	  have	  surfaced	  during	  voluntary	  disarmament	  operations	  in	  the	  Karamoja	  region	  of	  Uganda91	  and	  some	  parts	  of	  Tanzania92.	  Arms	  flowing	  from	  countries	  afflicted	  with	  wars	  and	  rebellions	  such	  as	  Somalia,	  Southern	  Sudan,	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo	  (DRC)	  have	  also	  contributed	  to	  the	  SALW	  menace	  in	  the	  East	  African	  sub-­‐region.	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  prolonged	  insurgency	  on	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	   has	   not	   only	   destabilized	   the	   East	   African	   sub-­‐region	   but	   has	   also	   led	   to	   rural	  violence	   that	   takes	   the	   form	  of	  banditry	  and	  cattle	   rustling	   in	   the	  Rift	  Valley	  province	  of	  Kenya	   and	   the	   Karamojong	   region	   in	   Uganda 93 .	   It	   follows,	   therefore,	   along	   the	  Sudan/Uganda,	   Sudan/Kenya,	   Kenya/Somalia,	   and	   Kenya/Uganda	   between	   the	  Karamojong	  and	  the	  Pokot	  borders,	  small	  arms	  are	  in	  abundance.	  The	  situation	  is	  so	  grave	  particularly	  on	  the	  edges	  of	  North	  Eastern	  Province	  of	  Kenya	  bordering	  Somalia	  ending	  up	  being	  described	  as	  ‘a	  no	  mans	  land’94.	  	  As	  observed	  by	  Maze	  and	  Rhee	  (2007:	  2),	  “The	  reasons	  for	  arming,	  and	  consequently	  what	  will	   enable	   disarming	   vary	   across	   the	   sub-­‐region	   irrespective	   of	   political	   boundaries.	  Rather,	  ethnic,	  economic	  and	  environmental	  factors	  have	  a	  predominant	  influence	  on	  how	  and	  where	  these	  problems	  manifest”.	  In	  sum,	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol	  acknowledges	  that	  the	  problem	  of	   SALW	  proliferation	   in	   the	  Great	   Lakes	  Region	   (GLR),	   the	  Horn	   of	   Africa	   and	  bordering	   states	   has	   been	   exacerbated	   not	   only	   by	   inadequate	   capacity	   of	   states	   to	  effectively	  control	  and	  monitor	  their	  borders,	  poor	  immigration	  and	  customs	  controls,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  Uganda:	  Mapping	  the	  Small	  Arms	  Problem,	  2007	  92	  Interview	  with	   Assistant	   Commissioner	   of	   Police	   Lutenta	  Mwauzi,	   Tanzania	   National	   Focal	   Point,	   at	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Home	  Affairs,	  Police	  Headquarters,	  4th	  January	  2011.	  93	  Juma,	  2002,	  Assessing	  the	  Peace	  Building	  Capacity	  of	  African	  Institutions,	  pp.	  21.	  94	  Rok	  Ajulu,	  March	  2001,	  “Democratization	  and	  Conflict	   in	  Eastern	  Africa:	  Kenya’s	  Succession	  Crisis	  and	  Its	  Likely	  Impact	  on	  Eastern	  Africa	  and	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  Region”,	  IGD	  Occasional	  Paper	  No.	  28,	  pp.7.	  According	  to	  the	  2010	  Kenya	  Country	  Report	  on	  Implementation	  of	  UNPoA	  and	  International	  Tracing	  Instrument,	  the	  illicit	  SALW	  problem	  manifests	   itself	   and	   is	   rampant	   in	   the	  major	  urban	   centres	   like	  Nairobi,	  Mombasa,	  Kisumu,	  Nakuru,	  and	  Eldoret,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  rural	  areas	  inhabited	  by	  pastoral	  communities	  such	  as	  the	  North	  Rift	  Region	  (Turkana,	  West	   Pokot,	   Trans	  Nzoia,	   Samburu	   and	   Laikipia,	   bordering	   Ethiopia,	   Sudan	   and	  Uganda);	   North	  Eastern	  Region	  (Mandera,	  Garissa,	  Wajir,	  Ijara,	  bordering	  Ethiopia/Somalia);	  Coast	  Province	  (Tana	  River	  and	  Lamu	   bordering	   Somalia);	   Eastern	   Province	   (Moyale,	   Marsabit,	   Isiolo	   and	   some	   parts	   of	   Meru,	   bordering	  Ethiopia),	  and	  Western	  Kenya	  (Mt.	  Elgon	  bordering	  Uganda).	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movement	   of	   armed	   refugees	   across	   national	   borders,	   but	   also	   internal	   political	   strife,	  terrorist	  activities	  and	  extreme	  poverty	  are	  to	  blame95.	  	  	  5.3. Coordination	  of	  Efforts	  Against	  SALW	  Proliferation	  in	  the	  EAC	  Sub-­‐Region	  	  The	  EAC	  efforts	  on	  dealing	  with	  the	  threat	  of	  SALW	  proliferation	  draw	  their	  mandate	  from	  a	  number	  of	   legal,	   regulatory	  and	  policy	   instruments	   to	  which	   the	  EAC	  as	  a	  sub-­‐regional	  body	   and	   its	  Member	   States	   are	   party	   to.	   These	   instruments	   include;	   the	   Treaty	   for	   the	  establishment	   of	   the	   EAC,	   specifically	   the	   Provisions	   of	   Articles	   123	   and	   12496;	   the	   EAC	  Regional	   Strategy	   for	   Peace	   and	   Security	   Goal	   No.1297;	   Successive	   EAC	   Development	  Strategies;	  various	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  Directives	  and	  Decisions;	  and	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol	  for	  the	  Prevention,	  Control	  and	  Reduction	  of	  Small	  Arms	  and	  Light	  Weapons	  in	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  Region,	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  and	  Bordering	  States,	  hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘Nairobi	  Protocol’.	  	  Article	  123	  of	   the	  EAC	  Treaty98	  provides	   for	   the	  establishment	  of	   a	   common	   foreign	  and	  security	  policy	  by	  defining	  and	  implementing	  common	  foreign	  and	  security	  programmes.	  The	  main	   objectives	   of	   a	   common	   foreign	   and	   security	   policy,	   besides	   safeguarding	   the	  common	   values,	   fundamental	   interests	   and	   independence	   of	   the	   Community,	   are	   to	  strengthen	   the	   security	   of	   the	   Community	   and	   its	   Partner	   States	   in	   all	   ways	   as	   well	   as	  preserve	   peace	   and	   strengthen	   international	   security	   among	   the	   Partner	   States.	   Under	  Article	   124	   of	   the	   Treaty	   EAC	   States	   undertake	   to	   promote	   and	   maintain	   good	  neighbourliness	   as	   a	   basis	   for	   promoting	   peace	   and	   security	   within	   the	   Community	   by	  evolving	  policies	  in	  regional	  disaster	  management,	  harmonizing	  training	  operations	  for	  the	  management	   of	   refugees;	   cooperate	   in	   the	   handling	   of	   cross	   border	   crime,	   provision	   of	  mutual	   assistance	   in	   criminal	   matters	   including	   arrest	   and	   repatriation	   of	   fugitive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  See	  the	  Preamble	  of	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol.	  96	  The	  two	  Articles	  are	  complemented	  by	  Articles	  121(on	  the	  role	  of	  women	  in	  socio-­‐economic	  development)	  and	  127	  (on	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  enabling	  environment	  for	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  the	  civil	  society).	  97	  This	   goal	   targets	   establishment	   of	   measures	   to	   combat	   the	   proliferation	   of	   illicit	   small	   arms	   and	   light	  weapons.	  The	  strategy	   itself	  was	  adopted	  by	   the	  13th	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  meeting,	  held	   in	  November	  28th,	  2006	  to	  guide	  EAC	  level	  interventions	  in	  the	  Peace	  and	  Security	  Sector	  (EAC/CM13/	  Decision	  57).	  98	  As	  amended	  on	  14th	  December,	  2006	  and	  20th	  August,	  2007	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offenders	  and	  the	  exchange	  of	  information	  on	  national	  mechanisms	  for	  combating	  criminal	  activities.	  	  To	   facilitate	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   Treaty	   for	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   East	   African	  Community	  in	  a	  systematic	  manner,	  EAC	  decided	  to	  adopt	  phased	  development	  strategies.	  The	   first	   EAC	   Development	   Strategy	   (1997-­‐2000)	   was	   succeeded	   by	   the	   second	   EAC	  Development	   Strategy	   (2001	   –	   2005)	   and	   the	   third	   EAC	   Development	   Strategy	   (2006-­‐2010).	  EAC	  is	  now	  in	  the	  process	  of	   implementing	  a	  fourth	  Development	  Strategy	  (2011-­‐2016).	  Each	  of	  these	  four-­‐year	  strategies	  pay	  attention	  to	  what	  are	  known	  as	  ‘Key	  Pillars	  of	  East	  Africa	  Integration’,	  one	  of	  which	  include	  cooperation	  in	  political	  matters,	  defence	  and	  security.	  The	  third	  EAC	  Development	  Strategy	  which	  has	  just	  expired	  highlighted	  measures	  to	  combat	  proliferation	  of	  Illicit	  Small	  Arms	  and	  Light	  Weapons;	  joint	  measures	  to	  control	  terrorism;	  a	  mechanism	  to	  enhance	  the	  exchange	  of	  criminal	  intelligence,	  joint	  operations	  and	   patrols	   between	   Partner	   States;	   finalizing	   and	   signing	   an	   MOU	   on	   EAC	   Police	  Cooperation;	   and	  harmonization	  of	  Police	   training	  and	  grades	  as	  part	  of	   its	   ten	   strategic	  interventions.	  All	  these	  proposed	  measures	  are	  further	  expounded	  in	  the	  aforementioned	  2006	  Regional	  Strategy	  for	  Peace	  and	  Security.	  	  All	   the	   five	  EAC	  Partner	   States	   are	   among	   states	   in	   the	  Great	   Lakes	  Region,	   the	  Horn	   of	  Africa	   and	   bordering	   states	   that	   signed	   the	   Nairobi	   Protocol	   on	   21	   April	   200499.	   The	  Nairobi	   Protocol	   was	   preceded	   by	   the	   Nairobi	   Declaration	   on	   the	   Problem	   of	   Illicit	  
Proliferation	  of	  small	  Arms	  and	  Light	  Weapons	  in	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  Region	  (hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘Nairobi	  Declaration’),	  which	  was	  signed	  on	  15	  March	  2000	  by	  ten	  countries100.	  The	  Nairobi	  Protocol	  as	  the	  legally	  binding	  instrument	  to	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  illicit	  SALW	  in	  the	  sub-­‐region	  recommends	  to	  State	  Parties	  to	  consider	  becoming	  parties	  to	  international	  instruments	   relating	   to	   prevention,	   combating	   and	   eradication	   of	   this	   problem	   and	  accordingly	   implement	   such	   instruments	   within	   their	   jurisdiction.	   Henceforth,	   the	   EAC	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  It	   entered	   into	   force	   in	   May	   2006.	   This	   Protocol	   is	   complemented	   by	   the	   Best	   Practice	   Guidelines	   on	  
Implementation	  of	  the	  Protocol	  which	  was	  adopted	  in	  2005.	  100	  Signatories	  to	  the	  Nairobi	  Declaration	  are:	  Burundi,	  Djibouti,	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo	  (DRC),	  Eritrea,	  Ethiopia,	   Kenya,	   Rwanda,	   Sudan,	   Tanzania	   and	   Uganda.	   	   The	   Nairobi	   Protocol	   currently	   has	   13	   signatory	  states	  after	  the	  addition	  of	  Seychelles	  (2004),	  Somalia	  (2005)	  and	  Republic	  of	  Congo-­‐RoC	  (2009).	  The	  ND	  has	  a	  practical	  Agenda	  for	  Action	  and	  an	  Implementation	  Plan.	  
	   88	  
member	   states	   are	   also	   signatories	   to	   the	   Bamako	   Declaration	   on	   African	   Common	  Position	  on	  Proliferation	  of	  Illicit	  Small	  Arms	  and	  Light	  Weapons,	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  Program	  of	  Action	  on	  SALW	  (popularly	  known	  as	  UNPoA)101.	  	  Content-­‐wise,	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol	  embraces	  a	  comprehensive	  and	  multi-­‐faceted	  strategy	  that	   is	  regional	   in	  scope	  and	  envisages	  a	  broad	  partnership	  between	  governments,	   inter-­‐governmental	  organizations	  and	  civil	  society	  in	  all	  matters	  relating	  to	  the	  illicit	  trafficking	  of	   SALW.	   In	   approach,	   it	   locates	   national	   initiatives	   within	   a	   regional	   context.	   The	  Protocol’s	   extensive	   coverage	   provides	   state	   parties	  with	   a	  wider	   but	   challenging	   scope	  with	   which	   to	   tackle	   the	   SALW	   problem.	   Intervention	   areas	   highlighted	   in	   the	   Protocol	  range	   from	   legislative	   measures,	   operational	   capacity	   building,	   marking	   and	   record	  keeping,	  control	  and	  disposal	  of	  both	  state-­‐owned	  and	  confiscated	  or	  unlicensed	  SALW	  to	  issues	  of	  brokering,	  public	  education	  and	  awareness	  programmes	  and	  curbing	  corruption	  associated	   with	   the	   illicit	   manufacturing	   of,	   trafficking	   in,	   illicit	   possession	   and	   use	   of	  SALW.	  	  	  The	   Nairobi	   Protocol	   is	   the	   only	   legally	   binding	   regional	   instrument	   that	   provides	   the	  definition	  of	  ‘tracing’,	  which	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  Protocol	  against	  the	  Illicit	  Manufacturing	  of	  and	  Trafficking	  in	  Firearms,	  Their	  Parts	  and	  Components	  and	  Ammunition,	  supplementing	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  against	  Transnational	  Organized	  Crime	  (UN	  Protocol)	  of	  31	  May,	  2001.	  Besides	  the	  Economic	  Community	  of	  West	  African	  States	  (ECOWAS)	  Convention	  
on	   Small	   Arms	  and	  Light	  Weapons,	   Their	  Ammunition	   and	  Other	  Related	  Materials102,	   the	  Nairobi	   Protocol	   is	   the	   only	   regional	   instrument	   in	   Africa	   to	   contain	   provisions	   on	   the	  crucial	   control	   measure	   of	   marking	   SALW103.	   It	   suffices	   to	   say,	   therefore,	   that	   the	   EAC	  member	   states	  have	  been	  adequately	  mandated	   to	   tackle	   the	  problem	  of	   SALW	   in	  all	   its	  manifestations.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  above	  agreements,	  Tanzania	  is	  also	  a	  signatory	  to	  the	  SADC	  Protocol	  on	  the	  Control	  of	  Firearms,	  Ammunition	  and	  Other	  Related	  Materials.	  102	  The	  ECOWAS	  Convention,	  which	  was	  adopted	  on	  14	   June	  2006,	   resulted	   from	  the	   transformation	  of	   the	  ECOWAS	  Moratorium	  on	  the	  Importation,	  Exportation	  and	  Manufacture	  of	  Light	  Weapons	  (adopted	  in	  1998	  and	  renewed	  in	  2001)	  into	  a	  legally	  binding	  instrument.	  103	  These	  are	  Articles	  3(vi)	  and	  7	  of	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol,	  and	  Articles	  5	  and	  9	  of	  the	  Nairobi	  Declaration.	  Both	  the	  SADC	  Protocol	  and	  SADC	  Declaration	  lack	  provisions	  on	  marking	  of	  SALW.	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  At	   the	   EAC	   level,	   issues	   relating	   to	   SALW	   come	   under	   Sectoral	   Committees.	   Sectoral	  Committees	   are	   the	   organs	   charged	  with	   the	   responsibility	   of	   preparing	   comprehensive	  implementation	  plans	  and	  setting	  out	  priorities.	  A	  Sectoral	  Committee	  also	  has	  to	  monitor	  the	   implementation	  of	   the	  Treaty	  with	   regard	   to	   its	   sector,	   and	  may	   submit	   reports	   and	  recommendations	   to	   the	   Coordination	   Committee104.	   According	   to	   Article	   20	   of	   the	   EAC	  Treaty,	   Sectoral	   Committees	   are	   to	   be	   formed	   upon	   the	   recommendation	   of	   the	  Coordination	  Committee	  to	  the	  Council.	  The	  relevant	  sectoral	  committees	  in	  this	  case	  are	  the	   Inter-­‐State	  Security	  Committee,	   and	   Inter-­‐State	  Defence	  Committee.	   	  Members	  of	   the	  Sectoral	   Committees	   are	   drawn	   from	   representatives	   of	   different	   Law	   Enforcement	  Agencies	  (LEAs),	  which	  are	  the	  Armed	  Forces,	  the	  Police,	  the	  Intelligence	  Services	  and	  the	  Immigration	  and	  Customs	  Services	  of	  the	  Member	  States.	  	  	  This	  means	  that	  the	  SALW	  has	  brought	   in	  the	  attention	  of	  two	  important	  sub-­‐sectors	  within	  the	  EAC	  peace	  and	  security	  architecture,	   namely	   the	   security	   and	   defence	   sectors.	   The	   work	   of	   these	   two	   Sectoral	  Committees	   within	   the	   Secretariat	   is	   coordinated	   by	   the	   Department	   for	   Peace	   and	  Security.	  Below	  the	  Sectoral	  Committees	  are	  the	  Experts	  Working	  Groups	  and	  Ad	  hoc	  Task	  Forces	  that	  are	  from	  time	  to	  time	  established	  as	  and	  when	  the	  need	  arises	  (See	  Figure	  1).	  	  	  Initially,	  relations	  between	  the	  two	  (i.e.	  security	  and	  defence)	  sub-­‐sectors	  was	  not	  clear	  in	  that	  members	   of	   the	   security	   sub-­‐sector,	   in	   particular	   EAC	   Chiefs	   of	   Police,	   felt	   that	   the	  defence	  sub-­‐sector	  was	  sidelining	  them.	  For	  example,	   in	   their	  meeting	  of	   June	  29th	  2007,	  the	  EAC	  Chiefs	  of	  Police	  were	  categorical	  that	  their	  Inter-­‐State	  Security	  Sector	  was	  not	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  subordinate	  to	  the	  Inter-­‐State	  Defence	  Sector,	  and	  therefore,	  it	  was	  viewed	  as	   unprocedural	   for	   the	   latter	   to	   take	   up	   an	   issue	   which	   was	   initiated	   by	   the	   Chiefs	   of	  Police	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	   Council	   of	  Ministers	   decision	   and	   reach	   decisions	  without	  consultations	   and	   consensus	   with	   Inter-­‐State	   Security	   Sector105.	   	   A	   feeling	   was	   running	  high	  among	  the	  Chiefs	  of	  Police	  that	  they	  were	  being	  sidestepped	  in	  the	  consultation	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  Article	   21	   on	   functions	   of	   the	   Sectoral	   Committee.	   The	   Co-­‐ordination	   Committee	   is	   composed	   of	   the	  Permanent	  Secretaries	  responsible	  for	  East	  African	  Community	  affairs.	  Its	  reports	  and	  recommendations	  are	  submitted	  to	  the	  higher	  policy	  making	  organ	  of	  the	  EAC,	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers.	  105	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Chief	  of	  Police,	  June	  29th,	  2007,	  Arusha,	  Tanzania	  (REF:	  EAC/SR/30/2007).	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consensus	  process	   and	   that	   the	   Sectoral	   Council	   on	   Inter-­‐State	  Defence	  was	   treading	   on	  unwarranted	  ground	  field.	  	  	  This	  perceived	  encroachment	  of	  one	  sector	  into	  activities	  of	  another	  led	  the	  state	  security	  sector	   to	   make	   the	   observation	   that	   “Pending	   establishment	   of	   the	   Sectoral	   Council	   on	  Inter-­‐state	   Security,	   any	   policy	   issues	   emanating	   from	   Inter-­‐state	   Security	   sector	   should	  only	   be	   referred	   to	   Inter-­‐state	   Defence	   (sector)	   vide	   a	   decision	   of	   the	   Council	   (of	  Ministers),	  upon	  recommendation	  by	  the	  Chiefs	  of	  Police”106.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  participation	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐state	  Security	  sector	  was	  made	  obligatory.	  	  	  Another	   important	   organ	   is	   the	   East	   African	   Legislative	   Assembly	   (EALA)	   set	   up	   under	  Article	  49	  of	   the	  EAC	  Treaty.	  The	  EALA	  whose	   legislative	  powers	   takes	  precedence	  over	  those	   of	   the	   Member	   States	   of	   the	   EAC	   under	   the	   EAC	   Treaty,	   also	   plays	   an	   oversight	  function	   through	   its	   Standing	   Committees	   including	   the	   Regional	   Affairs	   and	   Conflict	  Resolution,	  which	  is	  the	  lead	  committee	  in	  matters	  of	  SALW107.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  Ibid.	  Given	  the	  cross-­‐cutting	  nature	  of	  issues	  of	  SALW,	  anti-­‐terrorism,	  disaster	  management,	  cattle	  rustling	  and	  conflict	  prevention,	  management	  and	  resolution,	  it	  was	  found	  necessary	  to	  institute	  and	  operationalize	  a	  Joint	  Inter-­‐State	  Defence	  and	  Security	  Ministerial	  Forum.	  	  107	  See	  Presentation	  by	  Hon.	  Mike	  K.	  Sebalu,	  Chairperson	  of	   the	  Committee	  on	  Regional	  Affairs	  and	  Conflict	  Resolution	  on	  the	  Role	  of	  the	  EALA	  in	  SALW	  Legislation	  Harmonization	  at	  the	  Meeting	  of	  EAC	  SALW	  Project	  National	   Focal	   Point	   Coordinators,	   Directors	   of	   Operations,	   RECSA,	   EAANSA,	   and	   Other	   Stakeholders	   in	  Bujumbura,	  Burundi,	  6th	  -­‐7th	  December,	  2007.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  conducting	  field	  interviews	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  a	  delegation	  of	  EALA	  Committee	  on	  SALW	  were	  visiting	  the	  Tanzania	  National	  Focal	  Point,	  and	  were	  briefed	  on	  the	  country’s	  status	  of	  implementing	  measures	  on	  SALW.	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Note:	   The	   above	   presentation	   of	   the	   EAC	   institutions	   that	   handle	   issues	   of	   inter-­‐states	  security,	  including	  SALW	  related	  matters	  is	  different	  from	  the	  much	  more	  comprehensive	  and	  rather	  ambitious	  proposed	  Peace	  and	  Security	  Structure	  which	  appears	  as	  Figure	  2	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  Chapter.	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5.3.1.	  Coordination	  between	  the	  EAC,	  NFPs/National	  SALWs	  Commissions	  and	  Cooperating	  Partners	  
	  EAC	  Member	  States	  subscribe	  to	  various	  existing	  regional	  organizations	  that	  also	  deal	  with	  the	   security	   challenge	   of	   proliferation	   of	   SALW.	   The	   five	   EAC	   States	   also	   maintain	  memberships	   in	   two	   important	   regional	   inter-­‐governmental	   organizations,	   namely	   the	  Regional	  Centre	  on	  Small	  Arms	  in	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  Region,	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  and	  Bordering	  States	  (RECSA),	  and	  the	  East	  African	  Police	  Chiefs	  Cooperation	  Organization	  (EAPCCO),	  as	  shown	  in	  the	  table	  4.	  As	  opposed	  to	  the	  multi-­‐purpose	  mandate	  of	  the	  EAC,	  RECSA	  is	  the	  only	  internationally	  recognized	  inter-­‐governmental	  organization	  whose	  sole	  mandate	  is	  to	  address	   the	   proliferation	   of	   illicit	   SALW.	  RECSA	   is	  made	   up	   of	   13	  Member	   States	  whilst	  States	  maintain	  membership	  in	  the	  EAPCCO.	  
Table	  4:	  Multiple	  Memberships	  in	  Organizations	  with	  SALWs	  Agenda	  	  
ORGANIZATION	   EAC	   RECSA	   EAPCCO	  
FOCUS	  	   Multipurpose	  agenda:	  economic,	  political	  integration	  and	  security	  matters	  including	  SALWs	  
Solely	  curbing	  the	  threat	  of	  proliferation	  of	  illicit	  SALWs	  
Promoting	  regional	  police	  cooperation	  in	  order	  to	  manage	  all	  forms	  of	  cross-­‐border	  crimes	  including	  illegal	  firearms	  
HEADQUARTERS	  
	   Arusha	   Nairobi	   Nairobi	  	  BURUNDI	   ü 	   ü 	   ü 	  CONGO	   	   ü 	   	  DJIBOUTI	   	   ü 	   ü 	  DRC	   	   ü 	   	  ERITREA	   	   ü 	   ü 	  ETHIOPIA	   	   ü 	   ü 	  KENYA	   ü 	   ü 	   ü 	  RWANDA	   ü 	   ü 	   ü 	  SEYCHELLES	   	   ü 	   ü 	  SOMALIA	   	   ü 	   ü 	  SUDAN	   	   ü 	   ü 	  TANZANIA	   ü 	   ü 	   ü 	  UGANDA	   ü 	   ü 	   ü 	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  Both	   the	   EAC	   and	   RECSA	   have	   close	   working	   relationship	   with	   EAPCCO108.	   EAPCCO’s	  objectives,	   among	   others,	   include	   promotion	   and	   strengthening	   of	   cooperation	   and	  fostering	  of	   joint	  strategies	   for	  the	  management	  of	  all	   forms	  of	  cross-­‐border	  and	  related-­‐crimes	  with	  regional	  implications.	  Illicit	  firearms	  is	  one	  of	  the	  organization’s	  priority	  crime	  areas.	  EAPCCO	  also	  possesses	  experience	  in	  dealing	  with	  cross-­‐border	  illicit	  activities,	  such	  as	  drug	  trafficking,	  car	  theft,	  economic	  crimes,	  illegal	  firearms	  environmental	  and	  wildlife	  crime,	  trafficking	  in	  human	  beings	  and	  illegal	  immigrants,	  and	  cattle	  rustling.	  The	  drafting	  of	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol	  was	  done	  by	  EAPCCO.	  	  	  It	   is	   to	  be	  observed	   from	   the	   explanation	   in	   the	  preceding	   section	   that	   the	  EAC	   security	  structure	   is	   relatively	  embryonic.	  With	   such	  a	   relatively	  nascent	   institutional	   framework	  still	   the	   EAC	   has	   managed	   to	   coordinate	   SALW	   initiatives	   through	   the	   EAC/GTZ	   SALW	  Project109	  at	  the	  EAC	  Headquarters.	  This	  project	  not	  only	  promotes	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	   Nairobi	   Protocol	   among	   the	   EAC	   Member	   States,	   but	   also	   coordinates	   the	   work	   of	  National	   Focal	   Points	   (NFPs),	   RECSA,	   Eastern	   Africa	   Action	   Network	   on	   Small	   Arms	  (EAANSA)	   and	   Eastern	   Africa	   sub-­‐Regional	   Support	   Initiative	   for	   the	   Advancement	   of	  Women	   (EASSI).	   Implementation	   of	   the	   EAC/GTZ	   SALW	   Project	   is	   managed	   under	   the	  office	   of	   the	   Deputy	   Secretary	   General	   (in	   charge	   of	   Political	   Federation)	   at	   the	   EAC	  Secretariat,	  and	  overseen	  by	  a	  Project	  Steering	  Committee	  (PSC)	  (See	  Figure	  2).	  The	  PSC	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  It	  was	   created	   in	   1998,	   in	   Kampala,	   Uganda,	   as	   a	   regional	   practical	   response	   to	   the	   need	   to	   join	   police	  effort	   against	   transnational	   and	   organized	   crime.	   EAPCCO	   consist	   of	   the	   following	   11	   member	   countries:	  Burundi,	  Djibouti,	  Ethiopia,	  Eritrea,	  Kenya,	  Rwanda,	  Seychelles,	  Somalia,	  Sudan,	  and	  Tanzania.	  Its	  Secretariat	  is	   at	   the	   Interpol	   Sub-­‐Regional	   Bureau	   (SRB)	   Nairobi.	   EAPCCO	   staffs	   are	   seconded	   to	   INTERPOL	   Nairobi	  office,	  and	  use	  the	   latter’s	  equipment	  to	   facilitate	   their	  activities.	  According	  to	  Francis	  K.	  Wairagu,	  recently,	  there	  has	   even	  been	   closer	  working	   relationship	  between	  RECSA	  and	  EAPCCO	  because	   the	   latter	   has	  been	  running	  a	  project	  in	  partnership	  with	  the	  Institute	  for	  Security	  Studies	  (ISS-­‐Nairobi)	  on	  a	  protocol	  on	  cattle	  rustling,	   and	   RECSA	   has	   been	   a	   member	   of	   the	   steering	   committee.	   The	   cattle	   rustling	   protocol	   is	   led	   by	  EAPCCO	  but	  managed	  on	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  activities	  by	  ISS.	  It	  is	  called	  the	  Mifugo	  project.	  109	  The	   ‘Curbing	  Proliferation	  of	  SALW	  in	   the	  EAC	  Region’	  project	  was	   initiated	  by	  the	  EAC	  Secretariat	  with	  German	  Technical	  Assistance	   (GTZ)	  assistance	   to	  put	   in	  place	  a	   legal,	   institutional	  and	  political	   framework.	  The	  GTZ	  assistance	  covered	  the	  initial	  three-­‐year	  phase	  (2006-­‐2009)	  and	  has	  been	  extended	  to	  another	  phase	  (2009-­‐20120.	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comprises	   of	   the	   EAC	   Secretariat,	   RECSA,	   NFP	   Coordinators	   and	   EAANSA110.	   The	   main	  activities	   undertaken	   at	   the	   EAC	   level	   include	   among	   others	   to	   promote	   and	   facilitate	  harmonization	   of	   legislations	   at	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   level	   and	   engaging	   the	   various	   EAC	  organs,	  which	  includes	  the	  EALA.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  See	   the	   EAC/GTZ	   SALW	   Project,	   “	   Curbing	   the	   Spread	   of	   SALW	   in	   the	   EAC	   Region	   Project”,	   Strategic	  Implementation	   Plan,	   December	   2007.	   The	   same	   project	   provided	   platform	   for	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	  EU/ESA/CPMR	  Project	  where	   EAC	  was	   assigned	   responsibility	   over	  management	   of	   SALW.	   See	   also	   SALW	  Report	  2006-­‐2009,	  p.23.	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Figure	  2:	  Coordination	  between	  EAC	  Secretariat,	  and	  its	  Member	  States’	  
Focal	  Points/Commissions	  and	  Other	  Cooperating	  Partners	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





























	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
	  Despite	   its	   relatively	   new	   and	   evolving	   security	   structures,	   it	   can	   be	   argued	   that	   EAC	  coordination	   role	   on	   SALW	   issues	   has	   largely	   benefited	   from	   its	   partnership	   with	   a	  regional	   inter-­‐governmental	   organization,	   RECSA,	  whose	   sole	  mandate	   is	   to	   address	   the	  
NFPs/National	  SALW	  Commissions	   	  RECSA	  
	  EAPCCO	  	  EASSI	  
	  EAANSA	  
	   	  EAC	  Peace	  &	  Security	  Department	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proliferation	  of	  illicit	  SALW111.	  All	  the	  five	  EAC	  states	  are	  members	  of	  RECSA,	  signatories	  of	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol.	  So	  the	  two	  organizations	  have	  shared	  memberships.	  EAC	  and	  RECSA,	  therefore,	   co-­‐undertake	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   Nairobi	   Protocol.	   They	   have	   a	  structured	  coordination	  and	  cooperation	  mechanism,	  which	  is	  guided	  by	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  (MOU),	  concluded	  in	  May	  2007.	  The	  MOU	  spells	  out	  the	  areas	  and	  mode	  of	  cooperation,	  as	  well	  as	  duties	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  both	  parties.	  In	  an	  interview	  with	  the	  EAC	   SALW	   Programme	   Coordinator,	   Leonard	   Onyonyi,	   he	   had	   this	   to	   say	   as	   the	   main	  reason	  for	  establishing	  such	  a	  partnership:	  	   We	   bring	   in	   RECSA	   because	   it	   is	   important	   for	   us	   to	   eliminate	   any	  perceived	  competition	  between	  EAC	  and	  RECSA.	  So	  we	  basically	  have	  no	  competition.	  All	  that	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  do	  is	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  five	  EAC	  Partner	  States	  implement	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol	  in	  approximate	  manner	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  move	  together	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  challenges	  that	  come	  with	  regional	  integration…112	  	  According	  to	  the	  Head	  of	  Research	  and	  Gender	  at	  RECSA,	  apart	  from	  evading	  unnecessary	  competition,	   the	   EAC-­‐RECSA	   partnership	   has	   helped	   to	   eliminate	   any	   duplication	   of	  activities	   as	   the	   two	   organizations	   involve	   each	   other	   in	   the	   execution	   of	   SALW	  interventions113.	  It	  is	  for	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  reasons;	  RECSA	  is	  represented	  in	  the	  PSC	  of	  the	  EAC/GTZ	  SALW	  Project	  as	  indicated	  earlier.	  	  	  As	   alluded	   to	   earlier,	   the	   EAC	   also	   has	   a	   structured	   partnership	   with	   Civil	   Society	  Organizations	   (CSOs)	  with	   regional	  networks,	  namely	   the	  Eastern	  Africa	  Action	  Network	  on	   Small	   Arms	   (EAANSA)	   based	   in	   Kampala.	   The	   network	  members	   (national	   chapters)	  complement	   the	   work	   of	   NFPs	   in	   implementing	   the	   Nairobi	   Declaration	   and	   Nairobi	  Protocol.	  Apart	  from	  being	  involved	  in	  the	  PSC	  of	  the	  EAC/GTZ	  SALW	  Project,	  EAANSA	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  RECSA	  was	  established	  when	  the	  Third	  Ministerial	  Review	  Conference	  convened	  in	  Nairobi,	  Kenya,	  in	  June	  2005	  upgraded	  the	  former	  Nairobi	  Secretariat	  on	  Small	  Arms	  into	  an	  inter	  –	  governmental	  entity	  with	  a	  legal	  personality	   of	   a	   body	   corporate.	   Note	   that	   the	   Nairobi	   Secretariat	  was	   established	   in	   2002	   and	  mandated	  initially	  to	  implement	  the	  Nairobi	  Declaration	  and	  later	  in	  2004,	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol.	  RECSA’s	  core	  business	  is	  to	  coordinate	  the	  joint	  effort	  by	  National	  Focal	  Points	  in	  Member	  States	  to	  prevent,	  combat	  and	  eradicate	  stockpiling	   and	   illicit	   trafficking	   in	   small	   arms	   and	   light	  weapons,	   ammunition	   and	   related	  material	   in	   the	  Great	  lakes	  and	  Horn	  of	  Africa.	  112	  On	  11th	  January	  2011	  at	  the	  EAC	  Headquarters,	  Arusha-­‐Tanzania.	  113	  On	  24th	  January	  2011	  at	  RECSA	  offices,	  Timau	  Plaza,	  Arwings	  Kodhek	  Road,	  Nairobi-­‐Kenya.	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its	   national	   chapters	   have	   been	   engaging	   with	   EAC	   and	   RECSA	   in	   carrying	   out	   control	  measures	  particularly	  public	  awareness	  campaigns,	  advocacy	  and	  research.	  	  	  Interaction	  between	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   inter-­‐governmental	  bodies	  and	  CSOs	  has	   improved	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  EAANSA	  and	  its	  network	  members	  have	  been	  receiving	  funds	  from	  EAC	  and	   RECSA	   to	   carry	   out	   some	   of	   these	   activities.	   For	   instance,	   CSOs	   like	   the	   Tanzania	  National	   Action	   Network	   on	   Small	   Arms	   (TANANSA),	   which	   is	   the	   Tanzanian	   National	  chapter	   of	   EAANSA	   has	   received	   funding	   from	   RECSA	   that	   has	   also	   availed	   training	  opportunities	   to	   some	  of	   its	  members114.	   It	   is	   a	   healthy	  partnership	   that	   has	   seen	  CSOs’	  proposals	   receiving	   financial	   support	   from	   EAC	   and	   RECSA115.	   Likewise,	   the	   EAC	   has	  identified	  the	  East	  African	  Sub-­‐Regional	  Support	  Initiative	  for	  the	  Advancement	  of	  Women	  (EASSI),	  also	  based	  in	  Kampala,	  as	  its	  strategic	  partner.	  EASSI	  has	  prominently	  featured	  in	  EAC	   SALW	   initiatives	   due	   to	   its	   coverage	   of	   all	   Member	   States	   of	   EAC,	   and	   more	  importantly,	  because	  of	  recognizing	  the	  differential	  impacts	  of	  armed	  violence	  on	  women.	  EAC	  and	  RECSA	  now	  recognize	  EAANSA,	  and	   its	  national	   chapters	   like	  UANSA	  (Uganda),	  KAANSA	   (Kenya)	   and	   TANANSA	   (Tanzania),	   as	   well	   as	   EASSI	   as	   sub-­‐regional	   networks	  representing	  dialogue	  forum	  between	  them	  and	  civil	  society116.	  	  At	   the	  national	   level,	   all	  EAC	  Member	  States	  have	  established	  NFPs.	  As	   illustrated	   in	   the	  United	   Nations	   Development	   Programme	   (UNDP)	   guiding	   document	   of	   2008,	   NFP	   is	   an	  inter-­‐agency	   responsible	   for	   policy	   development,	   coordination,	   and	   serves	   as	   the	  implementation	   body	   at	   the	   national	   level	   that	   brings	   together	   relevant	   Ministries,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  Interview	  with	  Peter	  Boswell	  Mcomalla,	  TANANSA	  Chief	  Coordinator,	  and	  at	  that	  time	  Chair	  of	  EAANSA,	  on	  8th	  December	  2010	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  Tanzania.	  115	  Ibid.	  	  116	  EAANSA	  and	  EASSI	  were	  the	  first	  CSOs	  to	  be	  given	  official	  status	  with	  the	  EAC	  through	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  13th	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  held	   in	  November	  2006	   that	  accorded	   them	  membership	   in	   the	  EAC-­‐GTZ	  Project	  Steering	  Committee,	  and	  thus	  formally	  recognizing	  them	  as	  key	  stakeholders.	  EAANSA	  also	  concluded	  an	  MoU	  with	   RECSA	   in	   July	   2008	   formalizing	   and	   encouraging	   cooperation	   and	   exchange	   of	   information	   between	  them.	  	  In	  its	  first	  phase	  (2006-­‐2009)	  the	  EAC-­‐GTZ	  SALW	  Project	  has	  facilitated	  EASSI	  to	  undertake	  a	  number	  of	  interventions	  in	  its	  niche	  area,	  which	  include	  among	  others,	  Gender	  evaluation	  of	  the	  National	  Action	  Plans	  on	  Small	  Arms	  and	  Light	  Weapons	  of	  Kenya,	  Uganda	  and	  Tanzania;	  development	  of	  the	  gender	  component	  of	  the	   EAC	  Regional	   Policy	   on	   Small	   Arms	   and	   Light	  Weapons;	   and	   provision	   of	   technical	   support	   on	   gender	  during	  the	  development	  of	  the	  National	  Action	  Plans	  on	  SALW	  of	  Rwanda	  and	  Burundi.	  
	   98	  
Government	   Departments	   and	   CSOs117.	   Depending	   on	   the	   region,	   country	   and	   process,	  NFPs	   are	   also	   called	   National	   SALW	   Commissions.	   The	   relevant	   body	   in	   Burundi	   is	   the	  Burundi	  National	  technical	  Commission	  on	  Civil	  Disarmament,	  while	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  EAC	  members	  they	  are	  known	  as	  National	  Focal	  Points.	  	  	  The	  five	  NFPs	  have	  different	  status	  in	  terms	  of	  placement	  and	  coordinators.	  NFPs	  in	  Kenya,	  Rwanda	   and	   Uganda	   and	   the	   Burundi	   Commission	   are	   independent	   with	   fulltime	  coordinators	   and	   specific	  mandate	   on	   SALW	  management.	   The	   Tanzania	  NFP	   is	   a	   semi-­‐autonomous	   body	   within	   the	   National	   Police	   and	   mandated	   to	   address	   SALW	   issues	  alongside	   the	   routine	   police	   duties	   (RECSA,	   2010:	   12-­‐13).	   Henceforth,	   Burundi,	   Kenya,	  Rwanda	   and	   Uganda	   have	   fulltime	   coordinators	   while	   Tanzania	   has	   a	   part-­‐time	  coordinator.	  However,	  only	  Burundi	  and	  Uganda	  NFPs	  are	  fully	  staffed.	  	  	  	  	  From	  the	  foregoing	  explanation,	  the	  following	  positive	  observations	  can	  be	  made	  from	  this	  security	   governance	   component:	   First,	   the	   EAC	   has	   a	   relatively	   embryonic	   institutional	  arrangement	   that	   is	   still	   evolving.	   This,	   however,	   has	   not	   deterred	   the	   sub-­‐regional	  organization	   from	   establishing	   a	   formal	   coordination	   mechanism	   with	   other	   strategic	  partners	   at	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   and	   regional	   levels.	   Due	   to	   the	   overlapping	   nature	   of	   the	  SALW	   security	   challenge	   and	   owing	   to	  multiple	  memberships	   of	   EAC	  Member	   States	   in	  inter-­‐governmental	   organizations	   also	   striving	   to	   address	   the	   SALW	   problem,	   it	   was	  deemed	  necessary	   to	  actively	   involve	  RECSA	  and	  EAPCCO.	  The	   three	   inter-­‐governmental	  organizations	   have	   overlapping	   responsibilities	   and	   memberships	   with	   all	   of	   the	   their	  Member	  States	  bound	  by	  the	  same	  legal	  instrument,	   i.e.	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol.	  Henceforth,	  any	  reference	  to	  coordination	  of	  SALW	  activities	  in	  the	  East	  African	  sub-­‐region	  would	  not	  be	   complete	  without	  mentioning	   the	   three	   organizations	   (i.e.	   EAC,	  RECSA	   and	  EAPCCO).	  Second,	   Civil	   Society	   Organizations	   with	   a	   regional	   coverage	   have	   also	   featured	   in	   that	  relationship	  between	  the	  EAC,	  RECSA	  and	  EAPCCO.	  Engagement	  of	  CSOs	   is	  one	  area	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	  For	  instance,	  the	  NFP	  of	  Tanzania	  (i.e.	  the	  National	  Focal	  Point	  Committee-­‐NFPC),	  draws	  its	  members	  from	  different	  government	  ministries	  and	  departments	  that	  constitute	  the	  National	  Defence	  and	  Security	  Council.	  The	  NFP	  serves	  as	  the	  planning,	  coordinating,	   fundraising	  and	  monitoring	  body	  of	  the	  National	  Action	  Plan,	  whilst	  the	  Arms	  Management	  and	  Disarmament	  Committee	  (AMAD	  Committee)	  functions	  as	  its	  implementing	  body.	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has	   featured	   prominently	   in	   the	   coordination	   of	   SALW-­‐related	   activities	   by	   the	   EAC	  Department	  for	  Peace	  and	  Security	  at	  its	  Secretariat	  in	  Arusha,	  Tanzania.	  Third,	  within	  the	  EAC	   ranks,	   the	   Secretariat	   coordinates	   the	   work	   of	   two	   important	   sectoral	   committees	  actively	  involved	  in	  SALW	  matters,	  namely	  the	  inter-­‐state	  security	  and	  inter-­‐state	  defence.	  Working	   relationship	   between	   the	   two	   sectors,	   however,	   would	   be	   made	   much	   clearer	  when	  the	  proposed	  Directorate	  for	  Peace	  and	  Security	  is	  finally	  instituted	  to	  avoid	  possible	  encroachment	  of	  one	  sector	  into	  activities	  of	  another	  (See	  Figure	  3	  for	  Organogram	  of	  the	  Proposed	  EAC	  peace	  and	  security	  architecture).	  	  5.4.	  Management	  of	  the	  Threat	  of	  SALW	  Proliferation	  in	  the	  EAC	  Sub-­‐Region	  5.4.1.	  Review	  and	  Harmonization	  of	  Legislation	  	  In	   the	   fight	   against	   proliferation	   of	   SALW,	   the	   review	   and	   harmonization	   of	   national	  legislations	   is	   important.	  Review	   is	  necessary	  because	   countries	  have	   legislations,	  which	  are	   out-­‐dated,	   as	   they	   cannot	   keep	   abreast	   with	   new	   developments	   regarding	   the	  proliferation	  of	  SALW.	  In	  most	  of	  the	  out-­‐dated	  legislations	  the	  trans-­‐national	  character	  of	  the	  SALW	  problem	  was	  not	  captured	  (de	  Caris,	  2002).	  National	  firearms	  legislations	  were	  confined	   to	   firearms	  control	  within	  borders	  based	  on	   the	  assumption	   that	   such	  measure	  was	  sufficient	  to	  curb	  the	  flow	  of	  firearms.	  In	  the	  event	  important	  issues	  that	  can	  lead	  to	  firearms	  crossing	  national	  borders	  like	  brokering	  and	  export	  of	  SALW	  were	  not	  covered	  in	  any	   provisions	   of	   domestic	   legislation.	   Flew	   and	   Urquhart	   (2004)	   maintain	   that	   “If	  comprehensive	  legislation	  is	  not	  in	  place,	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  other	  measures,	  for	  instance	  to	  tighten	  border	  controls,	  raise	  awareness	  of	  the	  dangers	  and	  impact	  of	  firearm	  misuse	  or	  improve	  the	  capacity	  of	  law	  enforcement	  agencies,	  will	  be	  undermined.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  strong	  legislation	  alone	  will	  only	  have	  limited	  impact	  should	  there	  be	  a	  lack	  of	  capacity	  in	  other	   areas,	   such	   as	   law	   enforcement	   (p.	   9).”	   It	   follows	   that	   creating	   an	   enabling	   legal	  framework	   and	   improving	   capacity	   in	   other	   SALW	   control	   measures	   are	   mutually	  reinforcing.	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In	  the	  East	  African	  sub-­‐region,	  RECSA	  Member	  States	  under	  the	   initiative	  and	  support	  of	  the	   its	   Secretariat,	   developed	   through	   a	   consultative	   process	   Guidelines	   for	   Regional	  Harmonization	  of	  Legislation	  on	  Firearms	  and	  Ammunition	  which	  were	  adopted	  in	  2005.	  Legal	  Drafting	  Committees	  in	  order	  to	  guide	  review	  of	  respective	  national	  legislations	  have	  been	   established	   in	   all	   EAC	   states.	   These	   Legal	   Drafting	   Committees	   are	   supposed	   to	  ensure	  that	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Nairobi	  protocol	  and	  as	  expounded	  in	  the	  Best	  Practices	  Guidelines	  are	  integrated	  in	  any	  review	  that	  states	  do	  on	  small	  arms.	  The	  initial	  deadline	  of	  April	  2006,	  which	  was	  agreed	  by	  RECSA	  states	  to	  complete	  the	  review	  process	  was	  not	  met	  as	   countries	   have	   different	   legal	   systems,	   constitutional	   and	   bureaucratic	   systems	   for	  passing	  of	  legislation.	  	  What	   does	   harmonization	   mean?	   Harmonization	   simply	   entails	   having	   a	   legislation	  framework	  that	  function	  in	  harmony.	  Due	  to	  the	  transnational	  nature	  of	  the	  SALW	  problem	  states	  especially	  those	  sharing	  a	  certain	  geographical	  spread	  are	  compelled	  to	  direct	  part	  of	  their	  collaborative	  efforts	  into	  seeking	  to	  ensure	  consistency	  in	  particular	  areas	  of	  legal	  controls	   on	   illicit	   small	   arms.	   Enforcing	   common	   legal	   standards	   is	   a	   viable	   concerted	  approach	  to	  clamping	  down	  the	  proliferation	  of	  small	  arms.	  The	  process	  of	  harmonization,	  however,	  does	  not	  mean	  states	  must	  replicate	  one	  another’s	   legislation.	   It	  means	  that	  an	  offence	   recognized	   in	   one	   state	  must	   also	   be	   recognized	   as	   an	   offence	   in	   another	  while	  making	  sure	  at	  the	  same	  time	  that	  the	  legislation	  of	  a	  particular	  state	  continues	  to	  reflect	  its	  national	  context	  and	  policy	  towards	  SALW.	  Harmonization,	  therefore,	  ensures	  that	  such	  standards	   like	   brokering,	   marking	   of	   firearms,	   offences	   and	   penalties	   are	   compatible	  across	  borders	   to	   facilitate	   appropriate	   intervention	  measures	  by	   the	   (Law	  Enforcement	  Agencies)	   LEAs.	   This	   has	   been	   termed	   as	   ‘regional	   harmonization’118.	   The	   other	   equally	  important	  component	  is	  the	  process	  of	  	  ‘internal	  harmonization’.	  In	  this	  latter	  component	  harmonization	   entails	   “the	   coherence	   of	   provisions	   relating	   to	   small	   arms	   within	   other	  relevant	  national	   laws	  and	  removing	  any	  anomalies	  or	  contradictions	   that	  might	  exist.	   It	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  Catherine	  Flew	  and	  Angus	  Urquhart,	  2004,	   “Strengthening	  Small	  Arms	  Controls:	  An	  Audit	  of	  Small	  Arms	  Legislation	  in	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  Region	  and	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa”,	  SaferAfrica	  and	  Saferworld,	  February,	  p.13-­‐14.	  
	   101	  
should	   also	   seek	   to	  make	   the	   legislation	   as	   easily	   accessible	   as	   possible	   and	   to	   this	   end	  should	  aim	  to	  place	  controls	  on	  small	  arms	  in	  as	  few	  acts	  and	  statutes	  as	  possible”119.	  	  	  The	   EAC	   sub-­‐region,	   however,	   is	   yet	   to	   have	   a	   synchronized	   legislative	   framework	   for	  controlling	   the	   proliferation	   of	   SALW120.	   The	   16th	   EAC	   Council	   of	   Ministers	   meeting	  directed	   the	   EAC	   Member	   States	   to	   expedite	   the	   process	   of	   SALW	   legislation	  harmonization	   in	   line	   with	   the	   various	   integration	   stages121.	   Ironically,	   it	   is	   the	   new	  entrants	   to	   the	   EAC,	   i.e.	   Burundi	   and	   Rwanda,	   that	   have	   new	   firearms	   legislations122.	  Arguably,	  swift	  passing	  of	  their	  legislations	  might	  have	  been	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  two	  countries	   have	   relatively	  more	   security	   sensitive	   regimes	   given	   the	   ferocious	   past	   their	  respective	   populations	   have	   gone	   through.	   The	   rest	   of	   EAC	   Member	   States	   have	   draft	  policies	  and	  bills,	  which	  are	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  approval.	  	  	  Existing	   laws	   in	   Kenya,	   Tanzania	   and	   Uganda	   are	   being	   reviewed	   to	   reflect	   a	  comprehensive	   legislative	   framework	   that	   addresses	   demand	   and	   supply	   factors.	   The	  Firearms	  Act,	  Cap	  114	  (1954)	  of	  Kenya	  has	  a	  weak	  regime	  in	  its	  application	  and	  does	  not	  adequately	  provide	  for	  comprehensive	  control	  and	  management	  of	  the	  SALW	  problem	  in	  all	   its	   aspects.	   It	   has	   thus	   been	   reviewed	   22	   times	   in	   attempt	   to	   improve	   its	   provisions	  (Kenya,	   2010:	   8).	   The	   principal	   piece	   of	   legislation	   governing	   firearms	   in	   Tanzania,	   the	  Arms	   and	   Ammunition	   Act	   (1991),	   has	   also	   been	   reviewed	   to	   bring	   it	   in	   line	   with	   the	  international	   and	   regional	   agreements.	   There	   are	   other	   16	   Acts	   with	   provisions	   on	  firearms	  control123.	  The	  draft	  National	  Policy	  on	  Small	  Arms	  and	  legislation	  are	  already	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  119	  Ibid,	  p.13.	  120	  RECSA	  has	  been	  organizing	  biennial	  regional	  harmonization	  of	  legislation	  meetings	  since	  2005.	  See	  RECSA	  Report	  on	  Implementing	  the	  UNPoA,	  2010,	  p.	  16.	  121	  EA/CM16/Decision	  35,	  18th	  September	  2008.	  122	  Burundi	  (Law	  No	  1/14	  of	  August	  2009	  on	  Small	  Arms	  and	  Light	  Weapons),	  and	  Rwanda	  (Law	  on	  Firearms	  No.	  33/2009	  of	  18	  November	  2009).	  Currently,	  only	  Burundi	  has	  a	  SALW	  Policy.	  123	  Some	  of	  these	  Acts	  include:	  Armament	  Control	  Act	  No.	  1/1991;	  National	  Security	  Act	  No.	  3/1970;	  Refugee	  Act	  No.	  9/1998;	  Wildlife	  Conservation	  Act	  No.	  12/1974;	  Immigration	  Act	  No.7/1995;	  Customs	  Management	  Act	  No.	  19/1977;	  Mutual	  Assistance	  on	  Criminal	  Matters	  Act	  No	  24/1991;	  Proceed	  of	  Crimes	  Act	  No.	  4	  /1991;	  Extradition	  Act	  No.	  15/1965;	  Illicit	  Trafficking	  in	  Drugs	  Act	  No.	  9/1995;	  Corruption	  Act	  No.	  2/1974;	  Money	  Laundering	   Act;	   and	   East	   African	   Customs	   and	   Transfer	   Management	   Act,	   as	   quoted	   in	   SALW	   Baseline	  Assessment	  in	  Tanzania,	  2008,	  p.	  52.	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place.	  The	  draft	  legislation	  was	  submitted	  before	  the	  cabinet	  secretariat	  in	  2008124.	  Uganda	  has	  completed	  nationwide	  consultations	  with	  stakeholders	  to	  obtain	  views	  and	  input	  into	  the	  Draft	  Small	  Arms	  Policy	  and	  Bill.	  The	  new	  Bill	  will	  replace	  the	  1970	  Firearms	  Act	  and	  align	   it	   with	   the	   provisions	   of	   all	   international	   instruments	   that	   Uganda	   is	   a	   party	   to	  (Uganda,	  2010)125.	  With	  several	  scattered	  pieces	  of	  legislations	  related	  to	  firearms	  control,	  states	  have	  realized	  the	  need	  to	  conduct	  a	  full	  inventory	  and	  reviews	  of	  all	  legislations	  and	  regulations	  aiming	  to	  place	  controls	  on	  small	  arms	  in	  a	  single	  or	  few	  acts	  as	  much	  possible.	  5.4.2.	  Control	  Measures	  
5.4.2.1. Collection and Destruction of Firearms 	  	  Prior	  to	  providing	  an	  account	  of	  how	  the	  control	  measures	  of	  collection	  and	  destruction	  of	  SALW	  have	  been	  undertaken	  within	  the	  East	  African	  sub-­‐region,	  it	  is	  pertinent	  to	  establish	  how	   they	   have	   been	   defined	   in	   the	   regional	   instruments	   that	   give	  mandate	   to	   EAC	   and	  RECSA	   members	   to	   undertake	   SALW	   interventions.	   The	   Nairobi	   Protocol	   does	   not	  specifically	   define	   the	   control	   measures	   of	   collection	   and	   destruction.	   This	   Protocol,	  however,	   calls	   for	   effective	   programmes	   for	   the	   collection,	   destruction	   and	   disposal	   of	  firearms.	  The	  firearms	  in	  question	  here	  are	  those	  rendered	  surplus,	  redundant	  or	  obsolete,	  in	  accordance	  with	  domestic	  laws,	  and	  also	  through	  peace	  agreements	  and	  demobilization	  or	  re-­‐integration	  of	  ex-­‐combatants126.	  	  	  Definitions	   of	   these	   control	   measures	   have	   been	   provided	   in	   the	   Best	   Practice	  Guidelines127,	   which	   supplements	   the	   Nairobi	   Protocol.	   In	   the	   Best	   Practice	   Guidelines,	  collection	   of	   SALW	   “refers	   to	   all	   weapons	   that	   become	   the	   responsibility	   of	   the	   State,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  124	  The	  second	  draft	  is	  due	  to	  be	  submitted	  to	  the	  Parliament	  after	  incorporating	  recommendations	  that	  were	  made	  by	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Cabinet	  Secretariat	  during	  the	  first	  submission.	  See	  Brief	  Report	  by	  the	  Tanzania	  National	  Focal	  Point	  Coordinator	  on	  Small	  Arms	  to	  the	  East	  African	  Legislative	  Assembly	  (EALA)	  Committee	  on	  Small	  Arms,	  November	  2010.	  125	  Uganda	   also	   has	   several	   pieces	   of	   legislation	   related	   to	   the	   control	   of	   firearms.	   These	   include	   Anti-­‐terrorism	  Act	  (2003);	  Customs	  Management	  Act	  (2004);	  Explosive	  Act,	  Cap.	  298;	  Magistrates	  Courts	  Act,	  Cap.	  16;	   Penal	   Code,	   Cap	   120;	   Police	   Act,	   Cap.	   303;	   Prison	   Act,	   Cap	   304;	   Wildlife	   Act,	   Cap.200;	   and	   UPDF	   Act	  (2005).	  	  126	  See	  Articles	  8	  and	  9	  of	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol.	  	  127	  The	  main	   aim	   of	   these	   guidelines	   is	   to	   elaborate	   a	   framework	   for	   the	   development	   of	   policy,	   review	   of	  national	  legislation,	  and	  general	  operational	  guidelines	  and	  procedures	  on	  all	  aspects	  of	  SALW.	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through	   legal	   acquisition,	   seizure,	   forfeiture,	   voluntary	   surrender	   and	   disarmament,	  demobilization	  and	  reintegration	  (DDR)	  programmes”128.	  Henceforth,	   the	  main	  collection	  strategies	   are	   namely;	   voluntary	   and	   amnesty	   programmes,	   national	   security	   forced	  seizures,	  and	  DDR	  programmes.	  Under	  the	  same	  guidelines,	  destruction	  is	  described	  as	  the	  preferred	   method	   of	   disposal	   of	   SALW.	   Disposal	   entails	   deactivation	   (rendering	   all	  essential	  parts	  of	   the	  weapon	  permanently	   inoperable	  and,	   therefore,	   incapable	  of	  being	  removed,	   replaced	   or	   modified	   that	   allow	   reactivation),	   sale	   (selling	   surplus	   and	  redundant	   stock),	   and	   safe	   storage	   (storage	   of	   SALW	   in	   a	   safe	   and	   secure	   location)129.	  Destruction	  as	  the	  preferred	  method	  of	  disposal	  has	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  in	  a	  way	  that	  renders	  illicitly	   trafficked	   SALW	   seized	   by	   national	   authorities,	   both	   permanently	   disabled	   and	  physically	  damaged130.	  	  	  The	   Nairobi	   Protocol	   places	   responsibility	   on	   the	   State	   to	   collect	   and	   destroy	   SALW131.	  Whereas	   regional	   institutions,	   such	  as	  RECSA,	   can	  play	   the	   supportive	   role	  of	  mobilizing	  necessary	  resources	  such	  as	  funding	  and	  facilitating	  joint	  operations	  for	  the	  collection	  and	  destruction	  of	  illicit	  firearms	  by	  LEAs,	  it	  is	  the	  responsibility	  of	  State	  LEAs	  to	  remove	  illicit	  weapons	   from	   civilian	   possession.	   	   In	   practical	   terms,	   within	   the	   EAC	   Member	   States,	  specialized	  bodies	  to	  handle	  disarmament	  programmes	  have	  been	  established	  in	  Burundi	  (Commission	  for	  Civilian	  Disarmament	  and	  Control	  of	  the	  Proliferation	  of	  Small	  Arms	  and	  Light	   Weapons-­‐CDPCA),	   Tanzania	   (National	   Defence	   and	   Security	   Council)	   and	   Uganda	  (Amnesty	  Commission).	  At	  the	  national	   level,	   therefore,	  voluntary	  disarmament	  has	  been	  going	  on	  a	  continuous	  basis.	  In	  the	  Burundi	  voluntary	  disarmament,	  by	  2009	  about	  8000	  firearms	   had	   been	   handed	   in132 .	   The	   Kenyan	   Government	   declared	   the	   Presidential	  Amnesty	  of	  2009	  but	  has	  since	  2005	  embarked	  on	  a	  pilot	  project	  in	  Garissa	  District,	  which	  is	  known	  as	  Garissa	  Armed	  Violence	  Project	  and	  Small	  Arms	  Reduction133.	  The	  project	  has	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  128	  Best	   Practice	  Guidelines	   for	   the	   Implementation	  of	   the	  Nairobi	  Declaration	   and	   the	  Nairobi	   Protocol	   on	  Small	   Arms	   and	   Light	   Weapons,	   p.	   15.	   This	   document	   was	   approved	   by	   the	   third	   Ministerial	   Review	  Conference	  of	  RECSA	  held	  on	  20th	  -­‐21st	  June	  2005	  in	  Nairobi.	  	  129	  Ibid,	  p.15-­‐16.	  130	  Ibid,	  p.16.	  131	  Articles	  8,	  9	  and	  12	  of	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol.	  132	  Report	  of	  the	  2nd	  meeting	  of	  the	  Sectoral	  Council	  on	  inter-­‐state	  security	  (REF:	  EAC/SCISS/02/CC/2009)	  133	  UNDP	  provides	  financial	  and	  technical	  support.	  See	  Kenyan	  NFP	  Report,	  2010.	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since	  been	  expanded	  to	  other	  districts	  affected	  by	  armed	  pastoral	  conflicts	  resulting	  from	  illicit	  SALW	  proliferation.	  Following	  the	  return	  of	  ex-­‐combatants	  who	  had	  not	  surrendered	  their	  weapons,	  Rwanda’s	  NFP	  developed	  a	  disarmament	  of	  ex-­‐combatants	  program	  using	  the	  trust-­‐building	  strategy,	  specifically	  the	  blind	  surrender	  method,	  where	  the	  identity	  of	  a	  person	  surrendering	  an	  illicit	  weapon	  is	  not	  required	  and	  information	  leading	  to	  recovery	  of	  firearms	  is	  not	  used	  to	  pursue	  the	  owners	  (RECSA,	  2009).	  	  Tanzania	  has	  sporadically	  been	  carrying	  out	  targeted	  military	  or	  police	  operations	  across	  the	  country.	  The	  earliest	  in	  the	  last	  decade	  was	  in	  the	  North	  Western	  Region	  of	  Bukoba	  in	  2002	  and	  the	  most	  recent	  was	  carried	  out	  in	  Rorya	  and	  Tarime	  Districts	  in	  2010134.	  A	  total	  of	  4084	  firearms	  were	  seized	  in	  Tanzania	  police	  operations	  from	  the	  year	  2002	  to	  2007135.	  Uganda	   has	   put	   in	   place	   the	   Karamoja	   Integrated	   Disarmament	   and	   Development	  Programme	   (KIDDP)	   in	   the	  Karamoja	   region,	   one	   of	   the	   areas	   awash	  with	   illicit	   SALWs.	  According	  to	  the	  Ugandan	  President	  Museveni,	  the	  Karamoja	  disarmament	  exercise,	  which	  has	  been	  coordinated	  by	  the	  military	  since	  its	  commencement	  in	  2004,	  scored	  impressive	  success	   in	  collection	  of	  weapons	  resulting	   in	  peace	  and	  security	   in	   the	  area136.	  However,	  such	   accolade	   has	   to	   be	   received	   with	   caution	   as	   unilateral	   disarmament	   operations	   at	  border	  regions	  often	  end	  in	  diverting	  arms	  routes	  while	  restoring	  relative	  calm	  for	  a	  short	  period.	  	  	  The	   foregoing	  argument	  stems	   from	  the	   fact	   that	  a	  year	   since	   the	  commencement	  of	   the	  Ugandan	  KIDDP,	  it	  dawned	  on	  the	  national	  authorities	  that	  national	  (unilateral)	  initiatives	  have	   to	   be	   complemented	   by	   bilateral	   disarmament	   operations.	   As	   observed	   by	   one	  Regional	   Police	   Commander	   (RPC)	   in	   the	   Northern	   region	   of	   Uganda	   that	   the	   country	  cannot	  single-­‐handedly	  address	  the	  illegal	  trade	  in	  small	  arms	  in	  its	  common	  border	  with	  Sudan	  (Uganda	  NFP,	  2007).	  Thus,	  as	  they	  share	  a	  long	  common	  border,	  in	  June	  2005	  Kenya	  and	  Uganda	  agreed	  upon	  a	  joint	  disarmament	  program	  to	  restore	  peace	  in	  North	  Eastern	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134 	  Interview	   with	   ACP	   Lutenta	   Mwauzi,	   Tanzania	   NFP	   Coordinator,	   Ministry	   of	   Home	   Affairs,	   Police	  Headquarters,	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  4th	  January	  2011.	  135	  SALW	  Baseline	  Assessment	  in	  Tanzania,	  2008	  p.69.	  136	  Speech	   by	   President	   Museveni	   at	   the	   destruction	   of	   SALW	   on	   the	   occasion	   to	   commemorate	   the	   10th	  anniversary	  of	  the	  EAC,	  Commonwealth	  Speke	  Resort,	  Munyonyo,	  5th	  October,	  2009	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Uganda	  and	  the	  North	  Rift	  Districts	  of	  Kenya	  (Kenya,	  2006;	  2009).	  Since	  this	  border	  is	  on	  each	  side	   inhabited	  by	  armed	  pastoral	  communities,	   i.e.	   the	  Pokot	  and	  Karamojong	  (also	  referred	  as	   the	  Karamoja	  cluster)	  who	  have	   from	   time	   to	   time	  engaged	   in	  cattle	   rustling	  and	  border	  raids	  against	  each	  other,	  the	  joint	  program	  of	  action	  has	  involved	  simultaneous	  and	  coordinated	  disarmament	  operations,	  branding	  of	  livestock,	  sensitization	  and	  support	  for	  the	  development	  of	  alternative	  livelihood,	  among	  other	  measures.	  However,	  according	  to	  the	  Kenyan	  country	  report	  to	  the	  fourth	  UN	  Biennial	  Meeting	  of	  States	  on	  the	  Status	  of	  Implementation	   of	   the	   UNPoA	   and	   the	   implementation	   status	   of	   international	   tracing	  instrument	  of	  2010,	  however,	   the	   foregoing	   interventions	  have	  recorded	  minimal	  results	  owing	  partly	   to	   lack	  of	   funds	   to	   sustain	   the	  processes.	  Rwanda	   too	  has	  been	   conducting	  sporadic	   joint	  military	  operations	  with	  the	  DRC	  (a	  non-­‐EAC	  member	  but	  signatory	  to	  the	  Nairobi	   Protocol).	   It	   is	   estimated	   that	   the	   joint	   military	   operations,	   one	   of	   which	   was	  branded	   ‘Umoja	  Wetu’	   (meaning	   ‘Our	  Unity’),	  have	   successfully	   led	   to	   the	   return	  of	  over	  4,000	  ex-­‐combatants	  and	  civilians	  to	  Rwanda	  (RECSA,	  2009).	  	  At	   the	  EAC	   level,	   the	  EAC-­‐GTZ	  SALW	  Project	  has	  provided	  financial	  support	   to	   initiatives	  aimed	  at	  promoting	  voluntary	  disarmament	  among	  heavily	  armed	  pastoral	  communities.	  The	   annual	   Tecla	   Lorupe	   Peace	   Race	   is	   one	   such	   initiative,	   which	   brings	   together	  conflicting	  communities	  of	  northwestern	  Kenya,	  eastern	  Uganda	  and	  southern	  Sudan,	  who	  have	   been	   carrying	   out	   cattle	   rustling	   against	   each	   other	   with	   deadly	   consequences137.	  	  	  The	  race	  which	   is	  named	  after	  the	  world-­‐renowned	  Kenyan	  athlete,	  Tecla	  Lorupe,	  brings	  together	  members	   of	   the	   pastoral	   communities	  within	   the	   Karamoja	   cluster	   region.	   The	  main	   condition	   for	  participants	   is:	   drop	   the	  gun	  and	  embrace	  peace.	   In	   the	  warrior	   race	  category,	  warriors	   from	  different	  pastoral	   communities	   compete	   against	   each	  other,	   and	  winners	  are	  rewarded	  mainly	  with	  livestocks.	  	  This	  is	  to	  encourage	  them	  to	  abandon	  cattle	  rustling	   and	   appreciate	   sports	   as	   an	   alternative	   source	   of	   livelihood.	   Consequently,	   the	  race	   has	   been	   instrumental	   in	   making	   local	   communities	   give	   up	   illegal	   firearms.	   As	   of	  September	   2006,	   some	   12,000	   illegal	   guns	   had	   been	   surrendered	   by	   the	  Karamojong	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  137See	  “Curbing	  Small	  Arms	  And	  Light	  Weapons	  In	  The	  EAC	  Region:	  Implementation	  Of	  The	  EAC-­‐GTZ	  Project”,	  August	  2006-­‐July	  2009.	  	  
	   106	  
Uganda	   as	   a	   result	   of	   peace	   athletic	   events	   organized	   by	   the	   Tecla	   Lorupe	   Peace	  Foundation	  (Daily	  Nation,	  September	  26,	  2006)	  	  As	   far	   as	   destruction	   of	   SALW	   is	   concerned,	   EAC	   States	   have	   undertaken	   this	   control	  measure	   under	   the	   support	   of	   the	   EAC	   and	   also	   from	   the	   Governments	   of	   the	   United	  Kingdom,	   and	   United	   States.	   Destruction	   exercises	   in	   EAC	   States	   have	   also	   received	  technical	   assistance	   from	   UNDP,	   SaferAfrica	   and	   the	   Mines	   Advisory	   Group	   (MAG).	  National	   law	   enforcement	   authorities	   and	   their	   structures	   possess	   limited	   capacity	   for	  destruction	   processes	   as	   they	   lack	   either	   the	   requisite	   financial	   resources	   to	   purchase	  modern	  machines,	   like	  gun-­‐crunchers	   for	  destroying	  weapons,	  or	  expertise	   to	  dispose	  of	  caches	   of	   ammunition,	   or	   both.	   Of	   the	   eleven	  main	   techniques138	  for	   SALW	   destruction,	  EAC	  States	  have	  mostly	  used	  the	  Open-­‐Air	  Burning	  method	  before	  receiving	  support	  from	  the	  EAC	  and	  RECSA,	  because	   it	   is	  cheap,	  simple,	  highly	  visible	  and	  symbolic,	  and	  the	   fact	  that	  it	  requires	  limited	  training.	  	  	  	  	  	  Destruction	   of	   SALW	   has	   been	   used	   also	   as	   a	   public	   awareness-­‐raising	   tool.	   Open-­‐air	  destruction	  usually	  takes	  place	  to	  commemorate	  or	  in	  remembrance	  of	  important	  national	  ceremonies.	  EAC	  States	  as	  signatories	  to	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol	  have	  annually	  been	  marking	  the	   Nairobi	   Declaration	   Day	   (i.e.	   15th	   March)	   to	   commemorate	   the	   signing	   of	   the	  Declaration	   in	   2000.	   The	   five	   EAC	   States	   have	   also	   publicly	   destroyed	   illicit	   firearms	   to	  mark	   the	   African	   Day	   and	   commemorate	   the	   African	   Union’s	   2010	   Year	   of	   Peace	   and	  Security139.	  This	   is	  also	  an	  area	  where	  the	  civil	  society	  has	  come	  to	  share	  responsibilities	  with	  NFPs.	  Initially,	  before	  being	  recognized	  and	  involved	  in	  the	  national,	  sub-­‐regional	  and	  regional	   frameworks	   for	   dealing	   with	   SALW-­‐related	   aspects,	   CSOs	   were	   only	   invited	   to	  witness	   the	   exercise	   of	   destroying	   arms.	  Nowadays,	   CSOs	   take	   the	   lead	   in	   raising	  public	  awareness	  and	  mobilizing	  people	   to	  show	  up	   in	  destruction	  exercises	  and,	   in	  developing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  138	  Besides	   burning,	   other	   destruction	   techniques	   include	   smelting	   and	   recycling,	   band	   Shaw,	   cement,	  crushing	   by	   Armoured	   Fighting	   Vehicles	   (AFV),	   cutting	   by	   Oxyacetylene	   or	   plasma,	   cutting	   using	   hydro	  abrasive	  technology,	  cutting	  by	  hydraulic	  shears,	  deep	  sea	  dumping,	  detonation	  and	  shredding.	  139	  Other	  such	  ceremonies	  include	  the	  UN	  Arms	  Day	  on	  July	  2004	  in	  which	  1000	  firearms	  were	  destroyed	  at	  Jangwani	  grounds	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam.	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public	   campaign	   materials	   related	   to	   SALW	   issues140.	   This	   is	   in	   accordance	   to	   the	   Best	  Practice	  Guidelines	  that	  require	  states	  to	  use	  the	  destruction	  of	  weapons	  as	  a	  tool	  not	  only	  for	   public	   awareness	   raising,	   but	   also	   as	   a	   confidence	   building	   measure	   on	   the	   SALW	  problem,	  and	  ensure	  participation	  of	  the	  civil	  society	  to	  monitor	  the	  destruction	  process.	  Available	  statistics	  show	  that	  by	  May	  2010,	  in	  the	  five	  EAC	  States	  a	  total	  number	  of	  SALW	  destroyed	  stand	  at	  over	  184,000	  as	  shown	  in	  table	  5	  below.	  	  
Table	  5:	  Status	  of	  SALW,	  Ammunition	  and	  Unexploded	  Ordinances	  (UXOs)	  
Destruction	  
	   	   Burundi	   Kenya	   Tanzania	   Rwanda	   Uganda	  SALW	   22578	   Over	  22000	   53766	   10568	   75783	  UXOs	  &	  Ammunition	   13445	  Items	  	  	  
35000	  Landmines	   421	  Tons	   14000	  Landmines	   6300	  Landmines,	  798	  	  Tons	  	  Adapted	  from	  RECSA,	  Implementing	  the	  UNPoA-­‐May	  2010.	  	  
5.4.2.2. Marking and Record Keeping 	  One	  of	  the	  main	  challenges	  in	  controlling	  the	  illicit	  proliferation	  of	  SALW	  is	  the	  difficulty	  in	  tracing	  their	  origin	  and	  movement	  within	  and	  across	  states.	  If	  SALW	  are	  to	  be	  traced,	  they	  ought	   to	  bear	  marks	   that	  cannot	  be	  easily	   tampered	  with.	  Under	  Article	  7	  of	   the	  Nairobi	  Protocol,	  states	  are	  obliged	  to	  put	  a	  unique	  mark	  on	  weapons	  in	  state	  possession	  for	  easy	  traceability	  and	  identification.	  State	  Parties	  to	  this	  Protocol	  are	  required	  to	  mark	  all	  SALW	  upon	  manufacture,	  with	  a	  unique	  marking,	  providing	  the	  name	  of	  the	  manufacture,	  country	  or	  place	  of	  manufacture	  and	   the	  serial	  number	   if	   the	  weapon	  does	  not	  already	  bear	  one.	  Markings	   on	   firearms	  must	   be	   stamped	   on	   the	   barrel,	   frame	   and	   where	   applicable,	   the	  slide.	   States	   are	   also	   required	   to	   ensure	   that	   a	   database	   of	   information	   in	   relation	   to	  firearms	  is	  maintained	  for	  not	  less	  than	  ten	  years	  for	  tracing	  purposes.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  140	  Interview	   with	   Peter	   Boswell	   Mcomalla,	   TANANSA	   Chief	   Coordinator,	   and	   EANSA	   Chairperson,	   8th	  December	  2010	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam.	  
	   108	  
The	  RECSA	   region,	   i.e.	   the	   Great	   Lakes	   Region	   and	   the	  Horn	   of	   Africa,	   is	   the	   first	   in	   the	  world	  to	  mark	  firearms141.	  RECSA	  is	  therefore	  coordinating	  the	  arms	  making	  project	  in	  the	  sub-­‐region	   under	   the	   support	   of	   the	   German	   Government	   through	   the	   EAC-­‐GTZ	   SALW	  Project	   and	   the	   United	   States	   Department	   of	   State,	   Office	   of	   Weapons	   Removal	   and	  Abatement,	   Bureau	   of	   Political-­‐Military	   Office	   (WRA).	   The	   EAC-­‐RECSA	   MoU	   mentioned	  earlier	  provides	  for	  direct	  financial	  support	  to	  RECSA	  to	  support	  activities	  outside	  the	  EAC	  area,	   particularly	   in	   countries	   bordering	   EAC	   Member	   States	   whose	   security	   dynamics	  impact	  directly	  on	  the	  EAC.	  RECSA	  has	  received	  financial	  support	  worth	  over	  US	  $	  12,032,	  145	  between	  the	  year	  2000	  and	  2009	  from	  Development	  Partners142.	  About	  US	  $	  448,463	  of	   that	  support	  came	  from	  the	  EAC	  SALW	  Project143.	  Funding	   from	  the	  EAC	  via	   its	  SALW	  Project	  has	  supported	   the	  procurement	  of	   five	  electronic	  marking	  machines	  and	   twenty-­‐four	  computers.	  The	  US	  government	  on	  its	  part	  supported	  the	  procurement	  of	  twenty-­‐six	  marking	   machines.	   All	   EAC	   Member	   States	   have	   received	   2	   marking	   equipments144 .	  Electronic	  marking	  equipments	  are	  favoured	  as	  they	  can	  mark	  up	  to	  1500	  weapons	  a	  day	  and	  information	  is	  automatically	  stored	  in	  a	  database	  (Dye,	  2008:	  8).	  	  	  The	  massive	   financial	   support	   to	   RECSA	  marking	   project	   has	   also	   featured	   the	   training	  component.	  The	  EAC-­‐GTZ	  SALW	  Project	   supported	   training	   in	   the	   installation,	   operation	  and	  maintenance	   of	   the	   electronic	  marking	  machines	   in	  November	   2008	   and	   in-­‐country	  trainings	   on	   SALW	   marking	   in	   the	   five	   EAC	   states145 .	   The	   United	   States	   WRA	   also	  supported	   additional	   in-­‐country	   trainings	   between	   October	   and	   November	   2009146 .	  Training	   for	   civil	   society	   organizations	   and	   groups,	   such	   as	   the	   media	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  141	  Interview	   with	   Wairagu,	   Head	   of	   Research	   and	   Gender	   Unit	   at	   RECSA,	   24th	   January	   2011	   in	   Nairobi.	  Dominique	   Dye	   says	   RECSA	   is	   the	   first	   regional	   community	   in	   Africa	   to	   attempt	   to	   implement	   a	   regional	  marking	  programme.	  See	   the	  Article	   “East	  Africa:	  Making	  a	  Mark”,	  Arms	  Control:	  Africa,	  Volume	  1,	   Issue	  3,	  July	  2008.	  142	  RECSA	  Donors	   included	  Governments	   of	  UK,	  Netherlands,	  Belgium,	  Norway,	  US,	   Canada,	   Japan;	   Finland,	  Denmark,	  EAC/GTZ;	  EU;	  UNDP;	  BCPR;	  SaferWorld;	  ISS;	  FECCLAHA;	  and	  Oxfam	  143	  RECSA	  op.	  cit.	  p.	  33.	  144	  Interview	  with	  Wairagu,	   ibid.	  The	  EAC	   support	   to	   all	   its	   partner	   states	   to	   enable	   them	  electronize	   their	  databases	   through	   the	   provision	   of	   both	   software	   and	   hardware	  was	   confirmed	   by	   Leonard	  Onyonyi,	   EAC	  SALW	  Programme	  Coordinator	  in	  an	  interview	  on	  11th	  January	  2011.	  145	  15	   trainers	   from	   the	   GLR/HoA	   trained	   in	   South	   Africa	   for	   two	   weeks	   in	   South	   Africa.	   The	   in-­‐country	  trainings	  conducted	  in	  all	  EAC	  states	  covered	  30	  trainees	  per	  country.	  See	  EAC/GTZ	  SALW	  Report	  2006-­‐2009,	  p.35.	  146	  The	  trainings	  were	  conducted	  in	  six	  RECSA	  states	  namely,	  Burundi,	  Djibouti,	  Ethiopia,	  DRC,	  Seychelles	  and	  Sudan.	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parliamentarians,	   aimed	   at	   improving	   their	   capacity	   to	   support	   the	   NFPs	   in	   the	  implementation	   of	   the	   Nairobi	   Protocol	   has	   been	   given	   due	   attention	   at	   national	   level,	  again	   hosted	   and	   sponsored	   by	   states	  with	   contributions	   flowing	   from	   donor	   countries,	  local	  and	  international	  NGOs,	  and	  RECSA.	  	  	  The	   various	   training	   programmes	   thus	   far	   in	   the	   East	   African	   sub-­‐region	   have	   been	  conducted	  on	  a	  short-­‐term	  basis,	  and	  at	  most	  have	  an	  in-­‐ward/in-­‐country	  focus.	  The	  sub-­‐region	   is	   yet	   to	   conduct	   long-­‐term	   cross-­‐regional	   training	   for	   its	   LEAs.	   The	   EAC	   states	  ought	   first	   to	   achieve	   convergence	   in	   operational	   viability	   and	   that	  means	   training	   and	  understanding	   each	   other	   while	   creating	   the	   right	   environment	   for	   the	   different	   police	  services	  to	  work	  together	  in	  fighting	  illicit	  SALW	  proliferation147.	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  results	  of	  the	  LEAs	  Survey	   in	  Uganda	   improved	  police	  training	  would	  be	  crucial	   to	   increasing	  their	  ability	  to	  address	  small	  arms	  related	  crimes	  (Uganda	  NFP,	  2007)148.	  	  The	  Nairobi	  Protocol	  is	  silent	  on	  the	  aspect	  of	  joint	  training	  programme	  for	  LEAs.	  However,	  in	  recognition	  of	   the	   fact	   that	  skills	  development	  has	  not	  been	  uniform	  in	  all	   its	  Member	  States,	  development	  of	  the	  training	  programmes	  by	  states	  are	  at	  different	  paces,	  and	  being	  in	   a	  bid	   to	   improve	   standards	  and	   co-­‐operation	  within	   the	   sub-­‐region,	   the	  EAC	   included	  exchange	   of	   training	   programmes	   for	   security	   personnel	   in	   its	   2006	   Peace	   and	   Security	  Strategy149.	   Even	   though	   Article	   6	   (2),	   of	   the	   East	   African	   Police	   Chiefs	   Co-­‐operation	  (EAPCCO)	   spells	   out	   agreement	   in	   respect	   of	   co-­‐operation	   and	  mutual	   assistance	   in	   the	  field	  of	  combating	  crime,	  rendering	  advice,	  support	  or	  assistance	  relating	  to	  training,	  joint	  training	  to	  develop	  professional	  police	  with	  uniform	  standards	  across	  the	  sub-­‐region	  has	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  147	  Interview	  with	  Leonard	  Onyonyi,	  op.	  cit.	  	  148	  The	  police	  interviewed	  identified	  a	  number	  of	  areas	  (with	  their	  responses	  indicated	  in	  percentages)	  where	  there	  was	   need	   for	   specialized	   training	   to	   improve	   their	   capacity	   to	   deal	   with	   SALW.	   These	   include	   basic	  investigation	   techniques,	   firearms	   related	   crime	  detection	   (92%);	   identification	   of	   concealment	   techniques	  (90%);	   improvement	   of	   record-­‐keeping	   techniques	   (89%);	   understanding	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   illicit	   firearm	  problem	  (85%);	  safe	  storage	  and	  stockpile	  management	  skills	  (84%);	  and	  improved	  knowledge	  of	  the	  firearm	  legislation	  (82%)	  149	  Goal	  7	  (exchange	  of	  training	  programs	  for	  security	  personnel)	  of	  the	  Peace	  and	  Security	  Strategy	  that	  has	  15	  goals	  in	  total.	  Specific	  strategies	  to	  fulfil	  this	  goal	  include	  conducting	  specialist	  trainer	  exchange;	  sharing	  of	  experiences	   among	   the	   Partner	   States;	   developing	   appropriate	   syllabi,	   which	   measures	   to	   the	   standards	  applicable	  in	  other	  Partner	  States;	  carrying	  out	  study	  visits	  within	  the	  Partner	  States,	  and	  establishing	  an	  East	  African	  Police	  Academy.	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hitherto	  not	  been	  effected.	  The	  Strategy	  also	  ponders	   the	   raising	  of	   the	   security	   training	  institutions	   of	   the	   EAC	   Partner	   States	   to	   nationally	   and	   internationally	   recognized	  professional	  standards.	  This	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  done	  and	  EAC	  has	  a	  long	  way	  to	  go	  to	  achieve	  this.	  	  	  As	   rightly	  noted	  by	  Dye	   (2008),	   the	   success	  of	   the	   regional	  marking	  and	   record	  keeping	  initiative,	   however,	   hinges	   on	   the	   creation	   and	   maintenance	   of	   national	   databases	   on	  SALW.	  States	  parties	  to	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol	  have	  principally	  agreed	  to	  establish	  a	  central	  SALW	  registry	   for	   the	   administration	   and	  maintenance	  of	   firearms	   records.	  Thus	   far,	   no	  state	   has	   established	   a	   national	   centralized	   SALW	   database	   as	   each	   government	  department,	  which	  possesses	  SALW,	  has	  its	  own	  stand-­‐alone	  database.	  Some	  of	  EAC	  states	  (Burundi,	   Kenya	   and	   Uganda)	   still	   make	   use	   of	   manual	   databases	   while	   Rwanda	   and	  Tanzania	  maintain	  both	  manual	  and	  electronic	  SALW	  records	  (RECSA,	  2010).	  	  	  The	  major	  challenge	  for	  states	  is	  not	  only	  resources	  and	  technical	  expertise,	  but	  also	  to	  be	  able	   to	   share	   information	   once	   the	   computerized	   databases	   have	   been	   completed.	   The	  Nairobi	  Protocol	  encourages	  the	  exchange	  of	   information	  with	  partners	  and	  state	  parties	  to	  promote	  transparency	  as	  well	  as	  cross	  learning.	  Article	  16	  in	  particular	  of	  the	  Protocol	  gives	  emphasis	  to	  transparency	  and	  information	  exchange	  between	  parties	  involved	  in	  the	  campaign	  against	  SALW	  problem.	  	  	  
Table	  6:	  Status	  of	  SALW	  Marking	  in	  the	  EAC	  States	  by	  May	  2010	  	  
	   Member	  States	   Status	  of	  Marking	  1	   Burundi	   Yet	  to	  commence	  2	   Kenya	   25,000	  3	   Rwanda	   5,188	  4	   Tanzania	   1,646	  5	   Uganda	   35,000	  Adapted	  from	  RECSA,	  2010.	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In	  analyzing	  management	  of	  the	  SALW	  problem	  in	  the	  EAC	  sub-­‐region,	  the	  following	  major	  observations	  have	  been	  made.	  First,	  despite	  having	  participated	   in	  developing	  guidelines	  for	   regional	   harmonization	   of	   legislation	   on	   firearms	   and	   ammunition,	   the	   EAC	  Member	  States	  are	  yet	   to	  have	  a	  synchronized	   legislative	   framework.	  Second,	  EAC	  Member	  States	  have	  carried	  out	  both	  unilateral	  and	  bilateral	  operations	  for	  the	  collection	  and	  destruction	  of	   firearms.	   EAC	   countries	   realized	   that	   unilateral	   disarmament	   operations	   could	  not	   by	  themselves	   effectively	   control	   the	   flow	  of	   illicit	   arms	   since	   such	   operations	   often	   end	   in	  diverting	  arms	  routes.	  They,	  henceforth,	   complement	   their	  national	  efforts	  with	  bilateral	  operations	  with	  neighbouring	  countries.	  These	  have	  been	  carried	  out	  with	  the	  support	  of	  not	   only	   the	   EAC,	   but	   also	   RECSA	   and	   International	   Cooperating	   Partners.	   Third,	   EAC	  States	  are	  among	  the	  first	  countries	  within	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  Region	  to	  undertake	  marking	  of	  state-­‐owned	  firearms.	  	  	  5.4. Conclusion	  	  The	  EAC	   through	   its	   SALW	  Project,	   besides	  building	  a	   strong	  platform	   for	   SALW	  control	  and	   interventions	   in	   other	   related	   areas	   of	   peace	   and	   security	   within	   the	   EAC	  Member	  States,	  has	  hugely	  contributed	  to	  recognizing	   the	  crucial	  engagement	  of	  civil	   society,	  and	  more	   importantly,	   SALW	  has	   found	   its	  way	   into	   the	   core	   of	   security	  debates	   in	   the	  East	  African	  sub-­‐region150.	  Besides	  the	  EAC,	  there	  are	  two	  other	  organizational	  actors	  that	  have	  been	  addressing	   the	  SALWs	  security	  challenge	   in	  close	  collaboration,	  namely	  RECSA	  and	  EAPCCO.	  EAC	  and	  RECSA	  have	  a	  structured	  coordination	  and	  cooperation	  mechanism	  that	  is	   guided	  by	   an	  MOU.	  EAC	  also	  has	   a	   structured	  partnership	  with	  CSOs	  with	   established	  regional	  networks.	  EAC	  and	  RECSA	  provide	  financial	  support	  to	  the	  CSOs	  to	  carry	  out	  some	  of	  the	  SALW-­‐related	  interventions	  as	  observed	  earlier.	  	  As	   far	   as	   specific	  measures	   for	  managing	   the	   SALW	  problem	   are	   concerned,	   it	   has	   been	  observed	  that	  the	  EAC	  sub-­‐region	  is	  yet	  to	  have	  a	  synchronized	  legislative	  framework	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  150	  Interview	   with	   Mr.	   Wolfgang	   Leidig,	   German	   Technical	   Cooperation	   (GTZ)	   Head	   of	   Programme,	   GTZ	  Cooperation	  with	   EAC,	   at	   EAC	   Headquarters	   in	   Arusha	   on	   13th	   December	   2010.	   See	   also	   EAC/GTZ	   SALW	  Project	  2006-­‐2009	  Report,	  Curbing	  Small	  Arms	  and	  Light	  Weapons	  in	  the	  EAC	  Region:	  Implementation	  oft	  he	  EAC-­‐GTZ	  Project,	  p.	  21.	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controlling	   the	   proliferation	   of	   illicit	   SALW	   despite	   the	   EAC	   Council	   directing	   Member	  States	   to	   expedite	   the	   process	   of	   SALW	   legislation	   harmonization.	   Creating	   an	   enabling	  legal	   framework	   and	   improving	   capacity	   in	   SALW	   control	   measures	   are	   mutually	  reinforcing.	   Lack	   of	   a	   harmonized	   legislation	   for	   the	   sub-­‐region	   undermines	   the	  effectiveness	   of	   SALW	   control	   measures.	   Commitment	   towards	   putting	   in	   place	   a	  harmonized	   legislation	   is	   however	  present	   as	  national	   policies	   and	  bills	   on	   SALW	  are	   at	  different	  levels	  of	  approval.	  	  	  The	  most	  visible	  and	  arguably	  most	  successful	  SALW	  intervention	  has	  been	  the	  collection	  and	  destruction	  of	   illicit	   firearms,	  with	  the	  EAC	  playing	  the	  supportive	  role	  of	  mobilizing	  resources	   (funding	   and	   equipment)	   for	   these	   control	   measures.	   There	   have	   also	   been	  bilateral	  disarmament	  operations	  (on	  the	  one	  hand	  between	  EAC	  Member	  States,	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  between	  EAC	  countries	  and	  non-­‐EAC	  Member	  States	  that	  are	  also	  signatories	  to	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol).	  The	  EAC	  countries	  are	  also	  part	  of	  the	  RECSA	  set	  up	  that	  became	  the	  first	  grouping	  to	  undertake	  the	  exercise	  of	  marking	  firearms	  in	  state	  ownership.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   113	  










































	  DIRECTOR	  GENERAL	  PEACE	  AND	  SECURITY	  	   LIAISON	  OFFICER	  EAC-­‐AU	  HQs	   	  SITUATION	  ROOM	  
	  POLICE	  LIAISON	  OFFICE	  
DIRECTOR	  OF	  HUMANITARIAN	  AFFAIRS	  AND	  CRIME	  
DISASTER	  MANAGEMENT	  &	  CRISIS	  RESPONSE	  
TRANSNATIONAL	  AND	  CROSS	  BORDER	  CRIME	  
	  SALW	  AND	  CATTLE	  RUSTLING	  
DIRECTOR	  OF	  CONFLICT	  MANGT	  &	  JOINT	  OPERATIONS	  
	  CEWS,	  CPMR	  &	  RESEARCH	  
	  PSO	  AND	  JOINT	  OPERATIONS	  
COUNTER	  TERRORISM	  &	  NEGATIVE	  EFFECTS	  OF	  GLOBALIZATION	  
	   114	  
Chapter	  Six	  
	  
6.	  EAC	  Security	  Architecture	  and	  Domestic	  Political	  Crises	  
	  	  6.1. Introduction	  	  	  Kenya	  has	  been	  a	  beacon	  of	  stability	  in	  the	  East	  African	  sub-­‐region	  albeit	  a	  political	  milieu	  coloured	  by	  institutionalization	  of	  violence	  over	  the	  years	  and	  economic	  marginalization,	  often	   viewed	   in	   ethno-­‐geographic	   terms.	   However,	   the	   violence	   that	   followed	   the	  December	   2007	   General	   Elections	   shattered	   the	   image	   of	   stability.	   The	   events	   that	  followed	  President	  Kibaki’s	  disputed	  victory	  did	  not	  augur	  well	  for	  the	  political	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  welfare	  of	  Kenyans,	   in	  particular	  and	  East	  Africans	   in	  general.	  As	   the	   façade	  of	  stability	   unravel	   and	   cracks	   of	   ethnic	   discontent	   came	   to	   the	   fore,	   a	   spell	   of	   diplomatic	  efforts	   involving	   influential	   sub-­‐regional,	   regional	   and	   global	   actors	   to	   push	   and	   cajole	  feuding	   parties	   to	   make	   the	   necessary	   concessions	   and	   subsequently	   end	   the	   violence,	  followed.	  The	  EAC	  was	  one	  of	   the	   sub-­‐regional	  actors.	  As	   the	  conflict	   involved	  one	  of	   its	  member	   and	   owing	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   Kenya’s	   economy	   has	   vibrations	   of	   region-­‐wide	  consequences,	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   organization	   could	   be	   expected	   to	   be	   at	   the	   forefront	   of	  diplomatic	  efforts	  to	  diffuse	  the	  ensuing	  crisis.	  The	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  how	  various	  actors,	  within	   and	   outside	   the	   EAC	   arrangement,	   played	   the	   roles	   of	   coordination	   and	  management	   of	   domestic	   political	   crisis	   in	   one	   of	   the	   EAC	   Member	   States,	   Kenya.	   The	  domestic	   political	   crisis	   in	   Kenya	   reached	   its	   highest	   point	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	  December	  2007	  general	   election,	   leaving	  over	  a	   thousand	  Kenyans	   lifeless	  and	  others	  as	  IDPs.	  	  The	   chapter	   commences	  with	   an	   account	   of	   the	   nature	   and	   extent	   of	   domestic	   political	  crisis	   in	   Kenya,	   specifically	   focusing	   on	   its	   genesis,	   main	   perpetrators,	   the	   issue	   of	  impunity,	  patterns	  of	   the	  post-­‐election	  violence	   that	  gripped	   the	  country,	  and	   its	   impact.	  Analysis	   of	   the	   coordination	   and	   actual	   management	   of	   the	   Kenyan	   domestic	   political	  crisis,	  immediately	  follow.	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  6.2.	  The	  Nature	  and	  Extent	  of	  the	  Domestic	  Political	  Crisis	  in	  Kenya	  	  Kenya	  fell	  into	  a	  political	  crisis	  shortly	  after	  results	  of	  the	  controversial	  general	  elections	  of	  December	  27,	  2007	  were	  announced,	  declaring	  Mwai	  Kibaki	  of	  the	  Party	  of	  National	  Unity	  (PNU)	   the	   victor.	   The	   results	   were	   strongly	   opposed	   by	   the	  main	   opposition	   party,	   the	  Orange	  Democratic	  Movement	  (ODM)	  led	  by	  Raila	  Odinga	  who	  accused	  Kibaki	  of	  stealing	  the	  election.	  The	  crisis	   left	  over	  1000	  killed	  and	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  others	  displaced.	  This	   recent	  descent	   into	   ethno-­‐political	   violence	   illustrates	   the	   link	  between	  governance	  and	  human	  security	  (Khadiagala,	  2008:	  6).	  	  	  To	  some	  observers	  of	  politics	  in	  Kenya	  the	  violence	  that	  rocked	  the	  country	  following	  the	  2007	  elections	  was	  not	  a	  surprise	  episode	  but	  a	  simmering	  volcano	  only	  waiting	  to	  explode	  (Oucho,	  no	  date;	  Branch,	  2011:	  19).	  This	   is	   simply	  because	   the	  eruption	  of	   violence	  was	  largely	   the	   culmination	   of	   deliberate	   political	   manipulation	   of	   ethnic	   identities	   (Ajulu,	  2001:1;	  Khadiagala,	  2008:6;	  Bayne,	  2008:2;	  Hansen,	  2009:	  4;	  Murithi,	  2009:	  2).	  Since	  the	  restoration	  of	  competitive	  multi-­‐party	  politics	  in	  Kenya	  in	  1992	  ethnicity	  as	  a	  medium	  of	  political	  mobilization	   coupled	  with	   profound	  divisions	   along	   regional	   and	   religious	   lines	  have	  increasingly	  characterized	  local	  politics.	  Acts	  of	  ethnic	  violence	  have	  marked	  Kenya’s	  political	  landscape	  either	  in	  the	  run	  up	  to	  or	  after	  general	  elections.	  The	  difference	  has	  only	  been	  on	  the	  scale	  of	  violence	  unleashed.	  	  	  Like	   its	   neighbour,	   Tanzania,	  Kenya	  has	   held	   four	  multiparty	   general	   elections	   since	   the	  1990s,	   namely	   1992,	   1997,	   2002	   and	   2007.	   In	   the	   1992	   pre-­‐election	   period,	   observes	  Kagwanja	  (2003:35),	  ethnic	  violence	  pitying	  the	  so	  called	   ‘Kalenjin	  warriors’	  versus	  non-­‐Kalenjin	  ethnic	  groups,	  namely	  the	  Luo,	  Gusii,	  Luhya,	  Kamba	  and	  Kikuyu	  broke	  out	  in	  Rift	  Valley	  and	  Western	  province.	  According	  to	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  (1993:71),	  over	  1,500	  people	  had	  died	  and	  some	  300,000	  were	  displaced	  by	  the	  cycles	  of	  violence	  by	  November	  1993.	   In	  the	  run	  up	  to	  the	  1997	  elections,	  ethnic	  clashes	   involving	   ‘Digo	  Warriors’	  at	   the	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Coast	  left	  100	  people	  dead,	  including	  five	  police	  officers	  and	  displaced	  100,000	  people151.	  The	  spate	  of	  violence	  did	  not	  stop	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  1997	  elections	  as	  immediately	  in	  the	  January-­‐February	  1998	  period	  Kikuyu	  farms	  in	  Njoro,	  Nakuru	  and	  Laikipia	  came	  under	  attack	  from	  ‘Maasai	  morans’	  and	   ‘Kalenjin	  warriors’152.	  Estimated	  figures	  of	  fatalities	  and	  displaced	  people	   following	  a	  wave	  of	  violence	   in	   the	  period	  1991-­‐2001	  presented	  by	  the	  Kenya	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  stood	  at	  4,000	  and	  600,000	  respectively	  (Kenya	  Human	  Rights	  Commission,	  2001).	  	  	  An	   important	   revelation	   is	   the	   consensus	   among	   analysts	   that	   the	   spate	   of	   communal	  violence	   that	   has	   engulfed	   Kenya’s	   political	   landscape	   has	   either	   been	   sponsored	   or	  condoned	   by	   elites	   in	   positions	   of	   power.	   It	   is	   referred	   as	   state-­‐sponsored	   or	   state-­‐condoned	   violence	   since	   it	   is	   well	   documented	   that	   at	   different	   phases	   of	   the	   waves	   of	  violence	   the	   government	   has	   either	   been	   involved	   in	   instigating	   ethnic	   violence	   for	  political	   purposes	   or	   taken	   no	   concrete	   measures	   to	   prevent	   it	   from	   escalating	   out	   of	  control	   (HRW,	  1993).	  This	   institutionalization	  of	  political	   violence	  by	   successive	  Kenya’s	  ruling	   elites	   has	   been	   a	   common	   feature.	   It	   is	   an	   outcome	   of	   a	   strategy	   of	   informalizing	  state	   repressive	   institutions	   to	   serve	   political	   ends	   (Hansen,	   2009:5;	   Ajulu,	   2001:20;	  Kagwanja,	  2003:35-­‐36).	  As	  eloquently	  elaborated	  by	  Kagwanja	  (2003:	  36),	  “As	  part	  of	  the	  ‘informal	   repression’	   strategy,	   the	  elite	   relied	  on	  extra-­‐legal	   intimidation	  and	  violence	   to	  silence	   and	   disempower	   critics	   and	   to	   intimidate,	   displace	   and	   disenfranchise	   hostile	  voters	   in	   multi-­‐ethnic	   electoral	   zones”.	   Employing	   Mahmood	   Mamdani’s153	  notions	   of	  citizenship,	   Kagwanja	   further	   explicates,	   “The	   ‘retribalization’	   of	   the	   public	   sphere	   has	  sharpened	  the	  tension	  between	  civic	  or	  state	  citizenship	  and	  ethnic	  citizenship.	  While	  the	  former	  is	  based	  on	  liberal	  notions	  of	  civic	  citizenship	  and	  individual	  rights	  inscribed	  in	  the	  national	  constitution,	  the	  latter	  is	  predicated	  upon	  membership	  of	  an	  ethnic	  group	  or	  clan	  through	   which	   one	   accesses	   social	   and	   economic	   rights,	   especially	   the	   right	   to	   land”	  (2003:27).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  151	  Alamin	  Mazrui,	  1997,	   “Kayas	  of	  Deprivation,	  Kayas	  of	  Blood:	  Violence,	   ethnicity	  and	   the	   state	   in	  Coastal	  Kenya”,	  Kenya	  Human	  Rights	  Commission,	  Nairobi,	  as	  referred	  in	  Kagwanja,	  2003:35	  op.	  cit.	  152	  Marcel	  Rutten,	   ‘Fresh	  Killings:	   the	  Njoro	  and	  Laikipia	  violence	   in	   the	  1997	  Kenya	  election	  aftermath’,	   in	  Rutten	  et	  al.,	  Out	  for	  the	  Count,	  pp.	  536-­‐82,	  as	  referred	  in	  Kagwanja,	  2003:	  35	  op.cit.	  153	  Mahmood	   Mamdani,	   2001,	   When	   Victims	   Become	   Killers:	   Colonialism,	   Navitism,	   and	   the	   Genocide	   in	  
Rwanda,	  Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  pp.	  28-­‐31	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  The	   chief	   agents	   of	   carrying	  out	   acts	   of	   violence	   against	   civilians	  were	   groups	  of	   youths	  militias.	   The	   most	   prominent	   and	   radical	   of	   these	   violent	   gangs	   is	   the	   Mungiki	   sect,	  founded	   in	   the	  1980s	   initially	  harbouring	  religious	  undertones	  and	   later	  pursued	  radical	  brand	  of	  politics154.	  The	  growth	  of	  vigilantism	  associated	  with	  the	  proliferation	  of	  criminal	  gangs	  meant	   that	   the	   state	   security	   apparatuses	   had	   lost	   the	  monopoly	   of	   the	  means	   of	  violence.	  	  The	  Mungiki	  sect,	  which	  also	  deployed	  mafia-­‐like	  tactics	  such	  as	  extortion,	  extra-­‐judicial	  killings,	  and	  intimidation,	  was	  associated	  with	  attempts	  to	  protect	  interests	  of	  the	  Kikuyu	   ethnic	   group	   during	   Moi’s	   presidency	   that	   is	   affiliated	   with	   the	   Kalenjin	   ethnic	  group	  (Hansen,	  2009:4).	  Branch	  (2011:	  237)	  stresses	  that	  “	  Mungiki	  was	  not	  just	  a	  product	  of	   the	  ethnic	  substance	  of	  politics	   in	   the	  1990s;	   it	  was	  also	  an	  outcome	  of	   the	   increasing	  role	   of	  militias	   in	   political	   contests”.	   The	   operations	   of	   this	   sect,	   which	   has	   enjoyed	   the	  moral	   and	   financial	   support	   from	   a	   number	   of	   political	   big-­‐wigs	   very	   high	   up	   in	   the	  government,	   including	   parliamentarians,	   up	   to	   the	   height	   of	   the	   2008	   post-­‐election	  violence	  reached	  a	  point	  it	  exercised	  control	  as	  a	  ‘state	  within	  the	  state’	  in	  certain	  parts	  of	  Kenya,	  and	  using	  violence	  to	  maintain	  such	  control	  (ibid.)155.	  	  	  Several	   attempts	   by	   various	   institutions	   to	   probe	   ethnic	   clashes	   and	   other	   forms	   of	  violence	  since	  1991	  through	  parliamentary	  select	  committee	  and	  commissions	  of	   inquiry	  proved	   futile	   as	   their	   reports	   were	   either	   rejected	   or	   simply	   ignored	   by	   the	   Moi	  government.	   A	   report	   by	   the	   Parliamentary	   Committee	   (the	   Kiliku	   Report),	   which	  investigated	   the	   1991-­‐93	   ethnic	   clashes,	   was	   rejected	   by	   the	   Moi	   government.	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  154	  The	   term	   ‘Mungiki’	  has	  been	  variously	   interpreted.	  One	   interpretation	   traces	   its	  origin	   from	   the	  archaic	  Gikuyu	  word	  irindi,	  meaning	  crowds,	  that	  implies	  “people	  are	  entitled	  to	  a	  particular	  place	  of	  their	  own	  in	  the	  ontological	   world”	   (See	   Grace	   Nyatugah	   Wamue,	   “Revisiting	   Our	   Indigenous	   Shrines	   Through	   Mungiki”,	  African	   Affairs	   100,	   pp.	   453-­‐67).	   Another	   interpretation	   refers	   to	   Mungiki	   as	   “multitude”	   in	   the	   Kikuyu	  language	  and	  represents	  a	  political/religious	  movement	  committed	  to	  upholding	  the	  traditional	  African	  way	  of	  worship,	  culture	  and	  lifestyle	  (See	  Chris	  Maina	  Peter	  And	  Fritz	  Kopsieker(eds.),	  2006,	  	  Political	  Succession	  
In	  East	  Africa:	   In	   Search	   for	  a	  Limited	  Leadership,	   Kituo	   Cha	   Katiba	   and	   Friedrich	   Ebert	   Stiftung,	   pp.	   xviii).	  Another	   notorious	   group	   that	   inflicted	   terror	   against	   government	   opponents	   and	   which	   was	   deployed	  regularly	  against	  anti-­‐government	  demonstrations	  in	  Nairobi	  during	  former	  President	  Moi’s	  regime	  was	  Jeshi	  La	  Mzee	   (the	  Old	  Man’s	  Army).	  According	   to	  Ajulu,	  2001,	   “	  Democratization	  and	  Conflict	   in	  Eastern	  Africa:	  Kenya’s	  Succession	  Crisis	  and	   its	  Likely	   Impact	  on	  Eastern	  Africa	  and	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  Region”,	   Institute	   for	  Global	  Dialogue,	  Occasional	  Paper	  No.	  28,	  pp.	  20,	  March,	  members	  of	  this	  group	  were	  known	  to	  Moi’s	  security	  forces.	  	  	  155	  For	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  sect’s	  religious	  and	  ideological	  roots,	  its	  transformation	  from	  a	  ‘moral	  ethnic’	  movement	  to	  a	  ‘politically	  tribal	  one’,	  read	  Kagwanja,	  2003,	  pp.	  25-­‐29.	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Akiwumi	  Commission	  probed	  the	  1991-­‐98	  tribal	  clashes	  and	  submitted	  its	  report	  in	  1999.	  The	   government	   declined	   to	   release	   the	   damning	   report	   that	   had	   implicated	   its	   senior	  officials	  for	  sponsoring	  ethnic	  violence	  until	  2002.	  No	  action,	  therefore,	  was	  taken	  against	  perpetrators	  of	  wanton	  killings	  mentioned	  in	  both	  reports156.	  Other	  attempts	  made	  were	  by	  the	  Standing	  Committee	  on	  Human	  Rights	  (Kenya),	  a	  government	  appointed	  committee	  to	   advise	   on	   human	   rights	   violations.	   The	   Standing	   Committee	   investigated	   skirmishes	  occurring	   at	   the	   Coastal	   region	   in	   1998157.	   The	   Law	   Society	   of	   Kenya	   investigated	   and	  made	   a	   report	   on	   the	   violence	   in	   Coast	   Province	   related	   to	   the	   attack	   on	   Likoni	   Police	  Station	  on	  13th	  August	  1998.	  	  	  The	  political	  settlement	  following	  the	  30	  December	  2007	  heralded	  not	  only	  government	  of	  unity	  but	  also,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  a	  commitment	  to	  urgent	  constitutional	  reform.	  The	  settlement	   included	   the	   appointment	   of	   two	   commissions.	   One	   of	   the	   commissions,	   the	  Independent	  Review	  of	  Elections	  Commission	  (IREC),	  headed	  by	  the	  retired	  South	  African	  Justice	  Johann	  Kriegler,	  was	  appointed	  to	  examine	  the	  December	  2007	  Kenyan	  elections158.	  The	  Kriegler	  Report	  specifically	  examined	  the	  entire	  electoral	  process	  and	  concluded	  that	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  process	  and	  credibility	  of	  the	  election	  results	  were	  gravely	  impaired	  by	  several	   irregularities;	   weaknesses	   in	   the	   constitutional	   and	   legal	   framework;	   lack	   of	  functional	   efficiency,	   independence	   and	   capacity	   within	   the	   discredited	   Electoral	  Commission	  of	  Kenya	  (ECK).	  	  The	  other	  Commission	  to	  set	  up	  following	  the	  political	  settlement	  was	  the	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	   into	   the	   Post	   Election	   Violence	   (CIPEV)	   in	   2008;	   the	   now	   famous	  Waki	   Report	  named	   after	   its	   chair	   Justice	   Philip	   Waki,	   a	   judge	   of	   Kenya’s	   Court	   of	   Appeal159.	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  156	  The	  Kiliku	  Report	  implicated	  among	  others,	  the	  then	  vice	  president,	  Prof.	  George	  Saitoti,	  and	  the	  Trade	  and	  Industry	   Minister	   Nicholas	   Biwott.	   The	   Akiwumi	   Commission	   was	   headed	   by	   an	   Appeal	   Court	   judge,	   Mr.	  Justice	  Akilano	  Akiwumi,	  hence	  the	  reference	  ‘Akiwumi	  Report/Commission’.	  The	  Akiwumi	  Commission	  was	  appointed	  on	  1st	  July	  1998	  and	  its	  life	  was	  variously	  extended	  up	  to	  31st	  July,	  1999.	  	  157	  The	   Standing	   Committee	   released	   a	   report	   titled,	   “Recent	  Disturbances	  at	   the	  Coast	  province:	  From	  13th	  
August	  to	  date.”	  	  158	  Formally	  appointed	  by	  President	  Kibaki	  under	  the	  Commissions	  of	  Inquiry	  Act	  (Cap.	  102).	  IREC’s	  terms	  of	  reference	  (ToRs)	  were	  published	  in	  Gazette	  Notice	  1983,	  Kenya	  Gazette	  of	  14	  March	  2008	  159	  The	  Commission	  was	  funded	  by	  Government	  of	  Kenya	  (GOK)	  and	  the	  multi	  donor	  Trust	  Fund	  for	  National	  Dialogue	  and	  Reconciliation,	  managed	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  Development	  Programme	  (UNDP).	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Commission	  was	  mandated	   “to	   investigate	   the	   facts	   and	   circumstances	   surrounding	   the	  violence,	   the	   conduct	   of	   state	   security	   agencies	   in	   their	   handling	   of	   it,	   and	   to	   make	  recommendations	  concerning	  these	  and	  other	  matters”	  (Waki	  Report,	  2008:vii).	  The	  Waki	  Report	   revealed	   that	   the	   violence	   that	   ensued	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   2007	   elections	   is	  attributed	   to	   the	   failure	   to	   heed	   the	   recommendations	   from	   the	   various	   committee	   and	  commission	  reports	  because	  the	  underlying	  grievances	  remained	  unsettled160.	  This	  failure	  is	  also	  a	  function	  of	  prevalence	  of	  impunity	  in	  the	  Kenyan	  political	  system161.	  A	  situation,	  which	  is	  common	  where	  corruption	  and	  a	  patronage	  system	  are	  deeply	  entrenched,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  a	  tradition	  of	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  a	  strong	  judiciary,	  are	  lacking.	  This	  observation	  is	  attested	  by	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  Waki	  Report,	  which	  are	  worth	  quoting:	  	   In	   some	  ways	   the	   post-­‐election	   violence	   resembled	   the	   ethnic	   clashes	   of	  the	   1990s	   and	   was	   but	   an	   episode	   in	   a	   trend	   of	   institutionalization	   of	  violence	   in	   Kenya	   over	   the	   years.	   The	   fact	   that	   armed	   militias,	   most	   of	  whom	  developed	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   1990s	   ethnic	   clashes	  were	   never	   de-­‐mobilized	   led	   to	   the	   ease	   with	   which	   political	   and	   business	   leaders	  reactivated	   them	   for	   the	   2007	   post-­‐election	   violence.	   Secondly,	   the	  increasing	   personalization	   of	   power	   around	   the	   presidency	   continues	   to	  be	  a	  factor	  in	  facilitating	  election	  related	  violence.	  	  	  The	   widespread	   belief	   that	   the	   presidency	   brings	   advantages	   for	   the	  President’s	   ethnic	   group	  makes	   communities	  willing	   to	   exert	   violence	   to	  attain	   and	   keep	   power.	   Inequalities	   and	   economic	  marginalization,	   often	  viewed	   in	   ethno-­‐geographic	   terms,	   were	   also	   very	   much	   at	   play	   in	   the	  post-­‐election	  violence	  in	  places	  like	  the	  slum	  areas	  of	  Nairobi.	  	  The	  report	  concludes	  that	  the	  post-­‐election	  violence	  was	  more	  than	  a	  mere	  juxtaposition	   of	   citizens-­‐to-­‐citizens	   opportunistic	   assaults.	   These	   were	  systematic	  attacks	  on	  Kenyans	  based	  on	  their	  ethnicity	  and	  their	  political	  leanings.	   Attackers	   organized	   along	   ethnic	   lines,	   assembled	   considerable	  logistical	  means	  and	  traveled	  long	  distances	  to	  burn	  houses,	  maim,	  kill	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  160	  Gordon	  Ogolla	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Rift	  Valley	  Chapter	  of	  the	  Law	  Society	  in	  his	  testimony	  to	  the	  Waki	  Report,	  Commission	   of	   Inquiry	   into	   Post-­‐Election	   Violence,	   Report	   of	   the	   Commission	   of	   Inquiry	   into	   Post-­‐Election	  
Violence	  ‘Waki	  Report’,	  Nairobi,	  2008,pp.	  82.	  161	  The	   amended	   Set	   of	   Principles	   for	   the	   Protection	   and	   Promotion	   of	   Human	   Rights	   Through	   Action	   to	  combat	  Impunity,	  submitted	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights	  on	  8	  February	  2005,	  defines	  impunity	   as:	   “the	   impossibility,	   de	   jure	   or	   de	   facto,	   of	   bringing	   the	   perpetrators	   of	   violations	   to	   account	   –	  
whether	  in	  criminal,	  civil,	  administrative	  or	  disciplinary	  proceedings	  –	  since	  they	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  any	  inquiry	  
that	  might	   lead	   to	   their	  being	  accused,	  arrested,	   tried	  and,	   if	   found	  guilty,	   sentenced	   to	  appropriate	  penalties,	  
and	  to	  making	  reparations	  to	  their	  victims,”	  as	  quoted	  in	  the	  Wako	  Report,	  2008,	  p.	  443.	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sexually	   assault	   their	   occupants	   because	   these	  were	   of	   particular	   ethnic	  groups	   and	   political	   persuasion.	   Guilty	   by	   association	   was	   the	   guiding	  force	  behind	  deadly	  “revenge”	  attacks,	  with	  victims	  being	  identified	  not	  for	  what	   they	  did	  but	   for	   their	  ethnic	  association	   to	  other	  perpetrators.	  This	  free-­‐for-­‐all	   was	   made	   possible	   by	   the	   lawlessness	   stemming	   from	   an	  apparent	   collapse	   of	   state	   institutions	   and	   security	   forces	   (Waki	   Report,	  2008:	  vii-­‐viii).	  	  In	   her	   enlightening	   analysis	   of	   the	   post-­‐election	   violence	   following	   the	   elections	   of	   27	  December	   2007,	   Bayne	   (2008)	   identifies	   four	   broad	   patterns	   of	   violence,	   namely	  
spontaneous	   violence	   which	   broke	   out	   in	   the	   ODM	   strongholds	   immediately	   after	   the	  Presidential	  election	  results,	  directed	  by	  gangs	  of	  youth	  and	  was	  largely	  politically	  driven	  and	  ethnically	   targeted;	  organized	  attacks	   in	   the	  Rift	  Valley	  orchestrated	  by	   local	   leaders	  and	  carried	  out	  by	  Kalenjin	  ‘warriors’	  on	  the	  Kikuyus	  and	  other	  PNU	  supporters;	  organized	  
retaliatory	   attacks	   by	   gangs	   of	   Kikuyu	   youth,	   led	   by	  Mungiki	  were	   aimed	   at	   Luo,	   Luhya,	  Kalenjin	  and	  other	  ODM	  supporters;	  and	  excessive	  use	  of	  force	  by	  the	  police	  responding	  to	  demonstrations	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   election	   in	   selected	   parts	   of	   Kenya,	   causing	  significant	   casualties	   from	   gunshot	   wounds162.	   Bayne	   also	   notes	   that	   there	   were	   some	  forms	   of	   sexual	   and	   gender	   based	   violence	   perpetrated	   by	   gangs	   of	   youth	   in	   slums	   or	  targeted	  at	  women	  fleeing	  violence.	  	  Finally,	  it	  is	  worth	  highlighting	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  post-­‐election	  violence	  to	  Kenya	  itself	  and	  the	  East	  African	   sub-­‐region	   in	   general.	  As	   already	  hinted,	   the	  post-­‐election	  violence	   that	  shook	  Kenya	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  2007	  elections	  was	  by	  far	  the	  most	  deadly	  and	  most	  destructive	   since	   the	   restoration	   of	  multi-­‐party	   politics	   in	   the	   country	   in	   1991	   resulting	  into	   the	   loss	   of	   1133163 	  lives	   and	   displacement	   of	   an	   estimated	   500,000164 	  people.	  Internally,	   the	  post-­‐election	  crisis	  created	  negative	   impact	   to	   the	  Kenyan	  economy.	  Daily	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  162	  According	   to	   the	   Waki	   Report	   noted	   that	   out	   of	   a	   total	   of	   1133	   people	   died	   during	   the	   post-­‐election	  violence,	  405	  of	  them	  died	  from	  gunshot	  wounds.	   It	   is	   further	  noted	  that	  these	  figures	  may	  not	  fully	  reflect	  totals	   of	   people	   killed.	   Figures	  might	   have	   been	  much	   higher	   as	   ‘some	  may	   have	   been	   buried	  without	   the	  knowledge	  of	  officials’,	  pp.	  384-­‐5.	  163	  Figures	  obtained	  from	  the	  Waki	  Report,	  ibid.	  164	  Estimates	  by	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  in	  their	  report	  of	  March	  2008,	  Ballots	  to	  Bullets,	  based	  on	  UNOCHA,	  Kenya	   Humanitarian	   Update,	   Vol.	   7,	   February	   23-­‐27.	   By	   2008	   Uganda	  was	   hosting	   about	   12,000	   refugees	  from	  Kenya.	  This	  is	  according	  to	  Mary	  Kimani,	  2008,	  “East	  Africa	  Feels	  Blows	  of	  Kenyan	  Crisis,	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Repercussions	  Affect	  Entire	  Region”,	  Africa	  Renewal,	  Vol.22,	  No	  1,	  April.	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losses	  of	   tax	   revenues	  were	  estimated	  at	  approximately	  Ksh	  2	  billion	   ($29	  million)	   (ICG,	  2008:19).	  At	   the	  end	  of	   January	  2008,	   the	  Kenyan	  economy	   is	   reported	   to	  have	   suffered	  more	   than	   US	   $	   3	   billion	   in	   losses	   and	   about	   500000	   jobs	   vanished	   (Mbugua,	   2008:	   3).	  Kisumu	   City	   in	   particular	   was	   severely	   hit	   after	   losing	   an	   estimated	   Kshs	   3	   billion	   in	  property	   damages	   in	   late	   December	   2007	   (ICG,	   2008:	   19).	   The	   leading	   foreign	   export	  earner	   tourism	   industry	  was	   the	  hardest	   hit	   (ibid.pp.20)165.	   Income	   from	   tourism	  which	  tripled	  from	  21	  billion	  Kenyan	  shillings	  in	  2002	  to	  over	  65	  billion	  in	  2007,	  took	  a	  nose-­‐dive	  of	  a	  90	  per	  cent	  during	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2008	  alone	  due	  to	  the	  post	  election	  violence,	  as	  shown	  in	  the	  graph	  (figure	  4)	  below	  adopted	  from	  Callaghan	  (2008:55).	  	  
Figure	  4:	  Kenya	  Tourism	  Income	  
	  	  	  Moreover,	   since	   Kenya	   is	   an	   economic	   powerhouse	   in	   the	   sub-­‐region,	   the	   post-­‐election	  crisis	   triggered	   significant	   economic	   repercussions	   well	   beyond	   the	   country’s	   borders.	  There	  were	  several	  illegal	  roadblocks	  along	  the	  main	  Kenya	  highways	  and	  destruction	  of	  2	  km	  of	  the	  Kisumu-­‐Butere	  railway	  on	  28	  January,	  thus	  curtailing	  transportation	  of	  goods	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  165	  The	  tourism	  sector	  was	  about	  to	  come	  to	  its	  peak	  season	  at	  Christmas	  when	  post-­‐election	  violence	  broke	  out.	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some	   parts	   of	   the	   country	   as	   well	   as	   neighbouring	   countries.	   Given	   Kenya’s	   role	   as	   the	  main	  transportation	  hub	  in	  the	  sub-­‐region,	  the	  blockage	  of	  highways	  and	  railways	  caused	  significant	  disruptions	  to	   the	  economies	  of	  neighbouring	  countries.	  For	   instance,	  blocked	  roads	  and	  vandalized	  railway	   lines	  hampered	  commercial	   trade	   to	  Burundi,	  Rwanda	  and	  Uganda	  whose	  massive	  imports166	  as	  well	  as	  humanitarian	  assistance	  to	  the	  eastern	  DRC,	  Southern	   Sudan	   pass	   through	   the	   port	   of	   Mombasa	   (ICG,	   2008:22;	   Kimani,	   2008).	  According	  to	  the	  UN’s	  Office	  for	  the	  Coordination	  of	  Humanitarian	  Affairs	  (UNOCHA)	  fuel	  prices	   in	  Uganda,	  eastern	  DRC	  and	  Burundi	  went	  up	   to	  50	  per	  cent,	  while	   the	  Rwandese	  government	   was	   compelled	   to	   institute	   fuel	   rationing	   due	   to	   severe	   shortages	   in	   Kigali	  (Kimani,	   2008).	   There	   were	   also	   hikes	   in	   food	   prices	   in	   Uganda,	   decline	   in	   air	   traffic	  between	  Burundi,	  Rwanda	  and	  Kenya	  (Ibid.).	  	  	  This	   section	   has	   established	   five	   main	   issues,	   among	   others.	   First,	   the	   post-­‐election	  violence	   in	   Kenya	   towards	   the	   end	   of	   2007	   and	   beginning	   of	   2008,	   was	   not	   a	   surprise	  outcome	  or	  specific	  episode	   tied	   to	  a	   flawed	  electoral	  process,	  but	  rather	  part	  of	  a	  much	  longer	   history	   of	   political	   violence	   in	   the	   country.	   Second,	   perpetrators	   of	   violence	   are	  known	   and	   include	   vigilante	   groups,	   the	  most	   prominent	   and	   radical	   being	   the	  Mungiki	  sect,	   reflecting	   the	   increasing	   role	   of	   militias	   in	   political	   contests.	   Third,	   the	   failure	   to	  prosecute	   agents	   implicated	   in	   various	   reports	   of	   committees	   and	   commissions	   of	  inquiries	   for	   perpetrating	   violent	   acts	   is	   attributed	   to	   the	   prevalence	   of	   a	   culture	   of	  impunity	  in	  the	  Kenyan	  political	  system.	  Fourth,	  patterns	  of	  violence	  which	  were	  politically	  driven	  and	  ethnically	  targeted,	  involved	  both	  spontaneous	  and	  organized	  attacks	  directed	  at	   supporters	   of	   the	   two	  main	   rival	   political	   groups	   at	   the	   time,	   i.e.	   the	   ODM	   and	   PNU.	  Finally,	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   domestic	   political	   crisis	   has	   not	   only	   been	   losses	   of	   lives	   and	  creation	   of	   IDPs	   camps	   inside	   Kenya	   and	   plummeting	   of	   the	   Kenyan	   economy,	   but	   also	  triggered	  significant	  negative	  economic	  repercussions	  beyond	  the	  country’s	  borders.	  With	  this	   backdrop,	   the	   next	   section	   dwells	   on	   how	   coordination	   of	   responses	   to	   the	   Kenyan	  domestic	  political	  crisis	  took	  place.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  166	  According	   to	   the	   International	   Crisis	   Group,	   Kenya	   in	   Crisis	   Report	   No.	   137,	   21	   February	   2008,	   Kenya	  serves	  as	  a	  transit	  point	  for	  a	  quarter	  of	  the	  Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  (GDP)	  of	  Rwanda	  and	  Uganda	  and	  one	  third	  of	  Burundi’s.	  
	   123	  
	  6.3.	  Coordination	  of	  Responses	  to	  Domestic	  Political	  Crises	  	  As	  is	  the	  case	  on	  issues	  of	  SALW,	  there	  are	  several	  operational	  support	  tools	  that	  grant	  the	  EAC	  authority	  to	  engage	  in	  matters	  of	  peace	  and	  security.	  The	  first	  instrument	  is	  the	  EAC	  Treaty,	   particularly	   articles	   123,	   124	   and	   125.	   In	   these	   provisions	   of	   the	   Treaty,	   EAC	  Partner	   States	   agree	   that,	   peace	   and	   security	   are	   essential	   for	   social	   and	   economic	  development	   within	   the	   Community,	   and	   vital	   to	   the	   achievement	   of	   its	   objectives.	  Therefore,	   the	   Partner	   States	   agree	   to	   foster	   and	  maintain	   an	   atmosphere	   conducive	   to	  peace	   and	   security	   among	   the	   Partner	   States,	   through	   cooperation	   and	   consultation	   on	  issues	   of	   peace	   and	   security.	   Further,	   they	   agree	   to	   promote	   and	   maintain	   good	  neighbourliness	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  promoting	  peace	  and	  security	  within	  the	  Community.	  Article	  123	   is	  particularly	   important,	  as	   it	  puts	  emphasis	  on	  peaceful	   resolution	  of	  disputes	  and	  conflicts	  between	  and	  within	  the	  Partner	  States167.	  	  	  Examining	   the	  EAC	  Treaty	   critically	  as	   far	  as	   issues	  of	  peace	  and	  security	  are	   concerned	  reveals	  a	  problem	  in	  interpreting	  some	  of	  its	  provisions.	  Article	  11	  (5)	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  the	  functions	  of	   the	  Community’s	  highest	  organ-­‐	   the	  Summit	   is	  particularly	  noteworthy.	  This	  article	  authorizes	  the	  Summit	  to	  delegate	  the	  exercise	  of	  any	  of	  its	  functions,	  subject	  to	  any	  conditions,	  which	  it	  may	  think	  fit	  to	  impose,	  to	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Summit,	  to	  the	  Council	  or	  to	   the	   Secretary	   General.	   Indeed,	   this	   provision	   can	   be	   interpreted	   to	   imply	   that	   upon	  authorization	   from	   the	   Summit,	   any	   EAC	   Member	   State	   can	   actually	   deal	   with	   matters	  considered	   to	   be	   of	   sovereign	   importance	   to	   another	   country.	   Actually,	   there	   was	  disagreement	  associated	  with	   this	  particular	  article,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  Uganda’s	   insistence	  that	   the	  war	   against	   the	   Northern	   rebel	   group,	   the	   Lords	   Resistance	   Army	   (LRA),	   is	   an	  internal	   affair	   that	   is	   not	   subject	   to	   intervention	   by	   other	   EAC	   Member	   States	   (Okoth,	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  Article	   123	   4(d).	   The	   peaceful	   resolution	   of	   disputes	   and	   conflicts	   within	   the	   EAC	   States	   is	   further	  entrenched	   in	   the	  EAC	  Regional	  Strategy	   for	  Peace	  and	  Security	  of	  2006.	  Goal	  14	  calls	   for	  a	  mechanism	  for	  peaceful	  resolution	  of	  disputes	  and	  conflicts	  amongst	  the	  Partner	  States	  and	  a	  forum	  under	  which	  the	  EAC	  can	  participate	  in	  resolution	  of	  disputes	  within	  the	  region.	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2004a:	  153,	  2004b:	  54)168.	  Exceptions	  to	  the	  Summit	  delegation	  of	  powers	  are	  in	  the	  giving	  of	  general	  directions	  and	  impetus;	  the	  appointment	  of	  Judges	  to	  the	  East	  African	  Court	  of	  Justice;	   the	   admission	   of	   new	   Members	   and	   granting	   of	   Observer	   Status	   to	   foreign	  countries,	  and	  assent	  to	  Bills.	  	  Unlike	  in	  the	  area	  of	  SALW	  where	  EAC	  Member	  States	  are	  bound	  by	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol,	  the	  Community	  was	  yet	  to	  conclude	  a	  Peace	  and	  Security	  Protocol,	  which	  provides	  a	  legal	  domicile	  to	  all	  EAC	  peace	  and	  security	  interventions169.	  Even	  though,	  adoption	  of	  the	  EAC	  Protocol	  on	  Peace	  and	  Security	  is	  in	  an	  advanced	  stage,	  it	  is	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  the	  sub-­‐region	  did	  not	  have	  one	  when	   its	   economically	  powerful	  member,	  Kenya	  was	  under	   the	  grip	  of	  political	   crisis	   in	   the	  aftermath	  of	   the	  2007	  General	  Elections.	  A	  Draft	  Protocol	  on	  Peace	  and	  Security	  is,	  though,	  in	  place170.	  	  	  As	   far	   as	   coordination	   structures	   are	   concerned,	   and	   as	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   four,	  hierarchically	   the	   Sectoral	   Council,	   Coordination	   Committee,	   Sectoral	   Committee	   and	  Experts	  Working	  Group,	  in	  that	  order,	  have	  been	  dealing	  with	  peace	  and	  security	  matters	  even	   before	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   Draft	   Protocol.	   As	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   reporting	  channel	  provided	  in	  Chapters	  5,	  6	  and	  7	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  a	  Sectoral	  Committee	  reports	  to	  the	  Coordination	   Committee	  which	   in	   turn	   submits	   its	   reports	   and	   recommendations	   to	   the	  Council,	  which	  is	  the	  policy	  organ	  of	  the	  Community171.	  Currently,	  as	  one	  of	  the	  core	  organs	  of	   the	   Community,	   the	   Secretariat	   primarily	   acts	   as	   a	   co-­‐coordinating	   entity.	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  168	  See	   P.	   Godfrey	   Okoth,	   2004,	   “The	   New	   East	   African	   Community:	   A	   Defense	   and	   Security	   Organ	   as	   the	  Missing	  Link”,	  in	  John	  Mukumu	  Mbaku	  and	  Suresh	  Chandra	  Saxena	  (eds.),	  Africa	  at	  the	  Crossroads:	  Between	  Regionalism	   and	   Globalization,	   Connecticut:	   Praeger	   Publishers	   Inc.	   pp.	   147-­‐	   161.	   Also	   P.	   Godfrey	   Okoth,	  2004,	   “Regional	   Institutional	   Responses	   to	   Security	   in	   the	   Era	   of	   Globalization”,	   in	  Makumi	  Mwagiru	   (ed.),	  
African	  Regional	  Security	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Globalization,	  pp.	  49-­‐	  66.	  169	  EAC	   Brief	   to	   UN	   Member	   States	   on	   “The	   EAC	   Peace,	   Security	   and	   Good	   Governance	   Initiatives	   and	  Strategies	  for	  A	  Sustainable	  Integration”,	  New	  York,	  18th	  October	  2010.	  170	  The	   Protocol	  was	   supposed	   to	   have	   been	   signed	   by	   the	   EAC	  Heads	   of	   State	   in	  November	   2010	   but	   the	  Attorney	  Generals	  of	  Member	  States,	  who	  were	  supposed	  to	  have	  given	  it	  a	  clean	  bill	  of	  health	  before	  the	  draft	  goes	  to	  the	  Heads	  of	  State	  could	  not	  meet	  because	  the	  Kenyan	  Attorney	  General	  was	  hospitalized	  in	  Europe.	  According	  to	  the	  EAC	  rules	  of	  procedure	  all	  Member	  States	  must	  accent	  following	  the	  principle	  of	  consensus.	  This	  information	  was	  relayed	  to	  me	  during	  interview	  with	  Mr.	  Leonard	  Onyonyi	  of	  the	  Department	  for	  Peace	  and	  Security	  at	  the	  EAC	  Secretariat,	  Arusha,	  Tanzania	  on	  11th	  January	  2011.	  171	  The	   Council	   gives	   directions	   to	   the	   Member	   States	   and	   to	   all	   other	   organs	   and	   institutions	   of	   the	  Community	  other	  than	  the	  Summit,	  Court	  and	  the	  Assembly,	  and	  submits	  its	  reports	  to	  the	  Summit.	  So	  it	  is	  the	  most	  powerful	  organ	  besides	  the	  Summit.	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Secretariat,	   among	   other	   functions,	   is	   tasked	   to	   undertake	   the	   coordination	   and	  harmonization	  of	  the	  policies	  and	  strategies	  relating	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Community	  through	   the	   Coordination	   Committee,	   and	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   decisions	   of	   the	  Summit	  and	  the	  Council	  (of	  Ministers)172.	  	  	  It	  is	  fair	  to	  conclude	  that	  even	  though	  the	  EAC	  Treaty	  authorizes	  State	  actors	  to	  engage	  in	  matters	  of	  peace	  and	  security,	  and	  essentially	  stressing	  on	  peaceful	  resolution	  of	  conflicts	  between	  and	  within	  Partner	  States,	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  body	  did	  not	  have	  a	  binding	  Protocol	  that	   lays	   specific	   procedures	   for	   its	   peacemaking	   efforts173,	  when	  Kenya	  was	   in	   trouble.	  Neither	   was	   there	   a	   conflict	   Prevention	   and	   Management	   (CPMR)	   mechanism	   to	   avoid	  responding	  to	  conflicts	  in	  an	  ad	  hoc	  manner	  and	  on	  an	  individual	  Member	  State	  approach.	  In	  sharp	  contrast,	  there	  is	  a	  relatively	  well	  developed	  institutional	  mechanism	  for	  the	  EAC	  defence	   sector,	   with	   a	   Defence	   Liasion	   Unit	   based	   at	   the	   Secretariat,	   operating	   as	   a	  coordination	   structure	   reflecting	   the	   initial	   preponderance	   with	   inter-­‐state	   (traditional	  military)	  security174.	  	  In	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   specific	   institutional	   structure	   for	   coordinating	   issues	   related	   to	  conflicts	   in	  Member	  States	   (i.e.	   intra-­‐state	   conflicts),	   then	   it	  was	   left	   for	   the	  EAC	  highest	  decision-­‐making	  organ,	   the	  Summit,	   to	   take	   the	   initiatives	   to	  coordinate	   the	  sub-­‐regional	  body’s	   response	   to	   the	   crisis	   in	   Kenya.	   Attempts	   to	   hold	   a	   Summit	   of	  Heads	   of	   State	   on	  Kenya	  could	  not	  succeed	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  quorum.	  It	  has	  to	  be	  noted	  that	  according	  to	  2004	  
Rules	   of	   Procedure	   for	   the	   Organs	   of	   the	   EAC,	   the	   quorum	   of	   the	   Summit	   meeting	   is	   all	  members	   of	   the	   Summit,	   and	   decision-­‐making	   is	   by	   consensus175.	   In	   view	   of	   that,	   any	  Member	   State	   troubled	   by	   a	   domestic	   conflict	   but	   unwilling	   to	   forward	   a	   request	   for	  involvement	  of	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  body	  may	  be	  lured	  to	  abstain	  a	  Summit	  meeting	  which	  has	  an	  agenda	  to	  discuss	  that	  conflict.	  Such	  prospect	  would	  amount	  to	  ‘sabotaging’	  the	  quorum,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  172	  Articles	  71	  (e)	  &	  71	  (i)	  of	  the	  EAC	  Treaty.	  173	  For	  instance,	  whether	  in	  case	  of	  intra-­‐state	  conflicts	  in	  Member	  States,	  the	  EAC	  has	  to	  obtain	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  disputing	  parties	   for	   the	  sub-­‐regional	  body	   to	  get	   involved,	  and	   in	  case	   the	  consent	   is	  not	   forthcoming,	  what	  ought	  to	  be	  done.	  174	  Issues	  of	  disputed	  elections	  and	  election-­‐related	  violence	  did	  not	  take	  centre-­‐stage	  until	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  2000-­‐2010	  decade,	  especially	  after	  Rwanda	  and	  Burundi	  joined	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  organization.	  175	  Rule	  11	  (quorum)	  and	  Rule	  13	  (Decision	  Making).	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and	   thus,	   kill	   the	   agenda	   altogether.	   This	   point	  was	   also	  mooted	  by	   the	   then	  EAC	  Chair,	  President	  Yoweri	  Museveni,	  when	  addressing	  EAC	  Summit	  of	  Heads	  of	  State	  in	  Rwanda	  in	  June	  2008.	  The	   then	  EAC	  Chair	  proposed	   reforming	   the	  consensus	  decision-­‐making	   rule,	  cautioning	   his	   East	   African	   counterparts	   that	   if	   the	   prevailing	   situation	   guided	   by	   the	  consensus	   rule	   continues	   then	   it	   would	   mean,	   “one	   member	   can	   veto	   the	   intentions	   of	  others”176.	  This	  proposal	  was	  made	  at	  the	  backdrop	  of	  a	  report	  that	  an	  EAC	  Summit	  during	  the	  Kenyan	  post-­‐election	  violence	  could	  not	  be	  held,	  as	  the	  Kenyan	  President	  Kibaki	  was	  reluctant	  to	  attend	  (Khadiagala,	  2009:437).	  	  6.4.	  Management	  of	  the	  Kenyan	  Political	  Crisis	  	  In	  this	  section	  elaboration	  and	  analysis	  of	  responses	  to	  the	  Kenyan	  Post-­‐election	  crisis	  in	  2008	   are	   made	   with	   a	   view	   to	   situate	   the	   role	   played	   by	   the	   EAC.	   It	   is,	   therefore,	  acknowledged	  hereafter	  that	  there	  was	  more	  than	  one	  response	  to	  the	  Kenyan	  crisis	  and	  that	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   body,	   EAC	  was	   engaged	   in	   the	  process.	  How	  and	  whether	   the	  EAC	  engagement	  was	  significant	  in	  ultimately	  managing	  the	  political	  crisis,	  which	  was	  facing	  its	  economically	  powerful	  Member	  State,	  Kenya,	  will	  be	  addressed	  here.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  logical	  account	  of	  the	  actual	  efforts	  to	  manage	  the	  Kenyan	  crisis,	  I	  have	  divided	  the	  various	  actors	  involved	   into	   two	   main	   groups,	   namely	   actors	   from	   the	   EAC	   sub-­‐region	   (i.e.	   intra-­‐sub-­‐regional	  actors	   that	  are	  prominent	   local	   and	   religious	   figures,	   the	  EAC,	  and	  civil	   society)	  and	   those	   from	  outside	   the	   East	   African	   sub-­‐region	   (i.e.	   extra-­‐sub-­‐regional	   actors	  which	  includes	  a	  group	  of	  former	  Heads	  of	  States,	  the	  AU,	  the	  EU	  and	  Western	  donor	  countries).	  I	  hasten	  to	  add	  that	  all	  the	  responses	  taken	  immediately	  after	  violence	  broke	  out	  and	  nearly	  brought	   the	   whole	   country	   to	   its	   knees	   were	   aimed	   at	   ultimately	   reaching	   a	   peaceful	  resolution.	  This	  goal	  was	  very	  much	  in	  line	  with	  the	  EAC	  most	  preferred	  approach	  to	  the	  management	  of	  conflicts	  as	  espoused	  in	  its	  Treaty,	  alluded	  to	  in	  the	  preceding	  sections	  of	  this	   chapter.	   Henceforth,	   mediation	   of	   the	   main	   contending	   parties	   became	   the	   most	  preferred	  approach.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  176	  President	  Museveni’s	  Statement	  at	  the	  Summit	  of	  EAC	  Heads	  of	  State,	  Kigali,	  Rwanda,	  26th	  June	  2008.	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6.4.1.	  Intra-­‐Sub-­‐Regional	  Actors:	  A	  Coalition	  of	  Prominent	  Local	  and	  Religious	  Figures	  	  Prior	   to	  regional	  and	  sub-­‐regional	   responses	   to	   the	  Kenyan	  crisis,	   there	  was	  a	  combined	  initial	   involvement	   of	   prominent	   local	   leaders,	   the	   Concerned	   Citizens	   for	   Peace,	   and	  religious	  organizations	  to	  get	  the	  parties	  (the	  Party	  of	  National	  Unity-­‐PNU,	  which	  formed	  the	   Government,	   and	   the	   main	   opposition	   alliance	   the	   Orange	   Democratic	   Movement-­‐ODM)	  to	  seek	  a	  negotiated	  settlement.	  Two	  Kenya’s	  former	  envoys	  in	  the	  peace	  process	  in	  Somalia	   and	   Sudan,	   Ambassador	   Bethwell	   Kiplagat	   and	   General	   Lazarus	   Sumbeiywo	   led	  the	   appeal	   for	   mediation	   by	   the	   Concerned	   Citizens	   for	   Peace	   coalition.	   The	   two	   most	  accomplished	  mediators	  in	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  conflicts	  were	  rebuffed	  by	  the	  Government	  of	  Kenya	  (hereafter	  referred	  as	  GOK/PNU	  side).	  	  	  Adding	  to	  the	  voice	  of	  local	  actors	  was	  the	  South	  African	  Nobel	  Peace	  Laureate	  Archbishop	  Desmond	  Tutu,	  who	  was	  the	  first	  external	  mediator	  to	  arrive	  under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  the	  All-­‐Africa	  Conference	  of	  Churches	  (AACC)177.	  At	   this	  point,	   there	  was	  still	  no	  communication	  between	   the	   two	  main	  protagonists,	   PNU’s	   leader	  Mwai	  Kibaki	   and	  ODM’s	  Raila	  Odinga.	  Archbishop	   Tutu	   met	   with	   the	   ODM	   on	   January	   3,	   2008	   pressing	   for	   negotiations	   and	  managing	   to	   receive	   a	   commitment	   to	  move	   for	   an	   international	  mediation	   (Khadiagala,	  2009:	   436).	   Tutu	   also	   met	   with	   Kibaki	   but	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	   meeting	   was	   short	   of	   a	  government	  commitment	  for	  mediation.	  Up	  until	  this	  point,	  the	  Kibaki	  Government	  still	  felt	  could	  put	   the	  situation	  under	  control	  and	  was	  keen	  on	  deploying	   local	   security	   forces	   in	  the	   streets	   and	   banning	   media	   broadcasts	   on	   the	   on-­‐going	   violence	   (Lindenmayer	   and	  Kaye,	  2009:	  5).	  	  	  As	   rightly	   asserted	   by	   Lindenmayer	   and	   Kaye	   (ibid.),	   “Despite	   his	   impressive	   moral	  authority,	  Desmond	  Tutu’s	  intervention	  could	  not	  have	  changed	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  moment	  for	   engagement	   was	   simply	   ‘unripe’….”	   Ripeness	   for	   mediation	   occurs,	   according	   to	  Zartmann	  and	  Touval	  (2007),	  where	  a	  mutually	  hurting	  stalemate	  is	  present	  for	  the	  parties	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  177	  Archbishop	   Tutu	   arrived	   on	   the	   scene	   on	   January	   2,	   2008,	   just	   three	   days	   into	   the	   violence.	   Tutu	   was	  accompanied	  by	  the	  President	  of	  the	  AACC,	  the	  Rt.	  Rev.	  Nyasako	  ni	  Nku,	  the	  Chairperson	  of	  the	  Independent	  Electoral	  Commission	  of	  South	  Africa	  and	  former	  General	  Secretary	  of	  the	  South	  African	  Council	  of	  Churches,	  Dr.	  Brigalia	  H.	  Bam,	  and	  the	  General	  Secretary	  of	  the	  AACC,	  the	  Rev.	  Dr.	  H.	  Mvume	  Dandala.	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to	  be	  disposed	  to	  re-­‐evaluate	  their	  positions.	   “A	  mutually	  hurting	  stalemate	  begins	  when	  one	  side	  realizes	  that	  is	  unable	  to	  achieve	  its	  aims,	  resolve	  the	  problem,	  or	  win	  the	  conflict	  by	  itself;	  the	  stalemate	  is	  completed	  when	  the	  other	  side	  reaches	  a	  similar	  conclusion.	  Each	  party	   must	   begin	   to	   feel	   uncomfortable	   in	   the	   costly	   dead	   end	   that	   it	   has	   reached”	  (Zartmann	   and	   Touval,	   2007:445).	  Whereas	   the	   Kibaki	   side	   was	   adamant	   that	   the	   only	  recourse	   for	   the	   Odinga’s	   ODM	   was	   through	   the	   courts,	   the	   latter	   ruled	   out	   a	   legal	  challenge	   to	   the	   polls,	   claiming	   the	   Kenyan	   judiciary	   is	   packed	   with	   President	   Kibaki’s	  loyalists	  (The	  New	  Vision	  Online,	  2	  and	  8	  January,	  2008).	  	  6.4.2.	  The	  EAC	  Engagement	  	  It	   is	  important	  to	  note	  at	  the	  outset	  that	  the	  EAC	  deployed	  its	  Observer	  Mission	  in	  Kenya	  before	  the	  situation	  worsened	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  December	  2007.	  Besides	  admitting	  that	   the	   pre-­‐	   polling	   and	   post-­‐polling	   phases	   were	   characterized	   by	   an	   atmosphere	   of	  tension,	   incidences	   of	   violence,	   suspect	   actions,	   and	   other	   shortcomings	  which	   critically	  undermined	   the	   credibility	   of	   the	   final	   stage	   of	   the	   electoral	   process,	   the	   Mission	   went	  further	  to	  recommend	  wide-­‐ranging	  measures.	  The	  most	  pertinent	  recommendations,	  and	  which	   required	   immediate	   actions	  were	   to	   call	   upon	   the	   Summit	   to	   review	   the	   state	   of	  peace,	   security	  and	  good	  governance	   in	  Kenya	  as	  mandated	  by	  Article	  11	   (3)	  of	   the	  EAC	  Treaty.	  The	  Observer	  Mission	  also	  urged	  the	  Summit	   to	   take	  an	  active	  role	  and	  be	  at	   the	  forefront	  of	  the	  process	  towards	  a	  just	  and	  lasting	  solution	  to	  the	  crisis178.	  It	  has,	  however,	  been	  noted	  in	  the	  foregoing	  section	  that	  the	  Summit	  could	  not	  meet	  to	  review	  the	  political	  crisis	  in	  Kenya.	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  the	  face	  of	  economic	  strains	  sparked	  by	  disruption	  of	  the	  major	  transport	  routes	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  December	  2007	  General	  Elections	  in	  Kenya,	  the	  EAC	  and	  its	  Partner	  States	  had	  to	  engage	   in	  an	  attempt	   to	  bring	   the	  situation	  back	   to	  normal.	  The	  EAC	   intervention	  took	   the	   form	   of	   a	   diplomatic	   engagement,	   mostly	   at	   the	   level	   of	   the	   heads	   of	   state.	  Presidents	  Yoweri	  Museveni	  of	  Uganda	  and	  Jakaya	  Kikwete	  of	  Tanzania	  were	  involved	  at	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  See	  recommendations	  11.1	  &	  11.2	  of	  the	  East	  African	  Community	  Observer	  Mission	  Report	  Kenya	  General	  Elections	  December	  2007.	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different	  phases	  of	  the	  mediation	  process.	  President	  Museveni’s	  attempts	  at	  mediating	  the	  PNU	  and	  ODM	  camps	  bear	  EAC	  marks	  since	  he	  was,	  at	  the	  time,	  acting	  in	  his	  capacity	  as	  its	  Chair.	  The	  latter’s	  involvement	  in	  the	  final	  stages	  of	  the	  negotiations,	  at	  the	  request	  of	  AU	  Chief	   Mediator,	   proved	   crucial	   in	   breaking	   the	   stalemate	   over	   how	   a	   dual	   executive	  functions.	  President	  Kikwete	  drew	  Tanzania’s	  experience	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  power	  had	  been	   shared	   between	   the	   President	   and	   Prime	   Minister.	   Prior	   to	   Kikwete’s	   arrival,	  negotiations	   were	   suspended	   following	   disagreement	   over	   the	   powers	   of	   the	   newly	  created	  position	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister.	  Even	  though,	  President	  Kikwete	  was	  invited	  by	  the	  Annan	   Panel,	  more	   so	   as	   a	   Chairperson	   of	   an	   AU-­‐mandated	  mission179,	   his	   contribution	  received	   appreciation	   from	   the	   EAC	   Secretariat	   that	   was	   eager	   to	   accentuate	   the	   role	  played	  by	  one	  of	  its	  Head	  of	  State180.	  	  	  After	  snubbing	  earlier	  pleas	  for	  mediation	  by	  the	  coalition	  of	  prominent	  local	  and	  religious	  leaders	  and	  a	  group	  of	  former	  heads	  of	  state,	  the	  Kibaki	  government	  appealed	  for	  the	  EAC	  and	   its	   Partner	   States	   involvement	   in	   resolving	   the	   political	   crisis.	   Kibaki	   dispatched	  special	   envoy,	  Moses	  Wetangula,	   to	  meet	  President	  Museveni.	  According	   to	   the	  Ugandan	  State	  House	  statement,	   the	  envoy	  briefed	  Museveni	  about	   the	   situation	  and	   “He	   (Kibaki)	  appealed	   to	   President	   Museveni	   to	   use	   his	   position	   as	   the	   chairman	   of	   both	   the	   East	  African	  Community	  and	   the	  Commonwealth	   to	   involve	  both	   the	  Kenyan	  government	  and	  the	   opposition	   to	   get	   a	   solution	   to	   the	   current	   Kenyan	   problems”	   (Mukasa,	   January	   8th,	  2008).	  	  Meanwhile,	  Kibaki	  also	  sent	  his	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Minister,	  Raphael	  Tuju,	  to	  Rwandan	  President	   Kagame.	  Minister	   Tuju	   also	  made	   a	   briefing	   of	   the	   instability	   in	   Kenya	   and	   is	  quoted	   to	   have	   said	   that	   Kibaki	   was	   ready	   to	   set	   up	   a	   government	   of	   national	   unity	  provided	  the	  opposition	  accepts	  defeat	  (ibid.).	  The	  response	  of	  the	  Rwandan	  government,	  which	  was	  delivered	  by	  its	  Prime	  Minister	  Bernard	  Makuza,	  on	  behalf	  of	  President	  Kagame	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  179	  President	   Kikwete	   replaced	   then	   Ghanaian	   President	   John	   Kufuor	   as	   Chairman	   of	   the	   AU,	   following	   his	  election	  on	  January	  31,	  2008,	  Addis	  Ababa.	  180	  In	  a	  section	  of	  a	  congratulatory	  note	   to	  President	   Jakaya	  Mrisho	  Kikwete	  after	  his	   re-­‐election	   into	  office	  following	   the	   2010	   General	   Elections	   in	   Tanzania,	   the	   EAC	   Secretary	   General	   says	   “We	   appreciate	   the	  visionary	  leadership	  that	  you	  have	  provided	  in	  these	  positive	  developments	  in	  our	  region,	  in	  particular	  your	  role	   in	   the	   settlement	   of	   the	   2008	   Kenya	   post-­‐election	   crisis	   and	   now	   the	   settlement	   of	   the	   Zanzibar	  situation..”	   See	   “Congratulatory	   Note:	   Secretary	   General	   Congratulates	   H.	   E.	   Dr.	   Jakaya	   Mrisho	   Kikwete,	  President	   of	   the	   United	   Republic	   of	   Tanzania”.	   Available	   at	   http://www.eac.int/about-­‐eac/eacnews/.	  Accessed	  on	  February	  5th	  2011.	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who	  was	  on	  a	  visit	  to	  the	  U.S,	  was	  that	  “Rwanda	  would	  support	  any	  decision	  Kenyans	  take	  to	  solve	  their	  problems”	  (ibid.).	  	  As	  far	  as	  mediator	  credibility	  is	  concerned,	  President	  Museveni’s	  engagement	  was	  strongly	  encouraged	  by	  the	  GoK/PNU	  side	  and	  less	  favoured	  by	  the	  ODM	  (Lindenmayer	  and	  Kaye,	  2009:	   6).	   President	   Kibaki	   actually	   stalled	   his	   first	   meeting	   with	   the	   AU’s	   endorsed	  mediator-­‐Kofi	  Annan,	  slated	  for	  January	  2nd	  January,	  so	  as	  to	  meet	  President	  Museveni	  to	  discuss	  the	  latter’s	  peace	  plan	  (ibid.	  p.8).	  The	  EAC	  Chair,	  thus,	  paid	  visits	  to	  Nairobi	  to	  meet	  Kibaki	  and	  Odinga	  on	  22-­‐24	  January,	  pressing	  for	  an	  immediate	  solution	  (ICG,	  2008:	  21).	  I	  posit	  here	  that	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  EAC	  as	  a	  possible	  interlocutor	  in	  diffusing	  the	  Kenyan	  political	  crisis	  was,	  however,	  called	  into	  question	  by	  its	  Chair	  (Museveni’s)	  endorsement	  of	  Kibaki’s	  victory181.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that,	  in	  the	  past,	  it	  was	  Museveni	  who	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  breaking	  the	  standoff	  between	  the	  West	  and	  Libya’s	  Muammar	  Gaddafi,	  he	  immediately	  came	  under	  criticism	  for	  being	  the	  first	  and	  only	  East	  African	  leader	  to	  congratulate	  Kibaki,	  whose	   re-­‐election	   was	   being	   fiercely	   disputed	   by	   the	   opposition,	   and	   one	   which	   had	  sparked	  off	  violent	  protests	  in	  Kenya.	  The	  Ugandan	  opposition,	  the	  Forum	  for	  Democratic	  Change,	  urged	  President	  Museveni	   to	  withdraw	   the	   congratulatory	  message	   (Olupot	   and	  Etengu,	   2008).	   	   President	   Museveni	   defended	   his	   message	   on	   the	   ground	   that	   it	   was	   a	  ‘diplomatic	   gesture’,	   saying	   that	   “After	   the	   Kenya	   Electoral	   Commission	   declared	   the	  results	  in	  which	  H.	  E.	  Mwai	  Kibaki	  emerged	  as	  the	  winner,	  and	  his	  being	  sworn-­‐in	  on	  the	  30th	  December	  2007,	  I,	  as	  required	  by	  Diplomatic	  Conventions,	  called	  to	  congratulate	  him”	  (ibid.).	  Nevertheless,	  Museveni’s	  move	  seemed	  to	  have	  complicated	  attempts	  for	  mediation	  at	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   level,	   dealing	   a	   severe	   blow	   to	   the	   EAC	   credibility	   as	   an	   impartial	  mediator.	  An	  argument	  which	  is	  supported	  by	  African	  international	  relations	  and	  security	  expert	  stressing	  that	  “if	  you	  congratulate	  someone	  on	  winning	  an	  election,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  for	  you	  to	  be	  part	  of	  a	  mission	  to	  try	  to	  resolve	  that	  crisis”182.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  181	  Other	   non-­‐East	   African	   leaders	   who	   sent	   congratulatory	   messages	   to	   President	   Kibaki	   following	   his	  disputed	   re-­‐election	   for	   a	   second	   term	   include	   Singapore’s	   President	   Sellapan	   Rama	   Nathan,	   Djibouti’s	  President	   Ismael	   Omar	   Guelleh,	   Swaziland	   Prime	   Minister	   Absalom	   Themba	   Dlamini,	   Botswana	   President	  Festus	   Gontebanye	   Mogae,	   and	   the	   Crown	   Prince	   of	   Kuwait	   Sheikh	   Nawaf	   Al-­‐Jaber	   Al-­‐Sabah.	   Information	  retrieved	  from	  the	  State	  House	  of	  Kenya	  website:	  http://www.statehousekenya.go.ke/	  	  	  	  182	  Interview	   with	   Professor	   Mohabe	   Nyirabu,	   Department	   of	   Political	   Science	   and	   Public	   Administration,	  University	  of	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  7th	  February	  2011,	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  Tanzania.	  See	  also	  Gilbert	  M.	  Khadiagala,	  2009,	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  Conversely,	  Museveni’s	   perceived	   partiality	   did	   not	   stand	   in	   the	  way	   for	   the	   EAC	   Chair,	  who	   had	   the	   best	   chance	   of	   breaking	   the	   ice	   with	   the	   Kibaki	   (GoK/PNU)	   side,	   to	   be	  involved.	  His	  position	   in	   the	  mediation	  process	  was	  akin	   to	  what	   is	   advocated	  by	  a	  now	  revised	   assumption	   on	   mediator’s	   partiality	   and	   acceptability.	   	   The	   assumption	   is	   that	  “Although	  there	   is	  no	  necessary	  relationship	  between	  a	  mediator’s	  past	  partiality	  and	   its	  future	  usefulness,	  good	  relations	  between	  it	  and	  one	  of	  the	  adversaries	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  an	  aid	   to	   communicating,	   to	   developing	   creative	   proposals,	   and	   to	   helping	   the	   two	   parties’	  positions	   to	   converge.	   Closeness	   to	   one	   party	   implies	   the	   possibility	   of	   ‘delivering’	   it	  (Zartman	  and	  Touval,	  2007:	  443).	  Zartmann	  and	  Touval	  point	  out	  further	  that	  “The	  party	  closer	   to	   the	   mediator	   may	   soften	   its	   stand	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   preserving	   its	   favoured	  relationship	   with	   the	   would-­‐be	   mediator.	   The	   other	   side,	   which	   does	   not	   enjoy	   close	  relations	  with	  the	  mediator	  (and	  especially	   if	   it	   is	  the	  weaker	  side),	  sometimes	  perceives	  the	  potential	  advantages	  of	  accepting	  a	  ‘biased’	  third	  party	  as	  mediator:	  such	  a	  mediator	  is	  more	   likely	   to	   be	   able	   to	   extract	   concessions	   from	   its	   friend	   than	   an	   impartial	  mediator	  who	  carries	  no	  particular	  influence	  with	  the	  adversary…”	  (ibid.).	  	  	  	  The	  foregoing	  assertions	  reflect	  what	  transpired	  later	  as	  far	  as	  Museveni’s	  mediation	  was	  concerned.	   He	   was	   later	   welcomed	   by	   both	   parties	   as	   attested	   by	   Uganda’s	   Foreign	  Minister	   Sam	   Kutesa	   and	   also	   by	   ODM	   Spokesman	   Salim	   Lone	   who	   remarked	   that	  “President	   Museveni	   has	   telephoned	   Hon.	   Raila	   Odinga	   informing	   him	   of	   intentions	   to	  travel	  to	  Kenya	  and	  mediate	  between	  us	  and	  the	  PNU	  in	  efforts	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  there	  is	  peace	   and	   democracy	   in	   Kenya.	   As	   the	   Chairman	   of	   the	   East	   African	   Community,	   he	   is	  welcome”183.	   President	   Museveni,	   in	   consultation	   with	   Tanzania’s	   President	   Kikwete,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  “Regionalism	   and	   Conflict	   Resolution:	   Lessons	   From	   the	   Kenyan	   Crisis”,	   Journal	   of	   Contemporary	   African	  Studies,	   Vol.	   27,	  No.	   3,	   July,	   pp.	   437-­‐8.	  Mistrust	   of	  Museveni	   by	   one	   of	   the	   protagonists,	   ODM,	  was	   further	  aggravated	   by	   claims	   of	   Ugandan	   deployment	   of	   3000	   troops	   in	   western	   Kenya	   to	   reinforce	   government	  defences.	   These	   claims	   were,	   however,	   rejected	   by	   Ugandan	   authorities	   through	   its	   Foreign	  Minister	   Sam	  Kutesa,	  referred	  in	  “Uganda	  maintains	   it	  has	  not	  deployed	  troops	   in	  Kenya”,	  Daily	  Nation,	  20	  January	  2008.	  President	  Museveni	  also	  echoed	  this	  position	  while	  addressing	  a	  public	  rally	  in	  Busia,	  Uganda	  on	  January	  5,	  2008,	   stating	   categorically	   that	   Uganda	   would	   not	   interfere	   in	   Kenya’s	   internal	   problems.	   Cited	   in	   Daily	  Nation	  “Museveni	  Defends	  Message	  to	  Kibaki”,	  New	  Vision,	  6th	  January,	  2008.	  183	  “ODM	  Welcomes	  Museveni	  Mediation”,	  Daily	  Mirror,	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contacted	  Kibaki	  and	  Odinga	  in	  a	  bid	  to	  find	  an	  amicable	  solution	  to	  the	  crisis184.	  The	  EAC	  Chair’s	   involvement,	   therefore,	   took	   two	   forms,	   namely	   telephone	   calls	   to	   Kibaki	   and	  Odinga	  and	  actual	  visits	  to	  Kenya185.	  	  	  	  The	   EAC	   Chair’s	   role	   in	   the	   Kenya	   mediation	   process	   can	   be	   summed	   up	   as	   that	   of	   a	  ‘communicator’.	   Going	   back	   to	   the	   work	   by	   Zartman	   and	   Touval	   (2007),	   in	   the	   process	  toward	  a	  mutually	  acceptable	  solution	  to	  a	  crisis/conflict,	  mediators	  employ	  three	  modes,	  namely	  communication,	  formulation,	  and	  manipulation,	  in	  that	  order.	  As	  a	  communicator,	  the	   mediator	   acts	   as	   a	   conduit,	   opening	   contacts	   and	   carrying	   messages	   between	   the	  parties	  when	  they	  cannot	  talk	  to	  each	  other.	  Museveni	  acted	  as	  a	  communicator	  between	  the	   two	   principals	   (of	   PNU	   and	   ODM)	   when	   direct	   contact	   between	   them	   was	   still	  impossible,	   and	  went	  on	   to	  propose	  a	   framework	   to	   set	  up	  a	   judicial	   commission,	  which	  would	  report	  within	  three	  months186.	  Museveni’s	  communication	  role	  was	  enthusiastically	  confirmed	   by	   his	   Press	   Secretary,	   Tamale	   Mirundi:	   “President	   Museveni	   has	   left	   his	  framework	  and	  the	  Kofi	  Annan	  team	  can	  work	  with	  it	  or	  ignore	  it,	  but	  he	  is	  a	  happy	  man	  that	   his	  mission	   has	   broken	   the	   ice”187.	   It	   is	   not	   evident	   whether	   the	   Annan	   Panel	   that	  ultimately	  brokered	  the	  power-­‐sharing	  agreement	  made	  use	  of	  the	  EAC	  Chair’s	  proposal.	  	  	  It	  is	  evident,	  therefore,	  as	  confirmed	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  one	  of	  the	  EAC	  security	  experts,	  that	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   body	  worked	  behind	   the	   scene	  during	   the	  Kenyan	   crisis,	   involving	  background	  discussions	  at	  the	  level	  of	  individual	  Heads	  of	  State,	  as	  explained	  above,	  and	  a	  ministerial	   meeting	   of	   seven	  ministers	   from	   the	   EAC	  member	   countries	   in	  mid	   January	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  184	  See	   “Museveni	   Talks	   To	   Kibaki,	   Raila	   Odinga”,	   New	   Vision	   (online),	   Wednesday,	   2nd	   January,	   2008,	  http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/2/604746.	  Accessed	  30th	  March,	  2011.	  See	  also	  the	  Monitor,	  3rd	   January,	  2008.	  The	  urgency	  to	  contact	  the	  two	  protagonists	  was,	  not	  only	  taken	  out	  of	  the	  need	  to	  see	  an	  immediate	  cessation	  of	  violence	  in	  Kenya,	  but	  also	  was	  prompted	  by	  the	  precarious	  situation	  that	  faced	  Uganda’s	  goods	  transportation	   system,	   as	   was	   confirmed	   by	   President	   Museveni	   when	   he	   revealed	   some	   details	   of	   his	  telephone	   conversation	  with	  Kibaki	   and	  Odinga,	   saying	   that	   he	   called	  Kibaki	   to	   ensure	   that	   Kenyan	   police	  escort	  goods	  trucks	  destined	  for	  Uganda	  and	  had	  also	  rang	  Odinga	  to	  ask	  him	  to	  restrain	  his	  supporters	  from	  attacking	   those	   tracks.	   Cited	   in	   “Museveni	   Defends	   Message	   to	   Kibaki”,	   New	   Vision,	   Sunday,	   6ht	   January,	  2008.	  185	  President	   Museveni	   arrived	   in	   Nairobi	   on	   January	   22nd,	   2008	   on	   a	   two-­‐day	   official	   visit.	   When	   he	   left	  Uganda’s	   EAC	   Affairs	  Minister,	   Eriya	   Kategaya,	   remained	   behind	   to	   facilitate	   the	   dialogue.	   See	   New	  Vision	  Online,	  February	  5th,	  2008.	  Available	  at	  http://www.newvision.co.ug/.	  	  186	  “Kenya	   talks	   breakthrough	   denied”.	   Cited	   in	   http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/.	   Accessed	   January	   25th	  2011.	  	  187	  Ibid.	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2008188.	   The	   EAC	   could	   not	   seize	   the	   opportunity	   to	   own	   the	   process	   leading	   to	   a	  negotiated	  settlement,	  even	  though,	  its	  Secretary-­‐General	  refuted	  claims	  that	  the	  EAC	  was	  sitting	   on	   the	   fence	   and	   refusing	   to	   get	   involved.	   Ambassador	   Mwapachu,	   the	   EAC	  Secretary-­‐General,	  confirmed	  the	  ‘quiet	  diplomacy’	  approach	  that	  was	  adopted	  by	  the	  EAC	  into	   the	   Kenyan	   crisis	   when	   he	   said:	   “Let	   me	   assure	   you	   that	   we	   are	   fully	   involved	   in	  advocating	  peace	  and	  tranquillity	   in	  Kenya,	  may	  be	   it	   is	   just	   the	  method	  we	  use	  which	   is	  different	   from	  what	  most	   people	  were	   expecting…Our	   efforts	  may	  not	   be	   seen	   outward,	  but	   inwardly	   the	   EAC	   is	   working	   hard	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   troubles	   in	   Kenya	   are	   solved	  amicably.	   Kenya	   is	   a	   pivotal	   precinct	   as	   far	   as	   the	   regional	   economy	   is	   concerned,	  therefore,	  what	  is	  happening	  in	  Kenya	  is	  clearly	  affecting	  other	  member	  countries	  as	  well,	  so	  we	  cannot	  afford	  to	  remain	  passive”189.	  Despite	  the	  Secretariat’s	  assurances	  that	  a	  panel	  of	  ministers	  from	  all	  the	  five	  Member	  States	  were	  working	  closely	  with	  their	  presidents	  on	  the	  Kenyan	  crisis,	  the	  EAC	  failed	  to	  assert	  its	  authority	  over	  the	  mediation	  process,	  leaving	  the	  chance	  to	  fall	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  AU	  team.	  	  	  6.4.3.	  Civil	  Society	  Involvement	  	  The	   role	   of	   the	   Kenyan	   civil	   society	  was	   instrumental	   in	   laying	   a	   favourable	   ground	   for	  mediation.	  Besides	  taking	  the	  initial	  lead	  to	  encourage	  mediation	  and	  peacebuilding	  when	  the	   main	   protagonists	   were	   locked	   in	   an	   impasse,	   CSOs	   also	   were	   involved	   in	  implementing	  relief	  operations	  for	  IDPs	  (Murithi,	  2008:	  19).	  Apart	  from	  making	  persistent	  calls	  for	  a	  negotiated	  settlement,	  as	  alluded	  to	  earlier,	  some	  of	  the	  CSOs,	  like	  the	  National	  Council	  of	  Churches	  of	  Kenya-­‐NCCK	  and	  the	  Kenyan	  Women’s	  Consultation	  Group,	  actually	  approached	  the	  Annan	  Panel,	  which	  was	  equally	  eager	  to	  solicit	  the	  support	  of	  civil	  society	  members190.	  	  Grassroots	  support	  from	  the	  Kenyan	  society	  was	  vital	  for	  the	  Annan	  Panel	  to	  steer	   the	   parties	   closer	   to	   negotiation.	   In	   their	  Women’s	  Memorandum	   to	   the	  Mediation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  188	  Interview	   with	   Leonard	   Onyonyi,	   EAC	   Security	   Expert	   and	   SALW	   Programme	   Coordinator	   at	   the	   EAC	  Secretariat	   in	   Arusha,	   Tanzania,	   11th	   January	   2011.	   See	   also	   Valentine	  Marc	  Nkwame,	   “EAC	   pursues	   ‘quiet	  diplomacy’	  over	  Kenyan	  crisis”,	  The	  Arusha	  Times,	  	  189	  Valentine	  Kwame,	   “EAC	  pursues	   ‘quiet	  diplomacy’	  over	  Kenyan	  crisis”,	  The	  Arusha	  Times,	   January	  19-­‐25,	  2008.	  190	  CSOs	   also	   made	   submissions	   to	   two	   commissions	   constituted	   to	   investigate	   post-­‐election	   violence	   and	  irregularities,	  the	  Kriegler	  and	  Waki	  commissions,	  providing	  them	  with	  information	  and	  contacts.	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Team,	   the	   Kenyan	   Women’s	   Consultation	   Group	   on	   the	   Current	   Crisis	   in	   Kenya,	   for	  instance,	  having	  given	  its	  account	  of	  the	  crisis	  and	  the	  gender	  dimensions	  of	  the	  violence,	  the	  group	  recalled	  the	  centrality	  of	  women	  in	  the	  prevention	  and	  resolution	  of	  conflicts	  as	  reaffirmed	   in	   the	   Constitutive	   Act	   of	   the	   African	   Union,	   the	   AU’s	   Solemn	  Declaration	   on	  Gender	  Equality,	  the	  Protocol	  to	  the	  African	  Charter	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Women	  in	  Africa,	  the	  African	   Charter	   on	   the	   Rights	   and	   Welfare	   of	   the	   Child,	   and	   by	   UN	   Security	   Council	  Resolution	  1325191.	  This	  group	  pointed	  out	  to	  the	  Annan	  Panel	  that	  the	  crisis	  was	  beyond	  the	  two	  political	  protagonists	  and	  went	  on	  to	  recommend,	  among	  others,	  strengthening	  of	  institutions	   that	   support	   democratic	   constitutional	   governance,	   continued	   engagement	  with	   women	   as	   key	   stakeholders	   in	   all	   stages	   of	   the	   mediation,	   and	   that	   mediation	  continues	  until	  such	  time	  as	  peace	  is	  restored	  in	  Kenya192.	  	  	  In	   similar	   vein,	   the	   International	   Federation	   for	   Human	   Rights	   (FIDH),	   whose	   member	  organizations	  include	  the	  Kenyan	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  (KHRC),	  and	  the	  Kenyans	  for	  Peace,	  Truth	  and	   Justice	  (KPTJ)-­‐a	  coalition	  of	  Kenya’s	  governance,	  human	  right	  and	   legal	  organizations,	  reaffirmed	  its	  support	  to	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  Annan	  mediation	  Team	  towards	  effective	  political	  solution	  to	  the	  crisis,	  based	  on	  peace,	  truth	  and	  justice193.	  The	  FIDH	  also	  welcomed	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  African	  Commission	  on	  Human	  and	  Peoples’	  Rights	  (ACHPR)	  to	   examine	   the	   human	   rights	   situation	   in	   Kenya	   at	   the	   occasion	   of	   its	   4th	   extraordinary	  session	  held	  in	  Banjul,	  Gambia	  in	  February	  2008.	  The	  consultative	  involvement	  of	  Kenyan	  CSOs	  was	  also	  essential	  in	  putting	  pressure	  on	  the	  government	  in	  swiftly	  moving	  forward	  implementation	  of	  the	  power-­‐sharing	  agreement.	  Moreover,	  “the	  active	  involvement	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  191	  Interestingly,	  no	  mention	  of	  any	  EAC’s	   instrument	  was	  made;	   indicating	  how	  remote	  in	  thought	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  body	  has	  been	  to	  the	  grassroots	  of	  Partner	  States,	  despite	  being	  closer	  to	  home.	  More	  amusing	  was	  the	  perceptible	  silence	  of	  CSOs	  with	  an	  East	  African	  coverage,	  on	  the	  Kenyan	  crisis.	  It	  is	  only	  after	  the	  peace	  agreement	   had	   been	   signed	   that	   the	   Arusha	   based,	   East	   Africa	   Law	   Society,	   released	   a	   statement	  congratulating	  leaders	  of	  the	  two	  parties	  as	  well	  as	  appreciating	  the	  role	  of	  the	  AU	  Chair,	  President	  Kikwete,	  EAC	  Chair	  of	   the	  Summit,	  President	  Museveni,	   the	  Annan	  Panel,	  among	  others.	  See	  Valentine	  Marc	  Kwame,	  “EA	  Law	  Society	  lauds	  Kenya’s	  peace	  pact”,	  The	  Arusha	  Times,	  March	  8-­‐14,	  2008.	  192 	  These	   are	   some	   of	   the	   immediate,	   medium	   and	   long-­‐term	   recommendations	   contained	   in	   the	  Memorandum	  that	  was	  presented	  to	  the	  Annan	  Panel	  by	  a	  committee	  of	  11	  women	  representing	  the	   larger	  consultation	   group.	   For	   lists	   of	   committee	  members	  who	   attended	   the	  women’s	   consultations,	  which	  were	  facilitated	  by	  Action	  Aid	  International,	  Vital	  Voices,	  UNIFEM,	  Nairobi	  Peace	  Initiative	  and	  Urgent	  Action	  Fund-­‐Africa,	  see	  http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/45740.	  	  	  	  193	  Kenyans	  for	  Peace,	  Truth	  and	  Justice	  Statement	  to	  ACHPR,	  by	  FIDH	  and	  others,	  February	  21,	  2008.	  http://	  pambazuka.org/en/category/cooment/46289.	  Accessed	  March	  24th	  2011.	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media,	  religious	  groups,	  business	  communities,	  and	  peace	  activists	  was	  crucial	  for	  creating	  an	  atmosphere	  that	  was	  conducive	  to	  fruitful	  negotiations	  and	  for	  generating	  that	  vital	  link	  between	   an	   elite-­‐level	   process	   and	   the	   grass-­‐roots	   realities,	   to	   avoid	   disenchantment	   or	  dangerous	  disconnect”	  (Lindenmayer	  and	  Kaye,	  2009:	  23).	  	  	  	  6.4.4.	  Extra-­‐Sub-­‐Regional	  Actors:	  Former	  African	  Heads	  of	  State	  	  Coinciding	  with	  a	  string	  of	  high-­‐level	  diplomatic	  visits	  to	  the	  country	  that	  plunged	  in	  post-­‐election	  violence	  was	  the	  arrival	  on	  January	  8th,	  2008,	  of	  four	  former	  African	  heads	  of	  State.	  These	   were	   Tanzania’s	   Benjamin	   Mkapa,	   Mozambique’s	   Joachim	   Chissano,	   Botswana’s	  Katumile	  Masire,	  and	  Zambia’s	  Kenneth	  Kaunda.	  The	  former	  presidents	  held	  meetings	  with	  the	  Kenyan	  government	  and	  former	  Kenyan	  president	  Daniel	  Arap	  Moi	  to	  discuss	  ways	  of	  diffusing	   the	   political	   stalemate	   and	   fostering	   national	   reconciliation194 .	   The	   group	  immediately	  visited	  Kenyans	  displaced	  by	  the	  post-­‐election	  violence	  in	  Eldoret195.	  	  	  Its	  attempt	  at	  mediation,	  “albeit	  a	  very	   laudable	  response	  to	  the	  escalating	  events	  on	  the	  ground-­‐only	   added	   to	   the	   plethora	   of	   options	   available	   to	   the	   (Kenyan)	   government,	  thereby	  multiplying	  both	  the	  channels	  of	  communication	  and	  the	  possibilities	   for	  stalling	  any	  real	  efforts	  toward	  peace.	  The	  four	  former	  heads	  of	  state	  carried	  with	  them	  their	  moral	  authority	  and	  respect	  of	  both	  parties,	  and	  as	  part	  of	  an	  African	  intervention,	  were	  seen	  as	  more	  acceptable	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  a	  government	  still	  intent	  on	  resisting	  ‘internationalization’	  (of	   mediation	   efforts)”	   (Lindenmayer	   and	   Kaye,	   2009:	   5).	   There	   was,	   therefore,	   no	  discernible	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  intervention	  by	  the	  former	  heads	  of	  state	  gained	  much	   further	   ground,	   compared	   to	   the	   coalition	   of	   prominent	   local	   actors	   and	   religious	  leaders,	  in	  pulling	  off	  firm	  commitments	  for	  a	  negotiated	  settlement.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  194	  Spokesperson	  for	  the	  Kenyan	  Government,	  Alfred	  Mutua,	  cited	  in	  an	  AFP	  report.	  195	  The	  town	  of	  Eldoret	  is	  about	  190	  miles	  northwest	  of	  the	  capital	  Nairobi.	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6.4.5.	  The	  AU	  PEAP,	  EU	  and	  Donor	  Countries	  	  It	   has	   been	   observed	   that	   during	   the	   post	   2007	  Kenyan	   election	   crisis,	   the	   country	  was	  host	  to	  multiple	  mediation	  initiatives.	  The	  multiple	  and	  parallel	  mediation	  mechanisms	  by	  the	   local	   actors	   and	   religious	   organizations,	   former	   Heads	   of	   State,	   the	   EAC	   and	   the	  international	   community,	   albeit	   mounted	   with	   noble	   intentions	   of	   ending	   the	   political	  impasse,	   the	   opposition	   ODM	   felt,	   were	   bound	   to	   be	   ineffective	   and	   could	   cause	  confusion196.	  Following	   the	   frequent	   insistences	  of	  Kofi	  Annan,	   the	   former	  UN	  Secretary-­‐General	   and	   Chair	   of	   the	   Panel	   of	   Eminent	   African	   Personalities	   (PEAP),	   and	   the	   full	  backing	  of	  the	  international	  community,	  the	  various	  attempts	  at	  mediation	  culminated	  into	  one	  process	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  AU	  PEAP197.	  	  	  According	   to	   Lindenmayer	   and	  Kaye	   (2009:6),	   “Annan	  would	   insist	   that	   there	  would	   be	  one	  mediation	  and	  one	  mediation	  only;	  there	  could	  be	  no	  possibility	  for	  alternatives	  if	  the	  compromise	  being	  proposed	  did	  not	  suit	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  conflict.	  The	  previous	  absence	  of	  coordination	  in	  the	  first	  few	  weeks	  of	  crisis,	  even	  among	  African	  actors	  who	  rushed	  to	  the	  scene	  with	  noble	  intentions	  but	  not	  enough	  tools	  or	  resources	  at	  their	  disposal,	  could	  not	  be	  repeated;	  there	  should	  be	  no	  interference	  in	  the	  mediation	  and	  the	  mediator	  would	  decide	   whom	   to	   ask	   for	   support	   and	   when”.	   Consequently,	   when	   President	   Museveni	  attended	   the	   much-­‐publicized	   handshake	   between	   Kibaki	   and	   Odinga	   orchestrated	   by	  Annan	  on	  24th	   January,	   it	   signalled	   the	   end	  of	   the	  EAC’s	  diplomatic	   engagement	   and	   the	  start	   of	   the	   Annan	   team	   mediation	   (Khadiagala,	   2009:	   439).	   This	   was	   a	   major	   initial	  accomplishment	  by	  Annan	  to	  convince	  the	  parties	  to	  a	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  meeting,	  a	  move	  which	  earlier	  attempts	  at	  mediation	  had	  not	  managed	  to	  achieve.	  	  The	  PEAP	  mediation	  (hereafter	  also	  referred	  as	  the	  Annan	  mediation/Panel)	  was	  preceded	  by	   an	   advance	   team	   comprised	   of	   the	   Commissioner	   of	   Peace	   and	   Security	   and	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  196	  The	  ODM	  Spokesman	  Salim	  Lone,	  cited	  in	  Khadiagala,	  G.	  M.	  2009,	  op.	  cit.	  p.	  439.	  197	  The	  other	  members	  of	   the	  PEAP	  were	   former	  President	  Benjamin	  Mkapa	  of	  Tanzania,	  and	   former	  South	  African	  First	  Lady,	  Graca	  Machel.	  The	  Panel	  was	  charged	  with	  helping	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  conflict	  ensure	  that	  an	  escalation	   of	   the	   crisis	   was	   avoided	   and	   lead	   them	   to	   reach	   a	   negotiated	   agreement	   that	   would	   ensure	   a	  sustainable	  peace	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	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Ghanaian	   ambassador	   to	   the	   AU	   to	   prepare	   the	   ground	   for	   the	   AU	  mediation	   under	   the	  then	  Chair,	  President	  John	  Kufuor.	  Kufuor	  efforts	  proved	  inconclusive,	  and	  thus,	  he	  asked	  Annan	   to	   lead	   the	   PEAP	   in	   the	  mediation	   process.	   The	  Annan	  mediation	   did	   not	   have	   a	  smooth	  ride198.	  Annan	  was	  once	  again	  prompted	  to	   insist	  publicly	   that	   the	  AU	  PEAP	  was	  the	   only	   mediation	   process	   when	   the	   Intergovernmental	   Authority	   on	   Development	  (IGAD)	  proposed	  talks	  in	  Nairobi	  for	  the	  week	  of	  February	  4th	  2008.	  The	  IGAD	  move	  could	  only	  help	  to	  consolidate	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  disputed	  presidency	  in	  a	  forum	  that	  could	  be	  attended	  by	  heads	  of	  state.	  	  Sensing	  the	  GoK/PNU	  attempt	  of	  reneging	  on	  its	  commitment	  to	   the	  Annan	  mediation,	   the	  ODM	  mobilized	  people	   to	   conduct	  peaceful	  protests	   against	  the	  IGAD	  talks	  across	  the	  country	  (Lindenmayer	  and	  Kaye,	  2009:	  12).	  	  Any	  mass	  gathering	  at	   a	   time	   when	   tensions	   were	   still	   running	   high	   could	   degenerate	   to	   renewed	   acts	   of	  violence	   and	   thus	   jeopardize	   the	   mediation	   process.	   The	   Annan	   Panel	   successfully	  persuaded	   the	   ODM	   to	   call	   off	   the	   protests,	   whilst	   the	   IGAD	   talks	   went	   ahead	   at	   a	  ministerial	  level	  with	  the	  ministers	  who	  attended	  rejecting	  the	  claim	  that	  they	  were	  in	  the	  country	   to	   carryout	   a	   parallel	   mediation,	   but	   rather	   were	   merely	   expressing	   their	  solidarity	  with	  a	  fellow	  member	  of	  IGAD199.	  	  	  A	   close	   examination	   of	   Annan’s	   role	   in	   the	   mediation	   of	   the	   Kenya	   post-­‐election	   crisis	  reveals	   elements	   of	   the	   three	  modes	   of	  mediation	   (i.e.	   communication,	   formulation	   and	  manipulation).	  Annan	  managed	   to	   convince	   the	  disputing	  parties	   (the	  ODM	  and	  PNU)	   to	  come	   to	   a	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   meeting	   when	   earlier	   attempts	   to	   do	   so	   had	   flopped.	   He	  subsequently	   managed	   to	   get	   them	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   fact	   that	   to	   conduct	   a	   re-­‐run	  election	  under	   the	   very	   tense	   political	   climate	   prevailing	   at	   the	   time	  was	   tantamount	   to	  causing	   more	   tragedies.	   After	   tactically	   separating	   the	   main	   negotiating	   teams	   from	  hardliners	   of	   their	   respective	   parties	   and	   keeping	   them	   away	   from	   the	  media	   spotlight,	  which	  allowed	  the	  negotiations	  to	  build	  momentum,	  Annan	  issued	  a	  4-­‐step	  plan	  aiming	  to	  reach	  a	  political	  agreement	  within	  fifteen	  days.	  The	  four	  steps	  were:	  ending	  the	  violence,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  198	  The	  Kibaki	  government	  initially	  gave	  a	  cold	  reception	  to	  the	  AU	  team,	  insisting	  there	  was	  	  ‘no	  crisis	  to	  be	  managed’.	   The	   government	   was	   still	   reluctant	   to	   commit	   to	   mediation	   that	   would	   warrant	   making	  compromises,	  which	  to	  it	  meant	  relinquishing	  power.	  199	  “IGAD	  Ministers	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  meet	  President	  Kibaki”,	  State	  House,	  Nairobi,	  Kenya,	  February	  7th,	  2008.	  Accessed	  from	  http://www.statehousekenya.go.ke/news,	  on	  January	  10th,	  2011.	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resolving	  the	  humanitarian	  crisis,	  resolving	  the	  political	  crisis,	  and	  addressing	  the	  land	  and	  historical	  injustices.	  	  	  Annan	   made	   two	   major	   attempts	   to	   manipulate	   the	   two	   sides.	   According	   to	   Schwartz	  (2008),	  he	  made	  it	  public	  that	  the	  intention	  of	  both	  parties	  was	  to	  pursue	  a	  government	  of	  national	  unity	  as	  the	  most	  preferred	  final	  political	  settlement	  when	  the	  Kibaki	  side	  had	  not	  yet	  agreed	  to	  such	  a	  provision.	  Annan	  also	  used	  another	  tool	  of	  manipulation,	  the	  threat	  of	  terminating	  mediation	  (Zartman	  and	  Touval,	  2007).	  He	  threatened	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  mediation	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  frustration	  at	  the	  lack	  of	  progress	  and	  used	  it	  as	  a	  leverage	  to	  pressurize	  the	  parties	  towards	  a	  final	  agreement.	  As	  cogently	  summarized	  by	  Schwartz	  (2008:	  4)	  “Losing	  Annan	  as	  the	  primary	  negotiator,	  after	  weeks	  of	  negotiations	  with	  little	  progress	   to	   show	   for	   it,	   would	   have	   been	   a	   public	   relations	   disaster	   for	   both	   parties	  involved.	   It	   would	   have	   shown	   the	   world,	   and	   specifically	   the	   international	   donor	  community,	   that	  neither	   side	  was	  willing	   to	  put	  aside	   their	  differences	  and	  work	   for	   the	  good	  of	  the	  people	  of	  Kenya	  instead	  of	  wasting	  all	  of	  their	  time	  and	  resources	  on	  a	  power	  struggle”.	   It	   can,	   thus,	   be	   noted	   that	   it	   is	   through	   the	   tact	   and	   brinkmanship	   of	   the	   AU	  mediation	   Panel	   that	   a	   power	   sharing	   deal	   was	   successfully	   concluded	   on	   28th	   January	  2008.	  	  	  Another	  set	  of	  actors,	  the	  donor	  community	  including	  the	  EU,	  UK,	  France,	  Switzerland,	  U.S.,	  and	  Canada,	   all	   threw	   their	  weight	   behind	   the	  Annan	  mediation	   team	  and	   stepped	   in	   at	  pivotal	  moments	  to	  put	  pressure	  on	  the	  parties,	  which	  was	  decisive	  in	  galvanizing	  leverage	  and	   parties’	   attention	   (ICG,	   February	   2008:25;	   Lindenmayer	   and	   Kaye,	   2009:23;	  Khadiagala,	   2009:	   439).	   In	   a	   statement	   signed	   with	   fourteen	   bilateral	   donors,	   the	   U.S.	  threatened	  to	  cut	  off	  aid	  until	  a	  political	  settlement	  is	  reached200.	  Using	  the	  same	  ‘carrots	  and	  sticks	  approach’	   the	  Council	  of	   the	  EU	   issued	  a	   stern	  warning	   that	  until	   a	   legitimate	  political	  settlement	   is	  agreed,	   it	  could	  not	  conduct	   ‘business	  as	  usual’	  with	  Kenya201.	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  200	  Jaindi	  Kisero,	  “Aid	  cut	  by	  donors	  likely	  to	  result	  in	  budget	  shortfalls,	  financial	  instability”,	  The	  East	  African,	  21	  January	  2008.	  Kisero	  hinted	  that	  more	  than	  40	  percent	  of	  Kenya’s	  $	  2.3	  billion	  development	  budget	  is	  (was	  being)	  funded	  by	  donor	  money.	  201EU	   Statement	   on	   Kenya,	   February	   21,	   2008,	   see	   http://pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/46288.	  	  Accessed	  March	  4,	  2011.	  In	  a	  joint	  statement,	  U.K.	  Foreign	  Minister	  David	  Miliband	  and	  U.S.	  Secretary	  of	  State	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EU	  had	  initially	  planned	  aid	  to	  the	  country	  to	  the	  tune	  of	  euro	  383	  million	  for	  the	  period	  2008-­‐2013,	   but	   the	   European	   Parliament	   voted	   to	   suspend	   the	   aid	   package	   pending	   a	  satisfactory	   resolution	   of	   the	   crisis	   (ICG,	   February	   2008:	   28).	   Donor	   pressure	   was	   also	  applied	   to	   specific	   targeted	   individuals	   to	   bring	   an	   immediate	   end	   to	   the	   violence	   and	  commit	   feuding	   parties	   to	   the	  mediation	   process	   (ICG,	   ibid;	  Wangui,	   February	   7,	   2008).	  The	  U.S.	   issued	   letters	   to	  politicians	   and	  business	   leaders,	   described	  as	   ‘regional	   figures’	  suspected	  of	  inciting	  chaos	  that	  they	  risked	  visa	  denials	  for	  themselves	  and	  their	  families.	  Canada,	  the	  U.K.,	  France	  and	  Switzerland	  issued	  similar	  warnings	  to	  those	  under	  suspicion	  of	  stoking	  the	  violence202.	  	  	  6.5.	  Conclusion	  	  The	  EAC	  is	  the	  only	  Community	  that	  explicitly	  has	  political	  as	  well	  as	  economic	  integration	  objectives	  in	  its	  Treaty.	  It	  is	  one	  of	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations,	  which	  was	  founded	  with	  a	  realization	   that	  any	   form	  of	  economic	   integration	  cannot	   take	  place	  without	  peace	  and	  security	  within	  the	  Community,	  and	  thus	  its	  Member	  States	  have	  to	  pay	  serious	  attention	  to	  issues	  of	  peace	  and	  security.	  Examining	  the	  nature	  and	  extent	  of	  the	  domestic	  political	  crisis	   in	  Kenya	   it	   has	  been	  observed	   that	   the	   spate	  of	   violence	   in	   the	   country	  has	   either	  been	  sponsored	  or	  condoned	  by	  elites	  in	  positions	  of	  power.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  surprise	  outcome	  or	  an	  aberration	  only	  tied	  to	  a	  flawed	  election,	  rather	  a	  function	  of	  a	  much	  longer	  historical	  strategy	  of	  informalizing	  state	  repressive	  institutions	  to	  serve	  political	  ends	  (Branch,	  2011:	  18-­‐22).	  Looking	  at	  the	  post-­‐election	  situation	  of	  2008	  in	  Kenya	  with	  hindsight,	  in	  2006,	  i.e.	  two	  years	  prior	   to	   the	  post-­‐election	  violence,	  Kenya	  became	  one	  of	   the	   first	   countries	   in	  Africa	   to	   complete	   the	   process	   of	   assessment	   by	   the	   African	   Peer	   Review	   Mechanism	  (APRM).	   The	   country	   review	   report	   made	   a	   frank	   assessment	   of	   Kenya’s	   political	  problems,	   and	   in	   agreement	   to	   the	   findings	   of	   previous	   commissions,	   acknowledged	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Condoleezza	  Rice	  called	  for	  an	  end	  to	  violence	  and	  “an	  intensive	  political	  and	  legal	  process”.	  Extracted	  from	  “Museveni	  talks	  to	  Kibaki,	  Raila”,	  New	  Vision,	  January	  2,	  2008,	  available	  at	  http://www.newvision.co.ug/	  .	  	  	  202	  The	  Kenyan	  government,	  on	  its	  part,	  declared	  a	  former	  British	  envoy	  to	  Nairobi,	  Edward	  Clay	  who	  was	  a	  vocal	   critic	   of	   corruption	   in	  Kenya,	   persona	  non	  grata	   after	  his	   tenure	   ended.	   Clay	  had	  bought	  property	   in	  Kenya,	  extracted	  from	  Wangui	  Kanina,	  “U.S.	  threatens	  to	  ban	  eight	  Kenyans	  over	  violence”,	  Reuters,	  February	  7,	  2008,	  available	  at	  http://africa.reuters.com/elections/kenya/.	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role	   of	   prominent	   ruling	   elites	   in	   fuelling	   ethnic	   clashes	   and	   the	   entrenched	   culture	   of	  impunity203.	   It	   is	   of	   course	   conceivable	   that	   “Had	   the	   problems	   the	   APRM	   report	   then	  highlighted	   been	   tackled,	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   the	   violence	   and	   distress	   of	   the	   2008	   crisis	  could	  have	  been	  avoided.	  And	  yet	  nothing	  was	  done”	  (Manby,	  2008:	  1).	  	  In	  the	  face	  of	  real	  domestic	  security	  threats	  confronting	  one	  of	  its	  Member	  States,	  the	  EAC	  experience	   shows	   that	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   body’s	   coordination	  of	   the	   response	  has	  been	  at	  best	  ad	  hoc,	  mostly	  after	  a	  crisis	  has	  erupted	  and	  thus	  unable	  to	  assert	  its	  authority	  over	  its	  management.	  As	  corroborated	  by	  the	  EAC	  Deputy	  Secretary-­‐General	  in	  charge	  of	  Political	  Federation,	   Beatrice	   Kiraso,	   responding	   to	   conflicts	   of	   this	   nature	   in	   an	   ad-­‐hoc	  manner,	  usually	  only	  after	  they	  have	  already	  erupted	  and	  on	  an	  individual	  approach,	  points	  to	  the	  need	  for	  an	  EAC	  capacity	  to	  anticipate	  conflicts,	   to	   forestall	  and	  diffuse	  them	  before	  they	  become	  violent,	   and	   the	   capacity	   to	  manage	  and	   resolve	   them	  where	  prevention	   fails204.	  	  EAC’s	  coordination	  of	  responses	  to	  the	  Kenyan	  political	  crisis	  was	  a	  behind-­‐the-­‐scene	  affair	  marshalled	  by	  individual	  State	  actors.	  	  	  Attempts	  by	  the	  coalition	  of	  prominent	  local	  and	  religious	  leaders,	  and	  a	  group	  of	  former	  heads	  of	   state	   to	  open	  up	   channels	  of	   communication	  and	  diffuse	   the	  political	   stalemate	  were	  snubbed	  by	  the	  disputing	  parties,	  and	  did	  not	  eventually	  result	  in	  a	  firm	  commitment	  for	  a	  mediation	  process.	  The	  EAC	  Chair,	  notwithstanding	  initial	  expression	  of	  mistrust	  on	  his	  partiality	  by	  one	  of	  the	  disputing	  parties,	  managed	  to	  play	  an	  essential	  preliminary	  role	  of	  establishing	  communication	  between	  the	  GOK/PNU	  and	  ODM.	  CSOs	  role	  was	  limited	  to	  making	   submissions	   before	   the	   Annan	  Mediation	   Team	   and	   Commissions	   established	   to	  investigate	   post-­‐election	   violence	   and	   election	   irregularities.	   They	   were	   generally	  supportive	  of	   the	  Annan	  Team	  and	  persistently	   encourage	  mediation	   and	  peacebuilding.	  Some	  of	  the	  CSOs	  were	  involved	  in	  implementing	  relief	  operations	  to	  victims	  of	  the	  post-­‐election	   violence,	   the	   IDPs.	   The	   EU	   and	   Western	   donor	   countries	   threw	   their	   weight	  behind	  the	  Annan-­‐led	  mediation,	  insisting	  that	  it	  was	  ‘the	  only	  game	  in	  town’.	  This	  group	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  203	  The	   report	   was	   presented	   by	   the	   APRM	   Panel	   of	   Eminent	   Persons	   to	   the	   African	   Heads	   of	   State,	   and	  attended	  by	  President	  Mwai	  Kibaki	  himself,	  on	  the	  margins	  of	  the	  July	  2006	  AU	  Summit.	  204	  Remarks	  by	  Hon.	  Beatrice	  Kiraso	  at	  the	  Partner	  States’	  Experts	  Meeting	  to	  consider	  an	  EAC	  Draft	  Conflict	  Prevention,	  Management	  and	  Resolution	  (CPMR)	  Framework.	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actors	  used	  the	  threat	  of	  withholding	  aid	  as	  leverage	  to	  coax	  the	  main	  protagonists	  to	  come	  to	  an	  agreement.	  	  With	   the	   full	   backing	   of	   both	   local	   actors	   and	   the	   international	   community,	   the	   various	  attempts	  at	  mediation	  culminated	  into	  one	  process	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  AU’s	  Annan-­‐led	   team	  which	  eventually	  steered	  the	  parties	   to	  a	  negotiated	  political	  agreement	  paving	  way	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  coalition	  government	  in	  early	  2008.	  The	  next	  two	  chapters	  (i.e.	  six	  and	  seven)	   focus	  on	   the	  Southern	  African	  Sub-­‐regional	  organization,	  SADC’s	  practical	  experiences	   in	   the	   coordination	  and	  management	  of	   the	   collective	   security	   challenges	  of	  SALWs	  and	  the	  domestic	  political	  crisis	  in	  Zimbabwe,	  respectively.	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Chapter	  Seven	  
7.	  SADC	  Security	  Arrangement	  and	  the	  Transnational	  Threat	  of	  SALW	  	  7.1. Introduction	  	  It	   has	   already	   been	   noted	   that	   the	   proliferation	   and	   misuse	   of	   small	   arms	   and	   light	  weapons	  is	  a	  transnational	  security	  threat	  that	  has	  not	  only	  fomented	  but	  also	  prolonged	  violent	   conflicts	   in	   Africa.	   The	   SALW	   problem	   in	   the	   SADC	   countries	   reflects	   the	   varied	  history	   of	   the	   sub-­‐region,	   namely	   arms	   remaining	   after	   termination	   of	   conflicts,	   arms	  passing	  across	  porous	  borders	  and	  those	  purchased	  and	  used	  illegally	  for	  the	  commission	  of	   criminal	   activities.	   It	   is	   in	   response	   to	   the	   proliferation	   and	  misuse	   of	   SALW,	   various	  actors	  within	  the	  SADC	  arrangement	  have	   initiated	  arms	  control	  processes.	  This	  chapter,	  henceforth,	  explores	  the	  nature	  and	  extent	  of	  the	  SALW	  problem	  followed	  by	  the	  analysis	  on	  the	  coordination	  and	  management	  of	  the	  same	  in	  the	  SADC	  sub-­‐region.	  	  	  7.2. The	  Nature	  and	  Extent	  of	  Proliferation	  of	  SALW	  	  The	  proliferation	  of	  illicit	  SALW	  remains	  a	  significant	  and	  persistent	  threat	  to	  the	  security	  of	  the	  Southern	  African	  sub-­‐region	  to	  date.	  Most	  sources	  cite	  the	  legacy	  of	  decades	  of	  civil	  wars	   (almost	   25	   years)	   as	   the	   main	   contributing	   factor	   to	   the	   current	   illegal	   weapons	  situation	   in	   the	   sub-­‐region	   (SAIIA,	   2003:	   73;	  Mthembu-­‐Salter,	   2009:	   17;	   Special	   Report,	  2009:	  74).	  	  As	  remnants	  of	  civil	  wars,	  in	  Mozambique	  for	  instance,	  an	  estimated	  1.5	  million	  SALW	  were	  distributed	  by	  warring	  parties	  (FRELIMO	  and	  RENAMO)	  (Leão,	  2004;	  Solomon	  &	  Cilliers,	  1998:	  88).	  Sishi	  stresses	  that	   the	  Southern	  African	  sub-­‐region	  was	  awash	  with	  weapons	  even	  before	  the	  political	  violence	  of	  the	  1990s.	  Sishi	  singles	  out	  the	  Superpowers	  race	  to	  win	  allies	  during	  the	  1970s	  to	  the	  end	  of	  1980s	  Cold	  War	  resulted	  into	  pumping	  of	  massive	  amounts	  of	  guns	  and	  ammunition	  as	  government	  grants	  into	  the	  sub-­‐region	  (Sishi,	  1998).	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SALW	  are	  not	  a	  cause	  of	  conflict	  per	  se,	  but	  their	  continued	  proliferation	  makes	   it	  easier	  for	  violent	  conflicts	  to	  escalate.	  This	  implies	  that	  small	  arms	  do	  not	  create	  the	  conflicts	  in	  which	   they	   are	   being	   utilized	   but	   can	   exacerbate	   conflicts.	   Besides	   weapons	   caches	  following	  termination	  of	  armed	  conflicts,	  other	  sources	  of	  illegal	  SALW	  have	  been	  surplus	  state	   weapons	   that	   find	   their	   way	   into	   criminal	   gangs	   (Lamb,	   2004:	   326).	   Sizeable	  stockpiles	  of	  weapons	  were	  seized	  during	  the	  UN	  disarmament	  programs	  in	  Mozambique	  and	  Angola	  but	  were	  never	  destroyed	  and	  thus	  when	  the	  UN	  Mission	  left,	  a	  black-­‐market	  for	  the	  weapons	  involving	  corrupt	  officials	  emerged	  (Sishi,	  1998).	  Southern	  Africa	  shares	  a	  mere	   3	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   global	   small	   arms	   industry,	   with	   South	   Africa	   being	   the	   main	  producer	  and	  the	  only	  country	  that	  exports	  substantial	  volumes	  of	  arms	  (Wezeman,	  2009:	  1;	   Special	   Report,	   2009:	   75)205.	   Small	   homemade	   firearms	   industries	   have	   also	   been	  reported	  in	  Malawi	  and	  South	  Africa	  (Lamb,	  2004:	  325).	  	  	  Illicit	  SALW	  continue	  to	  pose	  a	  significant	  threat	  to	  social	  stability	  and	  development	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  a	  renowned	  analyst	  on	  arms	  and	  security	  issues	  in	  the	  sub-­‐region,	  Noel	  Stott,	  has	  dubbed	  them	  as	  the	  ‘real	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction’	  (Stott,	  2004:	  17).	  To	  put	  it	  into	  simple	  perspective,	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  SALW	  proliferation	  in	  the	  Southern	  Africa	  sub-­‐region	  is	  three-­‐fold.	  First	  and	  the	  overarching	  legacy	  of	  SALW	  proliferation	  is	  that	  they	  have	  retarded	  progress	  in	  the	  SADC	  sub-­‐region	  as	  funds	  meant	  for	  development	  purposes	  are	   diverted	   to	   address	   the	   SALW	   problem	   (Stott,	   2004:	   16).	   Second,	   SALW	   have	   been	  linked	   to	   increased	   levels	   of	   violence	   and	   criminal	   activity.	   Conflict	   presents	   the	   perfect	  opportunity	   for	   crime.	  As	   is	   the	   case	   in	   East	  Africa,	   SALW	  are	   the	  most	   commonly	   used	  weapons	   in	   violent	   conflicts	   in	   Southern	   Africa	   (Wezeman,	   2009:	   3).	   There	   has	   been	   a	  notable	  surge	  in	  violent	  crime,	  often	  with	  guns	  used	  as	  the	  weapons	  of	  choice,	  since	  2000	  (Msutu,	  2001:	  8;	  Meek	  &	  Stott,	  2003:	  1).	  As	  noted	  earlier	  a	  black-­‐market	  in	  arms	  thrives.	  Smuggled	  weapons	  as	  remnants	  of	  the	  Angolan	  civil	  war	  found	  their	  way	  to	  countries	  such	  as	   the	   DRC,	   the	   Republic	   of	   Congo,	   Malawi,	   Zambia,	   Namibia,	   Rwanda,	   Burundi	   and	  Tanzania	   (Goredema,	   2005:	   2).	   According	   to	   Goredema	   (ibid),	   in	   the	   Southern	   African	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  Wezeman,	   2009,	   notes	   that	   as	   is	   the	   case	   in	   East	   African	   sub-­‐region	   most	   weapons	   procured	   by	  governments	  or	  non-­‐state	  groups	  in	  Southern	  Africa	  originate	  from	  outside	  the	  sub-­‐region.	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countries	  of	  Malawi,	  Zambia	  and	  Namibia,	  weapons	  derived	  from	  Angola	  have	  been	  linked	  to	  armed	  robberies	  involving	  cash	  and	  motor	  vehicles.	  	  	  Third,	  the	  availability	  and	  spread	  of	  small	  arms	  have	  not	  only	  slowed	  prospects	  for	  durable	  settlement	  of	  on-­‐going	  armed	  conflict	  in	  the	  DRC,	  but	  have	  also	  exerted	  a	  huge	  human	  cost.	  Stohl	   and	   Hogendoorn	   (2010:	   9)	   observe	   that	   approximately	   5	   million	   people	   have	  perished	   and	   about	   1.4	   million	   others	   remain	   internally	   displaced,	   with	   approximately	  340,000	  living	  as	  refugees	  in	  neighbouring	  countries	  in	  Eastern	  DRC.	  The	  Southern	  African	  sub-­‐region	   has	   not	   only	   been	   a	   recipient	   of	   illegal	   firearms.	   Some	   of	   the	  weapons	   used	  during	   the	   Mozambique	   and	   Angolan	   civil	   wars	   in	   the	   1980s	   and	   1990s	   landed	   in	   the	  hands	   of	   rebels	   operating	   in	   Liberia	   and	   Sierra	   Leone	   in	   the	   late	   1990s	   and	   early	   2000	  (Stohl	  &	  Hogendoorn,	  2010:	  6).	  	  	  While	   the	   Southern	   Africa	   sub-­‐region	   is	   relatively	   peaceful	   compared	   to	   the	   1990-­‐2000	  decade,	  there	  is	  still	  a	  proliferation	  of	  small	  arms	  particularly	  in	  civilian	  hands.	  According	  to	  SIPRI	  (2009)	  it	  is	  rather	  difficult	  to	  assess	  the	  volume	  of	  illegal	  supplies	  of	  SALW	  to	  non-­‐state	   actors,	   and	   as	   noted	   by	   the	   small	   arms	   survey	   and	   the	   United	   Nations	   Office	   for	  Disarmament	  Affairs,	  more	  is	  known	  about	  nuclear	  heads	  than	  about	  the	  exact	   figures	  of	  small	  arms	  in	  circulation.	  However,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  get	  a	  general	  impression	  of	  the	  extent	  of	   the	   small	   arms	  problem	   in	  Southern	  Africa	  by	   looking	  at	   the	  available	  estimates	   from	  surveys	  carried	  out	  between	  2001	  and	  2007.	  According	  to	  the	  Small	  Arms	  Survey	  Project,	  most	   of	   the	   firearms	   around	   the	   world	   are	   not	   in	   state	   possession,	   they	   are	   in	   civilian	  hands.	  Out	  of	  the	  estimated	  30	  million	  small	  arms	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  about	  23	  million	  or	  79	  per	  cent	  were	  in	  civilian	  hands	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2003	  (Small	  Arms	  Survey,	  2003:	  80-­‐81).	  Now,	   in	   Southern	  Africa,	   a	   research	   carried	   out	   by	   the	   Gun	   Free	   South	  Africa	   (GFSA)	   in	  collaboration	   with	   the	   Centre	   for	   Conflict	   Resolution	   (CCR)	   between	   2001	   and	   2004,	  estimated	   a	   combined	   total	   of	   firearms	   in	   civilian	   possession	   in	   eight206	  of	   the	   Southern	  African	  countries	  was	  hovering	  over	  4,	  400,	  737	  (Lamb,	  2004:	  321).	  This	  means	  that	  19	  per	  cent	   of	   all	   firearms	   in	   civilian	   hands	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   (i.e.	   out	   of	   the	   23	   million	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  206	  The	  study	  was	  able	  to	  obtain	  data	  on	  civilian	  ownership	   from	  Botswana,	  Malawi,	  Mozambique,	  Namibia,	  South	  Africa,	  Swaziland,	  Zambia	  and	  Zimbabwe	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estimate)	   were	   located	   in	   just	   over	   half	   of	   SADC	   Member	   States.	   The	   overwhelming	  majority	  of	  those	  firearms,	  i.e.	  over	  3735676,	  were	  in	  South	  Africa	  (Lamb,	  ibid.).	  	  	  Figures	   drawn	   from	   the	   Small	   Arms	   Survey	   2007,	   which	   is	   the	   latest	   comprehensive	  analysis,	   put	   the	   estimate	   at	   around	   16	   million	   (see	   table	   7	   below),	   showing	   that	   the	  amount	   has	   quadrupled.	   A	   closer	   look	   at	   the	   individual	   country	   figures	   three	   groups	   of	  countries	   as	   far	   as	   civilian	   firearms	   possession	   is	   concerned.	   There	   is	   a	   group	   of	   three	  countries	   with	   the	   highest	   figures	   of	   above	   1	   million	   	   (South	   Africa,	   Angola	   and	  Mozambique).	   Then	   there	   are	   countries	   whose	   civilians	   are	   estimated	   to	   have	   between	  100,	   000	   and	   800,000	   firearms.	   Only	   four	   countries	   (Botswana,	   Swaziland,	   Lesotho	   and	  Seychelles)	  have	  civilian	  firearms	  ownership	  figures	  below	  the	  100,000	  mark.	  	  
Table	  7:	  Civilian	  Firearms	  Ownership	  in	  Southern	  Africa	  Country207	   Average	  total	  all	  civilian	  firearms	  South	  Africa	   5,950,000	  	  	  	  	  Angola	   2,800,000	  	  	  Mozambique	   1,000,000	  	  	  DRC	   	  	  	  800,000	  	  	  Zimbabwe	   	  	  400,000	  	  	  Namibia	   	  	  260,000	  	  	  	  	  	  Zambia	   	  	  230,000	  	  	  Mauritius	   	  180,000	  	  Madagascar	   	  150,000	  	  Malawi	   	  	  	  92,000	  	  Botswana	   	  	  	  87,000	  	  Swaziland	   	  	  	  72,000	  Lesotho	   	  	  	  47,000	  	  Seychelles	   	  	  	  	  	  	  4,600	  	  	  
Total	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16,668,000	  	  Source:	   Figures	   adapted	   from	   Karp,	   Aaron.	   2007.	   “Completing	   the	   Count:	   Civilians	  Firearms,”	  Small	  Arms	  Survey	  2007:	  Guns	  and	  the	  City,	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  This	   is	   to	   say	   that	   SADC	   countries	   are	   disparate	   in	   several	   ways:	   they	   vary	   in	   size,	  geographical	  location	  and	  even	  their	  exposure	  to	  the	  SALW	  proliferation	  threat.	  Six	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  207	  Tanzania	  which	  is	  also	  member	  of	  the	  EAC	  has	  not	  been	  included.	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SADC	   countries208	  are	   not	   only	   landlocked	   but	   are	   also	   surrounded	   by	   countries	   more	  severely	  affected	  from	  the	  legacy	  of	  arms	  left	  over	  by	  civil	  wars	  in	  other	  countries	  and/or	  serve	   as	   transit	   routes	   to	   conflicts	   in	   neighbouring	   countries.	   Whereas	   countries	   like	  Botswana,	   Malawi,	   Tanzania,	   Zambia	   and	   Zimbabwe,	   have	   often	   acted	   as	   transit	   points	  (Cross	  et.	  al.,	  2003),	  weapons	  sourced	  from	  the	  wars	  of	  liberation	  and/or	  internal	  conflicts	  in	   four	   of	   the	   SADC	   Member	   States	   (Angola,	   DRC,	   Mozambique	   and	   Namibia)	   have	  significantly	   contributed	   to	   the	   spread	   of	   SALW	   problem	   in	   the	   Southern	   African	   sub-­‐region.	  	  	  Three	   of	   the	   SADC	   countries	   that	   are	   Indian	   Ocean	   Islands	   (Madagascar,	  Mauritius,	   and	  Seychelles)	   have	   experienced	   limited	   levels	   of	   firearms-­‐related	   crimes.	   However,	   their	  exposures	   to	   the	   SALW	   threat	   differ.	   For	   example,	  Mauritius	   that	   has	   only	   two	   ports	   of	  entry,	   which	   are	   well	   controlled,	   has	   not	   experienced	   increased	   levels	   of	   violent	   crime	  involving	   firearms.	   Seychelles	   consists	   of	   over	   115	   islands,	   making	   the	   control	   of	   illicit	  trafficking	  through	  the	  territorial	  waters	  very	  difficult	  (Cross	  et.	  al.,	  2003).	  	  	  	  	  As	   stated	   at	   the	   outset,	   the	   proliferation	   of	   illegal	   SALW	   remains	   a	   significant	   threat	   in	  Southern	  Africa.	  Available	  data	  reveal	  that	  civilian-­‐owned	  firearms,	  which	  are	  likely	  to	  fall	  into	  wrong	  elements,	  are	  increasingly	  prominent	  in	  the	  sub-­‐region.	  The	  amount	  of	  firearms	  in	   civilian	  hands	  was	  hovering	  over	  4	  million	   in	  2004.	  Three	   years	   later	   another	   survey	  reported	  over	  16	  million	  firearms	  in	  civilian	  possession,	  indicating	  an	  upward	  trend	  in	  the	  problem209.	  The	  same	  figures	  also	  reveal	  that	  civilian	  firearms	  holdings	  are	  the	  largest	   in	  South	  Africa,	  Angola	  and	  Mozambique,	  and	  Seychelles	  with	  the	  least	  number,	  while	  the	  rest	  of	   the	   countries	   have	   sizeable	   firearms	   in	   civilian	   hands.	   Overall,	   the	   problem	   of	   illegal	  firearms,	  most	  commonly	  used	  in	  the	  perpetration	  of	  crime,	  contributes	  to	  the	  high	  levels	  of	   instability,	  extended	  conflict,	  violence	  and	  social	  dislocation	   is	  evident	   in	  the	  Southern	  African	  sub-­‐region.	  Thus,	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  approached	  at	  sub-­‐regional	  level,	  with	  bilateral	  and	  national	   initiatives	   bolstering	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   regime.	   The	   next	   section	   focuses	   on	   how	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  208	  These	  are	  Botswana,	  Lesotho,	  Malawi,	  Swaziland,	  Zambia,	  and	  Zimbabwe.	  	  209	  Small	  Arms	  Survey	  2007,	  Annex	  04:	  The	  largest	  civilian	  firearms	  for	  178	  countries,	  p.67.	  
	   147	  
different	  actors	  coordinate	  their	  responses	  against	  the	  SALW	  proliferation	  within	  the	  SADC	  arrangement.	  	  7.3. Coordination	  of	  Responses	  Against	  SALW	  Proliferation	  in	  the	  SADC	  Sub-­‐Region	  	  7.3.1.	  SARPCCO	  and	  SADC	  	  SADC’s	   mandate	   in	   dealing	   with	   what	   it	   identifies	   as	   a	   defence	   and	   public	   security	  challenge,	   the	   proliferation	   of	   and	   illicit	   trafficking	   of	   small	   arms	   and	   light	   weapons,	   is	  provided	   in	   the	  Protocol	  on	  Firearms,	  Ammunition	  and	  Other	  Related	  Materials	   (hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  SADC	  Firearms	  Protocol)	  which	  was	  adopted	  by	  heads	  of	  government	  in	  August	  2001.	  Prior	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  legally	  binding	  Protocol	  the	  SADC	  Heads	  of	  State	  and	  Government	  Summit	  signed	  the	  SADC	  Declaration	  Concerning	  Firearms,	  Ammunition	  and	  Other	  Related	  Materials	  on	  9th	  March	  2001.	  The	  evolution	  and	  subsequent	  adoption	  of	  the	   SADC	   Firearms	   Protocol	   follows	   the	   decision	   by	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   body’s	   Council	   of	  Ministers	   in	  August	  1999	  at	   its	  meeting	   in	  Maputo,	  Mozambique	   that	  mandated	  SADC	   to	  establish	  a	   regional	  policy	   for	   the	   control	  of	   small	   arms	  and	   light	  weapons210.	  The	  SADC	  Council	  noted	  at	  the	  time	  that	  the	  major	  trigger	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  proliferation	  of	  firearms	  to	   be	   the	   various	   conflicts	   in	   the	   sub-­‐region,	   which	   in	   turn	   contributed	   to	   the	   surge	   in	  criminal	  activities	  such	  as	  armed	  robberies	  (Stott,	  2003:	  2).	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  Angola	  and	  Madagascar,	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  SADC	  Member	  States	  are	  signatories	  to	  the	  SADC	  Firearms	  Protocol.	  Despite	  not	  being	  signatories	  to	  the	  Protocol	  Angola	  and	  Madagascar	  have	  been	  fully	  active	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  same211.	  	  The	  objective	  of	  the	  SADC	  Firearms	  Protocol	  is	  to	  prevent,	  combat	  and	  eradicate	  the	  illicit	  trade	   of	   firearms,	   ammunition	   and	   other	   related	  materials	   in	   the	   Southern	   African	   sub-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  210	  SADC	  Council	  Decision,	  13-­‐14	  August	  1999.	  211	  Interview	   with	   Joseph	   Musoni,	   at	   Interpol	   Regional	   Bureau-­‐Harare,	   Zimbabwe,	   18th	   November	   2010.	  Angola	   is	   also	   a	   party	   to	   the	   Central	   African	   Convention	   for	   the	   Control	   of	   Small	   Arms	   and	   Light	  Weapons,	  
Ammunition,	  and	  All	  Parts	  and	  Components	  that	  can	  Serve	  in	  their	  Manufacturing,	  Repair	  and	  Assembly.	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region212.	   The	   Protocol	   is	   a	   far-­‐reaching	   instrument	   that	   calls	   for	   close	   cooperation	   and	  exchange	  of	  information	  in	  the	  SADC	  region	  to	  prevent,	  combat	  and	  eradicate	  not	  only	  the	  proliferation	   of	   illicit	   arms,	   but	   also	   their	   manufacturing,	   excessive	   and	   destabilizing	  use213.	  	  	  An	  important	  agency	  for	  coordinating	  efforts	  directed	  towards	  curbing	  the	  proliferation	  of	  small	   arms	   and	   light	   weapons	   threat	   and	   related	   policing	   challenges	   in	   the	   Southern	  African	  sub-­‐region,	  is	  SARPCCO.	  SARPCCO	  was	  founded	  following	  a	  police	  chiefs	  meeting	  of	  the	  Southern	  African	  sub-­‐region	  on	  2	  August	  1995	  at	  the	  Victoria	  Falls	  in	  Zimbabwe.	  The	  police	   chiefs	   assembled	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐State	   Defence	   and	   Security	  Committee	   (ISDSC),	   itself	   a	   sub-­‐structure	   of	   the	   SADC	   Organ	   on	   Politics	   Defence	   and	  Security	  (hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  SADC	  Organ).	  It	  was	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  SADC	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  in	  August	  1999	  in	  Maputo	  to	  appoint	  SARPCCO	  as	  the	  implementation	  agency	  of	   the	   SADC	   policy	   on	   small	   arms	   and	   cross	   border	   crime	   prevention214.	   The	   ISDSC	  subsequently	  recognized	  SARPCCO	  as	  the	  lead	  organization	  coordinating	  policing	  matters	  in	  the	  sub-­‐region	  (Cilliers,	  1999;	  Isaksen,	  2001;	  Stott,	  2003).	  	  Eleven	  SADC	  countries,	  namely	  Angola,	  Botswana,	  Lesotho,	  Malawi,	  Mozambique,	  Namibia,	  South	   Africa,	   Swaziland,	   Tanzania,	   Zambia	   and	   Zimbabwe,	   signed	   the	   agreement	  establishing	  SARPCCO	  on	  1	  October	  1997215.	  As	   it	   can	  be	  noted,	   the	  DRC,	  Seychelles	  and	  Mauritius	   were	   not	   members	   of	   SARPCCO.	   However,	   according	   to	   Article	   2(3)	   of	   the	  SARPCCO	  Constitution	  membership	  in	  this	  organization	  is	  not	  restricted	  to	  the	  11	  founding	  States,	   allowing	  chiefs	  of	  police	  of	  other	   countries	   to	  petition	   for	  membership	  by	  way	  of	  special	   resolution.	  Mauritius	  was	   shortly	   allowed	   to	   join	   SARPCCO	  on	   this	   basis	   and	   the	  DRC	   and	   Seychelles	   have	   joined	   the	   organization	   to	   bring	   the	   membership	   to	   fourteen	  countries.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  212	  Article	  3	  (a)	  of	  the	  SADC	  Firearms	  Protocol.	  213	  Article	  3	  (b)	  of	  the	  SADC	  Firearms	  Protocol.	  214	  SADC	  Council	  Decision,	  13-­‐14	  August	  1999.	  215	  The	  agreement	  came	  into	  effect	  on	  29	  July	  1999	  after	  it	  was	  ratified	  by	  seven	  Member	  States	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The	  International	  Criminal	  Police	  Organization	  (INTERPOL)	  Sub-­‐Regional	  Bureau	  (SRB)	  in	  Harare	   has	   been	   acting	   as	   SARPCCO’s	   Secretariat	   since	   its	   inception	   in	   1997	   and	   have	  partnered	  together	   in	  many	  policing	   initiatives216.	  Moreover,	   the	  head	  of	   Interpol	  Harare	  Bureau	  is	  simultaneously	  the	  head	  of	  SARPCCO	  Secretariat,	  and	  given	  the	  close	  partnership	  in	   policing	  matters,	   it	  means	   there	   is	   little	   practical	   differentiation	  between	   the	  work	   of	  SARPCCO	   and	   Interpol	   (Cilliers,	   1999:	   4).	   The	   two	   Organizations	   thus	   share	   policing	  objectives;	   the	   only	   difference	   is	   that	   SARPCCO	   is	   a	   sub-­‐	   regional	   structure,	   while	  INTERPOL	  has	  global	  reach.	  	  	  In	  2002,	  the	  Southern	  African	  Regional	  Police	  Chiefs	  Cooperation	  Organization	  (SARPCCO)	  that	   had	   been	   identified	   by	   the	   SADC	   Council	   as	   the	   implementing	   agency	   for	   the	   SADC	  Policy	  on	  Small	  Arms	  and	  Cross	  Border	  Crime	  Prevention,	  developed	  an	  Action	  Plan	  on	  the	  SADC	  Protocol	  on	  the	  Control	  of	  Firearms,	  Ammunition	  and	  other	  Related	  Materials.	  The	  action	   plan	   identified	   the	   need	   for	   the	   development	   of	   Standard	   Operating	   Procedures	  (SOP’s)	  to	  serve	  as	  guidelines	  on	  best	  practices	  for	  implementing	  regional	  standards	  with	  regards	   to	   the	   SADC	   Firearms	   Protocol.	   Recommendations	   of	   the	   Standard	   Operating	  Procedures	   whose	   final	   document	   was	   approved	   by	   the	   13th	   SARPCCO	   Annual	   General	  Meeting	  held	   from	  2	   to	  6	  August	  2008	   in	  Windhoek,	   are	   the	  minimum	  requirements	   for	  Firearms	  control	  legislation	  intended	  to	  serve	  to	  inform	  changes	  in	  national	  legislations217.	  	  The	   relationship	   between	   SARPCCO	   and	   SADC	   Proper	   needs	   to	   be	   explored	   here,	   albeit	  briefly,	  within	   the	   context	  of	   the	  historical	   evolution	  of	   the	  SADC	  Organ.	  This	   is	  because	  although	  SARPCCO	  was	   created	   in	  1997	  and	  was	  actually	   involved	   in	   the	  drafting	  of	   the	  SADC	  Firearms	  Protocol	  (SADC,	  2005:	  65),	  it	  was	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  200s	  that	  SADC	  finally	  recognized	  the	  former	  as	  part	  of	  its	  security	  structures.	  	  	  As	   hinted	   earlier,	   the	   ISDSC	   that	   comprises	   ministers	   responsible	   for	   defence,	   public	  security	   and	   state	   security,	   recognized	  SARPCCO	  as	   the	   vehicle	   for	   coordinating	  policing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  216	  Remarks	   by	  Ronald	  K.	  Noble,	   Interpol	   Secretary	  General,	   at	   the	   14th	   SARPCCO	  Annual	  General	  Meeting	  Council	  of	  Police	  Chiefs,	  Johannesburg,	  South	  Africa,	  2	  September	  2009.	  217	  SARPCCO	  AGM/08/RES/14.	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efforts	  in	  the	  sub-­‐region.	  However,	  the	  duality	  of	  leadership	  within	  the	  SADC	  (South	  Africa	  as	   chair	   of	   the	   SADC	   and	   Zimbabwe	   as	   chair	   of	   the	   SADC	  Organ)	   in	   the	   late	   1990s	   and	  impasse	   over	   the	   control	   of	   the	   SADC	  Organ	  was	  deemed	   to	   have	  negative	   effect	   on	   the	  functioning	  of	  the	  ISDSC	  (Solomon,	  1999:	  154).	  During	  the	  impasse	  over	  the	  SADC	  Organ,	  the	   ISDSC	   which	   has	   a	   range	   of	   defence	   and	   public	   security	   committees	   never	   had	   a	  permanent	  secretariat,	  and	  thus,	  opting	  to	  have	  its	  services	  provided	  by	  the	  ISDSC	  Chair	  on	  a	  rotational	  basis	  (Isaksen	  &	  Tjønneland,	  2001:	  16).	  This	  compelled	  the	  ISDSC,	  specifically	  its	  Public	  Security	  Sub-­‐Committee	  to	  forge	  strong	  ties	  with	  SARPCCO	  since	  the	  latter	  had	  a	  permanent	  secretariat.	  	  	  The	  SADC	  Organ	   impasse	  was	   complemented	  by	  disagreement	  on	  how	   to	  operationalize	  Article	   17	   of	   the	   SADC	   Firearms	   Protocol	   regarding	   institutional	   arrangement.	   This	  particular	   Article	   provided	   that	   State	   Parties	   shall	   establish	   a	   Committee	   to	   oversee	   the	  implementation	   of	   the	   Protocol.	   However,	   this	   was	   not	   to	   be	   as	   there	   were	   differences	  among	  SADC	  Members.	  On	  the	  one	  side,	  there	  were	  Member	  States	  that	  were	  pushing	  for	  SARPCCO	  to	  be	  incorporated	  into	  the	  ISDSC	  (and	  henceforth	  become	  formally	  a	  structure	  of	   the	   SADC),	   and	  on	   the	  other	   side,	  were	   those	   that	  wanted	   the	  organization	   to	   remain	  independent	  body	  but	  in	  close	  collaboration	  with	  SADC218.	  Those	  initially	  reluctant	  to	  see	  SARPCCO	  serving	  as	  an	   integral	  part	  of	   ISDSC	  argued	   that	   it	  would	   free	   the	  organization	  from	   political	   machinations	   of	   the	   SADC219.	   In	   other	   words,	   they	   wanted	   SARPCCO	   to	  remain	  a	   strictly	  professional	   independent	  policing	  organization	  and	   thus	  not	   tied	   into	  a	  political	   structure.	   Since	   2008	   the	   Southern	   Africa	   sub-­‐region’s	   Heads	   of	   State	   and	  Government	   formally	   recognized	   SARPCCO	   as	   an	   affiliated	   SADC	   structure220.	   SARPCCO	  was	  thus	  placed	  under	  the	  ISDSC,	  which	  according	  to	  Article	  3	  (Structures)	  of	  the	  Protocol	  
on	  Politics,	  Defence	  and	  Security	  Cooperation,	  is	  recognized	  as	  one	  of	  the	  sub-­‐structures	  of	  the	  SADC	  Organ.	  The	  decision	  to	  place	  SARPCCO	  under	  the	  ISDSC	  seems	  to	  be	  in	  line	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  218	  Interview	   with	   Dominic	   Hayuma,	   Retired	   Deputy	   Director,	   Criminal	   Investigation	   Department	   (CID),	  Tanzania	   Police	   Force,	   and	   NFP	   Coordinator,	   Ministry	   of	   Home	   Affairs,	   Dar	   es	   Salaam,	   Tanzania,	   3rd	  December	  2010.	  219	  Interview	  with	  Mr.	   Chihika	   Simfukwe,	   the	   then	   Head	   of	   Interpol	   Regional	   Bureau-­‐Harare,	   and	   Head	   of	  SARPCCO	  Secretariat,	  Zimbabwe,	  18th	  November	  2010.	  220	  See	   Remarks	   by	   Ronald	   K.	   Noble,	   INTERPOL	   Secretary	   General,	   at	   the	   14th	   SARPCCO	   Annual	   General	  ‚Meeting,	  Johannesburg,	  South	  Africa,	  2nd	  September	  2009	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Article	   7	   (8)	   of	   the	   same	   Protocol	   that	   states	   ISDSC	  may	   establish	   such	   structures,	   as	   it	  deems	   necessary	   to	   perform	   its	   functions.	   This	   is	   also	   supported	   by	   provision	   2(f)	   of	  Article	  3	  that	  states	  the	  Organ	  shall	  have	  such	  other	  structures	  as	  may	  be	  established	  by	  any	   of	   the	   ministerial	   committees,	   and	   the	   ISDSC	   is	   such	   one	   ministerial	   committee	  comprising	   of	  what	   SADC	   refers	   to	   as	  ministers	   responsible	   for	   defence,	   public	   security	  and	   state	   security.	   SARPCCO’s	   position	   as	   a	   sub-­‐structure	   of	   the	   ISDSC	  within	   the	   SADC	  Organ	  is	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  5	  below.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   152	  
Figure	  5:	  The	  Structure	  	  Of	  the	  SADC	  Organ	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  7.3.2.	  SARPCCO	  and	  NFPs	  	  All	   SADC	   Member	   States	   are	   also	   signatories	   to	   the	   United	   Nations	   Program	   of	   Action	  (UNPoA)	  on	   small	   arms	   and	   the	  Bamako	  Declaration	  on	   an	  African	  Common	  Position	  on	  illicit	  Proliferation,	  Circulation	  and	  Trafficking	  on	  Small	  Arms	  and	  Light	  Weapons	  (Bamako	  Declaration).	   To	   address	   the	  problem	  of	   illicit	   proliferation,	   circulation	   and	   trafficking	   of	  SALWs	  at	  the	  national	  level,	  these	  international	  instruments	  recommend	  establishment	  of	  national	  coordination	  agencies	  responsible	  for	  policy	  guidance,	  research	  and	  monitoring	  all	  aspects	   of	   SALWs	   proliferation,	   circulation	   and	   trafficking.	   These	   national	   coordination	  agencies	   popularly	   known	   as	   National	   Focal	   Points	   (NFPs)	   have	   been	   established	   in	   all	  SADC	  Member	  States221.	  	  	  NFPs	  may	  assume	  different	  names/titles	  in	  some	  countries	  but	  perform	  or	  are	  expected	  to	  carry	   out	   similar	   roles	   as	   required	   of	   them	   under	   the	   aforementioned	   international	  instruments.	   For	   instance,	   the	   national	   coordination	   agencies	   of	   Botswana,	   Lesotho,	  Malawi,	   Mauritius,	   Namibia,	   Tanzania,	   Seychelles	   Swaziland,	   South	   Africa,	   are	   known	   as	  NFPs	   while	   they	   assume	   different	   names	   in	   Angola	   (National	   Commission	   on	   the	  Disarmament	   of	   the	   Civilian	   Population-­‐CNDPC);	   DRC	   (National	   Commission	   for	   the	  Control	   of	   Small	   Arms	   And	   Light	   Weapons-­‐CNC-­‐ALPC);	   Mozambique	   (COPRECAL-­‐Mozambique’s	  National	  Small	  Arms	  Commission);	  Zambia	  (National	  Commission	  on	  Small	  Arms);	  and	  Zimbabwe	  (National	  Task	  Force	  on	  Firearms,	  Ammunition	  and	  Other	  Related	  Materials).	   Some	   countries	   like	   Angola	   have	   more	   than	   one	   national	   structure	   for	  coordinating	   SALWs	   initiatives.	   In	   Angola,	   the	   CNPDC	   (the	   National	   Commission	   on	   the	  Disarmament	   of	   the	   Civilian	   Population)	   co-­‐exists	  with	   the	   National	   Commission	   for	   the	  Materialization	   of	   the	   Programme	   of	   Action	   on	   the	   illicit	   Trade	   in	   Small	   Arms	   and	   Light	  Weapons.	   The	   first	   focuses	   narrowly	   on	   the	   collection,	   storage	   and	   custody	   of	   SALWs	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  221	  This	   was	   confirmed	   in	   interviews	  with	  Mr.	   Ezekiel	   Senti,	   Legal	   Adviser,	   SADC	   Police	   Planning	   Element	  (SADCPOL	  PLANELM)	  on	  15th	  November	  2010,	  and	  Mr.	  Joseph	  Musoni	  of	  the	  INTERPOL	  Harare	  SRB	  on	  18th	  November	  2010.	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possessed	   illegally,	  while	   the	   second	  was	   designed	   to	   prevent,	   combat	   and	   eradicate	   the	  illicit	  trade	  in	  SALWs	  in	  all	  its	  aspects	  (Angola	  Report,	  2010:	  2).	  	  	  Although	   all	   SADC	   countries	   have	   in	   principal	   established	   NFPs	   as	   national	   structures	  bringing	   together	   different	   government	   departments,	   and	   in	   some	   cases	   civil	   society	  seeking	  to	  develop	  appropriate	  coordinated	  policy	  responses	  to	  the	  SALWs	  problem,	  these	  have	  different	  statuses	  in	  terms	  of	  financing	  and	  placement.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  Angola	  where	   the	   CNPDPC	   is	   coordinated	   by	   the	   Prime	  Minister’s	   office,	   most	   NFPs	   are	   placed	  either	  under	  the	  Ministries	  of	  Interior	  (known	  as	  Home	  Affairs	  and	  Public	  Safety	  depending	  on	  a	   country’s	  Ministerial	   structure),	  or	   Justice	  with	   the	   respective	  national	  police	   forces	  acting	  as	  host	  institutions	  and	  national	  points	  of	  contacts.	  Only	  a	  few	  of	  NFPs	  receive	  State’s	  general	   budget	   allocation	   (Angola	   and	   the	   DRC)	   while	   others	   depend	   on	   relevant	  ministerial	  budget	  votes	  (Swaziland,	  Tanzania,	  Zimbabwe)	  or	  were	  not	  fully	  functional	  due	  to	  financial	  constraints222.	  	  	  Besides	   having	   a	   dedicated	   Firearms	   Desk	   Officer	   responsible	   for	   assisting	   States	   with	  implementation	  of	  the	  SADC	  Firearms	  Protocol	  at	  its	  Harare	  Secretariat,	  SARPCCO	  has	  put	  in	  place	  a	  Regional	  Coordinating	  Committee	  (RCC)	  on	  SALWs223.	  RCC	  brings	  together	  NFPs	  Coordinators	  and	  convenes	  at	  least	  three	  meetings	  a	  year.	  The	  focus	  of	  each	  RCC	  meeting	  has	  been	  to	  devise	  strategies	  to	  implement	  key	  provisions	  of	  the	  SADC	  Firearms	  Protocol.	  Part	   of	   those	   strategies	   includes	   coordination	   of	   efforts	   to	   formulate	   systematic	   training	  policies	   for	   the	   States’	   LEAs.	   The	   RCC,	   for	   instance,	   formed	   the	   Task	   Team	   on	   the	  development	  of	  the	  SARPCCO	  SALW	  and	  ammunition	  course.	  The	  Task	  Team	  comprised	  of	  some	  SADC	  Member	  States	  (Namibia,	  South	  Africa,	  and	  Zimbabwe),	  SARPCCO	  Secretariat,	  the	   Institute	   of	   Security	   Studies	   (ISS)	   and	   the	   Centre	   for	   Peace,	   Dialogue	   and	  Mediation.	  SARPCCO	   also,	   with	   the	   support	   of	   host	   governments	   and	   cooperating	   partners224 ,	  facilitates	   various	   training	   sessions	   to	   the	   NFPs	   on	   structures,	   best	   practices	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  222	  See	  for	  example	  the	  following	  country	  reports	  to	  UNPoA	  Biennial	  Ministerial	  Conference:	  Lesotho	  (2010);	  Mozambique	  (2010).	  223	  RCC	  was	  established	  following	  the	  2007	  SARPCCO	  Annual	  General	  Meeting	  in	  Lusaka,	  Zambia.	  224	  For	  example,	  the	  German	  Technical	  Cooperation	  (GTZ).	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information	   sharing225 .	   	   Recent	   examples	   of	   such	   workshops	   include	   those	   held	   in	  Lilongwe-­‐Malawi	   (August	   2008),	   Lusaka-­‐Zambia	   (September	   2008),	   Harare-­‐Zimbabwe	  (October	  2008),	  and	  Luanda-­‐Angola	  (July	  2009).	  	  It	  is,	  therefore,	  evident	  that	  it	  is	  SARPCCO,	  which	  has	  the	  leading	  role	  in	  the	  coordination	  of	  SADC	  SALWs	  activities.	  SARPCCO	  participated	  actively	  in	  the	  drafting	  of	  the	  SADC	  Firearms	  Protocol	   (of	   course,	   final	   adoption	   and	   ratification	   of	   the	   same	   rested	   upon	   the	   State	  Parties),	   and	   facilitated	   the	   formulation	  of	   the	  SOP	   through	   its	  National	  Central	  Firearms	  Registrars’	   Forum	   that	   guide	   State	   practices	   on	   SALW	   control	   measures226.	   It	   has	   also	  played	   another	   crucial	   coordination	   role:	   that	   of	   preparing	   and	   disseminating	   relevant	  information	   on	   criminal	   activities	   as	   may	   be	   necessary	   to	   benefit	   Member	   States.	   Since	  SARPCCO	  became	  integrated	  into	  SADC	  Proper,	  it	  is	  bound	  to	  communicate	  and	  cooperate	  with	  the	  SADC	  Organ,	  particularly	  the	  SADC	  Police	  Planning	  Element	  (shortly	  abbreviated	  as	  SADCPOL	  PLANELM)227.	  	  	  	  After	  establishing	  the	  lead	  actors	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  SALW	  rules	  and	  guidelines	  and	  the	  forms	  under	  which	  they	  interact	  in	  coordinating	  responses	  to	  the	  SALW	  menace,	  the	  next	  section	  dwells	  on	  the	  actual	  management	  of	  this	  problem	  within	  the	  SADC	  sub-­‐region.	  The	  main	  management	  tasks	  under	  focus	  here	  are	  the	  review	  and	  harmonization	  of	  legislation	  and	  the	  control	  measures	  of	  collection,	  destruction,	  marking	  and	  record	  keeping.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  225	  Guy	   Lamb	   and	   Ben	   Coetzee,	   “Recent	   Regional	   Firearms	   Control	   Progress	   in	   the	   SADC“,	   accessed	   at	  http://www.issafrica.org/armsnetafrica/	  on	  October	  20th,	  2011.	  226	  The	  SARPCCO	  National	  Firearms	  Registrars	  Forum	  is	  an	  unofficial	  body	  established	  in	  2006	  and	  drawing	  its	  mandate	  from	  the	  2005	  SARPCCO	  Annual	  General	  Meeting	  in	  Lusaka	  that	  tasked	  the	  SARPCCO	  Secretariat,	  in	   conjunction	   with	   member	   countries,	   to	   develop	   the	   SOPs	   to	   control	   firearms,	   ammunition	   and	   related	  materials	  in	  Southern	  Africa.	  227	  SARPCCO	   is	   bound	   to	   invite	   SADC	   POL	   PLANELM	   to	   their	   workshops	   and	   vice	   versa.	   Interview	   with	  Ezekiel	  Senti,	  Legal	  Adviser-­‐SADCPOL	  PLANELM,	  15th	  November	  2010.	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7.4. Management	  of	  the	  SALW	  Proliferation	  Threat	  in	  the	  SADC	  Sub-­‐Region	  7.4.1.	  Review	  and	  Harmonization	  of	  Legislation	  	  As	  parties	  to	  the	  SADC	  Protocol	  on	  SALW,	  SADC	  Member	  States	  are	  obligated	  to	  enact	  the	  necessary	  legislation	  to	  establish	  as	  criminal	  offences	  under	  their	  national	  law	  to	  prevent,	  combat	  and	  eradicate,	  the	  illicit	  manufacturing	  of	  firearms,	  ammunition	  and	  other	  related	  materials.	   The	   SADC	   Protocol	   (Article	   3)	   provides	   minimum	   benchmark	   elements	   to	   be	  incorporated	   in	   national	   laws	   of	   State	   Parties.	   The	   elements	   range	   from	   unrestricted	  possession,	   use	   of	   small	   arms	   by	   civilians,	   centralized	   registration	   of	   civilian-­‐owned	  firearms,	   standardized	   marking	   to	   legal	   uniformity	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	   sentencing.	   From	  interviews	  conducted	  and	  survey	  of	  national	  reports	  to	  the	  UNPoA	  up	  to	  2010,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	   SADC	  Member	   States	   are	   yet	   to	  have	   a	  harmonized	  SALW	   legislation	   in	  place.	   SADC	  States	  are	  at	  different	  stages	  of	  the	  review	  and	  harmonization	  of	  legislation.	  	  	  While	   all	   SADC	   States	   have	   not	   shown	   any	   opposition	   to	   the	   requirement	   to	   enact	   their	  laws	   that	   are	   compatible	  with	   the	   SADC	   Protocol,	  most	   of	   them	   are	   yet	   to	   undertake	   or	  complete	   the	  review	  and	  harmonization	  of	   legislation.	  With	   the	  exception	  of	  South	  Africa	  and	  Mauritius,	  some	  SADC	  States	  are	  still	  in	  the	  process	  of	  consultation,	  while	  others	  have	  drafted	  bills,	  which	  are	  awaiting	  parliamentary	  approval,	  and	  yet	  others	  are	  still	  using	  old	  pieces	  of	   legislations	  but	  have	  proposed	   to	   the	   relevant	  authorities	   to	  enact	  new	   laws228.	  Even	  the	  two	  countries	  that	  have	  already	  reviewed	  their	  national	  laws,	  i.e.	  South	  Africa	  and	  Mauritius,	  their	  new	  legislations	  are	  reported	  to	  fell	  short	  of	  the	  SOPs	  (Standard	  Operating	  Procedures)	   for	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   SADC	   Protocol229.	   This	   means	   disparities	   in	  legislations	   is	   still	   a	  major	   challenge	   in	   the	  management	   of	   the	   problem	   of	   SALW	   in	   the	  SADC	   sub-­‐region.	   The	   status	   of	   review	   of	   national	   SALW	   legislations	   is	   as	   shown	   in	   the	  table	  8.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  228	  Interviews	  with	  Ezekiel	  Senti,	  Legal	  Advisor,	   SADCPOL	  PLANELM,	  at	  SADC	  Headquarters-­‐Gaborone,15th	  November	  2010,	  and	  Joseph	  Musoni	  at	  Interpol	  Regional	  Bureau-­‐Harare,	  18th	  November	  2010.	  	  229	  The	  SOPs	  were	  approved	  by	  the	  13th	  SARPCCO	  AGM	  held	  from	  2	  to	  6	  August	  2008	  in	  Windhoek,	  Namibia	  (SARPCCO	  AGM/08/RES/14).	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Table	  8:	  Status	  of	  Review	  of	  SALW	  legislations	  by	  SADC	  States	  (As	  of	  
December	  2010)	  	  
Country	   Status	  Angola	   Review	  in	  progress.	  Botswana	   Review	   in	   progress	   even	   though	   existing	   legislation	   has	   been	  subjected	  to	  regular	  review.	  DRC	   A	   draft	   law	   on	   SALW	   has	   developed,	   awaiting	   submission	   to	   the	  Parliament.	  Lesotho	   	  A	  draft	  bill	  is	  with	  Parliament.	  Madagascar	   Review	  of	  the	  Armaments	  law	  of	  22	  July	  1969	  yet	  to	  be	  undertaken.	  Malawi	   The	  Firearms	  Act	  that	  was	  enacted	  on	  December	  29,	  1997	  has	  never	  been	   reviewed	   since	   its	   enactment.	   Minor	   subsidiary	   legislations	  have	  been	  appended	  to	  this	  Act.	  Mauritius	   A	  Firearms	  Act	  adopted	  in	  2006.	  Mozambique	   The	   Arms	   and	   Ammunition	   Act	   2007	   (Decree	  No	   8/2007)	   passed.	  No	  review	  reported.	  Namibia	   An	  Amendment	  Bill	  has	  been	  drafted.	  Seychelles	   Review	  in	  progress.	  South	  Africa	   The	  National	  Conventional	  Arms	  Control	  Legislation	  of	  the	  Firearms	  Control	   Act	   and	   the	   National	   Conventional	   Arms	   Control	   Act,	  promulgated	  in	  2001	  and	  2003	  respectively.	  Swaziland	   The	  Arms	  and	  Ammunition	  Act.	  No.	  24	  of	  1964	  not	  yet	  reviewed.	  Tanzania	   Draft	   legislation	  has	  been	   forwarded	   to	   the	  Cabinet	   Secretariat	   for	  necessary	  actions	  before	  being	  tabled	  to	  the	  Parliament.	  Zambia	   Review	  in	  progress.	  Zimbabwe	   The	   Firearms	   Chapter	   10.09,	   adopted	   1956	   has	   been	   amended	  several	  times	  but	  comprehensive	  review	  is	  yet	  to	  take	  place.	  	  	  Source:	  Author’s	  Survey.	  	  Due	   to	   the	   transnational	   character	   of	   the	   SALW	   problem,	   the	   SADC	   Firearms	   Protocol	  places	   high	   premium	   on	   cooperation.	   Such	   sub-­‐regional	   wide	   cooperation	   between	  relevant	   actors,	   in	   turn,	   hinges	   on	   a	   common	   understanding	   of	   certain	   SALW-­‐related	  concepts.	   For	   this	   reason,	   SADC	   Member	   States	   recognize	   the	   importance	   of	   expediting	  their	  review	  of	   the	   legislations	   to	  ensure	   that	   they	   take	   into	  account	   the	  requirements	   in	  Article	   5	   of	   the	   Protocol.	   The	   revision	   of	   the	   normative	   framework	   of	   each	   country	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represents	   harmonization	   of	   existing	   national	   legislation	   while	   reflecting	   each	  government’s	  obligations	  under	  regional	  and	  international	  agreements.	  From	  the	  evidence	  presented	  here,	   it	   is	  clear	  that	  while	  there	   is	  no	  sign	  of	  opposition	  by	  State	  Parties	  to	  the	  SADC	  Firearms	  Protocol	  to	  the	  requirement	  to	  review	  their	  firearms	  legislations	  to	  ensure	  that	  they	  embrace	   legal	  uniformity	   in	  all	   important	  areas,	   including	  manufacture,	  control,	  possession,	  import,	  export,	  transfer	  of	  firearms	  and	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  sentencing,	  the	  actual	  review	   process	   has	   been	   initiated	   but	   not	   completed.	  While	   some	   SADC	  Member	   States	  have	   passed	   new,	   more	   stringent	   firearms	   legislations,	   majority	   of	   them	   still	   have	   out-­‐dated	   legal	   instruments,	   which	   do	   not	   adequately	   cover	   the	   range	   and	   extent	   of	   the	  contemporary	   firearms	  problems,	  nor	   the	  existing	   regional	  and	   international	  agreements	  to	  which	   they	   are	   party.	   A	   very	   recent	   development	   is	   that	   the	   UNODC	   (United	   Nations	  Office	  on	  Drugs	  and	  Crime)	  Model	  Law	  Against	  the	  Illicit	  Manufacturing	  and	  Trafficking	  in	  
Firearms,	  their	  Parts	  and	  Components	  and	  Ammunition,	  is	  currently	  in	  place	  (UN,	  July	  2011).	  It	  is	  thus	  easy	  for	  the	  SADC	  Member	  States	  to	  use	  it	  as	  a	  guideline	  as	  it	  takes	  into	  account	  concerns	  and	  inputs	  from	  all	  regions,	  and	  in	  fact,	  everything	  in	  the	  (SADC)	  SOPs	  has	  been	  captured230.	  7.4.2.	  Control	  Measures	  	  
7.4.2.1. Collection and Destruction 	  	  The	   control	  measures	   of	   collection	   and	   destruction	   of	   illicit	   trafficked	   SALWs	   is	   an	   area	  which	   evidently	   show	   how	   sub-­‐regional	   rules	   and	   norms	   have	   come	   to	   effectively	   guide	  States’	  practices	  and	  in	  the	  event	  also	  brought	  together	  multiple	  actors	  in	  effort	  to	  manage	  the	   SALW	  menace	   in	   the	   Southern	   Africa	   sub-­‐region.	   The	   relevant	   sub-­‐regional	   rules	   as	  defined	  in	  the	  SADC	  Protocol	  urges	  State	  Parties	  to	  adopt	  coordinated	  national	  policies	  for	  the	  disposal	   of	   confiscated	  or	  unlicensed	   firearms	   that	   come	   into	   the	  possession	  of	   state	  authorities,	   and	   to	   develop	   joint	   and	   combined	   operations	   across	   the	   borders	   of	   State	  Parties	   to	   locate,	   seize	   and	   destroy	   caches	   of	   firearms,	   ammunition	   and	   other	   related	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  230	  Interview	  with	  Joseph	  Musoni,	  op.	  cit.	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materials	  left	  over	  after	  conflict	  and	  civil	  wars231.	  These	  measures	  have	  been	  undertaken	  to	  great	  effect	  in	  two	  main	  ways.	  	  	  First,	   joint	   operations	   within	   individual	   SADC	   States	   have	   been	   conducted	   on	   a	   regular	  basis.	   They	   are	   termed	   as	   ‘joint	   operations’	   because	   they	   bring	   together	   several	  components	  and	  actors	  of	  the	  LEAs,	  for	  example,	  In	  Malawi	  the	  Police	  Service,	  the	  Malawi	  Defence	  Forces	  (MDF),	  Department	  of	  Immigration,	  Customs	  (Malawi	  Revenue	  Authority),	  and	   the	   department	   of	   wildlife	   and	   National	   Parts	   routinely	   conduct	   joint	   operations	   to	  recover	  illicit	  firearms	  (Malawi,	  June	  2010).	  	  	  Second,	   as	   active	   members	   of	   SARPCCO,	   practically	   all	   countries	   within	   the	   SADC	  arrangement	  are	  involved	  in	  trans-­‐national	  police	  operations	  (Stott,	  2003;	  Lamb	  and	  Dye,	  2009;	  SADC,	  2012).	  These	  are	  basically	  joint	  operations	  between	  a	  State’s	  LEAs	  and	  those	  from	   neighbouring	   countries.	   These	   are	   termed	   as	   ‘simultaneous	   operations’	   and	   are	  carried	   out	   by	  Member	   States	   under	   the	   aegis	   of	   SARPCCO	  on	   a	   quarterly	   basis232.	   They	  usually	   take	   place	   three	   times	   a	   year	   in	   each	   of	   the	  Member	   States	   featuring	   respective	  police	  agencies	  and	  specialised	  officers	  from	  SARPCCO	  secretariat	  in	  Harare	  (Lucey,	  2010).	  It	   ought	   to	   be	   noted	   that	   these	   operations	   target	   not	   only	   illicit	   small	   arms,	   but	   also	   a	  number	  of	  illicit	  activities	  including	  vehicle	  theft,	   illicit	  drugs	  and	  illegal	  immigrants233.	  In	  such	  operations,	  “SARPCCO	  provide	  resources	  such	  as	  laptops	  and	  databases	  and	  plan	  the	  operations;	   however,	   each	   individual	   country	   is	   responsible	   for	   the	   details,	   such	   as	   the	  people	  on	   the	  ground,	   the	   investigation	  of	   cases	  and	   logistics”	   (Lucey,	  2010:	  60).	  The	  4th	  March	  2010	  SARPCCO	  operation	  that	  was	  carried	  out	  in	  Lesotho	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  police	  from	  South	  Africa,	  Lesotho,	  Swaziland	  and	  Mozambique,	  is	  an	  example	  of	  such	  operations.	  	  Besides	   fulfilling	   sub-­‐regional	   obligations,	   these	   cross	   border	   joint	   operations	   have	   also	  been	  conducted	  through	  the	  guidance	  of	  bilateral	  agreements,	  which	  SADC	  countries	  have	  entered	  with	  each	  other.	  Several	  Joint	  Permanent	  Commissions	  of	  Cooperation	  (JPCC)	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  231	  SADC	  Protocol	  on	  the	  Control	  of	  Firearms,	  Ammunition	  and	  Other	  Related	  Materials,	  Article	  11	  (1	  &	  2).	  232	  Interview	  with	  Joseph	  Musoni,	  op.	  cit.	  233	  Ibid.	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been	   formed	   to	   guide	   and	   operationalize	   bilateral	   cooperation	   through	   joint	   meetings,	  exchange	   visits,	   shared	   experiences	   and	   strategies	   of	   enhancing	   mutually	   beneficial	  cooperation	   in	   economic,	   political,	   peace	   and	   security,	   social	   and	   cultural	   spheres.	   These	  agreements	   also	   allow	   for	   sectoral	   sub-­‐Commissions	   to	   be	   established	   within	   the	   main	  JPCC.	   In	   this	   regard,	   several	   States	   have	   established	   Joint	   Commissions	   on	   Defence	   and	  Security	   (JDSC)	   in	   the	  peace	  and	   security	   sphere.	   South	  Africa	  has	   such	  bilateral	  defence	  and	  security	  with	  more	  than	  half	  of	  SADC	  members234.	  Malawi	  has	  established	  JDSCs	  with	  Mozambique,	  Zambia	  and	  South	  Africa	  (Malawi,	  June,	  2010).	  Angola	  has	  a	  number	  of	  joint	  commissions	  with	  neighbouring	  countries,	  including	  the	  Congo	  DRC,	  Zambia,	  and	  Namibia	  (Solomon,	   1999).	   Most	   of	   these	   bilateral	   operations,	   for	   instance	   between	   Lesotho	   and	  South	  Africa,	  comprise	  cooperation	  that	  takes	  places	  “on	  an	  ad	  hoc	  basis	  as	  neither	  (police)	  agency	  has	  jurisdiction	  to	  act	  in	  the	  country	  of	  the	  other.	  Lesotho,	  for	  example,	  will	  only	  be	  invited	  to	  South	  Africa	  as	  an	  observer”	  (Lucey,	  2010:	  63).	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  successful	  joint	  operations	  in	  the	  sub-­‐region,	  which	  have	  been	  conducted	  under	   the	   auspices	   of	   a	   bilateral	   agreement,	   is	   Operation	   Rachel.	   Operation	   Rachel	   was	  operationalized	   following	   the	   March	   1995	   Agreement	   between	   Mozambique	   and	   South	  Africa	   in	  Respect	  of	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Mutual	  Assistance	   in	  the	  Field	  of	  Combating	  Crime.	  This	   bilateral	   operation	  was	   launched	   prior	   to	   other	   sub-­‐regional	   attempts	   to	   deal	   with	  SALW	   and	   when	   SARPCCO	   had	   not	   yet	   been	   institutionalized	   (Henda,	   2010;	   Monyane,	  2010).	  Operational	  Rachel	  aimed	  at	  identifying,	  recovering	  and	  destroying	  arms	  caches	  left	  behind	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Mozambican	  civil	  war.	  These	  weapons	  had	  become	  a	  major	  security	   threat	  not	   only	   to	  Mozambique	  but	   also	   to	   South	  Africa	   and	  other	  neighbouring	  countries	  as	  some	  of	  them	  found	  their	  way	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  criminal	  syndicates	  (Hennop,	  2001;	  South	  Africa,	  July	  2005).	  In	  2009	  alone,	  33	  operations	  were	  conducted	  during	  which	  33	  caches	  of	  firearms	  were	  located	  and	  destroyed,	  including	  163	  arms	  of	  various	  types	  and	  6682	   ammunitions	   (Mozambique,	   January	   2009).	   As	   shown	   in	   table	   9	   presenting	   a	  summary	  of	  Operation	  Rachel	  conducted	  in	  Mozambique	  from	  2004	  to	  2009,	  thousands	  of	  SALWs,	  explosives	  and	  other	  related	  material	  have	  been	  destroyed.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  234	  These	  are	  Botswana,	  Lesotho,	  Mozambique,	  Namibia,	  Swaziland,	  Tanzania,	  Zambia	  and	  Zimbabwe.	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Table	  9:	  Operation	  Rachel	  2004	  –	  2009	  	  
Number	   of	   the	  
Operation/Year	  
Quantity	   of	  
Caches	  
Identified	   &	  
Destroyed	  
Number	   of	  
Firearms	  
Destroyed	  
Quantity	   of	  
Explosives	  
Destroyed	  





Materials	  Operation	  Rachel	  X	  Year	  2004	   	  24	   	  1,876	   	  -­‐	   	  196,568	   	  1,176	  Operation	  Rachel	  XI	  Year	  2005	   	  21	   	  3,421	   	  -­‐	   	  1,752,724	   	  1,326	  Operation	  Rachel	  XII	  Year	  2006	   	  14	   	  3,240	   	  488	   	  3,247,417	   	  39,286	  Operation	  Rachel	  XIII	  Year	  2007	   	  33	   	  661	   	  -­‐	   	  5,4351	   	  2,004	  Operation	  Rachel	  XIV	  Year	  2008	   	  12	   	  5,729	   	  -­‐	   	  26,2125	   	  4,264	  Operation	  Rachel	  XV	  Year	  2009	   	  17	   	  163	   	  174	   	  6,682	   	  312	  
Total	   118	   15,090	   662	   5,519,867	   48,368	  	  Source:	  COPRECAL	  January	  2010	  	  In	   these	   operations,	   South	  Africa	   has	   been	   supplying	   the	   bulk	   of	   the	   financial	   resources,	  landmine	  resistant	  vehicles	  and	  other	  specialized	  equipment	  and	  trained	  police	  officials235.	  Besides	   Mozambique,	   the	   South	   Africa	   Police	   Service	   (SAPS)	   has	   provided	   technical	  assistance	   on	   the	   destruction	   of	   obsolete,	   redundant,	   confiscated	   and	   surplus	   SALWs	   to	  Angola,	   Lesotho,	   and	   Swaziland	   (South	   Africa,	   2005;	   2008).	   In	   November	   2004,	   SAPS	  trained	   members	   of	   the	   DRC	   National	   Police	   to	   carry	   out	   operations	   similar	   to	   the	  Operation	   Rachel	   model	   (South	   Africa,	   2005).	   Lesotho	   also	   conveniently	   used	   the	  agreement	   on	   defence	   issues	   (between	   Botswana,	   Lesotho	   and	   South	   Africa)	   to	   request	  South	   Africa’s	   assistance	   in	   the	   destruction	   of	   unserviceable,	   non-­‐standard	   excess	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  235	  For	   detailed	   account	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   bilateral	   agreement	   between	   the	   South	   African	   Police	   Service	  (SAPS	  and	  the	  Police	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Mozambique	  (PRM),	  see	  “Bilateral	  Treaties,	  Agreements	  and	  Related	  Issues“,	  ISS	  Monograph	  No	  43:	  Building	  Security	  in	  Southern	  Africa,	  November	  1999.	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redundant	   small	   arms.	  One	   such	  operation	   codenamed	   ‘Operation	  Qeto’	   destroyed	   about	  3,800	  weapons	  in	  November	  2001	  (Lesotho,	  2005).	  	  The	   success	   of	   Operation	   Rachel	   is	   partly	   due	   to	   the	   network	   that	   has	   been	   developed	  between	  State	   actors	   and	   the	   civil	   society	   that	   ensures	   the	   flow	  of	   information	  on	  SALW	  related	   matters.	   There	   is	   close	   collaboration	   and	   interaction	   between	   Operation	   Rachel	  (ran	  by	  Mozambique’s	  LEAs)	  and	  the	  Christian	  Council	  of	  Mozambique	  (CCM)	  that	  runs	  the	  TAE	  Project	   (Transforming	  Weapons	   into	  Ploughshares).	  For	  example,	   “Operation	  Rachel	  destroys	  most	   of	   the	   SALW	   recovered	   by	   TAE	   Project.	   Sometimes	   intelligence	   regarding	  arms	   caches	   is	   provided	   by	   TAE	   Project”	   (Mozambique,	   January	   2010:	   12).	   Apart	   from	  encouraging	   people	   to	   participate	   in	   weapons	   collection	   and	   destruction	   initiatives,	   the	  TAE	  Project	  also	  engages	   in	  exchange	  of	  weapons	   for	  production	  tools,	  civic	  education	  at	  the	  community	  level,	  as	  well	  as	  transformation	  of	  destroyed	  weapons	  into	  pieces	  of	  art.	  	  	  To	  replicate	  successes	  of	  Operations	  Rachel	  with	  a	  view	  to	  controlling	  the	  illicit	  circulation	  of	  weapons	  in	  the	  sub-­‐region,	  operation	  MANDUME	  was	  conducted	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  SARPCCO.	  In	  November	  2007,	  operation	  MANDUME	  was	  carried	  out,	  involving	  police	  forces	  from	  Angola,	  South	  Africa	  and	  Namibia,	  and	  incinerated	  vast	  quantities	  of	  weapons	  (6,799	  weapons;	  543	  explosives;	  517	  loaders	  and	  13,683	  ammunitions)	  (Angola,	  2008)236.	  Even	   though	   Operation	   MANDUME	   conducted	   since	   2005,	   is	   a	   collaborative	   effort	   by	  Angola,	   Namibia	   and	   South	   Africa,	   it	   relied	   heavily	   on	   the	   SAPS’	   competence.	   The	   SAPS	  provided	  most	  of	  the	  logistics	  including	  explosives,	  vehicles	  and	  even	  the	  helicopter,	  which	  scanned	  the	  Namibian	  desert	   for	  any	   form	  of	   life,	  humans	  and	  animals,	  before	  explosives	  were	  detonated.	  	  	  Apart	   from	   carrying	   several	   simultaneous	   operations	   at	   bilateral	   and	  multilateral	   levels,	  some	   SADC	   countries	   have	   forged	   partnership	  with	   extra-­‐regional	   actors	   in	   the	   areas	   of	  weapons	   collection	   and	   destruction.	   Mozambique	   and	   Tanzania,	   for	   instance	   have	   at	  different	   points	   in	   time	   entered	   into	   partnership	   with	   the	   UNDP	   for	   that	   purpose.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  236 	  See	   also	   “Operation	   Mandume	   reduces	   large	   arms	   caches	   to	   powder“,	   accessed	   at	  http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/sowetan/archive/	  on	  July	  20th,	  2011.	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Mozambique	   entered	   partnership	  with	   UNDP	   in	   2008	   under	   the	   project,	   “Weapons	   Risk	  Mitigation	  and	  Mainstreaming	  Mine	  Action,	  Small	  Arms	  and	  Light	  Weapons	  Controls	  2008-­‐2011”	   (Mozambique,	   2010).	   Tanzania	   entered	   a	   similar	   partnership	   with	   UNDP	   (UNDP	  Project	  Kigoma)	   leading	   to	  destruction	  of	  around	  2,	  772	   firearms237.	  These	  projects	  have	  extended	  their	  focus	  beyond	  weapons	  collection	  ad	  destruction	  to	  other	  supportive	  control	  measures	  like	  public	  awareness	  campaigns	  and	  training	  of	  LEAs.	  	  Another	   set	   of	   extra-­‐regional	   actors	   actively	   involved	   in	   the	   removal	   and	   destruction	   of	  weapons	   in	   Southern	   Africa	   is	   the	   international	   NGO	   by	   name	   of	   Halo	   Trust238.	   	   Halo’s	  Weapons	   and	   Ammunition	   Disposal	   (WAD)	   teams	   work	   in	   support	   of	   the	   Angola	   and	  Mozambique	   LEAs	   to	   destroy	   the	   considerable	   stocks	   of	   weapons	   and	   ammunition	   that	  were	   amassed	   during	   their	   civil	   wars.	   By	   June	   2010,	   Halo’s	   teams	   had	   demolished	   over	  70,000	  SALW	  and	  more	  than	  1,000	  tons	  of	  ammunition.	  	  	  MAG	  (Mines	  Advisory	  Group)	  is	  another	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	   international	  organization	  that	  has	  established	  close	  collaboration	  with	  LEAs	  of	  several	  African	  countries	  in	  the	  collection	  and	  destruction	   of	   SALWs,	   and	   other-­‐related	   weapons	   control	   measures.	   Within	   the	   SADC	  arrangement,	  MAG	   has	   on-­‐going	   operations	   in	   the	   DRC	   and	   Angola.	   In	   Angola,	  MAG	   has	  supported	   local	   authorities	   to	   destroyed	   around	   15,000	   hazardous	   items,	   including	  clearing	   2.7	   million	   square	   metres	   of	   land239.	   In	   DRC,	   this	   organization	   has	   developed	  successful	  partnerships	  with	   the	  FARDC	  (Forces	  Armees	  de	   ila	  Republique	  Democratique	  du	  Congo)	  and	  the	  PNC	  (Congolese	  National	  Police)	  to	  build	  capacity	  and	  destroy	  surplus	  weapons.	  Since	  2007	  MAG	  has	  destroyed	  more	  than	  116,000	  unserviceable	  and	  out	  of	  date	  weapons	  and	  over	  818	  tons	  of	  ammunition	  at	  its	  Kinshasa	  destruction	  workshop240.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  237	  Brief	  Report	  by	  Tanzania	  National	  Focal	  Point	  Coordinator	  on	  Small	  Arms	  to	  the	  East	  African	  Legislative	  Assembly	  (EALA)	  Committee	  on	  Small	  Arms	  and	  Light	  Weapons,	  December	  2010.	  238	  Halo	  is	  the	  landmine	  clearance	  organization	  registered	  in	  Britain	  as	  a	  charity	  and	  in	  the	  United	  States	  as	  a	  Not-­‐for-­‐Profit	  Organization.	  239	  See	  MAG	  Angola	  Report	  November	  2011	  at	  www.maginternational.org/angola.	  	  240	  See	   MAG	   DRC	   Report	   November	   2011	   at	   www.maginternational.org/drc.	   Some	   of	   MAG’s	   institutional	  donors	  include	  the	  Belgian	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  UK	  Department	  for	  International	  Development	  (DFID	  UKAid),	   the	   Dutch	   Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs,	   SIDA,	   ECHO,	   UNICEF,	   UNOPS,	   MAG	   America	   and	   the	   US	  Department	  of	  State	  Office	  of	  Weapons	  Removal	  and	  Abatement,	  the	  European	  Commission,	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  Development	  Programme	  (UNDP).	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  The	   foregoing	   account	   shows	   great	   strides	   have	   been	   achieved	   in	   managing	   the	   SALWs	  problem	   through	   joint	   bi-­‐	   and	   multi-­‐lateral	   cross	   border	   operations241 .	   These	   joint	  operations,	  which	  have	  more	  prominently	  featured	  in	  the	  sub-­‐region	  particularly	  in	  Angola,	  Mozambique,	   and	   Namibia,	   have	   yielded	   remarkable	   outcome	   resulting	   in	   the	   collection	  and	   destruction	   of	   approximately	   46,000	   SALW,	   and	   close	   to	   25	  million	   rounds	   of	   small	  arms	   ammunitions	   (SADC,	   2012:	   3).	   In	   fulfilling	   these	  management	   tasks	   (collection	   and	  destruction)	   non-­‐governmental	   organizations	   in	   the	   SADC	   sub-­‐region	   have	   also	   played	   a	  vital	   role	   in	   complementing	   States’	   efforts.	   In	   this	   regard,	   the	   technical	   support	   and	   the	  depth	  of	   experience	  of	   such	  organizations,	   as	   exemplified	  by	   their	   activities	   especially	   in	  the	   countries	   of	   Angola	   and	   Mozambique,	   particularly	   in	   the	   areas	   of	   voluntary	  disarmament	  through	  civic	  education,	  are	  noteworthy.	  And	  as	  observed	  by	  Lamb	  and	  Dye	  (2009:	   78)	   SARPCCO	   has	   also	   been	   dependent	   on	   the	   support	   of	   non-­‐governmental	  organizations	   as	   well	   as	   donor	   governments	   to	   cater	   for	   much	   of	   its	   arms	   control	   and	  destruction	  projects.	  	  	  Crucially,	  this	  points	  once	  more	  to	  the	  assortment	  of	  actors,	  both	  State	  and	  non-­‐state	  ones,	  working	   together	   in	   the	   management	   of	   the	   SALW	   scourge	   in	   the	   SADC	   sub-­‐region.	  Notwithstanding	  certain	  challenges	  such	  as	  budgetary	  constraints	  SARPCCO	  has	  managed	  to	  coordinate	  joint	  operations	  in	  several	  of	  its	  Member	  States	  (van	  der	  Spuy	  and	  Tait,	  2010:	  3-­‐4).	  It	  has	  also	  been	  observed	  that	  these	  multilateral	  operations	  to	  curb	  the	  trafficking	  in	  small	   arms	   have	   also	   been	   enshrined	   in	   a	   number	   of	   bilateral	   agreements	   between	   the	  SADC	  Member	  States.	  Some	  of	  the	  bilateral	  operations	  had	  started	  when	  the	  SARPCCO	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  institutionalised.	  	  	  The	   impact	   of	   the	   legacy	   of	   some	   of	   these	   bilateral	   operations	   that	   began	   as	   ad	   hoc	  cooperative	  measures	  and	  were	  later	  institutionalised,	  is	  to	  set	  the	  scene	  for	  cross-­‐border	  cooperation	  among	  the	  police	  forces	  of	  SADC	  Member	  States.	  For	  instance,	  Monyane	  (2010)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  241	  Statement	   by	   Joaquim	   Bule,	   Director	   of	   International	   Relations,	   Ministry	   of	   Interior	   of	   the	   Republic	   of	  Mozambique,	  on	  behalf	  of	   the	  SADC	  delivered	  before	   the	  Fourth	  Biennial	  Meeting	  of	  States	   to	  Consider	   the	  Implementation	  oft	  he	  Programme	  of	  Action	  to	  Prevent,	  Combat	  and	  Eradicate	  the	  Illicit	  Trade	  in	  Small	  Arms	  and	  Light	  Weapons	  in	  All	  ist	  Aspects,	  New	  York,	  14-­‐18	  June	  2010.	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notes,	   “By	   2005,	   SARPCCO	  was	   using	   Operational	   Rachel	   as	   the	   practical	   phase	   of	   their	  newly	   developed	   cross-­‐border	   Arms	   Destruction	   Course.	   By	   2007	   Operational	   Rachel	  Standard	   Operating	   Procedures	   were	   being	   adapted	   to	   guide	   those	   used	   in	   Operation	  Mandume,	   the	   Small	   Arms	   Destruction	   Operation	   between	   South	   Africa,	   Namibia	   and	  Angola	  (p.	  70).	  It	  follows	  therefore	  that	  bilateral	  operations	  not	  only	  gave	  impetus	  to	  other	  joint	   cross-­‐border	   operations	   but	   have	   also	   complemented	   SARPCCO	   operations	   to	   curb	  small	  arms	  trafficking.	  	  
7.4.2.2. Marking and Record Keeping 	  Marking	  and	  keeping	  of	  reliable	  databases	  of	  firearms	  are	  important	  control	  measures	  that	  SADC	  Member	   States	   ought	   to	   undertake.	   Article	   9	   of	   the	   legally	   binding	   SADC	   Protocol	  requires	  State	  Parties	  to	  establish	  agreed	  systems	  to	  ensure	  all	  firearms	  are	  marked	  with	  a	  unique	   number	   (marking)	   upon	   import	   or	   manufacture	   or	   where	   an	   imported	   firearm	  duplicates	  the	  markings	  of	  a	  firearm	  that	  already	  exist	  on	  the	  firearm	  identification	  system.	  Accordingly,	  the	  SARPCCO	  through	  its	  RCC,	  as	  mentioned	  on	  the	  section	  on	  coordination,	  in	  its	  Standard	  Operating	  Procedures	  which	  was	  developed	  to	  provide	  practical	  guidelines	  on	  how	   to	   effectively	   implement	   the	   SADC	   Firearms	   Protocol,	   sets	   out	   specific	   minimum	  requirements	  for	  marking	  of	  firearms242.	  	  Each	   SADC	   country	   has	   its	   unique	   code,	   which	   makes	   it	   easier	   for	   firearms	   under	   its	  possession	   to	   be	   identifiable	   and	   even	   those	   that	   were	   lost	   from	   national	   inventories	  throughout	  the	  region.	  	  	  Since	   marking	   of	   firearms	   is	   an	   expensive	   undertaking	   requiring	   specific	   modern	  technology,	   equipment	   and	   expertise,	   SADC	   countries	   have	   welcomed	   support	   from	  international	  organizations	  which	  have	  also	  been	  working	  with	  them	  in	  other	  areas	  related	  to	   SALWs	   control	   individually	   and	   within	   the	   SARPCCO	   framework.	   Supporting	   these	  countries	   with	   the	   capacity	   to	   comply	   with	   Article	   9	   of	   the	   SADC	   Protocol,	   MAG	   has	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  242 	  Chapter	   3	   (marking	   of	   firearms	   and	   ammunition)	   of	   the	   Standard	   Operating	   Procedures	   for	   the	  Implementation	  of	  the	  SADC	  Protocol	  on	  the	  Control	  of	  Firearms,	  Ammunition	  and	  Other	  Related	  Materials.	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provided	  ten	  SADC	  countries	  (Angola,	  Botswana,	  Lesotho,	  Malawi,	  Mauritius,	  Mozambique,	  Namibia,	   Swaziland,	   Zimbabwe	   and	   Zambia)	   at	   least	   one	   firearms	   marking	   unit	   and	  software	   under	   the	   project	   to	   manage	   stockpiles	   and	   trace	   illicit	   weapons243 .	   While	  organizations	   like	   RECSA	   and	   MAG	   provide	   the	   marking	   machines,	   SARPCCO	   in	  collaboration	  with	   think-­‐tanks	   or	   policy	   institutes	   like	   the	   ISS	   (the	   Institute	   for	   Security	  Studies)	  coordinates	  and	  oversees	  training	  workshops	  of	  the	  police	  personnel	  in	  the	  proper	  use	  of	  the	  acquired	  marking	  machines,	  among	  other	  issues244.	  	  Initially,	   marking	   in	   some	   countries	   was	   already	   underway	   having	   received	   marking	  machines	  from	  RECSA	  (e.g.	  Seychelles,	  Tanzania,	  and	  DRC).	  Zambia,	  a	  SADC	  country	  but	  not	  a	  member	  of	  RECSA,	   also	   received	  a	  marking	  machine	   from	   the	   latter	   for	  which	  an	  MOU	  had	  been	  signed,	  and	  Swaziland	  is	  the	  latest	  to	  be	  a	  recipient	  of	  a	  similar	  making	  equipment	  from	  the	  same	  organization	  (Zambia,	  2010;	  Ngozo,	  2011).	  Others	  like	  Zimbabwe	  just	  used	  manufacturers’	  markings.	  	  The	  SADC	  Protocol	  also	  call	  upon	  State	  Parties	  to	  establish	  and	  improve	  national	  databases	  and	  communication	  systems	  and	  acquire	  equipment	  for	  monitoring	  and	  controlling	  firearm	  movements	   across	   borders245.	   Following	   SARPCCO’s	   recommendations,	   SADC	   Member	  States	  have	  committed	  themselves	  to	  move	  away	  from	  paper-­‐based	  (manual)	  databases	  to	  computerized	  databases.	  Only	  Botswana,	  Tanzania	  and	  South	  Africa	  have	  thus	  far	  fulfilled	  this	  exercise246.	  Most	  of	  the	  other	  SADC	  countries	  are	  in	  the	  process	  of	  computerizing	  their	  databases.	  	  It	   thus	   appears,	   SARPCCO	  has	   been	   instrumental	   in	   developing	   standards	   relating	   to	   the	  control	  measures	   of	  marking	   and	   record	   keeping,	  while	   non-­‐governmental	   organizations	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  243 	  According	   to	   Ben	   Coetzee,	   Senior	   Researcher	   Arms	   Management	   Programme	   ISS	   Pretoria	   Office,	  participating	   SADC	   countries	   are	   now	   in	   possession	   of	   pin	   stamping	   marking	   machines	   and	   a	   computer	  software	   programme	   that	   would	   allow	   them	   to	   apply,	   track	   and	   trace,	   individualised	   markings	   on	   each	  firearms	  under	  their	  control.	  See	  ISS	  News	  Alert,	  “New	  Firearms	  Control	  Equipment	  Marking	  a	  Difference	  in	  SADC“,	  October	  6th,	  2011.	  244	  Interview	  with	  Joseph	  Musoni,	  at	  the	  SARPCCO	  Secretariat-­‐SRB	  Harare,	  18th	  November	  2010.	  245	  Article	  6	  (b)	  oft	  he	  SADC	  Firearms	  Protocol	  and	  Chapter	  3	  of	  the	  SARPCCO’s	  SOPs.	  246	  Interview	  with	  Musoni,	  op.cit.	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have	   provided	   support	   in	   terms	   of	   marking	   machines	   and	   collaborating	   with	   the	   sub-­‐regional	  body	   to	  conduct	   training	  of	  LEAs	  on	   the	  use	  of	   those	  machines.	  Accordingly,	   the	  marking	   exercise	   by	   individual	   States	   has	   begun.	   On	   the	   side	   of	   record	   keeping,	   a	   SADC	  harmonized	   database	   system	   is	   deemed	   important	   for	   the	   successful	   tracing	   of	   firearms	  across	   the	   Southern	   Africa	   sub-­‐region.	   Thus	   far,	   only	   one	   SADC	   Member	   State,	   namely	  South	   Africa	   has	   an	   online	   database	   that	   is	   compatible	   with	   the	   requirements	   of	   the	  International	  Tracing	  Instrument247.	  	  7.5	  Conclusion	  	  The	  illicit	  proliferation	  of	  SALW	  remains	  as	  a	  security	  threat	  in	  the	  whole	  Southern	  Africa	  sub-­‐region	   notwithstanding	   the	   fact	   that	   SADC	   countries	   are	   disparate	   in	   terms	   of	  geographical	  locations	  and	  capability	  to	  monitor	  their	  borders,	  and	  even	  their	  exposure	  to	  the	  SALW	  problem.	  Besides	  igniting	  violence	  and	  increasing	  criminal	  activities,	  illicit	  SALW	  have	  slowed	  prospects	  for	  durable	  peace	  and	  retarded	  development.	  In	  the	  coordination	  of	  SADC	   countries	   responses	   to	   the	   SALW	   problem,	   the	   impasse	   over	   the	   SADC	  Organ	   and	  initial	   strained	   relations	   between	   SADC	   and	   SARPCCO	   dragged	   on	   for	   far-­‐too	   long	   and	  actually	   seriously	   hampered	   coordination	   of	   small	   arms	   control,	   and	   thus,	   slowed	   down	  efforts	   at	   addressing	   the	   SALWs	   problem	   within	   the	   sub-­‐region	   (Gamba,	   1998:	   108;	  Oosthuizen,	   2006:	   310)248.	   SARPCCO,	   which	   is	   currently	   an	   affiliated	   structure	   of	   SADC	  entrusted	  with	  the	  responsibility	  of	  overseeing	  the	   implementation	  of	  the	  SADC	  Firearms	  Protocol,	  has	  since	  assumed	  the	  leading	  role	  in	  terms	  of	  setting	  the	  normative	  framework	  to	  guide	  state	  practices.	  It	  has	  developed	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  organization’s	  legal	  instruments	  (Firearms	   Protocol	   and	   SOPs),	   but	   also	   facilitated	   training	   of	   its	   members	   (National	  Firearms	  Coordinators)	  on	  how	  best	  to	  implement	  the	  same.	  	  Meanwhile,	  most	  actions	  relating	  to	  the	  management	  of	  the	  illicit	  weapons	  within	  the	  SADC	  arrangement	   have	   occurred	   at	   bilateral	   and	   multilateral	   levels	   as	   elaborated	   earlier.	   In	  comparative	   terms,	   even	   though	   States	   continue	   to	   eclipse	   non-­‐state	   actors	   (particularly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  247	  Statement	  by	  Joaquim	  Bule,	  op.	  cit.	  248	  See	  also	  Interview	  with	  Hayuma,	  op.	  Cit.	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Chapter	  Eight	  
8.	  SADC	  and	  Domestic	  Political	  Crises	  
	  8.1. Introduction	  	  Globally,	   a	   plethora	   of	   actors	   within	   sub-­‐regional	   contexts	   have	   begun	   to	   play	   a	   more	  prominent	  role	  in	  security	  matters.	  While	  the	  UN	  remains	  the	  ultimate	  guarantor	  of	  global	  peace	   and	   security,	   a	   range	   of	   actors	   working	   in	   close	   collaboration	   with	   sub-­‐regional	  organizations	   endeavour	   themselves	   to	   exploit	   the	   advantages	   of	   their	   proximity	   to	  troubled	   spots,	   their	   familiarity	   with	   disputing	   parties,	   and	   their	   vested	   interests	   in	  managing	   conflicts	   in	   their	   own	  backyards.	   In	   the	   absence	  of	   obvious	   external	   threats	   to	  peace	  and	  security	  in	  Southern	  Africa,	  the	  perennial	  occurrences	  of	  domestic	  political	  crises	  present	   one	   of	   the	   grimmest	   security	   challenges	   to	   the	   SADC	   arrangement.	   Zimbabwe	  experienced	  a	  political	  crisis	  accompanied	  by	  a	  precipitous	  economic	  slump	  in	  the	  2000s,	  with	  record-­‐breaking	  hyper-­‐inflation.	  	  	  The	   Zimbabwe	   political	   crisis	   since	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   2000s	   brought	   to	   the	   fore	   the	  challenge	   of	   dealing	   with	   a	   State	   whose	   government	   openly	   flouted	   the	   democratic	  pretensions	   of	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   organization.	   The	   challenge	   was	   one	   of	   addressing	   the	  political	   fallout	  of	  a	   long-­‐serving	  regime’s	  unwillingness	   to	  cede	  power	   to	   the	  opposition.	  The	   Zimbabwe	   case	   provided	   a	   litmus	   test	   for	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   body’s	   application	   of	  peaceful	  methods	  for	  the	  management	  of	  a	  domestic	  political	  crisis	  in	  a	  Member	  State.	  	  The	  current	  chapter,	  firstly,	  explores	  the	  nature	  and	  manifestations	  of	  the	  Zimbabwe	  domestic	  political	   crisis	   that	   has	   existed	   for	  much	  of	   the	  2000-­‐2010	  decade,	   and	   then	  proceeds	   to	  examine	   how	   the	   actual	   coordination	   of	   responses	   and	   management	   of	   the	   crisis	   were	  undertaken	  by	  various	  actors	  in	  the	  Southern	  Africa	  sub-­‐region.	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8.2. The	  Nature	  and	  Extent	  of	  Domestic	  Political	  Crises	  in	  the	  Southern	  Africa	  Sub-­‐Region	  	  The	   tragic	   violent	   events	   that	   befell	   Zimbabwe	   in	   the	   2000-­‐2010	   decade	   assumed	   one	  among	   other	   characteristics,	   and	   that	   is	   they	   involved	   the	   country’s	   presidential	   and	  parliamentary	   elections.	   A	   section	   of	   Zimbabweans	   experienced	   acts	   of	   violence	   as	   they	  exercised	  their	  constitutional	  right	  to	  choose	  their	  representatives	  in	  both	  presidential	  and	  parliamentary	  elections.	  The	  Zimbabwe	  domestic	  political	  crisis	  has	  not	  only	  engendered	  insecurity	  to	  the	  country’s	  people	  but	  has	  also	  led	  to	  widespread	  negative	  repercussions	  to	  the	   Southern	  African	   sub-­‐region.	   In	   light	   of	   the	   above,	   this	   section	   seeks	   to	   examine	   the	  nature,	   characteristics	   (in	   terms	   of	   perpetrators,	   pattern	   of	   violence	   and	   entrenched	  culture	  of	  impunity),	  and	  impact	  to	  the	  country	  and	  neighbouring	  states.	  	  	  Politically	  motivated	  violence	  in	  Zimbabwe	  has	  intensified	  since	  the	  opposition	  Movement	  for	   Democratic	   Change	   (MDC)	   emerged	   as	   a	   strong	   political	   contender	   to	   the	   ruling	  Zimbabwe	   African	   National	   Union-­‐Popular	   Front	   (ZANU-­‐PF)	   in	   1999.	   Violence	   around	  elections	   has	   been	   observed	   in	   all	   previous	   elections	   of	   2000,	   2002,	   2005	   and	   the	  presidential	  elections	  of	  2008.	  The	  more	  peculiar	  political	  situation	  of	  Zimbabwe	  in	  the	  last	  decade	   is	   that	  even	  where	  there	  was	  no	  overt	  violence,	  acts	  of	   intimidation	  were	  aplenty	  (McGreal,	  2002).	  It	  ought	  to	  be	  noted	  that	  election-­‐related	  violence	  and/or	  the	  threat	  of	  it	  (i.e.	   intimidation)	  fundamentally	  deters	  eligible	  or	  potential	  voters	  to	  participate	  freely	  in	  the	  electoral	  process	  (Bratton,	  2008	  as	  referred	  in	  Hickman,	  2011:1).	  	  	  As	  alluded	  to	  earlier,	  previous	  elections	  in	  Zimbabwe	  were	  characterized	  by	  violence	  and	  acts	   of	   intimidation	   before,	   during	   and	   after	   balloting.	   In	   the	   run-­‐up	   to	   the	   June	   2000	  parliamentary	  elections	  widespread	  acts	  of	  violence	  were	  reported	  by	  international	  human	  rights	  organizations249.	  Similarly	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  2002	  presidential	  election	  was	  marred	  by	   widespread	   violence	   as	   confirmed	   by	   the	   Commonwealth	   and	   SADC	   observer	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  249	  See	   for	   example,	   Amnesty	   International,	   “Zimbabwe:	   Terror	   tactics	   in	   the	   run-­‐up	   to	   parliamentary	  elections,“	   AI	   Index:	   AFR	   46/014/2000,	   June	   2000,	  http://amnesty.name/en/library/info/AFR46/014/2000/en	  (accessed	  February	  11,	  2011).	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missions250.	   The	   2005	   elections	   were	   relatively	   peaceful	   in	   the	   run-­‐up.	   However,	   the	  immediate	   aftermath	   was	   very	   volatile	   as	   the	   Zimbabwean	   government	   embarked	   on	  
Operation	   Murambatsvina	   (Operation	   ‘Clear	   the	   Filth’).	   This	   was	   an	   eviction	   operation	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  high-­‐density	  urban	  areas	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  aimed	  to	  remove	  criminal	  elements	  and	  clean	  up	  the	  cities.	  According	  to	  Human	  Right	  Watch,	  however,	  the	  operation	  that	   left	  more	   than	  700,000	  homeless	  was	  carried	  out	   to	  punish	   those	  who	  voted	   for	   the	  opposition	  MDC	  during	  the	  2005	  elections251.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  2000	  and	  2002,	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  March	  2008	  parliamentary	  and	  presidential	  elections	  was	  marked	  by	  relatively	  calm	  (HRW,	   June	  2008a:	  12).	  However,	   the	  scope	  and	  scale	  of	  violence	  observed	   following	   the	  March	  2008	  elections	  far	  surpassed	  that	  experienced	  during	  the	  previous	  elections	  of	  2000,	  2002	  and	  2005	  (ibid.	  p.15).	  This	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  levels	  of	  fatalities	  related	  to	  these	  elections.	  	  According	   to	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	   election-­‐related	  violence	   led	   to	   the	   loss	  of	   lives	  of	  40	  MDC	  candidates	  and	  supporters	   in	   the	  2002	  electoral	  contest	   (HRW,	  March	  2011:	  20)252.	  The	  MDC	  reported	  that	  85	  of	  its	  members	  had	  been	  killed,	  and	  some	  1,734	  beaten	  between	  April	  and	  June	  2008	  alone	  (Basildon	  et.	  Al.,	  20	  June	  2008).	  It	  ought	  to	  be	  recalled	  that	  the	  opposition	   candidate	   Morgan	   Tsvangirai	   and	   his	   party,	   the	   MDC,	   defeated	   incumbent	  President	  Robert	  Mugabe,	   in	  the	  general	  election	  on	  March	  2008	  but	  the	  former’s	  victory	  fell	  short	  of	  a	  50-­‐percent-­‐plus-­‐one-­‐vote	  majority,	   thus	  necessitating	  a	  presidential	  run-­‐off	  on	  June	  27	  the	  same	  year.	  Following	  the	  ruling	  party’s	  loss	  of	  parliamentary	  majority	  and	  its	  failure	  to	  win	  outright	  the	  presidential	  race,	  a	  brutal	  campaign	  of	  violence	  dubbed	  by	  its	  perpetrators	   “Operation	  Makavhoterapapi?”	   (Operation	  Where	   Did	   You	   Put	   Your	   Vote?),	  was	   unleashed	   (HRW,	   June	   2008a:	   14;	   Cawthra,	   2010:	   25).	   The	  MDC	   candidate,	  Morgan	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  250	  Commonwealth	   Observer	   Report,	   “Preliminary	   Report	   oft	   he	   Commonwealth	   Observer	   Group	   tot	   he	  Zimbabwe	  Presidential	  Election,	  9-­‐10	  March	  2002,“	  March	  14,	  2002.	  See	  also	   “Statement	  on	   the	  Zimbabwe	  Elections,“	   SADC	   Parliamentary	   Forum	   Observer	   Mission,	   Harare,	   March	   13,	   2002,	  http://www.africaaction.org/docs02/zim0202.htm	  (accessed	  February	  11,	  2011)	  251	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  Zimbabwe-­‐Evicted	  and	  Forsaken:	  Internally	  Displaced	  Persons	  in	  the	  Aftermath	  of	  Operation	   Murambatsvina,	   vol.	   17,	   no.	   16	   (A),	   December	   1,	   2005,	  http://hrw.org/reports/2005/zim1205/zim1205webwcover.pdf	  (accessed	  February	  11,	  2011).	  252	  See	   also	   Robert	   Chan,	   2003,	  Mugabe:	  A	  Life	  of	  Power	  and	  Violence,	  Michigan:	  The	  University	  of	  Michigan	  
Press,	   pp.	   196-­‐197;	   Meredith	   Meredith,	   2002,	   Our	   Votes	   Our	   Guns:	   Robert	   Mugabe	   and	   the	   Tragedy	   of	  
Zimbabwe,	  New	  York:	  Public	  Affairs,	  pp.	  194,	  214-­‐215.	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Tsvangirai	  ultimately	  gave	   in	  and	  withdrew	   from	  the	   June	  2008	  runoff	  election	   five	  days	  before	  the	  polling	  day253.	  	  The	  next	  two	  characteristics	  of	  the	  Zimbabwe	  election-­‐related	  violence	  that	  warrant	  focus	  here	   are	   the	   identity	   of	   the	   perpetrators	   and	   where	   the	   violence	   was	   concentrated.	  Numerous	   sources	   reveal	   that	   much	   of	   the	   election-­‐related	   violence	   in	   the	   country	   had	  been	  perpetrated	  with	  the	  connivance	  or	  active	  involvement	  of	  the	  security	  forces	  (police	  officers	  and	  soldiers),	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘War	  Veterans’,	  and	  the	  ruling	  party’s	  youth	  militia	  (AI,	  April	   2008;	   HRW,	   June	   2008a;	   Thomas,	   2010;	   Hickman,	   2011).	   Members	   of	   the	   armed	  forces	   and	   police	   were	   systematically	   or	   individually	   complicit	   in	   the	   violence,	   in	   most	  cases	  backing	  ZANU-­‐PF	  supporters	  who	  worked	  through	  proxy	  forces	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  war	  veterans	   and	   youth	  militia	   (Todd	  &	   Stewart,	   2006:	   1;	  HRW,	   June	   2008a:	   1).	   The	   leading	  perpetrators	  of	  violence,	   the	   trained	  paramilitary	  youth	  group	   trained	  under	  a	   ‘	  National	  Youth	  Training	  Programme’	  and	  the	  war	  veterans	  at	  one	  point	  carried	  out	  their	  violent	  acts	  in	   full	   view	   of	  members	   of	   an	   international	   observer	   group	   (Commonwealth	   Secretariat,	  2003:	  28-­‐29).	  According	  to	  local	  NGOs,	  ZANU-­‐PF	  officials	  and	  supporters	  were	  implicated	  in	  the	  deaths	  of	  at	  least	  163	  people	  over	  three	  months	  of	  2008	  (32	  of	  these	  were	  killed	  after	  the	  June	  2008	  run-­‐off	  election)	  (HRW,	  August	  2008:	  2).	  	  	  	  The	   ZANU-­‐PF	   side	   has	   also	   accused	  MDC-­‐T	   youth	   supporters	   for	   instigating	   violence	   to	  destabilise	   the	   country	   whilst	   in	   some	   instances	   putting	   on	   ZANU-­‐PF	   regalia254.	   These	  claims,	   however,	   have	   never	   been	   confirmed.	   Intra-­‐party	   violence,	   both	   within	   and	  between	   factions	  was	   also	   reported.	  The	  most	  notable	   example	  was	   the	  November	  2007	  violent	  clashes	  within	  the	  larger	  faction	  of	  the	  MDC,	  led	  by	  Tsvangirai,	  which	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  MDC-­‐T255.	  The	  clashes	  were	  associated	  with	  the	  controversial	  ouster	  of	  the	  chair	  of	  the	  women’s	  assembly,	  Lucia	  Mabitenga	  (ICG,	  March	  2008:	  9-­‐10).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  253	  Tsvangirai’s	   name,	   however,	   remained	   on	   the	   ballot	   and	   his	   rival	   Mugabe	   went	   on	   to	   be	   declared	   the	  winner	  by	  the	  Zimbabwe	  Electoral	  Commission.	  	  254	  See	  Ladislus	  Ndoro,“MDC-­‐T	  violence	  unacceptable“	  and	  “Tsvangirai	  must	  stop	  the	  violence“,	  retrieved	  from	  the	  ZANU-­‐PF	  website	  http://www.zanupf.org.zw/	  on	  26th	  May,	  2012.	  255	  The	   rival	   faction	   of	   the	   MDC-­‐T	   is	   led	   by	   Arthur	   Mutambara	   and	   is	   known	   as	   MDC-­‐M.	   The	   MDC	   split	  occurred	  in	  November	  2005	  over	  whether	  to	  boycott	  elections	  for	  the	  Senate,	  Zimbabwe’s	  second	  chamber.	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Where	  the	  violence	  was	  concentrated?	  In	  general	   it	  can	  be	  surmised	  that	  acts	  of	  violence	  around	   elections	   in	   Zimbabwe	   have	   been	   particularly	   concentrated	   in	   areas	   deemed	   as	  former	   strongholds	   of	   the	   ruling	   ZANU-­‐PF.	   These	  were	   rural	   areas	   but	   also	   low-­‐income	  suburbs	  where	  the	  opposition	  MDC	  appeared	  to	  have	  garnered	  more	  votes	  than	  the	  ruling	  ZANU-­‐PF.	   Mashonaland	   East,	   West	   Provinces	   and	   suburbs	   of	   Harare	   were	   particularly	  affected	  in	  the	  2008	  election256.	  	  This	  pattern	  of	  violence	  concentration	  particularly	   in	  areas	  where	   the	   leading	  opposition	  party,	  MDC,	  had	  commanded	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  support	  goes	  back	  to	  the	  2000	  election.	  Details	  of	  killings	  of	  five	  MDC	  supporters	  on	  the	  shores	  of	  Lake	  Kariba	  in	  the	  resort	  town	  of	  Kariba	  in	  April	  2000	  aimed	  primarily	  at	  subduing	  dissent	  are	  a	  case	  in	  point	  (Meldrum,	  April	  30,	  2000).	   It	   can,	   thus,	   be	   noted	   that	   the	   violence	   in	   Zimbabwe	  was	   characterized	   by	   ‘intra-­‐ethnic	  partisanship’,	  and	   largely	   “concentrated	   in	  Mashonaland,	   in	   the	  Centre	  and	  East	  of	  the	  country,	  rather	  than	  in	  Matebeleland,	  in	  the	  West	  of	  the	  country”	  (Hickman,	  2011:	  3).	  	  	  The	  experience	  of	  multi-­‐party	  elections	  in	  Zimbabwe	  particularly	  in	  the	  2000-­‐2010	  decade	  reveals	  once	  more	  the	  long	  history	  of	  impunity.	  The	  failure	  to	  impartially	  enforce	  the	  law	  by	  the	  LEAs;	  selective	  application	  of	  the	  law,	  or	  the	  security	  forces	  being	  heavy-­‐handed	  in	  dealing	  with	  opponents	  of	   the	  regime	  and	   lenient	   towards	  supporters	  of	   the	  ruling	  party	  bred	  a	  crisis	  of	  impunity.	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  found	  Zimbabwe	  to	  be	  a	  victim	  of	  two	  forms	  of	  impunity:	  De	  facto	  and	  De	  jure	  impunity.	  	  It	  accordingly	  notes,	  “De	  facto	  impunity	  takes	  place	   when	   the	   state	   fails	   to	   prosecute	   human	   rights	   abuses	   due	   to	   lack	   of	   capacity	   or	  political	   will.	   De	   jure	   impunity	   occurs	   when	   laws	   or	   regulations	   providing	   immunity	   or	  amnesty	   extend	   and	   strengthen	   the	   impact	   of	   de	   facto	   impunity	  by	   limiting	  or	  making	   it	  impossible	  to	  prosecute	  a	  perpetrator	  for	  human	  rights	  abuses”	  (HRW,	  March	  2011:	  21)257.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  256 	  Amnesty	   International,	   “Post-­‐election	   violence	   increases	   in	   Zimbabwe“,	   April	   18,	   2008,	  http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-­‐and-­‐updates/news/news/post-­‐election-­‐violence-­‐increases-­‐zimbabwe-­‐200801418	  (Accessed	  September	  25,	  2011).	  257	  The	  UN	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights	  “Report	  oft	  he	  independent	  expert	  to	  update	  the	  set	  of	  principles	  to	  combat	  impunity“,	  defines	  impunity	  as	  the	  “impossibility,	  de	  jure	  or	  de	  facto,	  of	  bringing	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  violations	  to	  account-­‐whether	  in	  criminal,	  civil,	  administrative	  or	  disciplinary	  proceedings-­‐since	  they	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  any	  inquiry	  that	  might	  lead	  to	  their	  being	  accused,	  arrested,	  tried	  and,	  if	  found	  guilty,	  sentenced	  to	  appropriate	   penalties,	   and	   to	   making	   reparations	   to	   their	   victims“.	   E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1,	   February	   8,	  2005	  para.	  A.	  p.	  6.	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  As	   far	   as	   impact	   is	   concerned,	   the	  political	   crisis	   in	   Zimbabwe	  has	   generally	   had	   serious	  negative	   repercussions,	  not	  only	   to	   the	   country	  and	   its	  people	  but	   also	   the	  neighbouring	  SADC	  Member	   States.	   Besides	   the	   tragic	   losses	   of	   lives	   as	   recounted	   above,	   the	   violence,	  intimidation	  and	  controversial	  crackdowns	  by	  authorities	  (like	  Operation	  Murambatsvina)	  principally	  destroyed	  the	  homes	  and	  livelihoods	  of	  an	  estimated	  700,000	  people	  (which	  is	  equivalent	   to	   6	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   Zimbabwean	   population)	   (HRW,	   June	   2008b:	   4).	   The	  outcome	  of	  the	  gloomy	  political	  and	  economic	  situation	  and	  the	  forced	  evictions	  of	  people	  living	   in	   the	   high-­‐density	   suburbs	   of	   the	   country’s	   cities	   triggered	   the	   influx	   of	  Zimbabweans	   to	   neighbouring	   states,	  mostly	   to	   South	  Africa	   and	  Botswana,	   sparking	   off	  serious	  xenophobic	  reactions	  (Mlambo	  and	  Raftopolous,	  2010:	  6)258.	  In	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2002,	  about	  500	  ‘illegal	  immigrants’	  were	  entering	  South	  Africa	  daily	  (Field,	  2003:	  4).	  Since	  2005	   an	   estimated	   one	   to	   1.5	   million	   Zimbabweans	   fled	   into	   South	   Africa	   (HRW,	   June	  2008b:	  1).	  The	  South	  African	  government	  treated	  the	  influx	  of	  Zimbabweans	  as	  voluntary	  ‘economic	  migrants’	   or	   ‘not	   real	   refugees’	   and	  deported	   about	  200,	   000	  of	   them	   in	  2007	  alone	  (ibid,	  p.	  8).	  	  	  Botswana	  also	  has	  treated	  Zimbabweans	  crossing	  its	  border	  at	  unspecified	  points	  and	  who	  do	  not	  make	  their	  presence	  known	  to	  the	  authorities	  as	  illegal	  immigrants.	  The	  Gaborone	  government	   viewed	   them	   as	   ‘economic	   refugees’	   and	   not	   as	   asylum	   seekers	   and	   had	  identified	  them	  as	  its	  top	  security	  threat	  (Molomo,	  2003:	  21).	  The	  ensuing	  overcrowding	  of	  refugee	  camps	  and	  jails	  in	  Botswana	  existed	  alongside	  “	  a	  growing	  sense	  of	  xenophobia;	  the	  Batswana	   have	   developed	   a	   negative	   attitude	   towards	   Zimbabweans	   and	   the	   latter	   have	  become	   scapegoats	   for	   many	   social	   ills	   in	   Botswana,	   causing	   tension	   between	   the	   two	  governments.”	   (AISA,	   2003:	   VI).	   Relations	   between	   the	   governments	   of	   Botswana	   and	  Zimbabwe	  were	  at	  their	  lowest	  ebb	  in	  2003	  (Molomo,	  2003:	  21).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  258	  The	   high-­‐density	   suburbs,	   which	   were	   targets	   of	   the	   evictions,	   were	   areas	   the	   opposition	   MDC	   had	  significant	   support.	   	   The	   most	   notable	   example	   of	   xenophobic	   reactions	   was	   the	   attacks	   on	   ‘foreigners’	  (mostly	  Zimbabweans)	  in	  South	  Africa	  in	  2008.	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Another	  impact	  was	  the	  complete	  meltdown	  of	  the	  Zimbabwean	  economy,	  which	  in	  2008	  recorded	  hyper-­‐inflation,	  estimated	  by	  the	  country’s	  state	  statistical	  office	  to	  hit	  100,	  000	  per	  cent,	  and	  by	  July	  of	  the	  same	  year	  it	  became	  impossible	  to	  continue	  measuring	  it	  (HRW,	  June,	   2008b:	   5;	   Cawthra,	   2010:	   26).	   Moreover,	   Zimbabwe	   once	   regarded	   as	   the	  ‘breadbasket’	   of	   Southern	   Africa,	   suffered	   a	   serious	   food	   shortage	   resulting	   from	   the	  collapse	  of	  food	  production	  that	  affected	  about	  4	  million	  Zimbabweans	  (HRW,	  June,	  2008b:	  6;	  Thomas,	  2010:	  269)259.	  The	  neighbouring	  country	  of	  Mozambique	  was	  also	  not	  spared	  from	  the	  crisis	  in	  Zimbabwe.	  As	  one	  of	  the	  SADC	  land-­‐locked	  countries,	  Zimbabwe	  relies	  on	  Mozambican	  ports	  for	  its	  imports	  and	  exports.	  The	  Beira	  corridor	  which	  comprises	  of	  the	  port,	  road	  and	  railway	  network	  from	  the	  town	  of	  Beira	  to	  the	  hinterland	  of	  Zimbabwe	  and	  other	  neighbouring	  land-­‐locked	  countries,	  experienced	  a	  decline	  in	  Zimbabwe	  imports	  and	  exports,	   thus	   jeopardising	   business	   and	   jobs	   at	   the	   central	   province	   of	   Sofala	   (Agaspar,	  2003:	  47-­‐48).	  	  	  To	   sum	   up,	   the	   section	   has	   provided	   the	   backdrop	   to	   the	   subsequent	   analysis	   on	   the	  coordination	   and	   management	   of	   the	   Zimbabwe	   domestic	   political	   crisis.	   It	   has	   clearly	  established	   that	   election-­‐related	   violence	   is	   inherent	   in	   Zimbabwe’s	   body	   politic,	   with	  political	   actors	   and	   security	   personnel	   involved	   and	   its	   repercussions	   extending	   into	   the	  neighbouring	  SADC	  Member	  States.	  After	  the	  exploration	  of	  the	  nature	  and	  manifestations	  of	   the	   Zimbabwe	   domestic	   political	   crisis,	   the	   next	   two	   sections	   dwell	   on	   how	   the	  coordination	  and	  management	  of	  the	  same	  took	  place.	  	  8.3. Coordination	  of	  Responses	  to	  Domestic	  Political	  Crises	  	  As	   noted	   in	   Chapter	   three	   of	   this	   study,	   interaction	   of	   various	   actors	   to	   coordinate	   their	  responses	   to	   collective	   security	   challenges	   can	   take	   place	   in	   either	   formal	   or	   informal	  institutional	   arrangements.	   The	   SADC	   sub-­‐regional	   organization,	   through	   its	   Treaty,	  decided	  to	  formalize	  security	  cooperation	  among	  its	  Member	  States	  on	  28	  June	  1996	  when	  the	  famous	  Front	  Line	  States	  (FLS)	  alliance	  became	  obsolete,	  by	  establishing	  the	  Organ	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  259	  Zimbabwe	  authorities	  have	  mostly	  blamed	  the	  effects	  of	  drought,	  sanctions,	  and	  the	  suspension	  of	  balance	  of	  payment	  support	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  for	  aggravating	  the	  crisis	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Politics,	   Defence	   and	   Security	   Cooperation	   (OPDSC,	   hereafter	   referred	   as	   ‘the	   Organ’).	   It	  was	   not	   a	   bright	   beginning	   for	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   security	   architecture	   as	   activities	   of	   the	  Organ	  were	  effectively	  paralysed	  between	  1996	  and	  2001,	  over	  whether	  it	  should	  operate	  under	  the	  aegis	  of	  the	  SADC	  Summit	  or	  independently	  of	  it.	  Differing	  positions	  on	  how	  the	  Organ	   should	   operate	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   larger	   SADC	   led	   to	   polarized	   situation,	   famously	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘SADC	  impasse’	  (Malan	  &	  Cilliers,	  1997).	  	  	  Various	  explanations	  have	  been	  offered	  on	  the	  Organ	  impasse.	  One	  explanation	  is	  that	  the	  bone	  of	  contention	  over	  the	  locus	  of	  the	  Organ	  in	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  security	  structure	  was	  the	  desire	  to	  see	  a	  separation	  of	  political	  and	  security	  issues	  from	  economic	  issues	  to	  avoid	  excessive	  power	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  one	  Head	  of	  State,	  whilst	  the	  opposing	  view	  stressed	  the	  need	   for	   one	   center	   of	   decision	   to	   ensure	   an	   effective	   coordination	   of	   all	   sub-­‐regional	  efforts	  (Ndlovu,	  2010:	  12).	  Cawthra,	  however,	  argues	  that	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  disagreement	  was	  whether	  SADC	  Member	  States	  “were	  willing	  to	  accept	  potential	  de	  facto	  South	  African	  hegemony	  over	  both	   economic	   and	  political	   spheres,	   as	  well	   as	   involvement	   of	  what	   are	  now	   called	   International	   Cooperating	   Partners	   (ICPs)	   in	   political	   and	   security	   affairs”	  (2010:	  10).	  	  	  The	   other	   explanation	  was	   that	   the	   impasse	   that	   translated	   into	   an	  hostile	   environment,	  primarily	   between	   South	   Africa	   and	   Zimbabwe	   (Ngoma,	   2005:	   151),	   was	   basically	  attributed	   not	   only	   to	   geo-­‐politics	   in	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   body	   but	   also	   a	   personality	   clash	  between	   Presidents	   Nelson	   Mandela	   and	   Robert	   Mugabe,	   with	   the	   latter	   wishing	   to	  preserve	   the	   FLS	   tradition	   that	   the	   longest	   serving	   Head	   of	   State	   (in	   this	   case	   himself)	  retained	  the	  Organ’s	  chair	  (Molomo,	  2003:	  19;	  Francis,	  2006:	  193;	  Cawthra,	  2010:	  10).	  The	  interventions	  of	  DRC	  and	  Lesotho	  in	  1998	  by	  different	  groups	  of	  SADC	  Member	  States	  were	  practical	   situations	   that	   demonstrated	   the	   need	   to	   review	   the	   position	   of	   the	   Organ	   in	  relation	   to	   the	   larger	   SADC	   organization	   (Macaringue	   and	   Magano,	   2008:	   141).	   The	  impasse	  was	  ultimately	  resolved	  in	  March	  2001,	  with	  the	  Summit	  decision	  to	  integrate	  the	  Organ	  into	  the	  overall	  SADC	  structures,	  and	  thus	  making	  it	  report	  to	  the	  SADC	  Summit	  of	  Heads	  of	  States.	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A	  Protocol	  on	  Politics,	  Defence	  and	  Security	  Cooperation	  was	  adopted	  in	  that	  same	  year	  to	  institutionalise	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  Organ.	  The	  Protocol	  tasked	  the	  Organ	  with,	  inter	  alia,	  promoting	   regional	   cooperation	   on	   matters	   related	   to	   defence	   and	   security,	   preventing,	  containing	   and	   resolving	   inter-­‐and	   intra	   state	   conflicts	   by	   peaceful	   means,	   with	   the	  insistence	  that	  the	  use	  of	  force	  or	  enforcement	  action	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  last	  resort	  to	  be	  effected	  only	  with	  the	  authorisation	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council260.	  	  The	  Organ	  authority	  is	  exercised	  based	  on	  a	  Troika	  (different	  from	  the	  overall	  SADC	  Summit)	  that	  comprises	  of	  the	   Current	   Chairperson,	   In-­‐coming	   Chairperson	   (who	   serves	   as	   the	  Deputy	   Chair	   of	   the	  Organ),	   and	   the	  Outgoing	   Chairperson.	   The	  Organ	  Troika	   reports	   directly	   to	   the	   Summit	  and	  receives	  inputs	  from	  the	  Ministerial	  Committee	  of	  the	  Organ	  (MCO).	  MCO	  is	  made	  up	  of	  Ministers	  responsible	   for	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Defence,	  State	  and	  Public	  Security.	  The	  MCO,	   in	  turn,	  receives	  inputs	  from	  two	  committees	  that	  make	  key	  decisions,	  the	  Inter-­‐State	  Defence	  and	   Security	   Committee	   (ISDSC)	   and	   the	   Inter-­‐State	   Politics	   and	   Diplomacy	   Committee	  (ISPDC)	  (refer	  to	  the	  Organogram	   in	  chapter	  6).	  The	  Organ	  and	  its	  subsidiary	  committees	  are	   facilitated	  and	  coordinated	  by	   the	  Directorate	  of	  Politics,	  Defence	  and	  Security	  at	   the	  SADC	  Secretariat	  in	  Gaborone261.	  	  Since	   this	   chapter	   focuses	   on	   a	   case	   of	   domestic	   political	   crisis	   in	   one	   of	   the	   Southern	  African	  countries,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  Protocol	  on	  Politics,	  Defence	  and	   Security	   Cooperation,	   SADC	   has	   in	   place	   a	   normative	   framework	   for	   the	   conduct	   of	  democratic	   elections	   in	   the	   sub-­‐region.	   The	   SADC	   Principles	   and	   Guidelines	   Governing	  
Democratic	   Elections,	   which	   were	   adopted	   in	   2004,	   specify	   a	   raft	   of	   criteria	   covering	  various	   aspects	   of	   a	   competitive	   electoral	   process262.	   	   The	   most	   glaring	   flaw	   of	   these	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  Article	  2	  of	  the	  SADC	  Protocol	  on	  Politics,	  Defence	  and	  Security	  Cooperation,	  Gaborone,	  2001.	  261	  The	  Directorate	  has	  a	  relatively	  small	  staff	  compared	  to	  its	  counterparts	  in	  the	  economic	  side,	  making	  the	  few	  available	  personnel	  to	  attend	  to	  all	  peace	  and	  security-­‐related	  issues	  taking	  a	  toll	  on	  the	  people	  involved.	  This	  is	  according	  to	  Linda	  Ramokate,	  Politics	  and	  Diplomacy	  Officer	  at	  the	  SADC	  Secretariat,	  Gaborone,	  in	  an	  interview	  on	  16th	  November	  2010.	  262	  The	   other	   related	   set	   of	   instruments	   guiding	   the	   conduct	   of	   credible	   democratic	   elections	   in	   Southern	  Africa	   include	   the	   SADC	   Parliamentary	   Forum	  Norms	   and	   Standards	   (2001),	   and	   the	   Electoral	   Institute	   of	  Southern	  Africa/Electoral	  Commissions’	  Forum	  (2003).	  The	  Norms	  and	  Standards,	  nonetheless,	  as	  noted	  by	  Shannon	  Field,	   2003,	   “Introduction”,	   in	  Effects	  of	   the	  Zimbabwean	  Crisis	  on	  SADC:	  The	  Cases	  of	  South	  Africa,	  
Botswana,	   Namibia,	   Zambia	   and	  Mozambique,	   AISA	   Research	   Paper	   No.	   68,	   are	   merely	   a	   set	   of	   guidelines	  “signed	  by	  parliamentarians	  as	  opposed	  to	  governments,	  and	  thus	  are	  not	   legally	  binding,	  as	  they	  would	  be	  under	  a	  SADC	  protocol”,	  (p.	  8).	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guidelines,	   however,	   is	   that	   they	   are	   voluntary	   instrument	   calling	   for	   the	   resolution	   of	  election-­‐related	  disputes	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  national	  laws	  of	  SADC	  countries	  (Dzinesa	  and	   Zambara,	   2011:	   76).	   	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   Sub-­‐regional	   body	   can	   encourage	   Member	  States	  to	  adhere	  to	  the	  SADC	  elections	  principles	  and	  guidelines,	  but	  they	  have	  at	  best	  the	  “name	  and	  shame”	  effect	  to	  solicit	  compliance	  (Kesselman,	  2009a:	  6;	  Dzinesa	  and	  Zambara,	  2011:	  67).	  Their	  other	  ostensible	   shortcoming	   is	   that	   they	  do	  not	  prescribe	  any	  punitive	  measures	  against	  Member	  States	  found	  to	  flout	  the	  guidelines	  (Mulaudzi,	  2006:	  26).	  These	  deficiencies	  have	   led	  Oosthuizen	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  SADC	  elections	  guidelines	  are	  more	  about	   controlling	   SADC	   election	   observers	   and	   less	   about	   the	   conduct	   of	   democratic	  elections	   (2006:	  325).	  The	  norms	  and	   standards	  were,	   for	   instance,	   violated	   in	   the	  2005	  Zimbabwe	  elections,	  nevertheless,	   the	  sub-­‐regional	  organization	  went	  on	  to	  declare	  them	  free	  and	  fair	  based	  on	  reports	  of	  its	  observers	  (Cawthra,	  2010:	  25).	  	  	  It	   can	   be	   recalled	   that	   the	   FLS	   grouping	   that	   preceded	   the	   current	   security	   structures	  nurtured	   a	   tendency	   of	   treating	   political	   and	   security	   issues	   with	   utmost	   secrecy.	   This	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  passed	  on	  to	  the	  current	  coordination	  role	  of	  the	  Organ,	  in	  particular	  in	  keeping	  its	  activities	  away	  from	  other	  actors	  like	  civil	  society	  organizations	  and	  SADC’s	  international	  Cooperating	  Partners	  (ICPs)263.	  It	  is	  noted	  that	  civil	  society	  members	  and	  ICPs	  alike	  “register	  frustration	  on	  a	  regular	  basis	  at	  the	  lack	  of	  engagement	  with	  the	  Organ	  and	  its	   Directorate”	   (van	   Nieuwkerk,	   2009:	   111).	   This	   is	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   structured	  SADC-­‐Civil	   Society	   Partnership	  was	  mooted	   during	   the	   SADC	   Consultative	   Conference	   of	  2006.	   In	   a	   statement	   to	   the	   SADC	   Heads	   of	   State	   and	   Government,	   Civil	   Society	  Organizations	  (CSOs)	  expressed	  their	  disappointment	  on	  the	  level	  of	  engagement	  between	  them	   and	   SADC,	   and	   in	   particular	   were	   “concerned	   that	   apart	   from	   isolated	   and	   event	  specific	   collaboration	   and	   engagement	   between	   SADC	   and	   civil	   society	   has	   not	   been	  sufficiently	  institutionalized	  and	  consistent,	  resulting	  in	  the	  marginalization	  of	  civil	  society	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  263	  According	   to	   Linda	   Ramokate,	   SADC’s	   Politics	   and	   Diplomacy	   Officer,	   the	   Organ’s	   activities	   are	   held	   in	  much	  secrecy	  because	  diverse	   interests	  are	   involved	  and	  thus	  non-­‐members	  have	  been	   locked	  out	   to	  avoid	  distractions	  and	  ulterior	  motives	  of	  different	  actors	  who	  have	  a	  stake	  in	  certain	  issues,	  interview	  at	  the	  SADC	  Headquarters,	  Gaborone,	  16th	  November	  2010.	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in	  a	  number	  of	   regional	   integration	  processes”264.	  They,	   thus,	   called	  upon	  SADC	  States	   to	  ensure	   CSOs	   participation	   in	   SADC	   processes,	   including	   consultative	  meetings,	   joint	   task	  force	  meetings,	  core	  group	  meetings,	  thematic/cluster	  meetings	  and	  other	  such	  forums,	  is	  institutionalized.	  	  It	   can,	   thus,	   firmly	   be	   said	   that	   the	   facilitation	   and	   coordination	   of	   peace	   ad	   security	  activities	  is	  under	  the	  firm	  control	  of	  SADC	  Organ.	  The	  process	  leading	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Strategic	  Indicative	  Plan	  for	  the	  Organ	  (SIPO)	  that	  serves	  as	  an	  implementation	  plan	  for	   the	   Organ,	   itself	   was	   managed	   within	   the	   SADC	   structures.	   The	   SADC	   Summit	  established	  a	  Task	  Force	  comprising	  of	  the	  Troika	  of	  SADC	  and	  that	  of	  the	  Organ	  to	  develop	  the	  SIPO,	  and	  it	  took	  several	  meetings	  held	  in	  Harare,	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  Maseru	  and	  Gaborone	  between	  September	  2002	  and	  April	  2003	  to	  finalise	  the	  exercise	  (SADC,	  August,	  2003).	  	  	  In	  general,	  coordination	  of	  initiatives	  aimed	  at	  addressing	  the	  Zimbabwe,	  has	  in	  effect	  been	  monopolized	   by	   SADC	   with	   South	   Africa	   taking	   the	   lead	   role.	   As	   early	   as	   2001	   SADC	  Summit	  created	  another	  task	  force	  comprising	  of	  the	  SADC	  Troika:	  Botswana,	  Mozambique	  and	  South	  Africa,	  to	  work	  with	  the	  government	  of	  Zimbabwe	  on	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  issues	   affecting	   the	   country265.	   Kesselman	   (2009b:	   21)	   notes,	   “From	   that	   time	   onwards,	  Zimbabwe	  remained	  on	  the	  agenda	  of	  the	  SADC	  Organ	  and	  was	  a	  standing	  issue	  in	  report	  of	  the	  Chair	  of	  the	  Organ	  at	  SADC	  Summits".	  Creation	  of	  this	  task	  force	  to	  deal	  with	  internal	  problems	   of	   a	   Member	   State	   was	   “unprecedented”	   development	   in	   SADC’s	   history	  (Hammerstad,	   2003:	   16).	   It	   ought	   to	   be	   noted	   that	   coordination	   of	   the	   response	   to	   the	  Zimbabwe	  crisis	  has	  also	  been	  undertaken	  outside	  the	  tutelage	  of	  the	  Organ	  by	  individual	  SADC	  Member	   States,	  with	   South	  Africa	   taking	   the	   lead	   role.	   South	  Africa	   under	  Mbeki’s	  presidency	   established	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘constructive	   engagement’	   with	   Zimbabwe.	   These	  were	   basically	   bilateral	   negotiations	   between	   both	   South	   African	   and	   Zimbabwe	   finance	  ministers	   and	   central	   bank	   governors	   on	   an	   aid	   package	   proposed	   by	   the	   Mbeki	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  264	  Statement	  tot	  he	  SADC	  Heads	  of	  State	  signed	  by	  representatives	  of	  CSOs	  from	  across	  the	  Southern	  Africa	  sub-­‐region,	  meeting	  under	  the	  auspices	  oft	  he	  Fellowship	  of	  Christian	  Councils	  of	  Southern	  Africa	  (FOCCISA),	  Southern	   Africa	   Development	   Community-­‐Council	   of	   Non	   Governmental	   Organizations	   (SADC-­‐CNGO),	  Southern	  Africa	  Trade	  Union	  Coordination	  Council	  (SATUCC),	  from	  the	  8th-­‐9th,	  August	  2011	  in	  the	  Southern	  Africa	  Civil	  Society	  Forum.	  265	  SADC	  Heads	  of	  State	  and	  Government	  Summit	  Communiqué,	  Blantyre	  Malawi,	  August	  2001.	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government	  in	  August	  2005	  that	  would	  assist	  the	  latter	  to	  repay	  its	  debts	  to	  the	  IMF	  (Prys,	  2008:	  20).	  The	  next	   section	  examines	   actual	  measures	  undertaken	  by	  various	  key	  actors	  aimed	  at	  managing	  the	  Zimbabwe	  political	  crisis.	  	  8.4. Management	  of	  the	  Zimbabwe	  Political	  Crisis	  	  It	   can	  be	   recalled	   that	   the	   SADC	   arrangement	  makes	  preference	   for	   peaceful	  methods	   of	  resolving	   conflict	   within	   the	   territory	   of	   a	   Member	   State,	   which	   include	   preventive	  diplomacy,	  negotiations,	  conciliation,	  mediation,	  good	  offices,	  arbitration	  and	  adjudication	  by	  an	  international	  tribunal266.	  Some	  of	  these	  methods	  were	  used	  in	  attempting	  to	  address	  the	   Zimbabwe	   political	   crisis.	   Mediation	   was	   the	   first	   method	   to	   be	   applied,	   and	   it	   can	  firmly	  be	  stated	  here	  that	  it	  is	  this	  method	  that	  has	  taken	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  efforts	  to	  address	  the	  Zimbabwe	  political	  crisis.	  	  Adjudication	  by	  the	  SADC	  Tribunal	  has	  also	  been	  attempted.	  This	  section	  will	  thus	  show	  how	  various	  actors,	  within	  and	  outside	  the	  SADC	  arrangement,	  applied	  those	  peaceful	  methods	  to	  manage	  the	  crisis	  and	  the	  outcome	  of	  their	  initiatives.	  It	  can,	   therefore,	   be	   noted	   at	   the	   outset	   that	   more	   than	   several	   actors	   were	   engaged	   in	  attempt	  to	  manage	  the	  Zimbabwe	  political	  crisis.	  The	  analysis	  will	  commence	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  intra-­‐sub-­‐regional	  actors	  (i.e.	  actors	  within	  the	  SADC	  sub-­‐region	  like	  South	  Africa,	  other	  SADC	   Member	   States	   and	   CSOs),	   and	   then	   move	   on	   to	   extra-­‐regional	   actors	   (i.e.	   actors	  outside	  the	  SADC	  organization	  like	  the	  AU,	  Nigeria,	  UN,	  EU,	  U.S.,	  to	  mention	  a	  few).	  	  8.4.1.	  Mediation	  by	  Intra-­‐sub-­‐regional	  Actors	  	  For	  ease	  of	  understanding	  and	  for	  convenience,	  the	  ensuing	  analysis	  of	  mediation	  efforts	  in	  this	   sub-­‐section	   has	   been	   categorized	   into	   three	  main	   phases,	   namely	   phase	   one	   (2000-­‐	  May	   2007)	   featuring	   initial	   negotiations	   by	   South	   Africa;	   phase	   two	   (May	   2007-­‐	   March	  2008)	  covering	  the	  SADC-­‐mandated	  mediation	  process	  following	  the	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  SADC	  Extra-­‐ordinary	  Summit,	  and	  phase	  three	  (March	  2008-­‐2011)	  is	  about	  the	  South	  Africa-­‐led	  mediation	  in	  the	  post-­‐March	  2008	  Zimbabwe	  presidential	  election.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  266	  Article	  11	  (3)	  (a)	  of	  the	  Protocol	  on	  Politics,	  Defence	  and	  Security	  Cooperation.	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  In	   Phase	   one,	   right	   from	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   2000s,	   the	   Republic	   of	   South	   Africa	  established	  itself	  as	  the	  lead	  actor	  in	  trying	  to	  support	  its	  northern	  neighbour,	  Zimbabwe,	  to	  overcome	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  challenges	  even	  before	  the	  crisis	  reached	  its	  peak	  by	   the	   second	   half	   of	   that	   epoch.	   South	   Africa’s	   approach	   to	   Zimbabwe	  was	   adopted	   by	  engaging	  in	  negotiations	  on	  both	  bilateral	  and	  multilateral	  levels.	  On	  a	  bilateral	  level,	  since	  2000	   the	   Thabo	   Mbeki	   regime	   conducted	   a	   series	   of	   negotiations	   with	   the	   Mugabe	  government	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  a	  Joint	  Commission	  between	  the	  two	  countries,	  with	  a	  dedicated	  sub-­‐commission	  on	  foreign	  affairs.	  By	  March	  2000,	  the	  Zimbabwe	  situation	  was	  already	   volatile	   as	   there	  were	  widespread	   acts	   of	   violence	   and	   confrontation	   around	   the	  land	  question.	  South	  Africa	  shifted	  to	  multilateral	  efforts	  in	  attempt	  to	  resolve	  the	  issue	  of	  white	   farms	   invasions	   ahead	   of	   the	   June	   2000	   elections	   and	   amidst	   deteriorating	   UK-­‐Zimbabwe	  relations.	  President	  Mbeki	  offered	  to	  facilitate	  negotiations	  between	  the	  UK	  and	  Zimbabwe	   governments	   in	   efforts	   to	   address	   the	   land	   question	   and	   went	   on	   to	   engage	  Saudi	   Arabia	   and	   Norwegian	   governments	   looking	   for	   funds	   to	   Zimbabwe’s	   land	  resettlement	  scheme	  (Landsberg,	  2000).	  	  	  South	  Africa’s	  motivation	  to	  take	  the	  lead	  role	  towards	  Zimbabwe	  has	  largely	  been	  driven	  by	  its	  own	  interests	  and	  more	  importantly,	  the	  need	  to	  maintain	  stability	  and	  peaceful	  co-­‐existence,	  given	  the	  mere	  fact	  that	  more	  than	  90	  per	  cent	  of	  Zimbabweans	  migrants	  headed	  for	   South	  Africa	   (Field,	   2003:	   5)267.	   Correspondingly,	   South	  Africa	   did	   not	   fancy	   to	   go-­‐it-­‐alone	  with	   regard	   to	  Zimbabwe	  having	   learnt	   the	  pitfalls	  of	   a	  unilateral	   approach	  on	   the	  issue	   of	   Nigeria	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1990s,	   and	   more	   importantly	   was	   further	   concerned	   about	  being	  viewed	  as	  a	  sub-­‐regional	  bully,	  imposing	  its	  own	  agenda	  in	  conflict	  situations	  (Field,	  2003:	   5;	   Mlambo	   and	   Raftopoulos,	   2011:	   7).	   The	   Pretoria	   government,	   henceforth,	  conducted	   bilateral	   and	   multilateral	   negotiations	   on	   Zimbabwe	   while	   carrying	  consultations	  within	  the	  SADC	  framework.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  267	  This	   was	   also	   confirmed	   in	   an	   interview	   with	   Brigadier	   General	   Maaparankoe	   Mahao,	   Chief	   of	   Staff	  Planning	  Element-­‐SADC	  Headquarters,	  15th	  November	  2010.	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Phase	   two	   is	  marked	  by	   the	  decision	  of	   the	  2007	  SADC	  Extra-­‐ordinary	  Summit	   in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam.	   Perturbed	   by	   the	   pervasively	   polarised	   political	   situation	   and	   recurrence	   of	  political	  violence,	  especially	  after	   the	  public	  assault	  of	  opposition	  MDC	  officials,	   including	  Morgan	   Tsvangirai	   as	   well	   as	   some	   supporters	   and	   activists	   while	   in	   custody,	   SADC	  mandated	  President	  Mbeki	  to	  negotiate	  an	  inter-­‐party	  dialogue	  between	  the	  ruling	  ZANU-­‐PF	  and	  the	  two	  MDC	  factions	  (i.e.	  MDC-­‐T	  and	  MDC-­‐M),	  at	  an	  Extraordinary	  Summit	  in	  Dar	  es	   Salaam	   in	   May	   2007268 .	   This	   signified	   that	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   body	   had	   officially	  recognized	  that	  the	  Zimbabwe	  crisis	  is	  a	  problem	  requiring	  a	  sub-­‐regional	  response.	  It	  also	  denoted	   that	   for	   the	   first	   time	   President	   Mbeki’s	   mediation	   had	   a	   formal	   sub-­‐regional	  mandate,	  “including	  a	  requirement	  to	  report	  to	  the	  SADC	  summit	  on	  the	  talks	  that	  provides	  an	  element	  of	  accountability	  and	  pressure	  absent	  from	  earlier	  South	  African	  efforts	  with	  its	  neighbour”	  (ICG,	  September	  2007:	  12).	  The	  resulting	  mandate	  also	  laid	  a	  tacit	  admission	  by	  the	   SADC	   countries	   that	   the	   existing	   legislative	   framework	   and	   electoral	   conditions	   in	  Zimbabwe	   did	   not	   pass	   the	   criteria	   that	   would	   allow	   for	   the	   holding	   of	   free	   and	   fair	  elections	  in	  Zimbabwe	  (IDASA,	  2008:	  2).	  	  From	   the	   onset,	   it	   emerged	   that	   the	   publicly	   proclaimed	   goals	   of	   the	   SADC-­‐mandated	  mediation	  process	  “were	  to	  endorse	  a	  decision	  to	  hold	  harmonised	  presidential,	  parliament	  and	   local	   government	   elections	   in	   2008;	   agree	   on	   steps	   to	   be	   taken	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	  elections	  would	  be	  generally	  acceptable	  to	  all	  concerned	  and	  representative	  of	  the	  will	  of	  Zimbabwean	  voters;	  and	  agree	  on	  the	  measures	  that	  had	  to	  be	  implemented	  to	  create	  the	  climate	   that	  would	   facilitate	   such	   acceptance”	   (Solidary	  Peace	  Trust,	   2010	   as	   referred	   in	  Dzinesa	   and	   Zambara,	   2011:	   64),	   as	   well	   as	   resuming	   the	   process	   leading	   to	   “…the	  resumption	  of	  its	  development	  and	  reconstruction	  process	  intended	  to	  achieve	  a	  better	  life	  for	  all	  Zimbabweans…”269.	   In	  general,	  Mbeki’s	  mediation	  efforts	  concentrated	  on	  reaching	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  268	  This	   Summit	   also	   called	   for	   lifting	   of	   all	   forms	  of	   sanctions	   imposed	  on	  Zimbabwe,	  mandated	   the	   SADC	  Executive	   Secretary	   to	   undertake	   a	   study	   on	   the	   economic	   situation	   in	   Zimbabwe	   and	   thereafter	   propose	  measures	  on	  how	  SADC	  can	  assist	   Zimbabwe	   recover	   economically,	   and	   reiterated	   the	  appeal	   to	  Britain	   to	  honour	   its	   compensation	   obligations	   with	   regards	   to	   land	   reform	   made	   at	   the	   Lancaster	   House.	   See	  Communiqué	  2007	  Extra-­‐Ordinary	  SADC	  Summit	  of	  Heads	  of	  State	  and	  Government,	  28th	  -­‐	  29th	  March	  2007,	  Dar-­‐es-­‐Salaam.	  269	  Letter	   from	  President	  Mbeki	   to	  Morgan	  Tsvangirai	  and	  Arthur	  Mutambara,	  copied	   to	  Robert	  Mugabe,	  as	  quoted	  in	  Mlambo	  and	  Rafropoulos,	  2010,“The	  Regional	  Dimensions	  of	  Zimbabwe’s	  Multi-­‐layered	  Crisis:	  	  An	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an	   agreement	   that	   would	   ensure	   political	   conditions	   for	   the	   holding	   of	   free	   and	   fair	  elections	  in	  Zimbabwe	  were	  in	  place	  (IDASA,	  2008:	  1).	  	  	  Mbeki’s	   mediation	   embraced	   all	   the	   three	   roles	   that	   mediators	   can	   play	   to	   marshal	   the	  interests	  of	  all	   the	   involved	  parties	   toward	  a	  mutually	  acceptable	  solution	   to	   the	  conflict,	  namely	  communication,	  formulation	  and	  manipulation270.	  President	  Mbeki,	  who	  preferred	  to	   handle	   the	   mediation	   process	   behind	   closed	   doors,	   giving	   rise	   to	   the	   term	   ‘quiet	  diplomacy’,	   hoping	   that	   tough	   talk	  behind	   the	   scenes	  would	  achieve	   far	  much	  more	   than	  publicly	   lashing	   at	   the	   disputing	  parties,	  managed	   to	   communicate	   and	  bring	   the	  parties	  together	   for	   talks	   (Kesselman,	   2009b).	   Mbeki	   went	   on	   to	   formulate	   a	   roadmap	   for	   the	  negotiations,	  also	  managed	  to	  reduce	  the	  asymmetry	  between	  the	  parties	  and	  got	  them	  to	  agree	   on	   key	   electoral	   reforms	   (IDASA,	   2008;	   Kesselman,	   2009b;	   Dzinesa	   and	   Zambara,	  2011).	  The	  parties	  agreed	  amendments	  to	  the	  Broadcasting	  Service	  Act	  (BSA),	  the	  Access	  to	  Information	  and	  Protection	  of	  Privacy	  Act	  (AIPPA)	  and	  the	  Public	  Order	  and	  Security	  Act	  (POSA).	  Changes	  to	  the	  electoral	  laws	  included	  a	  requirement	  to	  post	  the	  preliminary	  vote	  counts	  outside	  of	  polling	  stations.	  To	  some	  extent	   these	  changes	  created	  a	  slightly	  better	  political	  climate	  that	  relatively	  reduced	  the	  levels	  of	  pre-­‐election	  violence	  in	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  March	  2008	  elections	  (Dzinesa	  and	  Zambara,	  2011:	  64).	  	  	  Finally,	   phase	   three	   (i.e.	   the	   post-­‐	   March	   2008	   Presidential	   elections)	   saw	   intensified	  efforts	  by	  the	  SADC	  mandated	  mediator	  that	  culminated	  into	  a	  political	  agreement.	  Prior	  to	  a	  negotiated	   agreement,	   the	   country	   relapsed	   into	   a	  wave	  of	   political	   violence	   in	   several	  parts	   following	   a	   five-­‐week	   delay	   in	   announcing	   the	   March	   2008	   presidential	   results	  prompting	  the	  opposition	  candidate,	  Tsvangirai,	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  June	  run-­‐off.	  Before	  the	  June	  elections,	  SADC	  intensified	  diplomatic	  efforts	  to	  convince	  all	  the	  political	  parties	  to	  accept	   the	  March	   election	   results	   and	   participate	   in	   the	   run-­‐off	   (Angola	   Press	   Agency,	   5	  May	  2008).	  On	  12	  April	  2008,	  the	  Zambian	  President	  Levy	  Mwanawasa,	  by	  then	  the	  SADC	  chairperson,	  convened	  an	  Extraordinary	  Summit	  of	  SADC	  heads	  of	  State	  and	  Government	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Analysis“,	  Election	  Processes,	  Liberation	  Movements	  and	  Democratic	  Change	  in	  Africa	  Conference,	  Maputo,	  8-­‐11	  April.	  270	  Recall	  Zartman	  and	  Touval	  (2007)	  as	  referred	  in	  chapter	  three	  of	  the	  current	  study.	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specifically	  on	  Zimbabwe.	  South	  Africa’s	  Mbeki	  and	  Zimbabwe’s	  Mugabe	  did	  not	  consider	  the	  meeting	  necessary	  and	  the	  latter	  snubbed	  it	  by	  sending	  a	  minister	  in	  his	  place271.	  This	  alone	  was	  suggestive	  of	  differences	  and	  divisions	  within	   the	  sub-­‐regional	  body	  regarding	  the	  Zimbabwe	  political	  crisis	  (Badza,	  2008).	  Even	  “	  the	  final	  statement	  concealed	  important	  differences	   between	   the	   regional	   leaders,	   with	   Mbeki	   and	   Angola’s	   dos	   Santos	   resisting	  calls	   for	  a	   tougher	   line	   from	  Kikwete,	  Mwanawasa	  and	  Botswana’s	   Ian	  Khama”	  (ICG,	  May	  2008:	  10).	  The	  Lusaka	  Summit	  Communiqué,	  however,	  called	  for	  the	  results	  to	  be	  released	  “expeditiously”	  and	   to	  ensure	  a	  run-­‐off	  election	   is	  held	   in	  a	   “secure	  environment”272.	  The	  Angolan	   President	   dos	   Santos	   also	   sent	   a	   SADC	  Ministerial	   Troika	   on	   shuttle	   diplomacy	  meetings	  with	  Presidents	  Mugabe	  in	  Harare,	  Mwanawasa	  in	  Lusaka	  and	  Mbeki	  in	  Pretoria	  on	  May	  7	  2008273.	  	  	  Experience	   also	   show	   that	   SADC	   leaders	   and	   the	   Mbeki-­‐led	   mediation	   team	   applied	  strategies	  to	  manipulate	  the	  parties	  into	  agreeing	  certain	  positions	  or	  making	  concessions	  before	  and	  after	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Global	  Partnership	  Agreement	  (GPA)	  in	  September	  2008.	  Before	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  GPA,	  the	  mediator	  laboured	  to	  influence	  one	  of	  the	  negotiating	  parties,	   the	   seemingly	   reluctant	  MDC,	   to	   accept	   constitutional	   amendment	   eighteen	   that	  expanded	  the	  size	  of	  the	  parliament	  (i.e.	  the	  upper	  house	  was	  increased	  from	  66	  to	  93	  seats	  whilst	   the	   lower	   house	   from	   120	   to	   210	  members)	   and	   empowered	   it	   to	   choose	   a	   new	  president	   by	   a	   two-­‐thirds	   majority	   of	   both	   houses	   should	   the	   office	   become	   vacant	   by	  resignation,	  death,	   impeachment	  or	  illness.	  The	  MDC	  viewed	  these	  reforms	  would	  further	  entrenched	  ZANU-­‐PF’s	  rule	  and	  had	   initially	  vowed	  to	  block	  them	  (Mail	  and	  Guardian,	  13	  June	   2007).	   President	   Mbeki	   wanted	   to	   move	   the	   mediation	   process	   forward,	   and	   thus	  exerted	  pressure	  on	  the	  MDC,	  which	  acquiesced	  to	  the	  amendment	  leading	  to	  its	  adoption	  on	  18	  September	  2007	  (ICG,	  March	  2008:	  2).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  271	  The	  opposition	  leader	  Tsvangirai	  attended	  the	  SADC	  extraordinary	  summit	  in	  Lusaka.	  Member	  States,	  with	  the	   exception	   of	   Zimbabwe,	   held	   informal	   consultations	   with	   presidential	   candidates,	   Tsvangirai	   and	   Dr	  Simba	  Makoni.	  	  272	  SADC	  First	  Extraordinary	  Summit	  of	  Heads	  of	  State	  and	  Government,	  Lusaka,	  Zambia,	  13	  April	  2008.	  273 	  The	   Ministerial	   Troika	   comprised	   of	   Angola’s	   Foreign	   Minister,	   Joao	   Miranda,	   Swaziland’s	   Foreign	  Minister,	  Mathendele	  Dlaminie,	  and	  Tanzania’s	  Deputy	  Defence	  Minister,	  Emmanuel	  Nchimbi,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  SADC	  Executive	  Secretary,	  Tomaz	  Salomao.	  Crisis	  Group	  Africa	  Briefing	  No	  51,	  21	  May	  2008,	  p.	  10.	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Other	   SADC	   countries,	   acting	   individually,	   also	   exerted	   influence	   on	   President	   Mugabe	  while	   the	   South	  Africa-­‐led	  mediation	  was	   on-­‐going.	   In	   April	   2008,	   Zambia,	  Mozambique,	  Namibia	   and	   Angola,	   all	   declined	   to	   accept	   a	   Chinese	   ship	   loaded	   with	   weapons	   and	  ammunition274.	   Zambia’s	  Mwanawasa	   openly	   called	   for	   other	   States	   in	   the	   sub-­‐region	   to	  bar	  the	  ship	  from	  entering	  their	  wasters	  (ICG,	  May	  2008:	  10).	  Angola	  later	  allowed	  the	  ship	  to	  dock	  to	  offload	  other	  cargo	  (Guma,	  2008	  as	  referred	  in	  ICG,	  2008:	  10).	  	  Ultimately,	   the	   parties	   (i.e.	   ZANU-­‐PF,	   MDC-­‐T	   and	   MDC-­‐M)	   reached	   a	   power-­‐sharing	  agreement	   in	   the	  name	  of	   the	  GPA	   in	  September	  2008	   following	  a	  prolonged	  negotiation	  process	  that	  resumed	  after	  the	  controversial	  June	  re-­‐election	  of	  Mugabe.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  signed	   GPA	   was	   without	   clear	   implementation	   modalities,	   thus	   fuelling	   wrangling	   over	  allocation	   of	   posts	   and	   other	   components	   of	   the	   agreement275.	   Several	   Organ	   Troika	  meetings	   were	   held	   in	   the	   month	   of	   October	   2008	   to	   review,	   among	   other	   issues,	   the	  security	  situation	  and	  political	  deadlock	   in	  Zimbabwe276.	  Differences	  between	   the	  parties	  over	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   GPA	   delayed	   the	   inauguration	   of	   the	   power-­‐sharing	  government	   until	   February	   2009.	   	   By	   October	   2009,	   the	   MDC-­‐T	   had	   suspended	   its	  participation	   in	   the	   joint	   structures	  of	   the	   Inclusive	  Government	   (IG),	   although	   it	  did	  not	  withdraw	   from	   the	   GPA	   altogether.	   SADC	   held	   an	   emergency	   Heads	   of	   State	   and	  Government	  Summit	  in	  Maputo,	  Mozambique	  on	  5	  November	  and	  gave	  the	  parties	  a	  thirty-­‐day	  deadline	   to	   resolve	  outstanding	   issues	   and	  get	   the	   IG	  back	  on	   track	   (Cawthra,	   2010:	  26).	  The	  deadline	  passed	  without	  a	  resolution	  on	  substantive	  issues.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  274	  The	  Zimbabwe	  bound	   arms	   shipment	  was	   ordered	  before	   the	  2008	   election	   crisis.	   It	   initially	   docked	   at	  Durban,	  but	  could	  not	  offload	  as	  dock	  workers	  refused	  to	  do	  so.	  See	  Cecilia	  W.	  Dugger,	  2008,“Zimbabwe	  arms	  shipped	  by	  China	  spark	  an	  uproar“,	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  19	  April.	  275	  The	  MDC-­‐T	  was	  opposed	  to	  the	  appointments	  of	  the	  attorney	  general	  and	  reserve	  bank	  governor,	  and	  was	  not	  happy	  with	  the	  arrest	  of	  its	  deputy	  agriculture	  minister,	  Roy	  Bennett,	  on	  treason	  and	  terrorism	  charges.	  For	   its	   part,	   ZANU-­‐PF,	   lamented	   that	   the	   MDC-­‐T	   was	   not	   working	   to	   see	   to	   it	   that	   sanctions	   imposed	   on	  Zimbabwe	  by	  the	  West,	  are	  lifted.	  276	  See	   Communiqué,	   Extra-­‐ordinary	   Summit	   of	   OPDS	   Troika,	   17th	   August	   2008,	   Sandston,	   South	   Africa;	  Communiqué,	  Extra-­‐ordinary	  Summit	  of	  OPDS	  Troika,	  27-­‐28,	  October,	  Harare,	  South	  Africa.	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Negotiations	  resumed	  under	  the	  office	  of	  the	  new	  South	  African	  president,	  Jacob	  Zuma277.	  Dzinesa	  and	  Zambara	  (2011)	  rightly	  observe	  that	  SADC’s	  key	  mistake	  was	  not	  anticipating	  the	  need	  to	  set	  up	  impartial	  structures	  that	  would	  assist	  in	  monitoring	  and	  evaluating	  the	  implementation	   of	   the	   GPA,	   “which	   it	   had	   so	   painstakingly	   helped	   to	   negotiate”	   (p.	   64).	  	  They	   further	   contend	   that	   the	   Joint	  Monitoring	   and	   Implementation	   Committee	   (JOMIC)	  “was	  flawed	  from	  the	  start	  because	  it	  made	  the	  three	  political	  parties	  both	  the	  players	  and	  the	  referees,	   leaving	  full	   implementation	  of	  the	  GPA	  vulnerable	  to	  non-­‐compliance	  by	  any	  of	  the	  parties	  since	  there	  was	  no	  external	  supervision	  by	  SADC”	  (2011:	  65)278.	  	  	  There	  is	  further	  evidence	  to	  indicate	  that	  SADC	  had	  since	  attempted	  to	  further	  impose	  its	  influence	   on	   Zimbabwe’s	   embattled	   government.	   The	   SADC	   Organ	   Troika	   meeting	   in	  Livingstone,	  Zambia	  on	  31	  March	  2011,	  publicly	  noted	  “with	  grave	  concern	  the	  polarization	  of	  the	  political	  environment	  as	  characterized	  by,	  inter	  alia,	  resurgence	  of	  violence,	  arrests	  and	   intimidation	   in	   Zimbabwe”	   and	   expressed	   its	   “disappointment”	   at	   the	   slow	   pace	   of	  implementation	   of	   outstanding	   issues	   in	   the	   GPA	   (SADC,	  March	   2011)279.	   This	   approach	  was	  in	  sharp	  contrast	  to	  old	  tradition	  of	  SADC	  Member	  States	  to	  publicly	  ‘close	  ranks’,	  most	  of	  the	  time,	  with	  the	  incumbent	  Head	  of	  State,	  in	  this	  case	  Mugabe	  (Field,	  2003;	  Oosthuizen,	  2006;	   Cawthra,	   2010;	   Mavhinga,	   2011).	   SADC	   leaders’	   approach	   since	   they	   began	   to	  address	  the	  worsening	  situation	  in	  Zimbabwe	  in	  2000	  had	  been	  not	  to	  openly	  criticize	  the	  ZANU-­‐PF	  regime,	  some	  of	  them	  motivated	  by	  the	  desire	  “to	  maintain	  the	  bonds	  of	  solidarity	  between	   liberation	   movements…”	   (Field,	   2003:	   3).	   Nonetheless,	   as	   revealed	   by	   Gavin	  Cawthra’s	  study	  on	  Zimbabwe	  and	  Madagascar,	  behind	  closed	  doors	  SADC	  has	  taken	  much	  tougher	   positions	   against	   the	   Zimbabwean	   government	   than	   it	   has	   admitted	   to	   publicly	  (2010:	  31).	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  Mbeki	  lost	  the	  presidency	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  ruling	  party,	  the	  African	  National	  Congress	  (ANC),	  to	  the	  former	  deputy	  president	  Jacob	  Zuma	  in	  December	  2007,	  and	  thus	  had	  to	  vacate	  the	  Republic’s	  presidential	  office.	  278	  The	  new	  mediator,	  President	  Zuma,	  later	  appointed	  a	  three-­‐member	  facilitation	  team	  to	  assist	  the	  JOMIC	  in	   monitoring	   the	   coalition	   government,	   comprising	   Lindiwe	   Zulu,	   political	   advisor	   Charles	   Nqakula	   and	  special	  envoy	  Mac	  Maharaj.	  279	  SADC	  Communiqué	  Summit	  of	  the	  Organ	  Troika	  on	  Politics,	  Defence	  and	  Security	  Cooperation“,	  31	  March	  2011,	  Livingstone,	  Zambia.	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8.4.2.	  	  Adjudication	  by	  the	  SADC	  Tribunal	  	  As	   explained	   in	   section	   8.2	   of	   the	   current	   chapter,	   the	   Zimbabwe	   political	   crisis	   had	   an	  economic	   dimension	   to	   it,	   characterized	   by	   unprecedented	   meltdown	   of	   the	   entire	  economy	   that	   heightened	   exodus	   of	   Zimbabwe	   refugees	   to	   neighbouring	   States	   and	   sent	  negative	  ramifications	  to	  Zimbabwe’s	  trading	  partners	  in	  the	  sub-­‐region.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  recall	   this	   aspect	   of	   the	   Zimbabwe	   crisis	   since	   it	   is	   rather	   difficult	   to	   dissociate	   the	  country’s	   problems	   with	   the	   highly	   volatile	   issue	   of	   land	   reform,	   which	   was	   partly	  responsible	   for	  a	  series	  of	  violent	  acts	  amongst	  a	  section	  of	  Zimbabweans.	  This	  brings	   to	  the	  limelight	  the	  SADC	  Tribunal	  that	  has	  also	  attempted	  to	  play	  some	  role	  in	  addressing	  the	  Zimbabwe	  crisis.	  	  	  The	  SADC	  Tribunal,	  based	  in	  Windhoek,	  was	  established	  in	  2003.	  The	  Tribunal	  offers	  legal	  recourse	   for	   aggrieved	   citizens	   from	   SADC	   Member	   States	   who	   do	   not	   get	   satisfactory	  rulings	   in	   their	  own	  countries,	  or	   for	  whatever	   reason,	   find	  domestic	   courts	  unwilling	  or	  unable	  to	  offer	  effective	  remedy.	  In	  2007,	  a	  group	  of	  Zimbabwean	  white	  farmers	  took	  their	  case	  to	  the	  Tribunal,	  seeking	  redress	  after	   they	   lost	   their	   farms	  and	  properties	  under	  the	  land	   reforms	   program.	   The	   SADC	   Tribunal	   ruled	   in	   November	   2008	   that	   the	   seizures	   of	  land	   plots	   under	   the	   reform	   program	  were	   against	   the	   SADC	   Treaty	   because	   they	   were	  discriminatory	  in	  nature,	  and	  ordered	  the	  Zimbabwe	  government	  to	  protect	  the	  78	  farmers	  and	  pay	  compensation	  for	  land	  already	  seized	  (Bell,	  2010).	  	  The	  Tribunal	  also	  ruled	  that	  the	  Mugabe	   government	   was	   in	   contempt	   of	   court	   for	   ignoring	   its	   rulings.	   It,	   thus,	   referred	  Zimbabwe	  to	   the	  SADC	  Council	  of	  Ministers	   for	  appropriate	  action	   following	  the	   former’s	  persistent	  refusal	  to	  honour	  the	  Tribunal’s	  rulings280.	  	  	  In	  the	  spirit	  of	  honouring	  the	  SADC	  Treaty,	  the	  Council	  ought	  to	  have	  sought	  to	  enforce	  the	  Tribunal’s	  rulings	  by	  recommending	  either	  sanctions	  or	  suspension	  for	  Zimbabwe	  as	  it	  had	  previously	  done	   in	   the	   case	  of	   another	   SADC	  member,	  Madagascar.	  The	  SADC	  Summit	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  280	  Mugabe	  government	  snubbed	   the	  Tribunal’s	   rulings,	  declaring	   them	   ’null	  and	  void’.	  The	  Zimbabwe	  High	  Court	  also	  ruled	  that	  the	  SADC	  Tribunal’s	  rulings	  have	  no	  authority	  in	  Zimbabwe,	  despite	  the	  country	  being	  a	  signatory	  to	  the	  SADC	  Treaty.	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Heads	  of	  State	  and	  Government	  preferred	   instead	   to	  effectively	   suspend	   the	  Tribunal	   for	  six	  months	   “under	   the	  guise	  of	   a	   review	  process,	   thus	  avoiding	  dealing	  with	  Zimbabwe’s	  non-­‐compliance”	   (Fritz,	   2011:	   62)281.	   The	   SADC	   lawyers’	  Association	  noted	  with	   concern	  that	  the	  suspension	  of	  the	  Tribunal	  was	   illegal	  and	  ultra	  vires	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  SADC	  Treaty	  and	  the	  Protocol	  on	  the	  SADC	  Tribunal,	  and	  called	  for	  the	  decision	  to	  be	  reversed282.	  	  One	  grave	  repercussion	  of	  this	  decision	  is	  that	  it	  has	  dealt	  a	  serious	  blow	  to	  the	  Tribunal’s	  and	   the	  entire	  SADC	   integrity	  and	   thus	   far	  disapproving	  adjudication	  by	  an	   international	  tribunal,	  which	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  SADC	  Protocol	  on	  Politics,	  Defence	  and	  Security	  is	  one	  of	  the	  advocated	  peaceful	  methods	  of	  resolving	  disputes	  between	  SADC	  States	  and	  their	  citizens	  in	  the	  sub-­‐region.	  	  	  	  8.4.3.	  CSOs	  Involvement	  	  From	  the	  inception	  of	  the	  SADC-­‐led	  mediation	  CSOs,	  both	  local	  and	  sub-­‐regional	  networks	  were	   sidelined	   from	   the	   negotiations.	   This	   was	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   various	   CSOs	  presented	   their	   views	   to	   the	   South	   African	   facilitators	   and	   the	   MDC-­‐T.	   CSOs	   were	  increasingly	   disappointed	   by	   the	   decision	   of	   the	   SADC-­‐led	   mediation	   team	   to	   limit	   the	  negotiations	   to	   only	   three	   political	   parties,	   “and	   protested	   that	   they	  were	   being	   used	   to	  ‘popularise’	   the	   process	  without	   being	   substantially	   involved”	   (Mlambo	   and	  Raftopoulos,	  2010:	  8)283.	  In	  2008,	  for	  instance,	  various	  Zimbabwe	  CSOs	  demonstrated	  at	  the	  Mulungushi	  International	  Conference	  Centre	  in	  Lusaka,	  which	  was	  the	  venue	  of	  the	  SADC	  Extraordinary	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  The	  decision	  to	  review	  the	  Tribunal’s	  role,	  functions,	  and	  terms	  of	  reference	  was	  taken	  at	  the	  13th	  SADC	  Summit	   in	  Windhoek,	  Namibia	   in	  August	  2010.	  The	   six-­‐month	   suspension	  was	   later	   extended	  until	  August	  2012.	  	  As	  observed	  by	  the	  Senior	  Defence	  Affairs	  and	  Planning	  Officer	  at	  the	  SADC	  Headquarters,	  Col.	  Gerson	  M.	   Sangiza,	   in	   an	   interview	   on	   15th	  November	   2010,	   issues	   surrounding	   the	   Tribunal	   2008	   rulings	   and	   its	  eventual	  suspension	  were	  a	  bit	  complex	  and	  	  more	  political.	  	  282	  Resolutions	   of	   the	   SADC	   Lawyers	   Association	   12th	   Annual	   General	   Meeting	   and	   Conference	   held	   in	  Maputo,	  Mozambique	  from	  4-­‐6th,	  August	  2011.	  283	  See	  also	  a	  compendium	  of	  positions	   taken	  by	  CSOs	   in	  Zimbabwe	  on	  the	   talks	  between	  ZANU-­‐PF	  and	  the	  two	  formations	  oft	  he	  MDC,	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  SADC,	  titled	  “ZANU-­‐PF	  and	  MDC	  negotiations	  for	  a	  future	  authority	   in	   Zimbabwe:	   Benchmarks	   fort	   he	   Assessment	   of	   outcomes	   and	   recommendations	   from	  Zimbabwean	   civil	   society“,	   compiled	   by	   Zimbabwe	  Watch	   and	   Europe	   External	   Policy	   Advisors	   (EEPA)	   13	  August	  2008.	  See	  also	  “Zimbabwe:	  Government	  and	  opposition	  leave	  civil	  society	  out	  of	  talks“,	  IRIN,	  Harare,	  21	  June	  2007.	  Besides	  calling	  upon	  the	  SADC	  led	  mediation	  to	  accommodate	  a	  plethora	  of	  groupings	  including	  civic	   groupings,	   churches,	   and	   smaller	   political	   parties,	   various	   CSOs’	   forums	   expressed	   their	   scepticism	  about	  Mbeki’s	  impartiality	  as	  a	  mediator	  following	  his	  comment	  that	  there	  was	  ’no	  crisis	  in	  Zimbabwe’.	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Summit,	   protesting	   against	   the	   undue	  delay	   in	   the	   release	   of	   the	  March	  presidential	   poll	  results	  (Badza,	  2008:	  11).	  	  	  On	   the	   reason	  behind	  CSOs	   exclusion	   from	   the	   talks,	  Mlambo	   and	  Raftopoulos	   (2010:	   8)	  note	   that	   “…there	   was	   general	   agreement	   between	   both	   the	   SA	   facilitators	   and	   the	   two	  MDCs,	   that	   the	   involvement	   of	   civil	   society	   groups	  would	   cause	   enormous	   delays	   in	   the	  negotiations,	  and	  none	  of	  the	  players	  in	  the	  negotiations	  wished	  to	  entertain	  such	  delays”.	  This	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   there	  was	   no	   direct	   attempt	   by	   a	   section	   of	   Zimbabwe	  CSOs	   to	  claim	   a	   role	   in	   resolving	   the	   crisis.	   Leaders	   of	   three	   main	   Christian	   groupings-­‐the	  Zimbabwe	   Catholic	   Bishops	   Conference	   (ZCBC),	   the	   Evangelical	   Fellowship	   of	   Zimbabwe	  (EFZ)	   and	   the	  Zimbabwe	  Council	   of	   Churches	   (ZCC)	  unsuccessfully	  promoted	   inter-­‐party	  dialogue	   by	   holding	   meetings	   with	   leaders	   of	   the	   two	   main	   political	   parties	   (Chitando,	  2011:	  4).	  	  The	   outcome	   of	   the	   South	   Africa-­‐led,	   SADC	  mediation	   has	   not	  met	   its	   proclaimed	   goals.	  When	   the	   SADC	   mandated	   mediation	   formally	   took	   off	   under	   South	   Africa’s	   Mbeki,	   the	  publicly	  pronounced	  objective	  was	  to	  see	  to	  it	  that	  the	  parties	  reach	  an	  agreement	  paving	  way	   for	   immediate	   elections	   in	  Zimbabwe	   to	  be	   conducted	   in	   an	  atmosphere	   that	  would	  result	  in	  free	  and	  fair	  elections.	  In	  retrospect,	  the	  harmonised	  elections	  in	  2008	  were	  not.	  Mbeki	   later	   revised	   his	   initial	   stated	   goal	   of	   producing	   credible	   elections	   to	   having	  facilitated	   inter-­‐party	   dialogue	   that	   left	   unresolved	   “few	   procedural	   matters”284.	   SADC’s	  mediation	  has	  indeed,	  facilitated	  inter-­‐party	  talks	  leading	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Inclusive	  Government,	   and	   prevented	   the	   country	   from	   slipping	   into	   a	   full-­‐scale	   civil	   war	  (Kesselman,	   2009b;	   Cawthra,	   2011).	   The	   mediation	   has	   also	   led	   to	   a	   slightly	   improved	  electoral	  environment	  (HRW,	  June	  2008a)	  but	  has	  been	  unable	  to	  bring	  pressure	  to	  bear	  on	  the	   coalition	   government	   to	   implement	   the	  GPA	   in	   earnest	   to	   ensure	   holding	   of	   credible	  elections	   and	   avoid	   a	   relapse	   to	   an	   orgy	   of	   politically-­‐motivated	   violence.	   Candidly,	   the	  Zimbabwe	  domestic	  political	  crisis	  has	  dragged	  on	  for	  far	  too	  long,	  since	  it,	  firstly,	  appeared	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  284	  Thabo	  Mbeki,	  “State	  of	  the	  Nation	  Address	  of	  the	  President	  of	  South	  Africa,	  Thabo	  Mbeki:	   Joint	  Sitting	  of	  Parliament”,	   8	   February	   2008,	   at	  www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2008/.	   The	  Mugabe-­‐led	   government	   had	  refused	   to	   implement	  much	  of	  agreements	  related	   tot	  he	  constitutional	   reforms	  until	  after	   the	  March	  2008	  elections.	  See	  ICG,	  20	  March	  2008,	  op.	  Cit;	  IDASA,	  2008,	  p.	  4.	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as	  a	  ‘problem	  issue’	  to	  SADC	  in	  2000	  and	  became	  a	  constant	  item	  on	  the	  agenda	  of	  the	  SADC	  Organ	   chairperson	   thereafter.	   Table	  10	  presents	   a	   summary	  of	   the	   key	   events	   related	   to	  efforts	  at	  resolving	  the	  Zimbabwe	  domestic	  political	  crisis.	  
Table	  10:	  Chronology	  of	  Major	  Events	  Related	  to	  Efforts	  Aimed	  at	  
Addressing	  the	  Zimbabwe	  Political	  Crisis	  	   2000	   South	  Africa’s	  President	  Mbeki	  conducts	  a	  series	  of	  bilateral	  and	  multilateral	  negotiations	  with	  the	  Zimbabwe	  government	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  a	  joint	  commission	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  June	   Zimbabwe	  Parliamentary	  elections	  	   	  2002	  March	   Zimbabwe	  Presidential	  elections	  	   	  2005	  March	   Zimbabwe	  Parliamentary	  elections	  	   	  	  2007	  	  May	   	  SADC	  mandates	  President	  Mbeki	  to	  negotiate	  political	  agreement	  between	  ZANU-­‐PF	  and	  the	  MDCs	  	  	   	  	  2008	  March	  	  
	  Zimbabwe	  Presidential	  elections	  	  	  MDC’s	  Tsvangirai	  wins	  with	  47.9%	  of	  the	  votes	  to	  ZANU-­‐PF’s	  Mugabe	  with	  43.2%	  	  	  Wave	  of	  politically-­‐motivated	  violence	  directed	  toward	  MDC	  followers	  in	  Zimbabwe	  	  	  June	   	  Tsvangirai	  withdraws	  from	  the	  run-­‐off	  	  	  Mugabe	  victorious	  in	  the	  one-­‐	  man	  presidential	  election	  race	  	  	  AU	   Summit	   in	   Egypt	   mandates	   SADC	   to	   resume	   mediation	   of	   the	  Zimbabwe	  crisis	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  September	   	  	  ZANU-­‐PF	  and	  MDCs	  sign	  the	  GPA	  Different	  views	  between	  parties	  delays	  the	  inauguration	  of	  the	  IG	  until	  February	  2009	  	  	  	   	  	  2009	  January	   	  JOMIC	  launched	  to	  ensure	  parties’	  compliance	  with	  the	  GPA	  	  	   	  2010	  August	   The	  13th	  SADC	  Summit	  of	  Heads	  of	  State	  and	  Governments	  in	  Windhoek	  suspends	  the	  SADC	  Tribunal	  for	  six	  months	  pending	  a	  review	  of	  its	  role,	  functions	  and	  terms	  of	  reference.	  Source:	  own	  compilation	  	  The	  subsequent	  sub-­‐sections	  bring	  in	  the	  role	  played	  by	  other	  actors,	  non-­‐SADC	  members	  within	   as	  well	   as	   outside	   Africa,	   in	   the	  management	   of	   the	   Zimbabwe	   domestic	   political	  crisis.	  	  8.4.4.	  Extra-­‐regional	  Actors:	  The	  AU	  and	  Nigeria	  	  Zimbabwe	  has	  been	  under	  the	  AU	  radar	  since	  the	  country’s	  situation	  begun	  to	  deteriorate	  in	  2000.	  In	  2002	  the	  AU	  sent	  its	  election	  observation	  team,	  which	  endorsed	  the	  presidential	  election	  as	  legitimate,	  free	  and	  fair.	  However,	  a	  delegation	  from	  the	  African	  Commission	  for	  Human	  and	  People’s	  Rights	  (ACHPR)	  delivered	  a	  damning	  report	  that	  pointed	  an	  accusing	  finger	  at	  Mugabe’s	  government	  for	  police	  abuses,	  press	  censorship,	  and	  an	  encroachment	  into	   the	   judiciary285.	  The	  ACHPR	  produced	  an	  equally	  disapproving	   report	  on	   the	  human	  rights	   situation	   following	   its	   fact-­‐finding	   mission	   to	   Zimbabwe	   in	   December	   2005.	   Both	  reports	   were	   rejected	   by	   the	   AU’s	   Council	   of	   Ministers	   on	   irregularities	   and	   procedural	  grounds	   (Ploch,	  March	  2008:	   38-­‐39).	   The	   same	   year	  AU	  Commission	  Chairperson,	   Alpha	  Konare,	  dispatched	  the	  Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  Refugees,	  Internally	  Displaced	  Persons,	  and	  Asylum	  Seekers	  in	  Africa,	  Tom	  Nyanduga,	  as	  a	  special	  envoy	  to	  investigate	  the	  previously	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  285	  Zimbabwe	  Independent,	  “AU	  Report	  Slams	  Erosion	  of	  Rule	  of	  Law“,	  July	  16	  2004.	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mentioned	   Operation	  Murambatsvina.	   The	   Zimbabwe	   government	   thwarted	   the	   envoy’s	  attempt	   to	   conduct	   assessment	   of	   the	   situation	   and	   actually	   expelled	   him	   (Ploch,	  March,	  2008:	  39).	  	  In	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  June	  2008	  run-­‐off	  election,	  the	  AU	  Commission	  Chairperson,	  Jean	  Ping,	  met	  with	  President	  Mugabe	  and	  Zimbabwe	  Electoral	  Chair,	  George	  Chiwase286.	   	   It	   can	  be	  noted	  that	  following	  the	  controversial	  re-­‐election	  of	  Mugabe	  in	  June	  2008,	  the	  AU	  did	  not	  take	  a	  more	  prominent	  part	  in	  the	  subsequent	  negotiations,	  “playing	  an	  oversight	  role	  over	  SADC,	  and	  rubber-­‐stamping	   its	  decisions”	  (Cawthra,	  2010:	  30).	  AU’s	  decision	  to	  defer	  the	  task	  of	  facilitating	  mediation	  of	  the	  crisis	  to	  SADC	  came	  in	  its	  June	  30	  Summit	  in	  Egypt287.	  Despite	  AU’s	  official	  endorsement	  of	  the	  SADC	  to	  resume	  its	  mediation	  of	  the	  crisis,	  behind	  the	   scenes,	   a	   diplomatic	   row	   ensued	   between	   two	   of	   the	   SADC	   presidents,	   Tanzania’s	  Kikwete	   and	   South	   Africa’s	   Mbeki.	   Presidents	   Mwanawasa	   of	   Zambia	   and	   Khama	   of	  Botswana	  backed	  Kikwete’s	  call	  for	  a	  more	  expanded	  mediation	  team	  by	  means	  of	  a	  contact	  group	  and	  deployment	  of	  an	  UN-­‐led	  fact-­‐finding	  mission	  to	  Zimbabwe,	  but	  Mbeki	  strongly	  opposed	   the	   proposal	   (ICG,	   May	   2008:	   11).	   Botswana’s	   President	   Ian	   Khama	   openly	  criticized	  Robert	  Mugabe	  following	  the	  latter’s	  defeat	  in	  the	  29	  March	  2008	  elections.	  Even	  though	   Botswana	   recognized	   the	   results	   of	   these	   harmonized	   elections,	   “It	   expressed	  serious	  concern	  about	  the	  deteriorating	  political	  situation	  and	  made	  repeated	  calls	  on	  the	  authorities	   in	  Zimbabwe	  to	  take	  the	  necessary	  steps	  to	  ensure	  a	  climate	  conducive	  to	  the	  holding	  of	  a	  free	  and	  fair	  presidential	  election	  run-­‐off.	  It	  argued	  that	  the	  process	  that	  led	  to	  the	   run-­‐off	   election	   did	   not	   conform	   to	   the	   SADC	   guidelines	   governing	   the	   conduct	   of	  democratic	   elections”	   (Badza,	   2009:	   165).	   It	   was	   no	   surprise	   then	   when	   Botswana’s	  delegation	  to	  the	  AU	  Summit	  in	  Egypt	  called	  on	  both	  the	  AU	  and	  SADC	  to	  exclude	  Zimbabwe	  from	   their	  meetings	   since	   “a	   disputed	   election	  did	   not	   give	   the	   government	   of	   President	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  286	  Crisis	  Group	  interviews,	  SADC	  diplomats,	  Arusha,	  6	  May	  2008.	  287	  See	   AU	   Summit	   Resolution	   on	   Zimbabwe,	   2	   July	   2008,	   Sharm	   El	   Sheikh,	   Egypt.	   President	   Mugabe	   did	  attend	  this	  Summit	  having	  been	  hurriedly	  declared	  the	  winner	  and	  subsequently	  inaugurated	  within	  48	  hours	  of	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  run-­‐off.	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Robert	  Mugabe	  legitimacy”288.	  All	  this	  further	  suggested	  divisions	  among	  SADC	  leaders	  on	  the	  best	  approach	  to	  manage	  the	  Zimbabwe	  political	  crisis.	  	  Nigeria	  under	  Ousegun	  Obasanjo’s	  presidency	  also	  undertook	  some	  initiatives	  to	  facilitate	  negotiations	  between	  relevant	  actors	   in	  an	  attempt	  to	  address	  the	  crisis	   in	  Zimbabwe.	  As	  early	  as	  2001	  Nigeria	  hosted	  a	  meeting	  of	  foreign	  ministers	  of	  seven	  Commonwealth	  States	  to	   address	   the	   situation	   in	   Zimbabwe	   in	   Abuja289.	   The	   resolutions	   of	   the	   Abuja	  meeting	  included	   an	   immediate	   end	   to	   the	   occupation	   of	   farmlands	   and	   commitment	   to	   the	  restoration	   of	   rule	   of	   law	   in	   Zimbabwe290.	   An	   observer	   team	   from	  Nigeria	   endorsed	   the	  2002	   presidential	   election	   in	   Zimbabwe,	   but	   President	   Obasanjo	   called	   for	   incumbent	  Mugabe	  to	  retire	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  cajoling	  the	  opposition	  MDC	  to	  withdraw	  its	  legal	  petition	   against	   the	   election	   result	   (Maroleng,	   2004:	   5).	   In	   a	   subsequent	  move,	  Obasanjo	  supported	  Zimbabwe’s	  suspension	  from	  the	  Commonwealth	  grouping	  of	  States.	  	  However,	  Obasanjo’s	   role	   was	   restricted	   to	   holding	   talks	   with	   one	   of	   the	   disputing	   parties,	   the	  opposition	   MDC	   leader,	   Tsvangirai,	   at	   different	   occasions	   in	   2004	   and	   2005	   in	   Nigeria	  (Ploch,	  March	  2008:	  35-­‐36).	  8.4.5.	  Actors	  Outside	  Africa	  	  On	  its	  part,	  the	  UN	  through	  the	  Security	  Council	  expressed	  its	  concern	  over	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  Zimbabwe	  situation	  to	  the	  wider	  region,	  and	  like	  the	  AU,	  welcomed	  peaceful	  efforts	  by	  SADC	  leaders	  to	  negotiate	  the	  way	  out	  of	  the	  crisis,	  particularly	  by	  President	  Mbeki291.	  The	  Security	  Council	  also	  vowed	  to	  continue	  monitoring	  closely	  the	  situation.	  In	  April	  2008,	  six	  UN	   Special	   Rapporteurs	   condemned	   the	   violence	   in	   Zimbabwe	   in	   a	   statement292.	   The	  following	   month	   the	   UN	   country	   team	   to	   Zimbabwe	   released	   a	   statement	   expressing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  288	  Remarks	  by	  Botswana’s	  Vice	  President	  Mompati	  Merafhe	  during	  his	  speech	  at	  the	  AU	  Heads	  of	  State	  and	  Government	   Summit	   on	   1	   July	   2008	   in	   Sharm	   El	   Sheikh,	   as	   captured	   by	   Simon	   Badza.	   2009.	   „Zimbabwe’s	  2008	  Harmonized	  Elections:	  Regional	  and	  International	  Reaction,“	   in	  Elded	  Masunungure	  (ed.),	  Defying	  the	  Winds	  of	  Change,	  Harare:	  Weaver	  Press,	  pp.	  149-­‐175.	  289	  The	  seven	  states	  represented	  were	  Australia,	  the	  UK,	  Canada,	  Jamaica,	  Kenya,	  Nigeria	  and	  South	  Africa.	  290	  Foreign	  and	  Commonwealth	  Office	  News,	  “Conclusions	  of	  the	  meeting	  of	  the	  Committee	  of	  Commonwealth	  Foreign	  Ministers	  on	  Zimbabwe”,	  Abuja,	  6	  September	  2001,	  www.fco.gov.uk/news.	  	  291	  United	  Nations,	  Statement	  by	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Security	  Council,	  S/PRST/2008/23,	  23	  June	  2008.	  292	  Special	   Rapporteurs	   on	   extrajudicial	   killings,	   torture,	   violence	   against	  women,	   housing,	   free	   expression,	  and	  human	  rights	  defenders.	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concerns	  over	   the	  politically	  motivated	  violence293.	  Meanwhile,	   the	  UN	  Security	  Council’s	  attempt	  to	  place	  Zimbabwe	  on	  its	  agenda	  was	  successfully	  blocked	  by	  the	  leading	  Southern	  African	   country	   in	   the	   mediation	   of	   the	   crisis:	   South	   Africa.	   South	   Africa,	   together	   with	  China,	  Vietnam	  and	  Russia,	  used	  its	  Security	  Council	  seat	  to	  block	  UN	  debate	  on	  Zimbabwe	  (ICG,	  September	  2007;	  Badza,	  2008).	   	  Another	  attempt	  by	  some	  members	  of	   the	  UNSC	  to	  send	   a	   special	   envoy	   to	   Zimbabwe	   was	   prevented	   by	   South	   Africa,	   which	   chaired	   the	  session.	   South	   Africa’s	   argument	   during	   its	   tenure	   as	   a	   non-­‐permanent	   member	   of	   the	  Security	  Council	   in	  January	  2008	  was	  that	  by	  placing	  Mugabe’s	  government	  on	  its	  agenda	  “the	  UN	  risked	  complicating	   the	  situation	   in	  Zimbabwe	  that	  at	   that	   time	  had	  not	  reached	  the	  levels	  of	  Kenya’s	  December	  2007	  post-­‐election	  violence”	  (Badza,	  2009:	  164).	  	  Other	  international	  actors,	  the	  EU,	  UK,	  US,	  Canada,	  Australia,	  and	  New	  Zealand,	  also	  made	  attempts	  to	   influence	  the	  political	  situation	  in	  Zimbabwe	  but	  faced	  resistance	  from	  SADC.	  In	   interviews	   with	   a	   European	   diplomat	   and	   South	   African	   official,	   International	   Crisis	  Group	  established	  that	  the	  EU	  Member	  States	  consulted	  the	  SADC	  mediator,	  Mbeki,	  on	  how	  they	  could	  assist	  his	  mediation	  and	   the	  response	  was	   that	   “Western	  countries	  could	  best	  support	  the	  SADC	  process	  by	  staying	  out	  of	  the	  negotiation	  phase	  and	  then	  by	  supporting	  implementation	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  agreement	  with	  financial	  aid”	  (ICG,	  March	  2008:	  5)294.	  	  Opposition	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  perceived	   ‘external	   interference’	   in	  the	  sub-­‐regional’s	  affairs	  (Mulaudzi,	   2006:25),	   particularly	   the	   Zimbabwe	   situation	   has	   been	   experienced	  throughout	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  crisis	  in	  the	  2000-­‐2010	  decade295.	  	  	  	  Since	   2001	   the	   United	   States,	   EU,	   and	   UK,	   leaned	   on	   altering	   the	   behaviour	   of	   the	  Zimbabwe	  government	  and	  those	  that	  perpetrated	  violence	  by	  imposing	  sanctions	  on	  the	  country.	   The	   main	   rationale	   for	   imposing	   sanctions	   was	   to	   limit	   access	   to	   economic	  resources	   for	   the	  elite	  members	  of	   the	  Mugabe	  regime,	   thereby	   limiting	   their	   capacity	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  293	  UN	  Press	  Statement,”	  Zimbabwe:	  UN	  Voices	  Concern	  Over	  Politically-­‐Motivated	  Violence,“	  May	  13,	  2008,	  Retrieved	  from	  http://www.un.org/apps/news.	  (Accessed	  May	  10,	  2010).	  294	  Crisis	  Group	  interview	  with	  European	  diplomat	  was	  held	  on	  6	  March	  2008,	  and	  the	  interview	  with	  a	  South	  African	  foreign	  ministry	  official	  on	  5	  March	  2007.	  	  295	  See	   statements	   by	   the	   then	   Tanzania	   President	   Benjamin	  Mkapa	   and	   South	   Africa’s	   deputy	  minister	   of	  foreign	   affairs,	   Aziz	   Pahad,	   in	   Christophewr	  Mulaudzi,	   April	   2006,“The	   Politics	   of	   Regionalism	   in	   Southern	  Africa“,	  Institute	  of	  Global	  Dialogue	  Occasional	  Paper	  No.	  51,	  p.	  25.	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sustain	  human	  rights	  abuses	  against	   their	  own	  people	  (Tungwarara,	  2011).	  These	  actors’	  resolve	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  behaviour	  of	  those	  who	  condoned	  violent	  acts	  is	  transformed,	  translated	   practically	   into	   a	   series	   of	   sanctions	   and	   punitive	   measures	   on	   Zimbabwe,	  including:	   the	   enactment	   of	   the	   Zimbabwe	   Democracy	   and	   Economic	   Recovery	   Act	  (ZIDERA)296	  of	   2001	   by	   the	   US	   Congress;	   the	   suspension	   of	   budgetary	   support	   to	   the	  government	   by	   the	   EU297;	   the	   imposition	   of	   visa	   bans	   and	   asset	   freezes	   by	   the	   US,	   EU,	  Canada,	   New	   Zealand,	   and	   Australia	   on	   influential	   individuals	   associated	   with	   the	  government	   and	   ZANU-­‐PF298;	   and,	   the	   prohibition	   of	   military	   support	   and	   technical	  assistance.	  	  	  SADC	   opposed	   these	   sets	   of	   sanctions,	   continuously	   calling	   on	   Western	   countries	   to	  suspend	   them.	   The	   sub-­‐regional	   body	   also	   worked	   to	   undermine	   sanctions	   imposed	   on	  Zimbabwe	   leaders	   by	   refusing	   to	   participate	   in	   international	  meetings	   if	   Zimbabwe	  was	  barred	  from	  attending.	  One	  example	  here	  is	  the	  SADC-­‐EU	  ministerial	  meeting	  in	  November	  2002	   that	  had	   to	  be	  moved	   from	  Copenhagen	   to	  Maputo	  so	   that	  Zimbabwe	  could	  attend.	  The	  SADC	  delegation	   to	   this	  meeting	   later	  declined	   to	   sign	  a	   joint	   statement	  with	   the	  EU	  expressing	   concern	   at	   the	   plight	   of	   the	   Zimbabwe	   people	   (Oosthuizen,	   2006:	   375;	   Prys,	  2008:	   23).	   Another	   example	   was	   the	   December	   2007	   dispute	   over	   whether	   President	  Mugabe	  should	  attend	  the	  EU-­‐AU	  Summit	  in	  Portugal.	  Eventually	  Mugabe	  attended	  whilst	  Britain	  abstained.	  Consequently,	  the	  sanctions	  and	  punitive	  measures	  placed	  on	  Zimbabwe	  appeared	  to	  have	  some	  bearing	  on	  Zimbabwe’s	  political	  agreement	  as	  the	  issue	  of	  sanctions	  and	  punitive	  measures	  featured	  prominently	  in	  the	  final	  GPA.	  In	  fact,	  Article	  4	  of	  the	  GPA	  addresses	   the	   question	   of	   sanctions	   imposed	   by	   some	   sections	   of	   the	   international	  community,	   endorsing	   the	   SADC	  position	  on	  Zimbabwe	   sanctions	   and	   advocating	   for	   the	  lifting	  of	  the	  same.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  296	  This	  Act	  allows	   the	  US	   to	  veto	  Zimbabwe’s	  applications	   to	  multilateral	   lending	  agencies	  such	  as	   the	   IMF	  and	  World	   Bank.	   In	   2010,	   US	   Senator	   Jim	   Inhofe,	   a	  member	   of	   the	   Senate’s	   Foreign	   Relations	   Committee,	  introduced	  a	  bill	  (i.e.	  the	  Zimbabwe	  Sanctions	  Repeal	  Act	  2010)	  seeking	  to	  lift	  sanctions	  imposed	  on	  Mugabe	  and	  his	  cronies.	  297	  This	  suspension	  was	  made	  under	  article	  96	  of	  the	  Partnership	  Agreement	  between	  the	  African,	  Caribbean	  and	  Pacific	  Group	  of	  States	  (ACP)	  and	  the	  EU	  signed	  in	  Cotonou	  in	  2000.	  298	  The	  EU	  initially	  imposed	  targeted	  sanctions	  on	  19	  members	  of	  Zimbabwe’s	  elite	  and	  their	  spouses	  in	  2002	  and	  later	  expanded	  the	  list	  to	  35	  leaders.	  These	  target	  sanctions	  have	  been	  renewed	  annually.	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  In	  concluding	  this	  section,	  it	  has	  been	  observed	  that	  extra-­‐regional	  actors,	  both	  within	  and	  outside	  Africa,	  interacted	  with	  SADC	  at	  the	  AU,	  UN	  and	  during	  various	  international	  forums	  like	   the	   EU-­‐SADC	   and	   EU-­‐AU	   Summit	  meetings.	   The	   AU	   and	  UN	  were	   both	   alarmed	   and	  concerned	   by	   the	   deteriorating	   political	   situation	   in	   Zimbabwe.	   They	   both	   supported	   a	  peaceful	  resolution	   to	   the	  crisis	  and	  welcomed	  SADC’s	  mediation	   initiatives.	  The	  AU	  took	  the	  Zimbabwe	  political	  crisis	  under	  consideration,	  whilst	  attempt	  by	  the	  UN	  to	  place	  it	  on	  the	   Security	  Council	   agenda	  was	  blocked.	   South	  Africa,	   a	   SADC	  Member	   State	   and	   a	   lead	  actor	  in	  the	  Zimbabwe	  mediation	  process	  was	  one	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  UNSC,	  which	  were	  at	  the	  forefront	  in	  successfully	  blocking	  this	  attempt.	  	  	  Irrespective	   of	   some	   instances	   of	   internal	   division	   on	   how	   to	   handle	   the	   political	   fallout	  after	   the	   harmonized	   March	   2008	   elections	   in	   Zimbabwe,	   SADC	   as	   an	   organization	  portrayed	   a	   unified	   stance	   against	  what	   it	   considered	   as	   the	  UN	   and	   other	   international	  actors	  interference	  in	  a	  political	  crisis	  troubling	  one	  of	  its	  Member	  States.	  The	  sub-­‐regional	  body’s	   position	   was	   that	   Zimbabwe’s	   sovereignty	   ought	   to	   preclude	   any	   ‘external	  interference’	   (Nathan,	  2010).	  SADC	  also	  held	   the	  view	   that	  while	  mediation	  was	   the	  only	  route	   to	  an	  amicable	  political	   settlement,	  extra-­‐regional	  actors	  had	   to	  give	   it	  a	   chance	  by	  staying	  out	  of	   the	  negotiation	  phase	  but	  be	   ready	   to	  offer	   support	   after	   conclusion	  of	   an	  agreement.	  SADC	  sought	  to	   justify	   its	  position	  on	   locking	  out	  extra-­‐regional	  actors	  on	  the	  ground	   that	   some	   of	   them	   were	   interested	   parties	   (i.e.	   had	   a	   stake)	   in	   the	   Zimbabwe	  situation,	  particularly	   the	   controversial	   land	   reform	  program,	  and	   thus,	  keeping	   them	  off	  the	  mediation	  would	  avoid	  unnecessary	  distractions	  that	  could	  potentially	  undermine	  the	  process.	   It	   follows	   that	   SADC	   did	   not	   only	   seek	   to	   minimize	   as	   much	   as	   possible	   the	  influence	  of	  extra-­‐regional	  actors	  in	  what	  it	  considers	  as	  ‘sensitive	  operations’	  of	  its	  OPDS,	  but	   also	   obstructed	   their	   involvement	   in	   the	   actual	   negotiations	   among	   the	   Zimbabwe	  disputing	  parties.	  	  Condemnation	   and	   isolation	   of	   the	   ZANU-­‐PF	   through	   the	   imposition	   of	   sanctions	   in	   the	  form	   of	   travel	   bans	   and	   asset	   freezes	   by	   the	   international	   community	   sent	   a	   signal	   that	  violence,	   impunity	   and	   excessive	   use	   of	   force	  would	   not	   be	   tolerated.	   The	   imposition	   of	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sanctions,	   in	  particular,	   complemented	  sub-­‐regional	  efforts	   to	  pressurize	   the	  ZANU-­‐PF	   to	  come	  to	  the	  negotiation	  table.	  However,	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  sanctions	  have	  helped	   to	   change	   the	   behaviour	   of	   the	   targeted	   section	   of	   the	   Zimbabwe	   political	   and	  military	  elites	  who	  had	  persistently	  condoned	  violent	  acts	  against	  civilians	  and	  opposition	  supporters.	  The	  EU,	  U.S.,	  U.K	  and	  other	  western	  actors	  ultimately	  welcomed	  the	  2009	  GPA	  that	  was	  negotiated	  by	  SADC	  but	  did	  not	  remove	  sanctions	  as	  a	  public	  sign	  of	  support	  for	  the	  outcome.	  This	  presented	  one	  of	  the	  parties	  (the	  ZANU-­‐PF)	  with	  a	  convenient	  excuse	  to	  avoid	  responsibilities	  under	  the	  GPA	  (Tungwarara,	  2011).	  SADC	  has	  continuously	  called	  for	  unconditional	   lifting	  of	  all	   forms	  of	   sanctions	  against	  Zimbabwe	  and	  echoed	   its	  appeal	   to	  the	  U.K.	  to	  honour	  its	  compensation	  obligations	  on	  Zimbabwe’s	  land	  reform	  in	  conformity	  with	  the	  Lancaster	  House	  Agreement	  of	  1979299.	  	  Concerning	  SADC	  dealings	  with	  its	  Member	  State,	  indeed	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  body	  facilitated	  negotiations	   that	   resulted	   in	   the	   harmonization	   of	   the	   presidential,	   house	   of	   assembly,	  senatorial	  and	  local	  government	  elections	  of	  March	  2008.	  SADC	  also	  availed	  its	  support	  to	  Zimbabwe	   throughout	   the	  mediation	  process	  whose	  outcome	  was	   the	  GPA.	  Even	   though,	  the	  signed	  GPA	  might	  have	  prevented	   the	   total	  political	   implosion	  of	  Zimbabwe300,	   it	  has	  taken	   too	   long	   to	  be	   concluded.	  The	  SADC	  Organ	  Summit	  held	   the	  view	   that	   the	   charged	  political	   atmosphere	   and	   security	   situation	   in	   Zimbabwe	  was	   not	   permissive	   for	   holding	  the	  June	  2008	  run-­‐off	  election	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  would	  be	  deemed	  free	  and	  fair,	  but	  it	  could	  only	   ‘appeal’	   to	   the	   responsible	   authorities	   in	   Zimbabwe	   to	   consider	   postponing	   the	  election	   to	   a	   later	   date.	   Zimbabwe	   defied	   the	   SADC’s	   appeal.	   The	   sub-­‐regional	   body	  was	  well	   aware	   of	   the	   imminent	   political	   violence	   surrounding	   the	   controversial	   presidential	  run-­‐off	  election	  but	  was	  unable	  to	  stop	  Zimbabwe	  authorities	  from	  conducting	  it.	  	  	  Another	  important	  observation	  concerns	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  SADC	  itself	  and	  CSOs,	  which	  are	  part	  of	   intra-­‐sub-­‐regional	   actors.	  There	  has	  been	  minimal	   interaction	  between	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  299	  See	  Extra-­‐ordinary	  Summit	  of	  SADC	  Heads	  of	  State	  and	  Government,	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  Tanzania	  on	  29	  March	  2007.	  300	  Moreover,	   according	   to	   ACP	   Daniel	   Nyambabe,	   SADC	   Planning	   Element	   at	   SADC	   Headquarters,	   in	   an	  interview	   on	   15th	   November	   2010,	   one	   would	   have	   expected	   the	   Zimbabwe	   crisis	   to	   break	   the	   unity	   and	  solidarity	  within	  SADC.	  The	  SADC	  solidarity	  is	  still	  intact.	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the	  two	  sets	  of	  actors	  as	  far	  as	  the	  issue	  of	  domestic	  political	  crises	  is	  concerned.	  Both	  local	  and	  sub-­‐regional	  CSOs	  are	  not	  at	  all	  satisfied	  with	  the	  current	  level	  of	  interaction	  between	  them	   and	   SADC.	   CSOs	   have	   been	   calling	   for	   the	   SADC	   arrangement	   to	   ensure	   their	  involvement	  in	  various	  aspects	  of	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  body’s	  integration	  processes,	  including	  matters	  of	  peace	  and	  security	  is	  consistent	  and	  sufficiently	  institutionalized.	  Calls	  for	  their	  inclusion	   in	   the	   Zimbabwe	   mediation	   process	   were	   not	   heeded.	   CSOs,	   however,	   were	  supportive	  of	  SADC’s	  decision	   to	  appoint	  a	  mediation	   team	  on	  Zimbabwe	  albeit	   the	  view	  that	  it	  should	  have	  been	  taken	  much	  earlier.	  CSOs	  had	  a	  brief	  interaction	  with	  South	  Africa	  facilitators	   to	   the	   Zimbabwe	   intra-­‐party	   talks	   when	   they	   presented	   their	   views	   on	   the	  country’s	   political	   crisis.	   There	   is	   no	   apparent	   evidence,	   however,	   to	   suggest	   that	   their	  views	  were	  used	  during	  the	  actual	  negotiations.	  As	  noted	  earlier,	  their	  involvement	  in	  the	  mediation	  process	  was	  viewed	  as	  a	  potential	  barrier	   to	  a	   speedy	  conclusion	  of	   the	   intra-­‐party	  talks.	  CSOs	  role	  in	  the	  Zimbabwe	  political	  crisis	  also	  had	  a	  ‘name	  and	  shame’	  effect	  as	  they	  voiced	  their	  concerns,	  not	  only	  about	  the	  deteriorating	  political	  and	  security	  situation,	  but	   also	   over	   the	   suspension	   of	   the	   SADC	   Tribunal.	   Adjudication	   by	   the	   SADC	   Tribunal	  could	  offer	   SADC	  citizens	   access	   to	   legal	   recourse	   against	   their	   governments’	   actions	  but	  this	  was	  effectively	  blocked	  by	  the	  SADC	  Summit.	  	  8.5. Conclusion	  	  The	  chapter	  has	  clearly	  established	  that	  election-­‐related	  violence	  is	  inherent	  in	  Zimbabwe’s	  body	   politic,	   with	   political	   actors	   and	   security	   personnel	   involved	   and	   its	   repercussions	  spreading	   into	   the	   neighbouring	   SADC	   Member	   States.	   Previous	   elections	   in	   Zimbabwe	  were	  characterized	  by	  violence	  and	  acts	  of	  intimidation	  before,	  during	  and	  after	  balloting.	  Acts	   of	   violence	   around	   elections	   in	   Zimbabwe	   have	   been	   particularly	   concentrated	   in	  areas	  deemed	  as	  former	  strongholds	  of	  the	  ruling	  ZANU-­‐PF.	  The	  experience	  of	  multi-­‐party	  elections	  in	  Zimbabwe	  particularly	  in	  the	  2000-­‐2010	  decade	  also	  reveals	  Zimbabwe	  to	  be	  a	  victim	  of	  both	  De	  facto	  and	  De	  jure	  impunity.	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Prior	  to	  seriously	  embarking	  on	  addressing	  the	  Zimbabwe	  crisis,	  it	  took	  SADC	  sometime	  to	  set	   up	   an	   institutional	   framework	   for	   coordinating	   security	  matters	   owing	   to	   the	   Organ	  impasse	   of	   the	   late	   1990s.	   The	   sub-­‐regional	   organization	   later	  managed	   to	   establish	   the	  Organ,	   the	   Protocol	   that	   institutionalise	   its	   operations,	   the	   SIPO	   that	   serves	   as	   its	  implementation	  plan,	  and	  has	  in	  place	  an	  election	  guideline	  instrument	  notwithstanding	  its	  imperfections.	  The	  Organ’s	  activities,	  however,	  are	  held	  in	  much	  secrecy	  on	  the	  pretext	  that	  diverse	   interests	   are	   involved	   and	   thus	   non-­‐members	   have	   been	   locked	   out	   to	   avoid	  distractions	   and	   ulterior	  motives	   of	   different	   actors,	   who	   have	   a	   stake	   in	   certain	   issues.	  There	  is,	  henceforth,	  a	  lack	  of	  substantive	  engagement	  between	  the	  group	  of	  CSOs	  and	  ICPs	  and	   the	   SADC	   Organ,	   resulting	   into	   the	   former	   group	   being	   sidelined	   from	   playing	   a	  significant	   coordination	   role	   in	  peace	  and	  security	  matters,	   especially	   those	   falling	   in	   the	  category	   of	   domestic	   political	   crises	   in	   SADC’s	  Member	   States.	   This	   has	   been	   specifically	  evident	  with	   regard	   to	   coordinating	   responses	   to	   the	   Zimbabwe	  political	   crisis,	  whereby	  South	  Africa	  assumed	  the	  lead	  coordination	  role	  right	  from	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  crisis.	  	  	  Actors	  within	  the	  SADC	  arrangement	  have	   in	   the	  past	  applied	  a	  mix	  of	  peaceful	  methods,	  namely	  shuttle	  diplomacy,	  negotiations	  and	  mediation.	  Mediation,	  however,	  was	  the	  chief	  method	  pursued	  for	  the	  management	  of	  the	  Zimbabwe	  political	  crisis.	  An	  attempt	  to	  pursue	  adjudication	  by	  the	  SADC	  Tribunal	  as	  a	  parallel	  method	  to	  address	  part	  of	  the	  crisis	  were	  effectively	   thwarted	   by	   SADC	   Member	   States	   themselves	   under	   the	   guise	   of	   a	   review	  process,	  thus	  avoiding	  dealing	  with	  a	  fellow	  Member	  State’s	  non-­‐compliance.	  Meanwhile,	  it	  was	  not	  until	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  2000s	  when	  SADC	  Member	  States,	  grudgingly	  made	  a	  tacit	  admission	  that	  there	  was	  a	  crisis	  in	  Zimbabwe	  and	  decided	  to	  formally	  endorse	  South	  Africa’s	   mediation.	   The	   South	   Africa	  mediation	   team	   has	   been	   substantively	   involved	   in	  inter-­‐party	  negotiations	  by	  facilitating	  communication,	  formulating	  the	  actual	  roadmap	  and	  manipulating	  the	  parties	  into	  concluding	  an	  agreement.	  	  	  The	   South	   Africa-­‐led	  mediation	   resulted	   in	   a	   GPA	   in	  which	   Robert	  Mugabe	   retained	   the	  presidency	  and	  the	  main	  opposition	  leader,	  Morgan	  Tsvangirai,	  appointed	  prime	  minister.	  The	   mediation	   has	   also	   led	   to	   a	   slightly	   improved	   electoral	   environment	   but	   has	   been	  unable	   to	   bring	   pressure	   to	   bear	   on	   the	   coalition	   government	   to	   implement	   the	   GPA	   in	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Chapter	  Nine	  
9.	  Sub-­‐Regional	  Security	  Governance	  and	  Collective	  Security	  Challenges:	  
EAC	  and	  SADC	  Compared	  
	  9.1. Introduction	  	  The	  most	  prominent	  security	  challenges	  confronting	  majority	  of	  states	  in	  Africa	  to	  date	  are	  mainly	  of	  two	  forms,	  namely	  transnational	  threats	  and	  internal	  or	  domestic	  political	  crises.	  These	  security	  challenges	  if	  not	  properly	  addressed	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  turn	  stability	  into	  sub-­‐regional	   or	   regional	   anarchical	   order.	   Meanwhile,	   it	   was	   assumed	   that	   sub-­‐regional	  organizations	   are	   adeptly	   placed	   not	   only	   to	   provide	   a	   collective	   forum	   for	   facilitating	  response	  mechanisms	  to	  transnational	  threats,	  but	  also	  can	  play	  important	  roles	  resolving	  conflict	   situations	   within	   their	   members.	   The	   study,	   thus,	   set	   out	   to	   establish	   how	   sub-­‐regional	   arrangements	   with	   security	   mandates	   actually	   coordinate	   and	   manage	   their	  responses	   to	  collective	  security	  challenges	   in	   their	  delineated	  areas.	  The	  study	  posed	   the	  following	   question:	   What	   is	   the	   relevance	   of	   sub-­‐regional	   security	   governance	   in	  addressing	  collective	  security	  challenges	  facing	  participants	  of	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations?	  	  	  The	   study	   sought	   to	   answer	   this	   question	   by	   borrowing	   insights	   from	   the	   security	  governance	  perspective	  whose	  main	  assumption	  is	  that	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  actors	  is	  presently	  involved	   in	   the	   governance	   of	   security,	   and	   that	   the	   state	   is	   one	   actor,	   albeit	   a	   very	  important	   one,	   among	   various	   actors	   (non-­‐state	   actors	   such	   as	   NGOs,	   international	  institutions,	   regional	  and	   international	  organizations)	  at	  multiple	   levels	  who	  supplement,	  augment,	   or	   enrich	   the	   state’s	   efforts	   to	   counter	   security	   threats.	   Thus,	   the	   relevance	   of	  security	  governance	  at	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  level	  hinges	  on	  how	  an	  evolving	  plurality	  of	  actors	  and	  institutions	  actually	  coordinate	  and	  manage	  collective	  responses	  to	  security	  threats.	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As	   hinted	   before,	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   in	   Africa	   have	   come	   to	   deal	  more	  with	   two	  clusters	   of	   collective	   security	   challenges	   since	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Cold	   War,	   namely	  transnational	  threats	  and	  domestic	  political	  crises.	  Both	  transnational	  threats	  and	  domestic	  political	   crises	   require	   equal	   attention.	   However,	   coordination	   and	   management	   of	  responses	   to	   these	  security	  challenges	  will	  not	  practically	  be	  uniform.	   In	   the	  backdrop	  of	  the	   foregoing	   assumptions,	   the	   study’s	   guiding	   hypothesis	  was	   that	   the	  coordination	  and	  
management	  of	   sub-­‐regional	   security	  governance	  depends	  on	   the	   type	  of	   collective	   security	  
challenge.	  In	  carrying	  out	  this	  study,	  a	  comparative	  analytical	  approach	  of	  how	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  have	  coordinated	  and	  managed	  responses	  to	  the	  two	  set	  of	  collective	  security	  challenges	  was	  applied.	  As	  stated	  in	  chapter	  4,	  the	  study	  focused	  on	  the	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  as	  sub-­‐regional	  groupings	  undertaking	  security	  roles	  covering	  the	  period	  from	  2000	  to	  2011.	  The	   subsequent	   sections	  of	   this	   chapter,	   comparatively	  present	  key	   findings	  of	   the	   study	  starting	  with	  the	  collective	  security	  challenge	  of	  SALW	  and	  then	  domestic	  political	  crises,	  and	  proceed	   to	  establish	  whether	   these	  organizations	  add	  value	   to	   the	  security	  efforts	  of	  their	  Member	  States.	  	  9.2. The	  SALW	  Problem	  in	  the	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  	  SALW	  are	  still	  the	  most	  commonly	  used	  weapons	  in	  the	  commission	  of	  violent	  conflicts	  in	  East	  and	  Southern	  Africa	  (Wezeman,	  2009).	  The	  abundance	  and	  availability	  of	  SALW	  have	  deleterious	  impact	  on	  overall	  security	  dynamics	  in	  the	  two	  sub-­‐regions.	  Examination	  of	  this	  problem	   in	   East	   and	   Southern	   Africa	   shows	   that	   besides	   exacerbating	   conflicts	   and	  hampering	  peaceful	  settlement	  of	  disputes,	  small	  arms	  spark	  waves	  of	  criminal	  acts.	  They	  also	   deter	   economic	   development	   sustenance	   in	   that	   governments	   are	   forced	   to	   divert	  scarce	  resources	  to	  the	  SALW	  problem.	  	  Given	   the	   limited	   data	   available	   across	   time,	   an	   attempt	   at	   a	   systematic	   comprehensive	  comparison	   of	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   SALW	   problem	   in	   East	   and	   Southern	   Africa	   was	   not	  possible.	   It	   ought	   to	   be	   noted	   that	   there	   is	   still	   a	   major	   gap	   in	   regular	   comprehensive	  research	   on	   small	   arms	   and	   light	   weapons	   that	   could	   give	   actual	   figures	   of	   firearms	   in	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circulation	  in	  individual	  countries.	  The	  study	  was	  compelled	  to	  rely	  on	  estimates	  compiled	  by	   the	   Small	   Arms	   Survey	   Project.	   The	   Small	   Arms	   Survey	   country	   data	   are	   assembled	  using	   numerous	   sources	   and	   methods.	   Wherever	   possible,	   the	   project	   relies	   on	   official	  registration	  data,	  with	  independent	  estimates	  used	  to	  provide	  greater	  comprehensiveness.	  When	  neither	  registration	  data	  nor	   independent	  assessments	  are	  available,	  estimates	  are	  based	   on	   correlative	   statistical	   analysis	   (Small	   Arms	   Survey,	   2007).	   As	   the	   principal	   and	  most	  reliable	  source	  of	  information	  on	  several	  aspects	  of	  small	  arms,	  the	  last	  time	  the	  Small	  Arms	   Survey	   carried	  out	   a	   comprehensive	   compilation	  of	   data	   of	   about	   178	   countries	   in	  one	  single	  survey,	  was	  in	  2007301.	  	  	  Nonetheless,	  available	  data	  provides	  the	  general	  impression	  that	  the	  problem	  is	  more	  acute	  in	  Southern	  Africa	  than	  in	  East	  Africa.	  Small	  Arms	  Survey	  2007	  shows	  that	  there	  are	  more	  firearms	   in	   the	  Southern	  Africa	  sub-­‐region	  than	   in	  East	  Africa.	  Table	  11	  below	  shows	  the	  ranking	  positions	  of	  countries	  out	  of	  178	  worldwide.	  It	  shows	  that	  three	  Southern	  African	  countries	   are	   in	   the	   top	   50	   group	   of	   countries	   in	   the	   world	   with	   the	   highest	   civilian	  firearms	   possession.	   Angola	   leads	   the	   list	   of	   SADC	   countries	   with	   the	   highest	   average	  firearms	  per	  100	  people,	  while	  Kenya	  tops	  the	  EAC	  countries	  in	  the	  same	  category.	  In	  four	  SADC	  countries	  alone	  (Angola,	  Mauritius,	  South	  Africa	  and	  Namibia)	  the	  average	  firearms	  per	  100	  people	  is	  above	  10.	  In	  comparison,	  therefore,	  there	  are	  more	  civilians	  in	  possession	  of	   firearms	   in	   the	  SADC	  sub-­‐region	  than	   in	   the	  EAC	  sub-­‐region.	  The	  average	   total	  civilian	  firearms	  in	  South	  Africa	  alone	  by	  far	  dwarf	  the	  combined	  total	  of	  all	  the	  five	  EAC	  countries.	  The	  average	  combined	  total	  for	  EAC	  States	  is	  nearly	  2	  million	  firearms,	  which	  of	  course	  is	  still	  a	  huge	  amount	  that	  can	  perpetuate	  criminal	  violence	  and	  other	  social	  evils,	  but	  is	  far	  below	   the	  5	  million-­‐plus	   South	  African	  holdings	   and	  16	  million-­‐plus	   civilian	   firearms	   for	  the	  whole	   SADC	   sub-­‐region.	   The	   table	   also	   shows	   that	   some	   countries	   have	   low	   average	  firearms	  per	  100	  people	  (like	  DRC,	  Mozambique	  and	  Tanzania)	  but	  with	  significant	  figures	  of	  the	  total	  firearms	  in	  civilian	  hands	  (see	  table	  11	  below).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  301	  Small	   Arms	   Survey	   Yearbooks	   is	   the	   flagship	   publication	   of	   the	   Geneva-­‐based	   small	   arms	   project	   that	  annually	  selects	  and	  provides	  reviews	  of	  different	  global	  small	  arms	  issues	  and	  themes.	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Another	  observation	  is	  that	  if	  one	  is	  to	  further	  rank	  countries	  within	  the	  two	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations,	  the	  two	  wealthiest	  or	  rather	  economically	  powerful	  members	  of	  the	  EAC	  and	  SADC,	   i.e.	   Kenya	   and	   South	   Africa	   respectively,	   have	   with	   significant	   civilian	   firearms	  stocks.	  As	  stated	  in	  chapter	  6,	  civilian	  firearms	  are	  not	  stockpiled	  like	  those	  in	  the	  control	  of	  the	   military	   and	   other	   LEAs,	   which	   can	   easily	   be	   accounted	   for.	   It	   shows	   that	   the	   two	  countries	  face	  relatively	  high	  inflows	  of	  weapons	  into	  their	  territories.	  This	  partly	  explains	  their	  motivation	  to	  participate	  in	  as	  many	  joint	  cross-­‐border	  firearms	  collection	  operations	  as	  possible	  with	  neighbouring	  countries	  and	  other	  far-­‐flung	  states.	  	  
Table	  11:	  Civilian	  Firearms	  Ownership	  in	  SADC	  and	  EAC	  	  	   SADC	  Sub-­‐region	   EAC	  Sub-­‐region	  Country	   Rank	  by	  rate	  of	  ownership	  (out	  of	  178	  countries)	  
Average	  firearms	  per	  100	  people	  
Average	  total	  all	  civilian	  firearms	   Country	   Rank	  by	  rate	  of	  ownership	  (out	  of	  178	  countries)	  
Average	  firearms	  per	  100	  people	  
Average	  total	  all	  civilian	  firearms	  
Angola	   34	   17.3	   2,800,000	   Kenya	   86	   6.4	   740,000	  Mauritius	   44	   14.7	   180,000	   Tanzania	   137	   1.4	   550,000	  South	  Africa	   50	   12.7	   5,950,000	   Uganda	   137	   1.4	   400,000	  Namibia	   51	   12.6	   260,000	   Burundi	   145	   1.2	   200,000	  Zambia	   68	   8.9	   230,000	   Rwanda	   164	   0.6	   58,000	  Swaziland	   86	   6.4	   72,000	   	   	   	   	  Seychelles	   96	   5.4	   4,600	   	   	   	   	  Mozambique	   99	   5.1	   1,000,000	   	   	   	   	  Botswana	   102	   5.1	   87,000	   	   	   	   	  Zimbabwe	   106	   4.4	   400,000	   	   	   	   	  Lesotho	   122	   2.7	   47,000	   	   	   	   	  DRC	   137	   1.4	   800,000	   	   	   	   	  Madagascar	   157	   0.8	   150,000	   	   	   	   	  Malawi	   160	   0.7	   92,000	   	   	   	   	  
Total	   	   	   16,668,000	   Total	   	   	   1,948,000	  	   Source:	   Figures	   adapted	   from	   Karp,	   Aaron.	   2007.	   “Completing	   the	   Count:	   Civilians	  Firearms,”	  Small	  Arms	  Survey	  2007:	  Guns	  and	  the	  City,	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Annex	  04.	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9.2.1.	  Coordination	  of	  Responses	  to	  SALW	  	  As	  stated	  earlier,	  the	  current	  study	  set	  out	  to	  employ	  the	  security	  governance	  approach	  to	  analyse	  how	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  in	  a	  Sub-­‐Sahara	  African	  setting	  deal	  with	  collective	  security	   challenges	   in	   their	   respective	   areas.	   The	   empirical	   analysis	   focused	   on	   two	   key	  components	  of	   security	  governance,	  namely	  coordination	  and	  management.	  Coordination	  as	   conceptualized	   in	   this	   study	   refers	   to	   how	   the	   constellation	   of	   actors	   operating	   at	  different	   levels	  of	   interaction	  takes	  place.	   In	  this	   interaction,	  actors	  take	  one	  another	  into	  account	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   bringing	   together	   their	   decisions	   and/or	   activities	   into	  harmonious	  or	  reciprocal	  relation.	  It	  is	  also	  noted	  that	  interaction	  of	  actors	  takes	  place	  in	  an	   institutional	   context	   of	   some	   kind,	   which	   may	   or	   may	   not	   facilitate	   cooperative	  endeavours.	  	  	  The	  focus	  was	  on	  three	  main	  actor-­‐types:	  States,	  Non-­‐State	  actors	  like	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations,	  and	  sub-­‐regional	  and	  regional	  organizations.	  Interaction	  of	  these	  actors	  was	  thus	   analysed	   from	   two	   dimensions:	   vertically	   (i.e.	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   sub-­‐regional	  organization	  and	   its	  Member	  States)	  and	  horizontally	   (i.e.	   the	   interface	  between	  the	   sub-­‐regional	   organization	   and	   actors	   other	   than	   states	   such	   as	   CSOs	   and	   other	  organizations	  at	  sub-­‐regional	  and	  regional	  levels).	  Since	  one	  avenue	  of	  actors’	  interaction	  is	  in	  the	  development	  of	  policy	  and	  legal	  instruments	  that	  in	  turn	  require,	  prohibit	  or	  permit	  certain	  behaviours	  from	  the	  actors	  and	  go	  as	  far	  as	  to	  spell	  out	  the	  mandate	  for	  addressing	  particular	  security	  challenges,	  I	  henceforth	  commence	  presentation	  of	  key	  findings	  with	  a	  comparative	   focus	   on	   the	   relevant	   instruments	   for	   addressing	   the	   SALW	  menace	   in	   East	  and	  Southern	  Africa.	  	  Both	   the	   East	   and	   Southern	   African	   sub-­‐regions	   have	   in	   place	   specific	   legally	   binding	  protocols,	   i.e.	   the	   Nairobi	   Protocol	   and	   the	   SADC	   Firearms	   Protocol	   respectively,	   that	  provide	  state	  parties	  with	  mandates	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  proliferation	  of	  and	  illicit	  trafficking	  of	  SALW302.	  Both	  of	  these	  instruments	  envisage	  and	  encourage	  interaction	  and	  collaboration	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  302	  Note	  that	  signatories	  to	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol	  also	  include	  countries	  that	  are	  not	  members	  of	  the	  EAC	  (8	  out	  of	  the	  13	  signatory	  States)	  whereas	  all	  13	  signatories	  to	  the	  SADC	  Firearms	  Protocol	  are	  members	  of	  SADC.	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of	   various	   actors	   in	   all	   matters	   related	   to	   the	   SALW	   problem.	   They	   are	   far-­‐reaching	  instruments	   that	   stress	   upon	   close	   cooperation	   to	   prevent	   and	   combat	   not	   only	   the	  proliferation	  of	  illicit	  arms,	  but	  also	  their	  manufacturing	  and	  misuse,	  albeit	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol	  has	  provisions	  on	  the	  crucial	  measure	  of	  marking	  of	  firearms,	  whilst	  the	  SADC	  Firearms	  Protocol	  does	  not.	  	  	  The	  study	  shows	  that	  both	  the	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  embrace	  interaction	  and	  close	  collaboration	  of	  various	  actor-­‐types	  focusing	  on	  the	  SALW	  problem	  as	  envisaged	  in	  their	  aforementioned	  legal	   instruments.	  Horizontally,	   there	   are	   three	  main	   players	   in	   the	   area	   of	   SALW	   in	   the	  East	   Africa	   sub-­‐region.	   As	   indicated	   in	   chapter	   5.3,	   besides	   the	   EAC	   there	   are	   two	   other	  important	  parallel	  organizations	  that	  also	  deal	  with	  issues	  of	  SALW	  and	  which	  interact	  with	  the	  EAC	  on	  a	  regular	  basis,	  namely	  RECSA	  and	  EAPPCO.	  The	  three	  organizations,	   i.e.	  EAC,	  RECSA	  and	  EAPCCO,	  share	  memberships	  and	  have	  their	  entire	  Member	  States	  bound	  by	  the	  same	   legal	   instrument,	   i.e.	   the	  Nairobi	   Protocol.	   It	  was	   also	   observed	   that	   the	  EAC	  has	   a	  relatively	  small	  and	  evolving	  institutional	  mechanism	  that	  coordinates	  small	  arms	  issues	  at	  its	   Secretariat.	   The	   EAC	   has,	   however,	   established	   a	   structured	   coordination	   and	  cooperation	   mechanism,	   guided	   by	   an	   MOU,	   with	   the	   lead	   organization	   in	   coordinating	  matters	  related	  to	  small	  arms	  in	  East	  Africa	  and	  beyond-­‐	  i.e.	  RECSA303.	  This	  was	  done	  partly	  to	   benefit	   from	   the	   latter‘s	   experience	   and	   a	   relatively	   well-­‐developed	   institutional	  framework	   on	   small	   arms,	   and	   also	   to	   avoid	   unnecessary	   competition	   between	   the	   two	  organizations.	  The	  EAC	  relationship	  with	  EAPCCO	   is	  not	  as	   formalized	  as	   the	  EAC-­‐RECSA	  one.	  However,	  it	  is	  EAPCCO	  that	  drafted	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol.	  	  As	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   7,	   SARPCCO	   is	   SADC’s	   lead	   agency	   in	   the	   coordination	   of	   efforts	  directed	  towards	  curbing	  the	  proliferation	  of	  SALW	  in	  the	  Southern	  Africa	  sub-­‐region.	  It	  is	  SARPCCO	   that	  developed	   the	  SADC	  Firearms	  Protocol.	   In	   comparative	   terms,	   SADC	  has	  a	  relatively	  more	   developed	   institutional	   organ,	   under	  which	   SARPCCO	   operates,	   than	   the	  nascent	  EAC’s	  Peace	  and	  Security	  Department.	  It	  is	  noted,	  however,	  that	  the	  impasse	  over	  the	   SADC	   organ	   (1996-­‐2001)	   and	   initial	   strained	   relations	   between	   SADC	   and	   SARPCCO	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  303	  It	  covers	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  region,	  Horn	  of	  Africa,	  and	  bordering	  states.	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seriously	   hampered	   coordination	   of	   small	   arms	   control	  within	   the	   sub-­‐region	   before	   the	  latter	   became	   officially	   integrated	   into	   the	   SADC	   security	   structures.	   Additionally,	   unlike	  the	  observed	  problematic	  start	  to	  the	  formal	  interaction	  between	  actors	  with	  an	  interest	  in	  curbing	  the	  SALW	  problem	  in	  Southern	  Africa,	  coordination	  of	  small	  arms	  issues	  between	  the	  EAC	  and	  its	  strategic	  partner,	  RECSA,	  has	  been	  without	  observable	  hitches.	  	  The	   analysis	   in	   chapters	   5	   and	   7	   also	   reveal	   that	   the	   EAC	  maintains	   a	   more	   structured	  relationship	  with	  CSOs	  working	  on	  small	  arms	   issues	  and	  which	  encompass	  sub-­‐regional	  networks	  like	  EAANSA	  and	  EASSI,	  than	  in	  the	  SADC	  where	  such	  interaction	  is	  relatively	  less	  manifest	  at	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  level.	  The	  EAC	  recognizes	  these	  CSOs	  as	  sub-­‐regional	  networks	  representing	   dialogue	   between	   itself	   and	   civil	   society,	   and	   thus	   has	   given	   them	   official	  status	   by	   according	   them	   membership	   in	   its	   SALW	   Steering	   Committee.	   The	   Southern	  African	   situation	   with	   regard	   to	   CSOs	   is	   possibly	   because	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   main	  organization	  dealing	  with	  SALW	  within	  SADC,	  i.e.	  SARPCCO,	  shares	  its	  Secretariat	  with	  the	  sub-­‐regional	   policing	   institution-­‐INTERPOL	   (SRB	   Harare)	   that	   traditionally	   conducts	   its	  affairs	  in	  a	  fairly	  ‘secretive’	  manner.	  This,	  however,	  does	  not	  mean	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  organs	  have	   not	   at	   all	   interacted	  with	   CSOs	   on	   small	   arms	  matters.	   SARPPCCO	   has	   occasionally	  worked	   with	   specific	   CSOs	   with	   policy	   research	   and	   think	   tanks	   such	   as	   the	   ISS,	   in	   the	  development	   of	   training	   modules	   for	   LEAs	   and	   Standard	   Operating	   Procedures,	   as	  explained	  in	  chapter	  7.	  	  	  Vertically,	   the	   two	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   interact	  with	   their	  Member	   States	   through	  the	   structures	   called	   NFPs.	   These	   are	   inter-­‐agency	   structures	   at	   the	   national	   level	  responsible	   for	  policy	   guidance	   and	   coordination	  of	   small	   arms	  matters.	  All	   the	  EAC	  and	  SADC	   Member	   States	   have	   established	   NFPs	   in	   line	   with	   the	   respective	   sub-­‐regional	  instruments,	   even	   though	   they	   have	   different	   statuses	   in	   terms	   of	   functioning	   and	  placement	   in	   individual	   countries	   as	   intimated	   in	   chapters	   5.3	   and	   7.3.	  Within	   the	   EAC,	  NFPs	  are	  represented	  in	  the	  SALW	  Steering	  Committee	  alongside	  other	  actors	  mentioned	  earlier,	   i.e.	   CSOs	   and	  RECSA,	  whereas	   in	   SADC	   they	   are	   brought	   together	   under	   a	   forum	  overseen	  by	  SARPCCO,	  which	  is	  known	  as	  the	  Regional	  Coordinating	  Committee	  (RCC).	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Overall,	  it	  can	  be	  summed	  up	  that	  the	  two	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  which	  were	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  study	  proved	  as	  important	  frameworks	  for	  coordination,	  bringing	  together	  various	  relevant	   actors	   with	   a	   stake	   in	   SALW	   issues,	   and	   in	   promoting	   and	   supporting	   the	  essentially	  crucial	  coordinating	  structures	  at	   the	  national	   level,	  and	  fostering	  cooperation	  between	  LEAs,	  all	  in	  line	  with	  sub-­‐regional	  firearms	  instruments.	  Despite	  some	  variations	  on	   the	   statuses	   of	   national	   level	   coordinating	   structures	   in	   individual	  Member	   States	   as	  pinpointed	   earlier,	   the	   two	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   boast	   of	   commanding	   active	  institutional	  frameworks	  that	  lead	  and	  coordinate	  small	  arms	  initiatives	  in	  their	  respective	  sub-­‐regions.	   Member	   States	   of	   Sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   are	   guided	   by	   legally	   binding	  agreements	   on	   the	   SALW	   issue	   that	   not	   only	   spell	   out	   the	   lines	   of	   coordination	   and	  interaction	  between	  the	  various	  structures	  and	  actors,	  but	  also	  take	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  approach	   to	   SALW	   control	   than	   UNPoA	   and	   the	   UN	   Firearms	   Protocol304.	   The	   Nairobi	  Protocol	   and	   the	   SADC	   Firearms	   Protocol	   have	   contributed	   to	   the	   development	   of	   sub-­‐regional	  standards	  that	  are	  crucial	  for	  guiding	  control	  measures	  such	  as	  civilian	  possession,	  marking	  standards,	  destruction	  methods,	  to	  cite	  a	  few.	  The	  relevant	  institutional	  structures	  of	   the	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  managed	  to	   foment	   integrated	  approaches	   in	   the	   fight	  against	   illicit	  small	  arms	  and	  other	  cross-­‐border	  crimes	  like	  trafficking	  in	  illicit	  goods	  and	  motor	  vehicle	  theft	  since	  these	  security	  challenges	  feed	  into	  each	  other.	  	  9.2.2.	  Management	  of	  the	  SALW	  Proliferation	  Threat	  	  It	   was	   stated	   in	   chapter	   4	   that	   management	   relates	   to	   how	   policies	   are	   carried	   out,	  administered	  or	   controlled.	  This	   essentially	   implies	   implementation	  of	   certain	  policies	   in	  response	  to	  a	  collective	  security	  challenge	  at	  hand.	  It	  was,	  thus,	  assumed	  that	  measures	  or	  tasks	   designed	   to	   address	   the	   SALW	   threat	   would	   vary	   from	   those	   aimed	   at	   resolving	  domestic	   political	   crises.	   Likewise,	   multiple	   actors	   involved	   in	   the	   implementation	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  304 	  The	   UN	   Protocol	   against	   the	   Illicit	   Manufacturing	   of	   and	   Trafficking	   in	   Firearms,	   Their	   Parts	   and	  
Components	   and	   Ammunition	   (Firearms	   Protocol),	   was	   adopted	   in	   2001	   by	   the	   General	   Assembly	   with	  resolution	  55/255	  and	  entered	  into	  force	  on	  3	  June	  2005.	  The	  UN	  Firearms	  Protocol	  is	  the	  first	  legally	  binding	  global	   agreement	   on	   small	   arms	   but	   with	   a	   relatively	   narrow	   scope.	   For	   detailed	   comparison	   between	  regional	   instruments	  and	  the	  UNPoA	  see	  Elli	  Kytömäki,	  2005.	  “Regional	  Approaches	  to	  Small	  Arms	  Control:	  Vital	   to	   Implementing	   the	  UN	  Programme	  Action,”	   in	  UNIDIR	  Disarmament	   Forum,	  Taking	  Action	  on	  Small	  
Arms,	  pp.	  55-­‐64,	  available	  at	  www.unidir.org/.	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policies	   may	   be	   different	   from	   those	   engaged	   in	   coordination.	   On	   the	   management	   of	  SALW,	  the	  study	  focused	  on	  the	  six	  main	  intervention	  measures,	  which	  have	  been	  identified	  in	  the	  small	  arms	  legal	  instruments	  of	  the	  respective	  sub-­‐regional	  arrangements.	  These	  are	  review	   and	   harmonization	   of	   SALW	   legislations,	   collection,	   destruction,	   marking	   and	  record	  keeping.	  Those	  management	  measures	  that	  relate	  to	  each	  other	  or	  are	  carried	  out	  concurrently	   were	   grouped	   in	   pairs	   (i.e.	   review	   and	   harmonization;	   collection	   and	  destruction;	  and	  marking	  and	  record	  keeping).	  The	  empirical	  analysis	  reveals	  the	  following	  findings.	  	  First,	  while	   there	   is	  no	  apparent	  opposition	   to	   the	  requirement	   to	  review	  and	  harmonize	  SALW	  legislations	  by	  state	  parties	  to	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol	  and	  the	  SADC	  Firearms	  Protocol,	  both	  the	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  are	  yet	  to	  have	  harmonized	  legislations.	  Their	  Member	  States	  are	  at	  different	  stages	  of	  reviewing	  their	   firearms	   legislations	  to	  ensure	  that	   they	  embrace	   legal	  uniformity	   in	   all-­‐important	   areas.	   While	   majority	   of	   States	   have	   already	   initiated	   the	  review	  process,	   only	   four	   countries	   (Burundi	   and	  Rwanda	   in	   the	  EAC	  and	  Mauritius	   and	  South	  Africa	   from	  SADC)	  had	   in	  place	  new	  firearms	   legislations	  at	   the	   time	  of	  concluding	  fieldwork	   for	   the	   current	   study.	   Disparities	   in	   legislations	   are,	   henceforth,	   still	   a	   major	  challenge	   in	  the	  management	  of	   the	  SALW	  proliferation	  threat	   in	  both	  East	  and	  Southern	  Africa	  sub-­‐regions.	  	  Even	   in	   cases	   where	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   had	   invested	   much	   time	   and	   energy	   in	  supporting	  Member	  States	  to	  set	  up	  legal	  drafting	  committees	  and	  carrying	  out	  in-­‐country	  sensitisation	   workshops	   on	   sub-­‐regional	   harmonization	   of	   SALW	   legislation,	   agreed	  timeframes	  for	   initiating	  and	  completing	  national	  reviews	  of	   legislations	  were	  not	  met305.	  This	   can	  partly	  be	  ascribed	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   countries	   that	   are	   signatories	   to	   sub-­‐regional	  firearms	  agreements	  have	  different	   legal	   systems	  or	   traditions.	  The	  process	  of	   reviewing	  and	  enacting	  new	  firearms	  laws	  is	  inherently	  a	  political	  one	  that	  would	  require	  and	  involve	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  305 	  In	   September	   2006	   and	   December	   2007,	   for	   example,	   RECSA	   conducted	   in-­‐country	   sensitisation	  workshops	  on	  regional	  harmonization	  of	  SALW	  legislation	   for	   its	  Member	  States.	  Prior	   to	   this	  exercise	   this	  organization	  adopted	  Guidelines	   for	  Harmonization	  of	  Legislation,	  which	  set	  out	  elements	  of	   the	  envisaged	  harmonization	  process	  as	  well	  as	  national	  review	  processes.	  See	  RECSA,	  2005,	  Guidelines	  for	  Harmonization	  of	  Legislation.	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consultation	  with	  several	   relevant	   stakeholders	  prior	   to	  a	  drafted	  bill	  being	  presented	   in	  parliament.	  And	  passage	  of	  legislation	  would	  in	  some	  countries	  require	  going	  through	  two	  chambers	   of	   parliament	   before	   becoming	   law.	   Related	   to	   the	   foregoing	   is	   the	   fact	   that	  national	  reviews	  of	  SALW	  legislation	  often	  take	  different	  approaches.	  Some	  countries	  (for	  example,	  Kenya	  and	  Uganda)	  decided	  to	  embark	  on	  first	  developing	  national	  SALW	  policies	  to	   inform	   review	   of	   legislations.	   This	   is	   in	   contrast	   to	   countries	   like	   Burundi,	   DRC	   and	  Rwanda	  that	  directly	  reviewed	  their	  firearms	  laws	  without	  necessarily	  developing	  a	  policy	  to	  inform	  the	  review	  (Saferworld,	  2011).	  	  Second,	  the	  study	  shows	  that	  the	  most	  visible	  and	  successful	  SALW	  intervention	  measures	  in	   the	   two	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  are	  collection	  and	  destruction	  of	   illicit	  arms.	  These	  control	   measures	   are	   carried	   out	   through	   individual	   national	   authorities,	   which	   are	  complemented	  by	  bilateral	  and	  multilateral	  cross-­‐border	   joint	  operations.	   	  Moreover,	   the	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  share	  one	  more	  attribute:	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  South	  Africa,	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  national	   LEAs	   of	   their	   Member	   States	   possess	   limited	   capacity	   for	   firearms	   destruction	  processes.	   The	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   in	   collaboration	   with	   their	   international	  cooperating	  partners	  mobilize	  resources	  (funding	  and	  equipment)	  to	  assist	  states	  carry	  out	  destruction	  activities	  as	  indicated	  in	  chapters	  5.4	  and	  7.4.	  Another	  important	  observation	  is	  that	  unlike	  in	  the	  EAC	  sub-­‐region,	  bilateral	  and	  multilateral	  cross-­‐border	  operations	  have	  prominently	  featured	  in	  the	  SADC	  sub-­‐region	  and	  South	  Africa	  is	  the	  lead	  actor	  in	  fostering	  and	  participating	   in	   those	  operations.	  This	  state	  of	  affairs	   is	  not	  only	  due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  South	   Africa	   has	   a	   significant	   illicit	   firearms	   problem,	   and	   thus,	   is	   compelled	   by	  circumstances	  to	  collaborate	  with	  other	  SADC	  Member	  States,	  but	  also	  because	  of	  the	  other	  countries’	  heavy	  reliance	  on	  the	  competence	  of	  the	  SAPS.	  	  Third,	   both	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   have	   been	   instrumental	   in	   developing	   standards	  relating	  to	  the	  control	  measures	  of	  marking	  and	  record	  keeping,	  while	   international	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  and	  international	  cooperating	  partners	  have	  provided	  support	  in	  terms	  of	  marking	  units,	  software	  and	  training	  of	  LEAs	  on	  the	  use	  of	  marking	  machines.	  Henceforth,	  making	  of	   firearms	   in	  both	  East	   and	  Southern	  Africa	   sub-­‐regions	  had	  begun,	  even	  though,	  comparatively	  EAC	  is	  ahead	  of	  its	  southern	  African	  counterpart	  as	  its	  Member	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States	  were	  among	  the	  first	  countries	  within	  the	  East	  and	  Great	  Lakes	  Region	  to	  undertake	  marking	  of	  state-­‐owned	  firearms.	  On	  the	  side	  of	  record	  keeping,	  both	  state	  parties	   to	   the	  Nairobi	   Protocol	   and	   SADC	   Firearms	   Protocol	   agreed	   to	   establish	   a	   centralized	   SALW	  database	   for	   the	   maintenance	   of	   records	   that	   is	   deemed	   important	   for	   the	   successful	  tracing	  of	  firearms	  across	  countries.	  Thus	  far,	  neither	  of	  the	  two	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  has	  established	  a	  centralized	  SALW	  database.	  They	  still	  have	  a	  long	  way	  to	  go	  to	  fulfil	  this	  commitment.	  	  To	   sum	   up,	   therefore,	   given	   the	   transnational	   nature	   of	   the	   small	   arms	   problem,	   i.e.	  trafficking	  in	  small	  arms	  can	  hardly	  be	  fully	  handled	  by	  individual	  countries	  on	  their	  own	  as	   illicit	   firearms	   quiet	   often	   change	   hands	   across	   national	   borders,	   sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  are	  vital	  forums	  for	  sub-­‐regional	  wide	  implementation	  of	  small	  arms	  control	  measures.	  More	   importantly,	   sub-­‐regional	   implementation	   initiatives	   have	   not	   only	   been	  helpful	  in	  supporting	  national	  level	  efforts	  but	  also	  enabled	  state	  actors	  to	  both	  acquire	  the	  necessary	  financial	  support	  and	  share	  technical	  resources.	  This	  resource	  mobilization	  role	  by	   sub-­‐regional	   arrangements	   is	   extremely	   crucial	   given	   the	   fact	   that	   small	   arms	   control	  measures	  demand	  a	  lot	  of	  resources,	  which	  most	  cash-­‐strapped	  Member	  States	  are	  in	  need	  of.	   Sub-­‐regional	   arrangements	   have	   readily	   welcomed	   extra-­‐sub-­‐regional	   actors,	   more	  specifically	   ICPs	  and	   International	  NGOs	   that	  are	  keenly	   interested	   in	  providing	   logistical	  and	  technical	  support	  to	  small	  arms	  interventions.	  These	  actors	  prefer	  to	  act	  through	  sub-­‐regional	   and	   regional	   frameworks	   because	   it	   is	   a	   more	   cost-­‐effective	   and	   justifiable	  approach	   than	   to	  deal	  with	   individual	   countries.	   In	   relative	   terms,	   both	   the	   coordination	  and	  management	  of	  SALW	  in	  East	  and	  Southern	  Africa	  noticeably	  present	  an	  assortment	  of	  actors	   (international	   organizations,	   states,	   local	   and	   regional	   CSOs,	   and	   ICPs)	  complementing	   each	   other’s	   efforts	   and	   sharing	   best	   practices	   and	   experiences	   in	  addressing	  the	  small	  arms	  problem.	  	  In	   order	   to	   avoid	   being	   caught	   between	  harbouring	  modest	   expectations	   of	   sub-­‐regional	  organizations	   or	   set	   the	   bar	   too	   much	   higher,	   it	   is	   worth	   borrowing	   an	   approach	   of	  assessing	  organizations	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  stated	  objectives,	  i.e.	  under	  the	  benchmarks	  they	  have	   set	   themselves	   (Kirchner	   and	   Domìnguez,	   2011;	   Nathan,	   2012).	   While	   it	   does	   not	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bode	  well	  analytically	  to	  pass	  on	  judgement	  on	  an	  organization	  according	  to	  goals	  it	  did	  not	  claim	   to	   pursue	   (Nathan,	   2012:15),	   it	   is	   also	   noted	   that	   Member	   States	   of	   sub-­‐regional	  groupings	   might	   have	   unstated	   objectives,	   such	   as	   establishing	   and	   participating	   in	   as	  many	   SALW	   programs	   and	   projects	   as	   possible	   just	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   tapping	   donors’	  resources.	   It	   is,	   henceforth,	   less	   problematic	   to	   assess	   effectiveness	   basing	   on	   an	  organization’s	   attainment	   of	   its	   set	   objectives.	   Member	   States	   of	   the	   two	   sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  committed	  themselves	  through	  the	  respective	  firearms	  protocols	  to	  prevent,	  combat	   and	   eradicate	   the	   illicit	   manufacturing	   of,	   trafficking	   in,	   possession	   and	   use	   of	  SALW,	   as	   well	   as	   promoting	   and	   facilitating	   cooperation	   in	   collaboration	   with	   relevant	  partners	  at	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  level	  and	  in	  international	  fora.	  The	  study	  examined	  fulfilment	  of	  this	  commitment	  by	  specifically	  analysing	  six	  small	  arms	  control	  measures.	  The	  two	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  recorded	  relative	  progress	  in	  all	  except	  two	  intervention	  areas,	   i.e.	  creation	   of	   harmonized	   firearms	   legislations	   and	   centralized	   SALW	   databases	   for	  information	   sharing.	   States	   firmly	   indicated	   a	   preference	   to	   deal	   with	   SALW	   problems	  within	   frameworks	   set	   by	   sub-­‐regional	   arrangements.	   However,	   they	   still	   face	   daunting	  implementing	  challenges	  of	  a	  more	  logistical	  and	  technical	  nature.	  It	  is,	  thus,	  not	  primarily	  the	   question	   of	   whether	   or	   not	   Member	   States	   are	   willing	   to	   fulfil	   sub-­‐regional	  commitments,	  but	  rather	  whether	  they	  are	  able	  to	  comply.	  	  9.3.	  Domestic	  Political	  Crises	  in	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  	  The	   study	   focused	  on	   a	   sub-­‐category	  of	   intra-­‐state	   conflicts,	   i.e.	   domestic	   political	   crises,	  which	   were	   conceptualised	   as	   forms	   of	   intra-­‐state	   conflicts	   that	   take	   place	   within	   the	  internal	   boundaries	   of	   a	   state,	   between	   a	   government	   and	   a	   non-­‐government	   party,	  without	   foreign	   troops	   involvement,	   and	   in	  which	   the	   stalemate	   situation	   resulting	   from	  the	  employment	  of	  violence	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  political	  competition	  causes	  fatalities,	  and	  renders	  severe	  strains	  to	  its	  political	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  landscape	  with	  its	  impact	  also	  felt	  outside	  the	   national	   frontiers.	   Therefore,	   such	   conflicts	   usually	   concern	   the	   structure	   or	  distribution	  of	  state	  authority	  as	  the	  major	  bone	  of	  contention.	  The	  tragic	  events	  that	  befell	  Kenya	  in	  2007	  and	  Zimbabwe	  in	  2008	  involved	  general	  elections	  whereby	  voters	  in	  the	  two	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countries	   chose	   not	   only	   between	   presidential	   candidates	   but	   also	   between	  members	   of	  parliaments.	  	  	  These	   closely	   contested	   elections	   of	   December	   2007	   and	   March	   2008	   in	   Kenya	   and	  Zimbabwe	   respectively,	   saw	   the	   former	   opposition	   gaining	   parliamentary	  majorities	   and	  preliminary	  results	  in	  the	  presidential	  elections	  pointing	  to	  opposition	  victory,	  only	  for	  the	  final	   stages	   of	   voter	   tallying,	   compilation	   and	   announcement	   of	   results	   to	   be	  marred	   by	  reports	   of	  widespread	  malpractices.	   The	  disputed	  presidential	   results	   led	   to	  unrests	   and	  widespread	   violence	   especially,	   in	   the	   Kenyan	   case,	   prompting	   initiatives	   at	   mediation.	  Negotiations	  to	  resolve	  the	  two	  crises	  (the	  comparison	  of	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  they	  were	  actually	   carried	  out	  will	   be	   covered	   in	   a	   later	   section	  of	   this	   chapter)	   resulted	   in	  power-­‐sharing	  political	  agreements	  in	  which	  case	  the	  disputed	  election	  results	  were	  restored,	  but	  the	  incumbent	  president	  would	  share	  power	  with	  the	  newly	  created	  post	  of	  prime	  minister	  who	  was	  a	  previous	  presidential	  candidate	  from	  the	  opposition.	  	  As	   observed	   in	   chapters	   6	   and	   8	   of	   the	   current	   study,	   election-­‐related	   violence	  was	   not	  restricted	  to	  elections	  of	  2007	  and	  2008.	  Previous	  elections	  in	  both	  Kenya	  and	  Zimbabwe	  were	   characterized	  by	  acts	  of	   violence	  and	   intimidation	  before	  and	  after	   the	  polling	  day.	  This	   is	   to	   say	   that	   the	   dreadful	   events	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   December	   2007	   Kenyan	  elections	  and	  March	  2008	  Zimbabwean	  elections	  were,	  indeed,	  not	  specific	  episodes	  tied	  to	  a	  particular	  flawed	  electoral	  exercise,	  but	  rather	  part	  of	  a	  much	  longer	  deplorable	  history	  of	  political	  violence	  in	  the	  two	  countries.	  	  	  Moreover,	  some	  members	  of	  the	  security	  forces	  were	  complicit	  in	  the	  violence.	  Another	  set	  of	   perpetrators	   included	   vigilante	   groups,	   the	   so-­‐called	   war	   veterans,	   and	   trained	  paramilitary	   youth	   groups,	   reflecting	   the	   entrenched	   role	   of	  militias	   in	   political	   contests.	  While	   in	   Zimbabwe	   acts	   of	   violence	  were	   largely	   directed	   at	  members	   of	   the	   opposition	  MDC	  and	  their	  supporters,	  in	  Kenya	  violence	  involved	  supporters	  of	  both	  parties,	  PNU	  and	  ODM.	  Furthermore,	  elections	   in	   the	   two	  countries	  had	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	   involved	  ethnic	  voter	  mobilization.	  However,	  where	  the	  post-­‐election	  violence	  in	  Kenya	  was	  largely	  inter-­‐ethnic,	  featuring	  communities	  in	  the	  Rift	  Valley	  province	  and	  Nairobi,	  it	  was	  intra-­‐ethnic	  in	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Zimbabwe.	   In	  Zimbabwe	   the	  violence	  was	  concentrated	   in	   the	  provinces	  of	  Mashonaland	  (i.e.	   it	   was	   among	   the	   Shona),	   in	   the	   centre	   and	   east	   of	   the	   country,	   rather	   than	  Matebeleland,	  in	  the	  west.	  	  	  In	  both	  cases,	  attempts	  to	  prosecute	  those	  implicated	  for	  perpetrating	  acts	  of	  violence	  hit	  a	  snag.	  This	  is	  attributed	  to	  the	  prevalence	  of	  a	  culture	  of	  impunity	  in	  the	  political	  systems	  of	  the	  two	  countries.	  The	  experience	  of	  multiparty	  elections	  in	  Kenya	  and	  Zimbabwe	  reveals	  this	   culture	   of	   impunity.	   Whereas	   in	   Kenya	   there	   was	   largely	   a	   lack	   of	   political	   will	   to	  prosecute	   human	   rights	   abuses,	   in	   Zimbabwe	   there	   were	   deliberate	   attempts	   to	   shield	  alleged	  perpetrators	  from	  prosecution	  by	  enacting	  laws	  that	  provided	  them	  immunity	  and	  amnesty	  (i.e.	  De	  jure	  impunity).	  	  Finally,	   the	   negative	   impact	   of	   these	   domestic	   political	   crises	   (both	   humanitarian	   and	  economic)	   was	   not	   confined	   to	   the	   affected	   countries’	   national	   frontiers.	   Significant	  negative	   socio-­‐economic	   repercussions	   were	   felt	   in	   the	   neighbouring	   states,	   raising	   the	  concerns	  of	  the	  respective	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  and	  the	  international	  community	  in	  general.	  The	  Zimbabwe	  crisis	  caught	  the	  eye	  of	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  peers	  and	  the	  international	  community	  as	  early	  as	  beginning	  of	  2000,	  while	  the	  Kenyan	  case	  received	  serious	  attention	  only	  after	   the	   tragic	   events	   in	   the	  aftermath	  of	   the	  December	  2007	  general	   election.	  The	  next	  two	  sections	  present	  main	  findings	  on	  the	  actual	  coordination	  and	  management	  of	  the	  domestic	  political	  crises	  in	  Kenya	  and	  Zimbabwe.	  	  9.3.1.	  Coordination	  of	  Responses	  to	  Domestic	  Political	  Crises	  	  It	  was	  noted	  at	  the	  outset	  that	  both	  the	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  treaties	  spell	  out	  the	  organizations’	  objectives	  as	  well	  as	  grant	  them	  authority	  to	  engage	  in	  matters	  of	  peace	  and	  security.	  It	  was	  further	   noted	   that	   the	   EAC	   did	   not	   have	   in	   place	   a	   binding	   protocol	   that	   lays	   specific	  procedures	   for	   its	   peacemaking	   efforts	   when	   its	   most	   economically	   powerful	   member,	  Kenya,	  was	  in	  trouble.	  In	  contrast,	  SADC	  already	  had	  in	  place	  a	  Protocol	  on	  Politics,	  Defence	  and	   Security	   Cooperation,	   in	   addition	   to	   a	   normative	   framework	   for	   the	   conduct	   of	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democratic	  elections	  irrespective	  of	  its	  shortcomings306,	  when	  Zimbabwe	  was	  facing	  a	  long	  running	  political	  crisis.	  	  	  Institutionally,	   the	  Peace	  and	  Security	  Department	   at	   the	  EAC	  Secretariat	   that	   is	   charged	  with	  the	  responsibility	  of	  coordinating	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  organization’s	  peace	  and	  security	  initiatives	   is	   understaffed	   and	   does	   not	   have	   a	   specific	   structure	   or	   unit	   for	   mediating	  domestic	   political	   crises	   in	   Member	   States,	   such	   as	   the	   Kenya	   post-­‐election	   violence	   of	  2008.	   Likewise,	   the	   Directorate	   of	   Politics,	   Defence	   and	   Security	   at	   the	   Gaborone	  Secretariat	   that	   is	   expected	   to	   coordinate	   daily	   activities	   of	   the	   SADC	   Organ,	   has	   few	  personnel	   in	   proportion	   to	   its	   responsibilities	   (as	   observed	   in	   chapter	   8)	   and	   lacks	   a	  specific	  mediation	  unit	  within	  its	  ranks.	  This	  has	  left	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  bodies	  to	  respond	  to	  domestic	  political	  crises	  in	  an	  ad	  hoc	  basis,	  with	  serving	  or	  former	  presidents	  being	  called	  upon,	   such	   as	   Thabo	  Mbeki	   of	   South	  Africa,	   Yoweri	  Museveni	   of	  Uganda,	   to	   intervene	   in	  troubled	  Member	  States.	  	  	  Moreover,	  the	  tendency	  of	  treating	  political	  crises	  with	  utmost	  secrecy	  within	  the	  two	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  renders	  coordination	  as	  a	  behind-­‐the-­‐scene-­‐activity.	  On	  the	  security	  challenge	   of	   SALW,	   we	   observed	   a	   more	   open	   interaction	   of	   different	   actors	   and	   more	  importantly,	   non-­‐state	   actors	   in	   the	   form	   of	   organised	   CSOs	  with	   local	   and	   sub-­‐regional	  networks.	  The	  situation	  is	  different	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  coordinating	  responses	  to	  domestic	  political	  crises.	  There	  is	  little	  room	  for	  civil	  society	  involvement	  within	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  sub-­‐regional	   organizations307.	   These	   matters	   are	   under	   the	   firm	   control	   of	   state	   actors	  within	   the	   respective	   arrangements.	   Coordination,	   thus,	   relies	   on	   facilitation	   by	   a	  government	  of	  a	  Member	  State	  whose	  President	  has	  volunteered	  (like	  President	  Museveni	  in	  the	  Kenyan	  case)	  or	  has	  been	  appointed	  by	  the	  SADC	  Summit	  to	  conduct	  negotiations	  or	  the	  facilitation	  of	  the	  country	  hosting	  or	  convening	  the	  SADC	  Organ	  Troika	  of	  Heads	  of	  State	  and	   Government	   or	   its	   Ministerial	   Troika	   to	   consult	   on	   the	   political	   developments	   in	  Member	  States.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  306	  SADC	  Principles	  and	  Guidelines	  Governing	  Democratic	  Elections.	  307	  I	  refer	  to	  ’little	  room’	  because	  in	  some	  other	  cases	  that	  did	  not	  feature	  in	  this	  study,	  for	  instance	  Lesotho,	  SADC	   recognized	   the	   Christian	   Council	   of	   Lesotho’s	   (CCL)	   role	   of	   mediating	   the	   political	   impasse	   in	   that	  country.	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  In	  a	  nutshell,	  as	  noted	  earlier,	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  have	  been	  accorded	  some	  degree	  of	  authority	  to	  coordinate	  security	  policies.	  However,	  sub-­‐regional	  structures	  particularly,	  secretariats	  which	   still	   have	   limited	   authority	  were	   deliberately	   designed	   to	   support	   the	  respective	  governments,	  and	  not	  to	  act	  as	  implementing	  bodies	  that	  can	  effectively	  follow	  up	   on	   the	   decisions	   made	   by	   Member	   States	   (Kimathi,	   2010;	   Mwapachu,	   2011).	  Coordination	  of	  efforts	  geared	  towards	  addressing	  domestic	  political	  crises	  by	  sub-­‐regional	  institutions	   is	   significantly	   constrained	   as	  Member	   States	   continue	   to	   exercise	   dominant	  authority	  even	  on	  matters	  that	  are	  typically	  of	  an	  operational	  nature	  (Mwapachu,	  2011).	  	  	  9.3.2.	  Management	  of	  the	  Kenyan	  and	  Zimbabwean	  Political	  Crises	  	  The	   study	   notes	   that	   the	   two	   sub-­‐regional	   arrangements,	   i.e.	   EAC	   and	   SADC,	   make	  preference	   for	   peaceful	  methods	   of	  managing	   conflicts	  within	   the	   territory	   of	   a	  Member	  State,	   which	   include	   preventive	   diplomacy,	   negotiations,	   conciliation,	   mediation,	   good	  offices,	   arbitration	   and	   adjudication	   by	   an	   international	   tribunal308.	   The	   most	   favoured	  method	   from	   the	   foregoing	   list	   that	   came	   to	   be	   applied	   in	   the	   Kenyan	   and	   Zimbabwean	  cases	  is	  mediation.	  This	  section	  presents	  the	  key	  findings	  within	  the	  two	  main	  categories	  of	  actor-­‐types	   (i.e.	   intra-­‐sub-­‐regional	   actors	   and	   extra-­‐regional	   actors),	   whose	   roles	   in	   the	  management	   of	   the	   respective	   political	   crises	   in	  Kenya	   and	   Zimbabwe,	  were	   analysed	   in	  chapters	  6	  and	  8.	  	  First,	   starting	   with	   inter-­‐sub-­‐regional	   actors,	   it	   is	   to	   be	   recalled	   that	   both	   Kenya	   and	  Zimbabwe	   were	   subject	   to	   intensive	   mediation	   processes	   that	   aimed	   at	   resolving	   the	  political	  crises	  facing	  them.	  Both	  the	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  were	  involved	  in	  these	  processes	  albeit	  at	  varying	  degrees.	  The	  EAC	  was	  involved	  at	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  Kenyan	  political	  crisis	  through	   its	   Chair,	   President	   Museveni,	   whose	   mediation	   role	   was	   limited	   to	   creating	  communication	  between	  the	  two	  main	  antagonists	  when	  direct	  contact	  between	  them	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  308	  Article	  123	  of	   the	  EAC	  Treaty	   and	  Article	  11	   (3)	   of	   the	   SADC	  Protocol	   on	  Politics,	  Defence	   and	  Security	  Cooperation.	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still	   not	   possible.	   	   Even	   though	   Museveni	   proposed	   a	   framework	   to	   set	   up	   a	   judicial	  commission,	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  AU	  Team	  took	  up	  his	  proposal	  in	  the	  subsequent	  negotiations.	   	   	   In	  his	   intervention,	  Museveni	  was	  prompted	  by	  the	  precarious	  situation	   that	   faced	   Uganda’s	   goods	   transport	   system.	   In	   the	   final	   outcome,	   despite	   the	  recommendation	  of	  the	  EAC	  observer	  mission	  on	  the	  Kenyan	  2007	  general	  election	  for	  the	  EAC	  Summit	  to	  take	  an	  active	  leading	  role	  in	  the	  process	  towards	  a	  just	  and	  lasting	  solution	  to	  the	  crisis,	  the	  EAC	  ultimately	  failed	  to	  assert	  its	  authority	  over	  the	  mediation	  process.	  It	  however,	   supported	   the	   AU’s	   appointed	   mediator	   who	   brokered	   the	   final	   political	  agreement.	  	  In	  contrast,	  SADC	  had	  a	  more	  substantive	  role	  in	  the	  management	  of	  the	  Zimbabwe	  political	  crisis.	   The	   South	   African-­‐mandated	  mediation	   team	  was	   substantively	   involved	   in	   inter-­‐party	   negotiations	   by	   facilitating	   communication,	   formulating	   the	   actual	   roadmap	   and	  manipulating	   the	   parties	   into	   concluding	   an	   agreement.	   This	   is	   to	   say	   that	   Mbeki’s	  mediation	   role	   was	   much	   more	   intrusive	   (i.e.	   recalling	   the	   intrusiveness	   scale	   from	  communication,	  to	  formulation,	  and	  finally	  manipulation,	  chapter	  4.4.4.2)	  than	  Museveni	  in	  the	  Kenyan	   case.	   South	  Africa’s	   eagerness	   to	   take	   the	   lead	   role	   towards	  Zimbabwe,	   right	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  2000,	  was	  also	  driven	  by	  its	  own	  interest	  of	  maintaining	  stability	  and	  peaceful	  situation.	  	  Second,	  as	   it	  was	  observed	  in	  the	  coordination	  component	  there	  was	  minimal	   interaction	  between	  sub-­‐regional	  groupings	  and	  CSOs	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  management	  of	  domestic	  political	   crises	   in	   Member	   States.	   In	   the	   Kenyan	   case,	   the	   analysis	   reveals	   no	   apparent	  channel	  of	  interaction	  between	  the	  local	  CSOs,	  a	  coalition	  of	  prominent	  local	  and	  religious	  leaders,	  who	  were	   the	   first	   to	  attempt	   to	   initiate	  negotiations,	   and	   the	  EAC	  organs.	  Local	  CSOs	   in	  Kenya	  only	  made	   submissions	   to	   the	  AU	  mediation	   team.	   In	   the	  Zimbabwe	  case,	  CSOs’	  call	   for	   their	   inclusion	   in	   the	  actual	  mediation	  process	  was	  not	  heeded.	  CSOs	  had	  a	  brief	   interaction	  with	   South	   African	   facilitators	   to	   the	   Zimbabwe	   intra-­‐party	   talks	   when	  they	  presented	   their	   views	  on	   the	   country’s	  political	   crisis.	   In	  both	   cases,	  however,	  CSOs	  were	  supportive	  of	  the	  mediation	  and	  peacebuilding	  initiatives.	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The	   manner	   in	   which	   the	   two	   cases	   have	   been	   managed	   show	   that	   state	   actors	   do	   not	  accord	   CSOs	   substantive	   roles	   in	   peaceful	   resolution	   of	   intra-­‐state	   conflicts.	   As	   it	   was	  observed	  earlier,	  their	  involvement	  in	  the	  mediation	  process	  is	  viewed	  as	  a	  potential	  cause	  of	  delays	  in	  concluding	  negotiations.	  State	  actors	  interacting	  among	  themselves	  within	  sub-­‐regional	   groupings	   they	   belong	   to,	   prefer	   working	   behind	   the	   scene,	   treating	   domestic	  political	  crises	  as	  very	  sensitive	  security	  issues.	  It	  is	  no	  surprise	  that	  at	  different	  points	  in	  time;	   the	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  were	  accused	  of	  pursuing	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘quiet	  diplomacy’	  by	  not	  publicly	  stating	  their	  positions	  in	  the	  face	  of	  an	  imminent	  crisis,	  or	  openly	  criticize	  parties	  that	   flout	   sub-­‐regional	   norms,	   while	   they	   chose	   to	   take	   much	   tougher	   positions	   behind	  closed	   doors.	   The	   ‘name	   and	   shame’	   role	   was	   left	   to	   the	   activist	   CSOs,	   especially	   when	  mediation	   rounds	   are	   not	   moving	   or	   when	   sub-­‐regional	   rules	   are	   frequently	   infringed.	  	  CSOs	  involvement	  in	  domestic	  political	  crises	  is	  thus	  limited	  as	  states	  continue	  to	  sideline	  them	  in	  this	  area.	  	  Third,	  as	  far	  as	  extra-­‐regional	  actors	  are	  concerned,	  both	  the	  AU	  and	  UN	  were	  alarmed	  and	  concerned	   by	   the	   insecure	   political	   situations	   in	   Kenya	   and	   Zimbabwe.	   While	   the	   AU’s	  Panel	  of	  Eminent	  African	  Personalities	  led	  by	  Kofi	  Annan	  took	  full	  control	  of	  the	  mediation	  process	   in	   Kenya,	   the	   continental	   body	   deferred	   the	   task	   of	   facilitating	   Zimbabwe	   inter-­‐party	  negotiations	  to	  SADC.	  This	  outcome	  warrants	  some	  explanation.	  In	  Kenya,	  the	  Annan-­‐led	  team	  successfully	  managed	  to	  convince	  the	  disputing	  parties,	  sub-­‐regional	  players	  like	  IGAD	  and	  EAC,	  and	  international	  community	  that	  its	  mediation	  was	  the	  ‘only	  game	  in	  town’.	  With	  regard	  to	  Zimbabwe,	  SADC	  portrayed	  a	  unified	  stance	  against	  what	   it	  considered	  as	  ‘interference’	   in	  a	  domestic	  crisis	  troubling	  one	  of	   its	  Member	  States.	  SADC	  had	  sought	  to	  minimize	   as	   much	   as	   possible	   the	   influence	   of	   extra-­‐regional	   actors	   in	   the	   negotiations	  among	  the	  Zimbabwe	  disputing	  parties.	  The	  sub-­‐regional	  grouping	  had	  consistently	  sought	  to	  retain	  the	  mediation	  of	  the	  crisis	  under	  its	  control.	   	  More	  particularly,	  South	  Africa	  had	  on	  different	  occasions	  at	  the	  UN	  shielded	  Zimbabwe	  from	  being	  placed	  under	  international	  mediation.	  	  	  Fourth,	   as	   observed	   elsewhere	   in	   this	   study,	   both	   mediation	   teams	   to	   the	   Kenyan	   and	  Zimbabwean	  political	   crises	  were	  subject	   to	  a	   strong	  under	  current	  of	  diplomatic	  muscle	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provided	  by	  another	  set	  of	  extra-­‐regional	  actors,	   i.e.	   the	  EU	  and	  western	  donor	  countries.	  The	   EU’	   and	   western	   donor	   countries’	   stance	   toward	   parties	   to	   the	   Zimbabwe	   political	  crisis	   was	   largely	   asymmetrical:	   strongly	   denouncing	   the	   ZANU-­‐PF	   regime,	   whilst	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  MDC	  factions	  (Cliffe,	  2009).	  In	  Kenya,	  western	  pressure	  was	  applied	  to	  both	   parties	   (PNU	   and	   ODM)	   to	   first	   agree	   to	   sit	   in	   the	   negotiation	   table,	   and	   later,	   to	  implement	  agendas	  of	  the	  concluded	  agreement.	  The	  western	  donor	  countries’	  position	  on	  Zimbabwe	   has	   thus	   dictated	   imposition	   of	   sanctions.	   Sanctions	   may	   have	   helped	   to	  pressurize	   the	  ZANU-­‐PF	  side	   to	  come	  to	   the	  negotiation	  table	  but	   there	   is	  no	  evidence	  to	  suggest	   that	   they	  were	   equally	   instrumental	   in	   changing	   the	  behaviour	   of	   the	  Zimbabwe	  political	  and	  military	  elites	  who	  are	  alleged	  to	  have	  condoned	  violent	  acts	  and	  other	  human	  rights	   abuses.	  Withholding	   of	   sanctions	   even	   after	   the	   signing	   of	   the	   GPA	   presented	   the	  ZANU-­‐PF	  side	  with	  a	  convenient	  excuse	  to	  avoid	  fulfilling	  its	  share	  of	  responsibilities	  under	  the	  agreement.	  	  9.4. A	  Synthesis	  of	  Research	  Findings	  	  As	   the	   title	   suggests	   this	   section	   synthesizes	   the	   study’s	   findings	   and	   general	   trends.	   To	  fulfil	  this	  task	  in	  a	  coherent	  manner,	  the	  section	  has	  been	  divided	  into	  six	  main	  sub-­‐themes	  namely,	  coordination	  and	  management	  of	  security	  challenges	  and	  contextual	  explanations	  for	   differential	   responses;	   the	   question	   of	   standards	   versus	   practice;	   adjudication	   as	   an	  alternative	   conflict	   resolution	   method	   and	   the	   influence	   of	   extra-­‐regional	   players;	  assessment	  of	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  two	  organizations	  as	  security	  actors;	  theoretical	  lessons	  drawn,	   and	   the	   advantages	   of	   employing	   a	   comparative	   approach	   in	   analysing	   security	  practices	  of	  sub-­‐regional	  arrangements.	  	  9.4.1.	  Coordination	  and	  Management	  of	  Security	  Challenges	  and	  Contextual	  Explanations	  	  The	  emerging	  patterns	  from	  the	  examination	  of	  the	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  experiences	  in	  reacting	  to	   the	   security	   challenges	   of	   SALW	   and	   domestic	   political	   crises	   confirm	   the	   study’s	  hypothesis	   that	   the	   coordination	   and	   management	   of	   sub-­‐regional	   security	   governance	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depends	   on	   the	   type	   of	   collective	   security	   challenge.	   First,	   the	   coordination	   component	  shows	   a	   more	   structured	   relationship	   and	   interaction	   between	   state	   actors,	   non-­‐state	  actors	  and	  other	  parallel	  organizations	  and	  international	  institutions	  with	  a	  stake	  in	  small	  arms	  issues	  than	  in	  the	  case	  of	  domestic	  political	  crises.	  Coordination	  of	  domestic	  political	  crises	   is	   mostly	   a	   behind-­‐the-­‐scene	   activity,	   restricted	   to	   state	   actors,	   and	   relies	   on	   the	  facilitation	   of	   a	   Member	   State’s	   government	   (as	   was	   the	   case	   with	   the	   South	   African	  government	  in	  the	  Zimbabwe	  political	  crisis	  and	  to	  some	  extent	  the	  Ugandan	  government	  in	   the	   Kenya	   post-­‐election	   crisis)	   instead	   of	   respective	   secretariats	   and	   attendant	  institutional	   structures	  being	   centrally	   involved.	  As	   it	  was	  observed	   in	  both	   sub-­‐regional	  arrangements,	   there	   were	   no	   extant	   specific	   mediation	   units	   to	   spearhead	   the	  organizations’	   coordination	   roles	   in	   domestic	   political	   crises.	   Second,	   the	   picture	   that	  emerges	  from	  the	  coordination	  of	  SALW	  across	  the	  two	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  is	  also	  mixed	   in	   that	  EAC	  maintains	  a	  more	  structured	  relationship	  with	   the	  other	  actors	   (CSOs,	  regional	  organizations,	  and	  Member	  States)	  than	  SADC.	  	  Third,	  management	  of	  SALW	  reveals	  the	  fact	  that	  despite	  the	  persistence	  of	  the	  problem,	  an	  array	  of	  actors	   interacting	  within	   sub-­‐regional	   institutional	  arrangements	  made	  progress	  in	   the	   implementation	   of	   some	   control	   measures	   (more	   particularly	   collection	   and	  destruction	   of	   firearms,	   and	   marking	   of	   firearms).	   They	   were	   yet	   unable	   to	   establish	  synchronized	   SALW	   legislations	   and	   centralized	   small	   arms	   databases.	   Whereas	  management	  of	  domestic	  political	  crises	  accommodated	  a	  much	  smaller	  range	  of	  actors,	  it	  is	  conceivable	  that	  mediation	  as	  the	  preferred	  method	  in	  responding	  to	  the	  crises	  helped	  to	  avert	  the	  total	  implosion	  of	  Kenya	  and	  Zimbabwe	  (i.e.	  mediation	  initiatives	  prevented	  the	  situation	   from	  descending	   into	   full-­‐scale	   civil	  wars,	  meaning	   it	   could	   possibly	   have	   been	  much	  more	  worse).	  Yet,	  in	  both	  cases,	  sub-­‐regional	  actors	  were	  ill	  prepared	  and	  displayed	  limited	  capability	  in	  dealing	  with	  typical	  cases	  of	  domestic	  political	  crises.	  	  	  It	  has	  thus	  been	  posited	  that	  even	  though	  the	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  were	  engaged	  in	  attempts	  to	  respond	   to	   cases	   of	   domestic	   political	   crises,	   both	   were	   relatively	   less	   effective	   in	   their	  efforts.	   It	   ought	   to	   be	   noted	   that	   there	   is	   a	   marked	   difference	   between	   actors	   that	   are	  ‘active’	   (i.e.	   those	  engaging	  or	  participating	   in	  a	  particular	  endeavour)	  and	   those	   that	  are	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‘effective’	   (i.e.	   being	   efficacious	   in	   using	   tact	   and	   skill	   in	   producing	   a	   desired	   result).	  	  Indeed,	  there	  is	  a	  sharp	  contrast	  between	  being	  energetically	  involved	  in	  a	  crisis	  to	  create	  an	  impression	  that	  something	  is	  being	  done	  about	  it,	  and	  a	  sub-­‐region	  body	  that	  is	  fulfilling	  its	  responsibilities,	  and	  actually	  putting	  its	  utility	  into	  action.	  	  It	   was	   also	   shown	   that	   their	   degree	   of	   engagement	   in,	   and	   common	   stances	   on	   the	  Zimbabwe	   and	   Kenyan	   crises	   also	   varied	   greatly.	   This	   is	   partly	   ascribed	   to	   contextual	  reasons.	  When	  the	  Mugabe	  regime	  realized	  that	  its	  political	  support	  had	  quickly	  waned	  in	  the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   parliamentary	   elections	   in	   June	   2000,	   it	   reignited	   the	   land	   reform	  debate	  as	  a	  way	  of	  bolstering	  support	  for	  ZANU-­‐PF’s	  traditional	  rural	  constituency	  (Alden,	  2011).	   South	  Africa	   that	   had	   a	   strong	   foothold	   on	   the	   Zimbabwe	  negotiations	   cautiously	  handled	   the	   process	   as	   this	   politically	   sensitive	   subject	   had,	   and	   still	   has	   significant	  ramifications	   for	   the	   domestic	   situation	   in	   the	   former	   settler	   states	   in	   the	   sub-­‐region.	  Unsurprisingly,	  land	  activists	  in	  South	  Africa,	  and	  Namibian	  NGO	  and	  trade	  unionists	  “used	  the	   spectacle	   in	   Zimbabwe	   to	   raise	   questions	   about	   the	   continuing	   inequities	   in	   land	  distribution	  in	  their	  countries”	  (Alden,	  2011:	  210).	  	  	  Kenya	  is	  also	  a	  former	  settler	  state	  where	  competition	  for	  land	  between	  locals	  has	  been	  one	  of	   the	   major	   flashpoints	   for	   inter-­‐ethnic	   violence	   (Hickman,	   2011;	   Branch,	   2011).	   Land	  completion	  is	  a	  recurring	  theme	  in	  Kenya	  and	  the	  ethnic	  clashes	  that	  gained	  currency	  since	  the	  1990s	  were	  also	  a	  way	  of	  resolving	  grievances	  over	  land	  (Branch,	  2011).	  Although	  the	  long	  history	  of	  localised	  contests	  over	  access	  to	  land	  in	  Kenya	  was	  closely	  tied	  to	  electoral	  politics,	   it	   had	   no	   telling	   influence	   on	   the	   reaction	   of	   its	   neighbours	   to	   the	   2008	   post-­‐election	   violence.	   Admittedly,	   access	   to	   land	   is	   an	   intricate	   issue	   also	   in	   individual	   East	  African	  states.	  	  However,	  sensitivity	  over	  the	  land	  issue	  had	  impacted	  more	  on	  the	  common	  market	   negotiations	   in	   which	   case	   Tanzania,	   which	   still	   has	   relatively	   large	   chunks	   of	  arable	  land,	  successfully	  resisted	  pressure	  from	  other	  Member	  States	  to	  put	  land	  under	  the	  ambit	  of	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  body	  by	  insisting	  that	  it	  remains	  a	  sovereign	  matter.	  	  	  Moreover,	   the	   Mugabe	   regime	   successfully	   exploited	   the	   national	   land	   debate	   as	   a	  propaganda	  tool	  to	  project	  itself	  as	  a	  victim	  of	  an	  imperialist	  onslaught	  (Ndlovu-­‐Gatsheni,	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2011).	   The	   anti	   imperialist	   claims	   by	   Mugabe	   reverberated	   solidarity	   campaigns	   of	   the	  recent	  past	  in	  Southern	  Africa	  where	  majority	  of	  states	  are	  still	  under	  parties	  that	  led	  the	  liberation	   struggle	   (Alden,	  2011;	  Hull	   and	  Derblom,	  2009).	   	  There	  was	  no	   such	   room	   for	  manoeuvre	   for	  the	  Kibaki	  regime	  as	  the	  country	  descended	  in	  violence	   immediately	  after	  the	   2007	   elections.	   Kibaki	   vainly	   attempted	   to	   use	   the	   ‘incumbency	   card’	   to	   draw	  diplomatic	   support	   from	   fellow	   East	   African	   leaders	   as	   a	   way	   to	   fend	   off	   extra-­‐regional	  pressure	  for	  mediation.	  	  	  As	   expected	   the	   Kibaki	   regime	   did	   not	   receive	   any	   bashing	   from	   the	   other	   East	   African	  leaders	  following	  the	  highly	  disputed	  December	  2007	  elections	  as	  states	  with	  more	  or	  less	  similar	  ‘undemocratic’	  credentials	  are	  hardly	  likely	  to	  take	  a	  critical	  stance	  against	  breach	  of	   democratic	   practices	   by	   their	   counterparts.	   In	   the	   face	   of	   a	   conspicuously	   silent	   sub-­‐regional	  body,	  lack	  of	  opposition	  for	  extra-­‐regional	  actors’	  involvement	  in	  the	  crisis	  by	  the	  East	  African	  grouping,	  and	  an	   international	  community	  baffled	  by	  the	  speed	   in	  which	  the	  country	   descended	   into	   chaos,	   there	  was	   a	   tacit	   agreement	   by	   both	   sub-­‐regional	   leaders	  and	  international	  players	  that	  the	  situation	  called	  for	  the	  regional	  body’s	  (AU)	  immediate	  attention.	  	  	  Besides	   the	   manifestly	   weak	   EAC	   conflict	   management	   machinery	   for	   dealing	   with	  domestic	   political	   crises,	   there	   was	   no	   state	   within	   the	   grouping	   that	   commanded	  considerable	  diplomatic	  influence	  to	  convince	  the	  concerned	  international	  community	  that	  the	  crisis	  could	  effectively	  and	  solely	  be	  managed	  by	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  arrangement.	  Within	  the	  SADC,	  South	  Africa	  consistently	  foiled	  attempts	  to	  take	  the	  Zimbabwe	  issue	  away	  from	  the	  grouping’s	  control.	  	  It	  was	  thus	  not	  only	  an	  obvious	  decision	  (because	  South	  Africa	  had	  already	  shown	  keen	  interest	  in	  resolving	  the	  crisis)	  but	  also	  a	  rational	  move	  by	  the	  SADC	  to	  entrust	  South	  Africa	  with	  the	  mediation	  role.	  I	  shall	  return	  to	  implications	  of	  this	  scenario	  for	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  arrangement	  when	  making	  conclusions	  on	  theoretical	  lessons.	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9.4.2.	  Matching	  Standards	  with	  Practice	  	  While	   EAC’s	   limited	   role	   in	   the	  management	   of	   the	   Kenyan	   post-­‐election	   violence	   could	  escape	  much	  critical	  scrutiny	  for	  not	  having	  a	  relevant	  security	  protocol	  and	  election	  norms	  in	  place	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  crisis,	  SADC’s	  experience	  has	  shown	  that	  even	  with	  the	  adoption	  of	   those	   instruments,	   it	   was	   unable	   to	   censure	   a	  Member	   State	   that	   persistently	   flouted	  relevant	  provisions.	  Not	  being	  bold	  enough	   to	  effectively	  enforce	   sub-­‐regional	   rules	  does	  indeed	  bog	  down	  the	  organization’s	  efforts	  in	  the	  management	  of	  domestic	  political	  crises,	  and	  the	  outcome	   is	   that	  peacemaking	  efforts	  drag	  on	   for	   too	   long	  while	  at	   the	  same	  time	  denying	   the	  much	  needed	  attention	  and	  energy	  on	  more	  progressive	   integration	  agenda.	  SADC’s	   endorsement	   of	   democratic	   election	   norms	   in	   its	   official	   documents	   has	   not	   in	  practice	   led	   it	   to	   address	   squarely	   the	   violence	   and	   insecurity	   associated	   with	   hugely	  flawed	  multiparty	   elections	   in	   its	  Member	   States.	  Undeniably,	   having	   rules	   and	  norms	   is	  one	  thing,	  implementing	  them	  in	  situations	  they	  were	  meant	  to	  address	  is	  another,	  and	  it	  is	  an	   area	   that	   leaves	   a	   lot	   to	   be	   desired.	   The	   analysis	   of	   management	   of	   the	   Kenyan	   and	  Zimbabwean	   crises	   go	   a	   long	   way	   to	   support	   the	   assertion	   that	   peacemaking	   at	   sub-­‐regional	   level	   is	   often	   aimed	   at	   stopping	   the	   immediate	   violence,	   with	   less	   attention	  directed	  at	  solving	  the	  underlying	  governance	  problems	  that	  brought	  the	  dire	  situations	  in	  the	   first	  place	   (Hartmann,	  2008;	  Ancas,	  2011).	  There	   is	   indeed	   the	  need	   for	   sub-­‐regional	  actors	  to	  push	  the	  interrogation	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  democracy	  currently	  practiced	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  constitutional	  rule	  of	  elected	  governments	  (Hartmann,	  2008).	  	  Of	   course,	   this	   is	   not	   the	   first	   time	   a	   debilitating	   gap	   between	   normative	   standards	   and	  actual	  practice	  by	  states	  is	  highlighted.	  A	  consensus	  has	  emerged	  that	  at	  least	  on	  paper	  sub-­‐regional	   organizations	  portray	  very	   ambitious	   security	  policies,	   but	  more	  often	   than	  not,	  they	  are	   lagging	  behind	   in	   their	   implementation	  and	   this	  observation	   is	  not	   restricted	   to	  the	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  (Elowson	  and	  Macdermott,	  2010;	  Zounmenou	  and	  Loua,	  2011).	  A	  quick	  query	   that	   follows	   from	   this	   troubling	   fact	   on	  African	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   is:	  why	  would	   states	   sign	   agreements	   at	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   level	   in	   which	   case	   they	   make	  commitments,	  but	  do	  not	  follow	  through	  with	  implementation	  at	  the	  national	  level?	  This	  is	  attributed	  to	  a	  number	  of	  factors.	  One	  reason	  is	  the	  tendency	  by	  some	  leaders	  to	  use	  sub-­‐
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regional	  and	  regional	  forums	  merely	  for	  political	  expediency.	  To	  some	  leaders	  engaging	  in	  high-­‐level	   negotiations	   that	   lead	   to	   the	   signing	   of	   protocols	   and	   other	   agreements	   with	  some	  lofty	  goals	  is	  just	  a	  convenient	  forum	  to	  legitimize	  a	  government	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  it	  helps	  to	  score	  some	  political	  points	  with	  a	  domestic	  audience.	  While	  it	  looks	  good	  for	  the	  domestic	  electoral	  constituency,	  the	  external	  image	  of	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  organization	  before	  its	   peers	   suffers,	  who	   in	   the	   long	   run	  might	   stop	   to	   view	   the	   organization	   as	   a	   potential	  security	  actor	  but	  another	  ‘talking-­‐shop’.	  	  Another	  reason	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  clear	  and	  practical	  implementation	  strategies.	  Even	  when	  an	  organization	   has	   developed	   a	   plan,	   like	   the	   SADC’s	   SIPO	   that	   suggests	   strategies	   and	  activities	  for	  implementation	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  politics,	  defence	  and	  security,	  still	  there	  is	  lack	  of	   clarity	  as	   to	   the	   relative	   sequence	  and	  priority	  of	  objectives	   (Hull	   and	  Derblom,	  2009:	  32).	   This	   prompted	   the	  need	   for	   revision	  of	   the	   SIPO	   for	   the	  plan	   to	  have	   any	   chance	  of	  attainment	  within	  the	  foreseeable	  future.	  The	  SIPO	  is	  certainly	  indicative,	  as	  it	  for	  instance	  proposes	  measures	  for	  the	  consolidation	  of	  democracy	  in	  Southern	  Africa.	  While	  this	  was	  a	  welcome	  step	  within	  the	  SADC	  arrangement,	  the	  strategic	  plan	  remained	  insufficient	  as	  it	  fell	   short	   of	   providing	   clarity	   on	   what	   exactly	   the	   principles	   of	   democracy	   meant	   in	  particular	  for	  SADC	  Member	  States	  (Debiel	  et.	  al.	  2008:	  169).	  	  	  Moreover,	  most	  of	  the	  designated	  strategies	  and	  activities	  are	  too	  bland	  (e.g.	  ‘hold	  regional	  meetings’),	  too	  general	  and	  lofty	  (e.g.	  ‘consolidate	  peace	  and	  security	  and	  stability’)	  and	  too	  vague	   (e.g.	   ‘establish	  and	  strengthen	  bilateral	   commissions’)	   (Nathan,	  2012:	  53).	  Had	   the	  SIPO	   addressed	   these	   loopholes	   and	   the	   previously	   mentioned	   SADC	   Principles	   and	  Guidelines	   Governing	   Democratic	   Elections	   improved	   to	   overcome	   their	   apparent	  shortcomings,	  including	  their	  failure	  to	  go	  beyond	  the	  actual	  election	  period	  to	  include	  the	  run-­‐up	   phase;	   the	   country	   holding	   elections	   not	   compelled	   to	   invite	   SADC	   Observer	  Mission;	   and	   absence	   of	   punitive	   measures	   versus	   states	   which	   fail	   to	   comply	   with	   the	  principles	  and	  guidelines,	  they	  could	  prove	  as	  valuable	  reference	  instruments	  for	  cases	  of	  domestic	  political	  crises.	  As	  was	  rightly	  commented	  by	  Van	  Schalkwyk,	  the	  SADC	  Principle	  and	  Guidelines	  Governing	  Democratic	  Elections	  along	  with	  Protocols	  and	  other	  agreements	  signed	  by	  states	  largely	  remain	  paper	  tigers	  (Van	  Schalkwyk,	  2005).	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  The	  EAC,	  on	  its	  part,	  decided	  to	  start	  with	  a	  highly	  ambitious	  peace	  and	  security	  strategy	  that	  was	  adopted	  in	  2006,	  followed	  with	  a	  draft	  Protocol	  for	  Peace	  and	  Security.	  As	  is	  the	  case	  with	  SADC,	  EAC	  is	  yet	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  practical	  plan	  for	  implementing	  the	  15	  broad	  goals	  of	  its	  Peace	  and	  Security	  Strategy.	  There	  is	  now	  a	  growing	  realization	  of	  the	  need	  for	  sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   to	   settle	   for	   a	   set	   of	   concrete	   attainable	   instruments	   and	  activities	  that	  will	  transform	  sub-­‐regional	  standards	  and	  policies	  into	  practice.	  9.4.3.	  Adjudication	  and	  the	  Influence	  of	  Extra-­‐Regional	  Actors	  	  While	   mediation	   has	   appeared	   as	   the	   most	   favoured	   method	   in	   the	   management	   of	  domestic	  political	  crises	  in	  the	  two	  cases	  studied,	  opportunity	  of	  pursuing	  adjudication	  as	  an	  alternative	  approach	  to	  conflict	  resolution	  was	  sealed	  off.	  Both	  the	  East	  African	  Court	  of	  Justice	   (EACJ)	   and	   the	   SADC	   Tribunal	   could	   have	   offered	   alternative	   legal	   recourse	   for	  disputing	  parties	  had	  they	  been,	  first,	  accorded	  the	  jurisdiction	  to	  attend	  to	  cases	  related	  to	  election	  malpractices	  in	  Member	  States;	  second,	  be	  allowed	  to	  act	  independent	  of	  political	  machinations	  of	  states’	  elites,	  and	  thus	  not	  allowing	  their	  proper	  functioning	  resting	  at	  the	  whims	   of	   the	   other	   decision	   making	   organs	   of	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   such	   as	   the	  Summit;	  and	  third,	  their	  ruling	  be	  upheld	  even	  when	  they	  stand	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  wishes	  of	  an	  incumbent	  regime.	  	  The	   study	  also	  notes	   the	  differential	   roles	  played	  by	  extra-­‐regional	   actors	   in	   response	   to	  the	   two	   collective	   security	   challenges.	   Extra-­‐regional	   actors	   played	   supportive	   and	  complementary	   roles	   in	   the	   coordination	   and	  management	   of	   the	   SALW	  problem	  within	  both	  EAC	  and	  SADC.	  The	  sub-­‐regional	  actors	  were	  more	  than	  willing	  to	  welcome	  this	  set	  of	  actors	   to	   practically	   offer	   support	   and	   complement	   intervention	   initiatives	   to	   curb	   the	  SALW	   problem.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   domestic	   political	   crises	   (which	   Member	   States	   of	   the	  respective	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   treated	  with	   high	   sensitivity)	   extra-­‐regional	   actors	  applied	   pressure	   on	   disputing	   parties	   through	   the	   threat	   of	   and	   actual	   imposition	   of	  sanctions,	  which	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  helped	  to	  push	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  negotiating	  table,	  but	  on	  the	   other,	   did	   much	   less	   to	   alter	   the	   behaviour	   of	   states	   concerned	   as	   well	   as	   those	   in	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positions	  of	  authority.	  More	  particularly,	  sanctions	  did	  not	  make	  them	  acquiesce	  to	  ending	  the	  culture	  of	   impunity,	   including	  taking	  the	  responsibility	  of	  prosecuting	  perpetrators	  of	  election	   violence	   or	   make	   them	   implement	   terms	   of	   the	   signed	   political	   agreements	  profusely	  and	  promptly.	  	  	  9.4.4.	  Assessing	  Effectiveness	  in	  Addressing	  Collective	  Security	  Challenges	  	  Having	  learnt	  how	  the	  two	  cases	  of	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  responded	  to	  two	  different	  sets	  of	  security	  challenges,	  and	  in	  the	  backdrop	  of	   the	  study’s	   findings,	   it	  naturally	  draws	  interest	   to	   move	   a	   bit	   further	   and	   interrogate	   their	   effectiveness	   in	   dealing	   with	   those	  security	   challenges	   (i.e.	   SALW	   threat	   and	   domestic	   political	   crises).	   Equipped	   with	   all	  information	  and	  knowledge	  about	  the	  security	  practices	  of	  the	  EAC	  and	  SADC,	  thus	  far,	  do	  we	   look	   at	   these	   particular	   organizations	   as	   actors	   playing	   a	   meaningful	   or	   just	  inconsequential	  role	  with	  regard	  to	  security	  challenges	  confronting	  their	  Member	  States?	  	  Cognizant	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   divergent	   views	   still	   exist	   in	   the	   general	   field	   of	   international	  relations	   and	   regionalism	   in	   particular,	   on	   the	   actual	   and	  potential	   contributions	   of	   sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  to	  matters	  of	  security,	  it	  might	  be	  useful	  to	  situate	  my	  position	  in	  the	  debate	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   observed	   findings.	   Henceforth,	   this	   brief	   assessment	   of	   the	  organizations’	  effectiveness	  is	  not	  framed	  around	  or	  shaped	  by	  a	  priori	  expectations	  but	  it	  is	   grounded	   on	   the	   security	   objectives	   of	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   groupings	   towards	   the	   two	  specific	   security	   challenges.	   It	   can	   affirmatively	  be	  noted	   that	   if	   one	   is	   to	   recapitulate	   all	  observed	   developments	   within	   the	   EAC	   and	   SADC	   security	   architectures,	   the	   emerging	  picture	   does	   not	   cast	   a	   wholly	   optimistic	   or	   completely	   pessimistic	   outlook.	   This	   has	  already	   been	   highlighted,	   though	   in	   patches,	   in	   the	   foregoing	   sections	   that	   the	   security	  dimensions	  facing	  Member	  States	  and	  the	  mitigating	  task	  of	  sub-­‐regional	  groupings	  vary	  in	  their	   respective	   areas	   of	   operations.	   To	   be	   more	   specific,	   in	   comparative	   terms	   sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  under	  focus	  here	  appear	  as	  more	  effective	  actors	  in	  the	  small	  arms	  issue-­‐area	  and	  less	  so	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  cases	  of	  domestic	  political	  crises.	  While	  mindful	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  both	  the	  small	  arms	  problem	  and	  domestic	  political	  crises	  still	  persist	  in	  East	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and	  Southern	  Africa	  sub-­‐regions,	  and	  that	  the	  constructions	  of	  the	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  security	  architectures	  are	  works	  in	  progress,	  it	  is	  fairly	  conclusive	  that	  the	  two	  organizations	  have	  relatively	  recorded	  progress	  in	  their	  SALW	  control	  measures	  than	  in	  their	  interventions	  in	  domestic	   political	   crises.	   There	   are	   explanations	   behind	   this	   state	   of	   affairs,	   which	   are	  worthy	  of	  attention.	  	  One	   explanation	   lies	   on	   the	  nature	  of	   the	   security	   threats	   themselves.	  While	   state	   actors	  expressly	  and	  commonly	  agreed	  to	  place	  SALW	  and	  intra-­‐state	  conflicts	  in	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  security	   agenda,	   they	   are	   more	   sensitive	   when	   dealing	   with	   the	   latter	   than	   the	   former	  security	  challenge.	  Even	  though,	  the	  threat	  of	  SALW	  proliferation	  is	  real	  because	  if	   it	  gets	  out	  of	  hand	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  spark	  waves	  of	  crime	  and	  insecurity,	  and	  in	  the	  end	  the	  worsening	  security	  situation	  can	  turn	  the	  populace	  against	  a	  regime,	  this	  is	  perceived	  as	  a	  less	  direct	  threat	   to	   state	   sovereignty	   than	   would	   be	   a	   domestic	   political	   crisis.	   High	   sensitivity	  attached	  to	  domestic	  political	  crises	  by	  state	  elites	  largely	  explains	  their	  strong	  aversion	  to	  sub-­‐regional	  actors’	  involvement	  in	  domestic	  conflicts.	  It	  is	  one	  area	  that	  state’s	  authority	  is	  still	  jealously	  guarded.	  While	  state	  actors	  have	  allowed	  more	  nuanced	  roles	  for	  a	  range	  of	  state	   and	   non-­‐state	   actors	   in	   both	   the	   coordination	   and	   management	   of	   small	   arms	  measures,	  the	  window	  of	  engagement	  is	  much	  more	  restricted	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  domestic	  political	  crises.	  It	  is	  also	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  sanctity	  of	  state	  sovereignty	  that	  informs	  the	  continuing	  reluctance	  to	  relocate	  some	  of	   the	  governmental	  authority	   to	   the	  sub-­‐regional	  institutions.	   Even	   though	   we	   regard	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   as	   emerging	   collective	  actors	   in	   security	   matters	   whose	   members	   remain	   sovereign	   actors,	   the	   pooling	   of	  sovereignty	  especially	  in	  the	  security	  realm	  is	  still	  a	  very	  sensitive	  subject.	  And	  this	  ‘hurts’	  more	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations’	  efforts	  in	  addressing	  cases	  of	  domestic	  political	  crises	  as	  they	  often	  relate	  to	  shortcomings	  in	  domestic	  governance	  structures.	  	  	  A	   more	   revealing	   fact	   for	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations’	   feeble	   contribution	   in	   managing	  domestic	  crises	   is	   that	  when	  resolution	  methods	  such	  as	  negotiations	  and	  mediation	  had	  been	  employed	  in	  a	  domestic	  situation,	  they	  were	  generally	  meant	  to	  preserve	  and	  not	  to	  upset	   the	   status	   quo.	   As	   it	   unsurprisingly	   turned	   out	   in	   Kenya	   and	   Zimbabwe,	   final	  settlements	   were	   drawn	   up	   with	   a	   leaning	   towards	   accommodating	   a	   ‘disgraced’	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incumbent	  leader.	  There	  is	  yet	  another	  explanation	  for	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations’	  dismal	  performance	  in	  matters	  of	  domestic	  political	  crises:	  the	  failure	  to	  make	  full	  use	  of	  existing	  sub-­‐regional	   body’s	   institutional	  mechanisms	  with	   potential	   to	   enforce	   norms	   of	   rule	   of	  law,	  human	  rights	  and	  democratic	  practices	  in	  general.	  Evidences	  are	  not	  hard	  to	  find	  here.	  The	  SADC	  Tribunal	  and	  the	  EACJ	  are	  potential	  mechanisms	  for	  ensuring	  compliance	  within	  the	   SADC	   and	   EAC,	   respectively.	   However,	   in	   the	   interest	   of	   political	   expediency	   for	   the	  sub-­‐regional	  elites,	  SADC	  States	  suspended	  the	  Tribunal	  and	  EAC	  countries	  moved	  swiftly	  to	  amend	  provisions	  of	  the	  EACJ	  thereby	  limiting	  the	  court’s	  jurisdiction	  so	  as	  not	  to	  apply	  to	  “jurisdiction	  conferred	  by	  the	  Treaty	  on	  organs	  of	  Partner	  States”309.	  These	  are	  decisions	  that	   appeased	   more	   state	   leaders	   than	   individual	   civilians	   who	   approach	   sub-­‐regional	  courts	  when	  domestic	  recourse	  fails.	  	  9.4.5.	  Some	  Theoretical	  Lessons	  	  Finally,	  there	  are	  theoretical	  lessons	  to	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  foregoing	  findings.	  Examination	  of	  the	  EAC	  and	  SADC	  experiences	  in	  response	  to	  collective	  security	  challenges	  featured	  two	  of	   the	  most	   economically	   dominant	   states	   in	   the	   two	   organizations.	   In	   the	  EAC,	   the	   sub-­‐regional	  economic	  powerful	  country,	  Kenya,	  was	   itself	  a	  scene	  of	  political	  violence.	  When	  this	  most	   powerful	   economic	  member	   of	   the	   EAC	  was	   caught	   up	   in	   a	   political	   crisis,	   the	  entire	  sub-­‐region	  was	  rocked.	  Within	  SADC,	  South	  Africa	  possesses	  all	   the	  attributes	  of	  a	  hegemonic	  power.	  The	  notable	  positive	   side	   to	   this	   is	   that	   this	  hegemonic	   status	  has	  not	  deterred	   it	   from	   playing	   a	   leading	   role	   by	   offering	   a	   significant	   contribution	   not	   only	   to	  peacemaking	  efforts	  in	  the	  sub-­‐region,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  through	  non-­‐violent	  means,	  but	  also	  in	  forging	  collaborative	  bilateral	  and	  multilateral	  operations	  to	  stem	  out	  the	  SALW	  problem.	   This	   goes	   a	   long	   way	   to	   allay	   fears	   most	   often	   associated	   with	   proponents	   of	  mainstream	   rational	   systemic	   theories	   that	   a	   country	   of	   South	   Africa’s	   attributes	   would	  always	   seek	   to	   bully	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   grouping	   and	   unilaterally	   drive	   the	   sub-­‐regional	  organization’s	  security	  agenda	  according	  to	  its	  whims	  and	  interests.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  309	  Amendments	  to	  Article	  27	  and	  30,	  which	  were	  published	  in	  the	  EAC	  Gazette	  on	  16th	  March	  2007.	  The	  EAC	  Partner	  States	  had	  also	  adopted	  a	  draft	  Protocol	  extending	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  EACJ,	  in	  which	  all	  the	  EAC	  Member	  States	  agreed	  to	  exclude	  any	  reference	  to	  human	  rights	  adjudication	  by	  the	  Court.	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  Scholars	   increasingly	   see	   countries	  with	  hegemonic	   status	  within	   sub-­‐regional	   groupings	  as	  capable	  of	  steering	  the	  integration	  process	  through	  the	  provision	  of	  public	  goods	  such	  as	  security.	   Still,	   the	  hegemonic	   state	  would	  be	   circumspect	  of	  being	  assertive	   in	   its	   foreign	  conduct	  due	  to	  sub-­‐regional	  fears	  of	  domination.	  This	  concern	  pushes	  the	  hegemonic	  state	  to	  work	  for	  sub-­‐regional	  harmony	  instead	  of	  creating	  discord	  within	  the	  grouping	  of	  states.	  Thus,	  to	  secure	  the	  support	  of	  the	  other	  weaker	  Member	  States,	   it	  would	  have	  to	  operate	  through	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  organization	  that	  apparently	  is	  designed	  to	  counter	  dominance	  by	  any	   one	   state	   (Nathan,	   2012).	   This	   is	   the	   context	   in	   which	   South	   Africa	   has	   to	   operate	  within	   the	   SADC.	   South	   Africa	   is	   firmly	   aware	   that	   its	   interests	   in	   both	   security	   and	  economic	   integration	   agenda	   do	   not	   prevail	   unconditionally.	   It	   follows,	   henceforth,	   by	  engaging	  under	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  framework,	  South	  Africa’s	  mediation	  efforts	  on	  Zimbabwe	  received	   added	   legitimacy	   and	   clout.	   Where	   does	   this	   leave	   SADC	   as	   a	   collective	   actor?	  South	   Africa’s	   dominant	   position	   does	   not	   diminish	   the	   relevancy	   of	   SADC’s	   security	  arrangement.	  In	  fact,	  a	  strong	  lead	  state	  that	  can	  chaperone	  peace	  and	  security	  agenda	  and	  one	  that	  views	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  organization	  as	  a	  collaborative	  and	  consensual	  enterprise,	  is	  a	  welcome	  addition	  to	  its	  composition.	  	  The	  dilemma	  that	  the	  most	  powerful	  actor	  in	  the	  sub-­‐region	  faces	  is	  that	  it	  would	  be	  criticized	  for	  acting	  and	  even	  much	  slated	  if	  it	  does	  not.	  	  	  At	  this	  juncture,	  it	   is	  hard	  to	  speculate	  what	  would	  have	  happened	  had	  South	  Africa	  itself	  been	   in	   trouble.	   If	   the	   local	   hegemon	  had	   itself	   fallen	   into	   a	  domestic	  political	   crisis	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	   predict	  with	   great	   certainty	  what	  would	   have	   been	   the	   reaction	   of	   the	   other	  weaker	  members	  of	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  body.	  The	  only	  experience	  we	  have	  here	  is	  that	  when	  the	  East	  African	  economic	  giant	  (Kenya)	  found	  itself	  in	  trouble,	  the	  EAC	  was	  helpless.	  Well,	  this	  is	  just	  one	  instance	  that	  cannot	  be	  used	  on	  its	  own	  to	  make	  a	  general	  claim.	  Perhaps,	  consideration	   of	   more	   cases	   featuring	   more	   sub-­‐regions	   can	   help	   to	   arrive	   at	   more	  informed	  assertions	  on	  this	  issue.	  	  	  	  	  The	   theoretical	   perspective	   employed,	   i.e.	   security	   governance,	   was	   not	   about	  making	   a	  purely	  legal	  argument	  about	  competences	  and	  mandates.	  It	  was	  not	  solely	  focused	  on	  how	  states	  use	  international	  organizations.	  The	  security	  governance	  perspective	  as	  applied	  here	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extended	  beyond	  theoretical	  frameworks	  that	  are	  state-­‐centric	  in	  orientation	  by	  capturing	  both	  the	  multi-­‐level	  (i.e.	  national	  and	  sub-­‐regional)	  and	  multi-­‐actor	  dimensions	  of	  security	  cooperation.	  Thus	  a	  sub-­‐regional	  security	  governance	  perspective	  expressed	  not	  only	   the	  territoriality	   of	   security	   concerns	   under	   focus	   but	   also	   widened	   the	   analytical	   focus	   to	  incorporate	   actors	   other	   than	   states.	   It	   drew	   attention	   to	   the	   living	   reality	   that	   the	  complexity	  of	  contemporary	  security	  challenges	  outstrips	  the	  capabilities	  of	  state	  actors	  to	  respond	  unilaterally.	  State	  actors	  are	  thus	  compelled	  to	  team	  up	  with	  an	  evolving	  array	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  and	  international	  actors,	  often	  drawing	  upon	  their	  support	  and	  resources	  in	  responding	  to	  security	  challenges.	  	  	  It	   can	   be	   recalled	   that	   even	   at	   the	   continental	   level	   there	   is	   a	   wide	   appreciation	   of	   the	  potential	   contribution	   of	   non-­‐state	   actors	   to	   the	   promotion	   of	   sub-­‐regional	   security.	   The	  AU’s	   Peace	   and	   Security	   Council	   position	   on	   non-­‐state	   actors	   is	   to	   encourage	   NGOs,	  community-­‐based	   and	   other	   CSOs	   to	   participate	   actively	   in	   promotion	   of	   peace	   and	  security310.	  As	  it	  turned	  out,	  however,	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  role	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  this	  study	  revealed	   that	   these	   sets	   of	   actors	   are	   selectively	   engaged	   in	   the	   coordination	   and	  management	   of	   some	   security	   functions.	   State	   actors	   within	   sub-­‐regional	   groupings	  sideline	   non-­‐state	   actors	   especially	   in	   their	   reaction	   to	   cases	   of	   domestic	   political	   crises.	  The	  role	  of	  CSOs	  has	  not	  moved	  beyond	  ‘naming	  and	  shaming’	  states	  and	  state	  elites	  who	  flout	   not	   only	   national	   laws	   but	   also	   sub-­‐regional	   standards	   and	   rules,	   to	   include	   a	  recognized	   responsibility	   endorsed	   and	   supervised	   by	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   to	  engage	   in	   a	   more	   substantively	   in	   intra-­‐state	   conflicts	   via	   conciliation,	   negotiations	   and	  mediation.	  	  	  Another	   usefulness	   of	   the	   security	   governance	   perspective	   to	   the	   current	   study	   besides	  highlighting	   the	   extent	   of	   interactions	   among	   actors,	   it	   covered	   the	   contexts	   that	   give	  meaning	   to	   particular	   responses	   to	   security	   challenges	   and	   institutionalized	   forms	   of	  behaviour	   among	   the	   relevant	   actors	   in	   the	   coordination	   and	   management	   of	   security	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  310	  See	  Article	  24	  of	  the	  AU’s	  Common	  African	  Defence	  and	  Security	  Policy	  (CADSP)	  of	  2004.	  The	  UN	  General	  Assembly	   also	  describes	  CSOs	   as	   the	  prime	  movers	  of	   some	  of	   the	  most	   innovative	   initiatives	   to	  deal	  with	  emerging	  global	  threats	  (UNGA	  A/58/817,	  11th	  June	  2004).	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tasks.	   For	   instance,	   we	   were	   able	   to	   understand	   that	   the	   interactive	   history	   of	   security	  actors	  (for	  example,	  the	  self-­‐imposed	  solidarity	  ties	  of	  former	  liberation	  movements	  within	  the	   SADC	   grouping)	   indirectly	   influenced	   their	   tendency	   to	   close	   ranks	   to	   incumbent	  regimes	  in	  crisis	  amid	  pressure	  from	  both	  local	  and	  international	  peers	  to	  act	  proactively.	  Using	   the	   security	   governance	  perspective	   aided	   in	   appreciating	   the	   fact	   that	   before	   one	  gets	  to	  understand	  how	  implementation	  of	  policies	  in	  the	  security	  field	  is	  carried	  out,	  it	  is	  equally	   important	   to	   grasp	   the	   context	   in	  which	  actors’	   interaction	   takes	  place.	   It	   can	  be	  summed	   up	   that	   this	   analytical	   perspective	   helped	   to	   capture	   complex	   governing	  (coordination	   and	   management)	   mechanisms	   in	   security	   issue-­‐areas	   characterized	   by	   a	  constellation	   of	   different	   types	   of	   actors	   operating	   at	   different	   levels	   of	   interaction.	  Through	  this	  security	  governance	  perspective	  which	  is	  an	  actor-­‐oriented	  model,	  it	  has	  been	  possible	   to	  bring	  under	  one	   framework	  actors’	   interactions,	   contexts	  under	  which	  actors	  operate	   and	   the	   evolving	   institutional	   mechanisms	   under	   the	   auspices	   of	   sub-­‐regional	  organizations.	  On	   the	   one	  hand,	   it	   shows	   that	   states	   continue	   to	   create	   and	  use	  multiple	  sub-­‐regional	   arrangements	   to	   pursue	   their	   security	   agenda.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   sub-­‐regional	   arrangements	   are	   enabling	   networks	   with	   state	   and	   non-­‐state	   actors	   in	  responding	  to	  collective	  security	  challenges	  prevailing	  in	  their	  respective	  areas.	  	  Can	  this	  perspective	  be	  applied	  elsewhere?	  This	  is	  not	  the	  first	  study	  that	  makes	  use	  of	  the	  security	   governance	   perspective.	   It	   had	   successfully	   been	   applied	   to	   analyse	   the	   EU	   as	   a	  security	  actor	  and	  to	  explain	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  trans-­‐Atlantic	  security	  architecture	  (Krahmann,	  2003;	  Kirchner	  and	  Sperling,	  2007)	  and	  also	  in	  a	  developing	  world	  context,	  the	  security	  governance	  perspective	  proved	  very	  helpful	  to	  capture	  the	  multi-­‐level	  and	  multi-­‐actor	   security	   dynamics	   in	   the	   countries	   of	   South	   America	   (Flemes	   and	   Radseck,	   2009;	  Oelsner,	  2009).	  So	  the	  answer	  is	  yes,	  the	  security	  governance	  perspective	  can	  conveniently	  be	   applied	   elsewhere	   to	   capture	   security	   dynamics	   especially	   in	  multi-­‐actor,	  multi-­‐levels	  situations.	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9.4.6.	  Usefulness	  of	  the	  Comparative	  Approach	  	  	  	  Has	  the	  current	  study	  benefited	  in	  whatever	  way	  from	  the	  use	  of	  a	  comparative	  approach?	  Certainly,	   the	   comparative	   approach	   has	   been	   helpful	   in	   answering	   the	   study’s	   research	  questions	  by	  allowing	  a	  comprehensive	  analysis	  of	  variation	  in	  the	  security	  practices	  across	  two	   sub-­‐regional	   arrangements	   based	   on	   (a)	   the	   nature	   and	   extent	   of	   threats,	   and	   (b)	  existing	  mechanisms	  for	  responding	  to	  security	  challenges.	  	  Why	  would	  two	  organizations	  facing	  a	  similar	  form	  of	  security	  challenge	  appear	  to	  institute	  different	  response	  mechanisms?	  Comprehending	  first	  and	  foremost	  the	  scope	  of	  a	  security	  challenge	  was	  important	  in	  understanding	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  an	  organization	  responded.	  There	  is	  more	  to	  it	  than	  explanations	  bent	  on	  highlighting	  capacity	  deficiencies	  within	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations.	  The	  nature	  and	  extent	  of	  the	  threat	  and	  the	  context	  under	  which	  the	  organization	  finds	  itself	  also	  informs	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  it	  reacted	  to	  a	  security	  challenge.	  For	   instance,	   the	   lead	   actor	   in	   the	   mediation	   of	   the	   Zimbabwe	   crisis,	   South	   Africa,	  successfully	   mounted	   a	   diplomatic	   campaign	   to	   keep	   Zimbabwe	   off	   the	   UN	   Security	  Council’s	  agenda	  while	  serving	  as	  a	  non-­‐permanent	  member	   in	  2007-­‐8	  by	  repudiating	  an	  attempt	  to	  treat	  the	  Southern	  African	  country	  and	  Kenyan	  crises	  on	  the	  same	  wave	  length.	  	  South	  Africa	  maintained	  that	  Zimbabwe	  at	  the	  time	  had	  not	  reached	  the	  levels	  of	  Kenya’s	  December	   2007	   post-­‐election	   violence,	   and	   thus,	   the	   UN	   was	   risking	   complicating	  mediation	  efforts.	  The	  main	  intention,	  which	  in	  fact	  paid	  off,	  was	  to	  protect	  the	  SADC	  from	  increasing	   international	   reproach	   and	   to	   starve	   off	   external	   pressure.	   We	   were	   able	   to	  understand	  that	  actors	  also	  make	  use	  of	  comparable	  cases	  in	  attempt	  to	  legitimize	  a	  chosen	  form	  of	  reaction	  to	  certain	  types	  of	  security	  challenges.	  	  	  A	  comparative	  method	  did	  not	  only	  allow	  an	  examination	  of	  how	  an	  array	  of	  actors	  reacted	  to	  different	  sets	  of	  security	  challenges	  but	  also	  enabled	  capturing	  two	  differing	  but	  rapidly	  evolving	   institutional	   developments	   undertaken	   by	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations.	   One	  organization	  had	  relatively	  invested	  a	  lot	  in	  setting	  up	  political	  and	  security	  structures	  and	  their	   attendant	   policy	   instruments.	   Another	   organization	   that	   featured	   had	   recorded	  relatively	  remarkable	  milestones	  in	  the	  general	  regional	  integration	  sector	  but	  with	  a	  thinly	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developed	  security	  institutional	  framework,	  except	  for	  fairly	  developed	  confidence	  building	  measures	  in	  the	  defence	  sector.	  A	  comparative	  examination	  of	  the	  institutional	  paths	  taken	  by	   the	   organizations	   established	   that	   the	   SADC	   built	   on	   the	   institutional	   structure	   left	  behind	  by	   the	  erstwhile	  FLS	  grouping	  while	   institutionalisation	  of	   the	  EAC’s	  political	  and	  security	   sectors	   only	   received	   added	   impetus	   following	   expansion	   of	   the	   sub-­‐regional	  grouping	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  2000-­‐2010	  decade.	  	  	  Additionally,	   it	   is	   common	   for	   some	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	   that	   strive	   to	  be	  effective	  security	   actors	   to	   look	   to	   other	   organizations	   for	   policies	   and	   rules	   that	  were	   applied	   to	  solve	   similar	   problems	   and	   are	   transferable	   into	   their	   context	   (Börzel,	   2011).	   When	  conducting	   empirical	   analysis	   for	   this	   study	   I	   was	   intrigued	   by	   the	   EAC	   protracted	  negotiations	   to	   adopt	   a	   peace	   and	   security	   protocol.	   It	   became	   apparent	   that	   EAC	   was	  cautiously	  drawing	  in	  the	  experience	  of	  SADC	  with	  its	  Mutual	  Defence	  Pact	  and	  the	  Organ’s	  Protocol.	   Tanzania	   that	   maintains	   membership	   in	   both	   organizations	   shared	   her	  experience	   on	   operationalization	   of	   these	   SADC	   security	   instruments311.	   As	   EAC	   was	  mulling	   over	  whether	   to	   adopt	   separate	  Protocols	   on	  Cooperation	   in	  Defence,	   and	  Peace	  and	   Security,	   it	   had	   to	  move	   carefully	   against	   rushing	   to	   adopt	   an	   eye-­‐catching	   Security	  Protocol	  but	  one	  without	  clearly	  specified	  modalities	   for	   involvement	   in	   inter-­‐	  and	   intra-­‐state	  conflicts.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  comparative	  approach	  also	  highlighted	  the	  question	  of	  lesson	  drawing	  in	  the	  SALW	  area.	  It	  was	  established	  during	  field	  research	  for	  the	  current	  study	  that	  the	  SADC	  Firearms	   Protocol	   was	   not	   only	   one	   of	   the	   main	   references	   for	   the	   development	   of	   the	  Nairobi	   Protocol	   hence	   much	   similarity	   in	   the	   language	   of	   their	   provisions,	   but	   also	  signatories	  of	  the	  latter	  Protocol	  were	  keen	  to	  avoid	  controversy	  in	  operationalizing	  Article	  18	   concerning	   institutional	   arrangement	   as	   it	   happened	   in	   implementing	   a	   similar	  provision	  (Article	  17	  of	  the	  SADC	  Protocol)	  which	  slowed	  efforts	  to	  combat	  SALW	  problem	  in	  Southern	  Africa312.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  311	  At	   the	   High	   Level	   Seminar	   on	   the	   upgrading	   of	   the	  Memorandum	   of	   Understanding	   on	   Cooperation	   in	  Defence	  into	  the	  Protocol	  on	  Defence	  Cooperation,	  Kampala,	  Uganda,	  22nd	  –	  24th	  February	  2010.	  	  312	  Interview	  with	  Dominic	  Hayuma	  who	  once	  served	  as	  Tanzania	  NFP	  Coordinator	  at	  SADC	  and	  EAC	  fora.	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  The	  comparative	  approach	  was	  also	  useful	  in	  unveiling	  the	  inter-­‐linkage	  between	  the	  two	  security	  challenges	  under	  consideration	  (i.e.	   the	  SALW	  and	  domestic	  political	  crises).	  For	  instance,	   in	   the	   post-­‐election	   violence	   of	   2007-­‐08	   in	   Kenya,	   many	   crude	   weapons	   were	  used	  to	  unleash	  the	  violence	  and	  the	  resultant	  fatalities	  (Wepundi	  et.	  al,	  2012:21-­‐22).	  The	  Waki	  Report	  referred	  to	  in	  Chapter	  6	  noted	  that	  gunshots	  accounted	  for	  962	  causalities	  out	  of	  which	  405	  died	  (CIPEV,	  2008:	  345-­‐46).	  As	  a	  result	  the	  need	  to	  speed	  up	  implementation	  of	   SALW	   control	   measures	   alongside	   peacebuilding	   efforts	   has	   received	   close	   attention	  than	  before.	  	  9.5. Future	  Research	  Agenda	  	  This	  study	  focused	  on	  the	  elaboration	  of	  the	  nature	  and	  volume	  of	  the	  SALW	  proliferation	  problem,	  coordination	  and	  management	  of	  various	  control	  measures	  in	  East	  and	  Southern	  Africa	   sub-­‐regions.	   The	   other	   collective	   security	   challenge	   under	   focus	   was	   domestic	  political	  crises.	  There	  is	  still	  very	  limited	  data	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  small	  arms	  control	  measures	  on	  crime	  prevention.	  Future	  studies	  ought	  to	  be	  designed	  to	  examine	  the	  rates	  of	  change	  in	  transnational	  criminal	  acts	  within	  each	  Member	  State	  and	  then	  determine	  the	  impact	  that	  the	   small	   arms	   policies	   of	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   have	   had	   on	   that	   range	   of	   change.	  Moreover,	   attention	   on	  more	   cases	   of	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations,	   can	   allow	  more	   useful	  comparisons,	   and	   thus,	   commonalities	   and	   differences	   to	   be	   drawn,	   which	   would	  complement	   available	   knowledge	   and	   generate	   further	   insights	   in	   tackling	   the	   SALW	  menace.	  	  Negotiations	   following	   disputed	   elections	   and	   election	   violence	   in	   Kenya	   and	   Zimbabwe	  resulted	  in	  power-­‐sharing	  agreements	  as	  transitional	  measures	  toward	  long-­‐term	  conflict	  resolution	   in	   those	   countries.	   There	   is	   need	   to	   conduct	   further	   studies	   to	   assess	   the	  capability	  of	  sub-­‐regional	  arrangements	  to	  effectively	  monitor	  and	  oversee	  implementation	  of	  political	  agreements	  once	  signed	  by	  the	  parties	  to	  a	  domestic	  political	  crisis.	  The	  current	  study	   did	   not	   go	   far	   beyond	   the	   signing	   of	   power-­‐sharing	   agreements,	   for	   example,	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appraising	   the	   functioning	   of	   an	   agreed	   inclusive	   or	   coalition	   government,	   and	   how	   the	  various	   actors	   within	   the	   respective	   sub-­‐regional	   arrangements	   actually	   monitor	   the	  precarious	   post-­‐agreement	   situation	   in	   a	   Member	   State	   that	   has	   just	   emerged	   out	   of	   a	  protracted	  domestic	  political	  crisis.	  	  There	   is	   another	   area	   that	   is	   amenable	   to	   future	   in-­‐depth	   investigation.	  The	  Kenyan	  and	  Zimbabwean	   political	   crises	   provided	   important	   litmus	   tests	   for	   the	   respective	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations’	   capacity	   to	   resolve	   such	   crises	   using	   mediation	   as	   a	   non-­‐violent	  method.	   Both	   the	   EAC	   and	   SADC	   are	   at	   advanced	   stages	   of	   setting	   up	   fully-­‐fledged	  mediation	   units	   alongside	   conflict	   prevention,	   management	   and	   resolution	   mechanisms.	  This	   stems	   from	  a	   growing	   recognition	   that	   there	   are	   shortfalls	   in	   their	   preparedness	   to	  situations	  that	  call	  for	  mediation,	  leaving	  it	  to	  be	  conducted	  in	  an	  ad	  hoc	  basis.	  It	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  examine	  whether	  dedicated	  mediation	  architectures	  of	  EAC	  and	  SADC,	  once	  fully	   instituted,	   could	   play	   any	   significant	   role	   in	   future	   domestic	   political	   crises	   should	  they	  happen.	  	  Another	  area	  that	  begs	  for	  investment	  in	  research	  is	  how	  to	  empirically	  ascertain	  the	  extent	  to	   which	   political,	   economic	   and	   functional	   cooperation	   among	   a	   group	   of	   countries	  overtime	   contributes	   to	   fending-­‐off	   violent	   conflicts.	   It	   has	   often	  been	  posited	   elsewhere	  that	  security	  and	  development	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  and	  that	  one	  is	  inconceivable	  without	  the	  other	   but	   a	   comprehensive	   comparative	   study	   to	   examine	   whether	   or	   not	   such	   a	  relationship	  exists	  in	  Africa’s	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  done.	  Such	  an	  inquiry	  is	   justified	   as	   African	   sub-­‐regional	   organizations	   have	   been	   pursuing	   both	   security	   and	  development	  agenda	  concurrently	  for	  sometime	  now.	  	  Moreover,	   so	   far	   the	   focus	   of	   most	   regionalism	   literature	   has	   been	   on	   what	   induces	  Member	   States	   in	   a	   regional	   grouping	   to	   either	   comply	   or	   not	   with	   regional	   rules.	  	  Unfortunately,	   no	   adequate	   attention	   has	   been	   directed	   on	   interrogating	   what	   happens	  when	  structures	  created	  specifically	  for	  addressing	  conflicts	  are	  not	  used	  effectively.	  Why	  would	   Member	   States,	   for	   instance,	   by-­‐pass	   or	   show	   reluctance	   to	   involve	   the	  organization’s	  structures	  and	  organs	  in	  their	  peacemaking	  undertakings?	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  There	   is	  still	  an	  apparent	  omission	   in	  the	  existing	  operational	   instruments	  guiding	  action	  on	  the	  security	  sub-­‐sector	  in	  considering	  instances	  where	  conflicts	  do	  not	  conform	  to	  inter-­‐or	  an	  intra-­‐state	  conflict,	  such	  as	  the	  conflicts	  which	  have	  been	  engulfing	  the	  DRC	  for	  over	  fourteen	   years.	   The	   lines	   are	   sometimes	   very	   blurred.	   While	   this	   is	   indeed	   the	   case,	  modalities	  for	  dealing	  with	  inter-­‐state	  war	  as	  entrenched	  in	  the	  UN	  system	  and	  replicated	  in	  regional	  and	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  are	  not	  appropriate	  for	  resolving	  such	  conflicts	  (Van	  Schalkwyk,	  2005:	  39).	  Clarifying	  these	  issues	  especially	  what	  substantive	  procedures	  would	   be	   taken	   in	   a	   regional	   context	   in	   such	   a	  mixed	   intra-­‐extra-­‐state	   conflict	   is	   a	   valid	  point	  that	  deserves	  attention	  as	  sub-­‐regional	  blocs	  such	  as	  the	  EAC	  are	  deeply	  engaged	  in	  negotiating	  a	  Security	  Protocol.	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10.	  Appendices	  
	  10.1.	  	  List	  of	  Interviewees313	  	  	  	  




DATE	  1	   Daniel	  Nyambabe	   Assistant	  Commissioner	  of	  Police,	  SADC	  POL	  PLANELM	   SADC	  Headquarters,	  Gaborone,	  Botswana.	  
15th	  November	  2010.	  2	   Ezekiel	  Senti	   Advocate,	  Legal	  Adviser,	  SADC	  POL	  PLANELM	   SADC	  Headquarters,	  Gaborone,	  Botswana.	  
15th	  November	  2010.	  3	   Gerson	  M.	  Sangiza	   Colonel,	  Senior	  Officer	  Defence	  Affairs	  and	  Planning,	  	   SADC	  Headquarters,	  Gaborone	   15th	  November	  2010.	  4	   Habib	  G.	  Kambanga	   Senior	  Analyst,	  Political	  and	  Security	  Threats,	  SADC	  Regional	  Early	  Warning	  Centre	  
SADC	  Headquarters,	  Gaborone,	  Botswana.	  
15th	  November	  2010.	  5	   Maaparankoe	  Mahao	   Brigadier	  General,	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  Planning	  Element	   SADC	  Headquarters,	  Gaborone,	  Botswana.	  
15th	  November	  2010.	  6	   Linda	  Ramokate	   Politics	  and	  Diplomacy	  Officer	   SADC	  Headquarters,	  Gaborone,	  Botswana.	  
16th	  November	  2010.	  7	   Chihika	  Simfukwe	   Head	  of	  INTERPOL	  Regional	  Bureau-­‐Harare,	  and	  SARPCCO	  Secretariat	   Harare,	  Zimbabwe.	   18th	  November	  2010.	  8	   Joseph	  Musoni	   Regional	  Specialised	  Officer,	  INTERPOL	  Regional	  Bureau-­‐Harare	   Harare,	  Zimbabwe.	   18th	  November	  2010.	  9	   Dominic	  Hayuma	   Retired	  Deputy	  Director,	  Criminal	  Investigation	  Department	  (CID),	  Tanzania	  Police	  Force	  and	  former	  Coordinator	  Tanzania	  NFP	  
Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  Tanzania.	   3rd	  December	  2010.	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  The	  status	  and	  positions	  of	  respondents	  at	  the	  time	  of	  interviews.	  
	   238	  
10	   Peter	  Boswell	  Mcomalla	   TANANSA	  Chief	  Coordinator	   Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  Tanzania.	   8th	  December	  2010.	  11	   Wolfgang	  Leidig	   GTZ	  Head	  of	  Programme,	  GTZ	  Cooperation	  with	  EAC	   EAC	  Headquarters,	  Arusha,	  Tanzania.	  
13th	  December	  2010.	  12	   Lutenta	  Mwauzi	   Assistant	  Commissioner	  of	  Police,	  Tanzania	  NFP,	  Ministry	  of	  Home	  Affairs	   Police	  Headquarters,	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  Tanzania.	  
4th	  January	  2011.	  
13	   Leonard	  Onyonyi	   SALW	  Programme	  Coordinator	   EAC	  Secretariat,	  Arusha,	  Tanzania.	  
11th	  January	  2011.	  
14	   Francis	  K.	  Wairagu	   Head,	  Research	  and	  Gender	  Unit,	  RECSA.	   Nairobi,	  Kenya	   24th	  January	  2011.	  15	   Mohabe	  Nyirabu	   Associate	  Professor,	  Department	  of	  Political	  Science	  and	  Public	  Administration,	  University	  of	  Dar	  es	  Salaam.	  
Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  Tanzania.	   7th	  February	  2011.	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10.2.	  Interview	  Schedule	  A:	  for	  the	  EAC	  	  
Introduction	  	  I	   am	  conducting	  a	   study	   to	   find	  out	  how	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	   in	  Sub-­‐Sahara	  Africa	  deal	   with	   collective	   security	   challenges	   of	   transnational	   threats	   and	   domestic	   political	  crises	  that	  are	  facing	  their	  member	  states.	  To	  this	  end	  I	  have	  sought	  this	  interview	  as	  one	  of	  the	   tools	   for	   soliciting	   informed	   data,	   opinions	   and	   comments	   from	   a	   cross	   section	   of	  decision	   makers,	   practitioners,	   experts	   and	   those	   who	   are	   either	   directly	   involved	   in	  addressing	  these	  challenges	  or	  are	  conversant	  with	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  work	  in	  this	   area.	   	   I	   will	   kindly	   appreciate	   if	   you	  will	   respond	   to	   the	   following	   questions	  whose	  responses	  will	  immeasurably	  enable	  provision	  relevant	  information	  for	  accomplishing	  this	  study.	  Your	  responses	  may	  be	  recorded	  for	  quality	  control	  purposes	  but	  will	  not	  be	  used	  for	  any	  other	  reason	  than	  this	  research.	  	  
PART	  A:	  Coordination	  and	  Management	  Of	  the	  Transnational	  Threat	  of	  SALW	  
	   1. Can	  you	  describe	  the	  security	  situation	  in	  the	  sub-­‐region	  in	  general?	  	  2. The	  East	  African	  sub-­‐region	   is	  confronted	  with	  a	  number	  of	   transnational	  security	  threats	   like	   organized	   crime,	   Small	   Arms	   and	   Light	   Weapons	   (SALW),	   drug	  trafficking,	  and	  cattle	  rustling.	  What	  is	  the	  extent	  of	  these	  threats	  in	  the	  sub-­‐region?	  	   3. Focusing	  specifically	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  stockpiling	  and	  trafficking	  of	  SALW,	  in	  your	  opinion,	  what	  are	  its	  major	  causal	  factors?	  a) Conflicts	  in	  the	  neighbouring	  countries.	  b) Porous	  borders.	  c) Weak	  control	  systems	  by	  states.	  d) All	  the	  above.	  e) Other	  factors	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  	  4. All	  five	  EAC	  Partner	  States	  are	  signatories	  to	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol	  for	  the	  Prevention,	  Control,	  and	  Reduction	  of	  SALW.	  How	  does	  the	  EAC	  coordinate	  operationalisation	  of	  this	  Protocol?	  [i.e.	  how	  does	  the	  EAC	  coordinate	  all	  aspects	  and	  activities	  related	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol?].	  	   5. What	  is	  the	  status	  of	  the	  EAC	  Policy	  on	  small	  arms?	  	   6. What	  is	  the	  current	  status	  of	  development	  of	  national	  policies	  on	  small	  arms	  in	  the	  EAC	  member	  states?	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7. There	  are	  several	  bodies	  that	  are	  involved	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another	  in	  controlling	  the	  SALW	   menace	   and	   its	   consequences.	   The	   major	   sub-­‐regional	   intergovernmental	  bodies	  are	  the	  Regional	  Centre	  on	  Small	  Arms	  and	  Light	  Weapons	  (RECSA),	  formerly	  the	   Nairobi	   Secretariat,	   and	   the	   Eastern	   Africa	   Police	   Chiefs	   Cooperation	  Organization	   (EAPCCO).	   How	   does	   the	   EAC	   coordinate	   its	   activities	   on	   SALW	   in	  relation	  to	  these	  organizations?	  a) RECSA.	  b) EAPCCO.	  	   8. How	  does	  the	  EAC	  Department	  for	  Peace	  and	  Security	  operate	  in	  relation	  to	  National	  Focal	  Points	  (NFPs)?	  	   9. Have	  member	  states	  sought	  to	  coordinate	  their	  policies	  on	  SALW	  and	  pursued	  any	  forms	  of	  cooperation	  outside	  the	  EAC	  formal	  structures?	  [	  To	  put	  it	  differently,	  are	  there	   any	   informal	   arrangements	   or	   mechanisms,	   known	   to	   you,	   that	   have	   been	  employed	  by	  individual	  states	  to	  address	  the	  transnational	  threat	  of	  SALW?]	  If	   yes,	   how	   do	   such	   bilateral	   or	   multilateral	   arrangements	   by	   states	   affect	   EAC’s	  coordination	  of	  its	  policy	  on	  small	  arms?	  	  10. Has	  there	  been	  an	  EAC	  coordinated	  operation	  for	  collection	  of	  illicit	  arms?	  a) If	  yes,	  how	  often	  has	  it	  been	  carried	  out?	  	  i) How	  many	  arms	  have	  been	  collected	  so	  far?	  ii) Has	  the	  EAC	  sponsored	  operation(s)	  achieved	  its	  goals?	  b) If	  no,	  what	  are	  the	  reasons	  for	  a	  lack	  of	  an	  EAC	  joint	  operation?	  	  11. a)	  Which	  countries	  are	  involved	  in	  bilateral	  disarmament	  operations	  alongside	  the	  EAC	  program	  on	  SALW?	  b)	   If	   one	  were	   to	   assess	   the	   national	   and	   bilateral	   disarmament	   operations,	  what	  level	  of	  achievement	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  them?	  	  12. How	  much	   arms	   have	   been	   destroyed	   by	  member	   states	   since	   the	   signing	   of	   the	  Nairobi	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Problem	  of	  Illicit	  SALW	  in	  2000?	  	  13. The	   EAC-­‐GTZ	   Small	   Arms	   Project	   provides	   support	   for	   the	   establishment	   of	   an	  electronic	  database.	  What	  is	  the	  status	  of	  progress	  on	  this	  undertaking?	  	   14. Is	   there	   a	   cross-­‐national	   (bilateral	   or	   sub-­‐regional	   wide)	   training	   for	   Law	  Enforcement	  Agents	  (LEAs)	  besides	  those	  conducted	  by	  individual	  member	  states?	  	   15. Is	   the	   sub-­‐region	  moving	   towards	  harmonization	  of	   training	   syllabi	  of	   the	  various	  national	  training	  institutes	  for	  LEAs?	  	  	   16. Providing	   public	   education	   and	   awareness	   is	   one	   of	   the	   crucial	   elements	   in	   the	  attempt	   to	   address	   the	  problem	  of	   stockpiling	   and	   trafficking	  of	   SALW.	  How	  does	  the	   sub-­‐regional	   organization	   fare	   on	   the	   implementation	   of	   this	   control	  measure	  according	  to	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol?	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   17. a)	  What	  are	  the	  major	  challenges	  facing	  the	  EAC	  States	  in	  controlling	  SALW?	  	   b)	  If	  you	  were	  asked	  to	  rank	  these	  challenges,	  which	  one	  would	  you	  rate	  as	  the	  most	  persistent?	  	  
PART	  B:	  Domestic	  Political	  Crises	  	  18. This	   sub-­‐region	   has	   not	   been	   spared	   of	   domestic	   political	   crises	   in	   some	   states.	  What	  has	  been	  the	  reason	  behind	  the	  emergence	  of	  such	  crises?	  [The	  researcher	  to	  
elaborate	   to	   the	   respondent	   the	   meaning	   of	   ‘domestic	   political	   crises,’	   as	  
applied	  in	  the	  study].	  	  19. How	  devastating	  was	  the	  2008	  Kenyan	  Post-­‐Election	  violence	  to	  the	  sub-­‐region?	  	  	  20. What	   mechanisms	   are	   currently	   in	   place	   at	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   level	   to	   address	  domestic	  political	  crises	  when	  they	  erupt	  in	  a	  member	  state?	  	   21. In	  your	  opinion,	  does	  the	  current	  EAC	  security	   framework	  equipped	  to	  adequately	  address	  domestic	  political	  crises	  within	  member	  states?	  	  	  	  	   22. The	   EAC	   appeared	   to	   have	   taken	   a	   back	   seat	   role	   in	   the	   mediation	   of	   the	   2008	  Kenyan	   post-­‐election	   violence.	   Why	   EAC	   could	   not	   assume	   a	   leading	   role	   in	   the	  mediation	  process?	  	   23. What	  is	  the	  major	  challenge(s)	  facing	  the	  EAC	  in	  addressing	  conflicts	  within	  member	  states?	  	   24. The	  sub-­‐regional	  organization	  has	  put	   in	  place	  a	  set	  of	  protocols,	  agreements,	  and	  strategies	   to	   ensure	   stability	   and	   improve	   security	   in	   the	   sub-­‐region.	  How	  do	  you	  evaluate	  the	  organization’s	  and	  individual	  member	  states	  delivery	  on:	  a) Implementation	  of	  those	  protocols,	  agreements	  and	  agreed	  strategies,	  b) General	  enforcement	  mechanisms.	  	  
PART	  C:	  Questions	  Exclusive	  For	  RECSA	  	  1. Can	   you	   please	   explain	   the	   current	   status	   of	   development	   of	   the	   Reference	   and	  Operational	  Manual	  (ROM)	  that	   is	  envisaged	  to	  guide	   interaction	  and	  coordination	  between	  NFPs	  and	  also	  NFPs	  and	  RECSA?	  	  2. How	  can	  you	  describe	  the	  interaction	  and	  partnership	  between:	  a. RECSA	  and	  EAC.	  b. RECSA	  and	  EAPCCO.	  	   3. The	   East	   Africa	   sub-­‐region	   lacks	   a	   synchronized	   legislative	   framework	   for	  controlling	  illicit	  trafficking	  of	  firearms.	  Why	  is	  this	  so?	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  4. It	   is	   noted	   that	   RECSA	   is	   facilitating	   adoption	   of	   new	   legislation	   on	   SALW	   in	   EAC	  member	   states.	   What	   is	   the	   current	   progress	   on	   this	   activity	   (	   in	   each	   of	   the	   5	  member	  states)?	  	  	   5. Harmonization	   of	   legislation	   remains	   a	   key	   area	   of	   focus	   in	   the	   efforts	   to	  manage	  SALW.	   What	   is	   the	   status	   of	   implementation	   of	   guidelines	   for	   harmonization	   of	  legislation	   and	   implementation	   plan	   for	   the	   review	   process	   on	   small	   arms	  legislation?	  	   6. Why	   was	   the	   process	   of	   harmonization	   of	   legislation	   at	   national	   level	   not	  accomplished	  as	  per	  initial	  date	  agreed	  at	  the	  Third	  Ministerial	  Review	  Conference	  of	  RECSA	  (of	  June	  2005)?	  	   7. Have	   member	   states	   undertaken	   the	   computerization	   of	   their	   central	   firearms	  databases	  so	  as	  to	  be	  in	   line	  with	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  Best	  Practice	  Guidelines	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Nairobi	  Protocol?	  	  	  	   8. RECSA	   is	   coordinating	   the	   implementation	  of	  an	  arms	  marking	  project	   in	   the	  sub-­‐region.	  Can	  you	  describe	  the	  status	  of	  implementation	  of	  this	  exercise?	  	   9. a)	  What	  are	  the	  major	  challenges	  facing	  the	  EAC	  States	  in	  controlling	  SALW?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  b)	  If	  you	  were	  asked	  to	  rank	  these	  challenges,	  which	  one	  would	  you	  rate	  as	  the	  most	  persistent?	  	  
PERSONAL	  PARTICULARS	  	  Name	  of	  the	  Respondent:	  __________________________________________	  	  Designation:	  ____________________________________________________	  	  Organization:	  ___________________________________________________	  	  Date	  of	  Interview:	  _______________________________________________	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10.3.	  Interview	  Schedule	  B:	  For	  the	  SADC	  
	  
Introduction	  	  I	   am	  conducting	  a	   study	   to	   find	  out	  how	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	   in	  Sub-­‐Sahara	  Africa	  deal	   with	   collective	   security	   challenges	   of	   transnational	   threats	   and	   domestic	   political	  crises	   that	  are	   facing	   their	  member	  states.	  To	   this	  end	   I	  have	  organized	   this	   interview	  as	  one	  of	  the	  tools	  for	  soliciting	  informed	  data,	  opinions	  and	  comments	  from	  a	  cross	  section	  of	  decision	   makers,	   practitioners,	   experts	   and	   those	   who	   are	   either	   directly	   involved	   in	  addressing	  these	  challenges	  or	  are	  conversant	  with	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  organizations	  work	  in	  this	   area.	   	   I	   will	   kindly	   appreciate	   if	   you	  will	   respond	   to	   the	   following	   questions	  whose	  responses	  will	   immeasurably	   enable	  provision	  of	   relevant	   information	   for	   accomplishing	  this	   study.	   Your	   responses	  may	  be	   recorded	   for	   quality	   control	   purposes	  but	  will	   not	   be	  used	  for	  any	  other	  reason	  than	  this	  research.	  	  	  
PART	  A:	  Coordination	  and	  Management	  Of	  the	  Transnational	  Threat	  of	  SALW	  	  1. All	   SADC	   States	   are	   signatories	   to	   the	   SADC	   Protocol	   on	   the	   Control	   of	   Firearms,	  Ammunition	   and	   Other	   Related	   Materials.	   How	   does	   the	   SADC	   coordinate	  operationalization	  of	  this	  Protocol?	  	  	  NFPs	  	  2. What	  is	  the	  current	  status	  of	  the	  process	  of	  establishing	  and	  developing:	  c) National	  Policies	  on	  small	  arms.	  d) National	  Focal	  Points	  (NFPs)?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  SADC	  Organ	  	   3. How	   does	   the	   SADC	   Organ	   on	   Politics,	   Defence	   and	   Security	   (OPRDS)	   operate	   in	  relation	  to:	  a. SARPCCO,	  b. National	  Focal	  Points	  (NFPs)?	  	   4. Have	  member	  states	  sought	  to	  coordinate	  their	  policies	  on	  SALW	  and	  pursued	  any	  forms	   of	   cooperation	   outside	   the	   SADC	   formal	   structures?	   If	   yes,	   how	   do	   such	  bilateral	   or	   multilateral	   arrangements	   by	   states	   affect	   SADC’s	   coordination	   of	   its	  policy	  on	  small	  arms?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Reviewing	  and	  harmonizing	  legislations	  	   5. Member	  states	  have	  been	  reviewing	  their	  firearm	  legislations	  to	  bring	  them	  in	  tune	  with	   the	   SADC	   Protocol.	   What	   is	   the	   current	   status	   of	   implementation	   of	   this	  exercise?	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6. Has	   the	   sub-­‐region	   adopted	   any	   guidelines	   for	   harmonization	   of	   legislation	   on	  outstanding	  issues	  of	  small	  arms	  control?	  	  	  	  	  Collection/disarmament	  operations	  and	  destruction	  of	  firearms	  	   7. Has	  there	  been	  a	  SADC	  coordinated	  operation	  for	  collection	  of	  illicit	  arms?	  a. If	  yes,	  how	  often	  has	  it	  been	  carried	  out?	  	  iii) How	  many	  arms	  have	  been	  collected	  so	  far?	  iv) Has	  the	  SADC	  sponsored	  operation(s)	  achieved	  its	  goals?	  b. If	  no,	  what	  are	  the	  reasons	  for	  a	  lack	  of	  a	  SADC	  joint	  operation?	  	   8. a)	  Which	  countries	  are	  involved	  in	  bilateral	  disarmament	  operations	  alongside	  the	  SADC	  program	  on	  SALW?	  b)	   If	   one	  were	   to	   assess	   the	   national	   and	   bilateral	   disarmament	   operations,	  what	  level	  of	  achievement	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  them?	  	   9. How	  much	   arms	   have	   been	   destroyed	   by	  member	   states	   since	   the	   signing	   of	   the	  SADC	  Protocol	  on	  SALW	  in	  2001?	  	  
Electronic	  Database	  	  10. Any	  sub-­‐regional	  efforts	  for	  establishment	  of	  a	  unified	  electronic	  database?	  	  
Training	  for	  LEAs	  	  11. Is	   the	   sub-­‐region	  moving	   towards	  harmonization	  of	   training	   syllabi	  of	   the	  various	  national	  training	  institutes	  for	  LEAs?	  	  	   12. What	   efforts	   have	   been	   taken	   by	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   body	   to	   enhance	   the	   skill	   and	  capacity	  of	  various	  LEAs	  in	  the	  sub-­‐region?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Public	  education	  and	  awareness	  	   13. Providing	   public	   education	   and	   awareness	   is	   one	   of	   the	   crucial	   elements	   in	   the	  attempt	   to	   address	   the	   problem	   of	   stockpiling	   and	   trafficking	   of	   SALW.	   How	   has	  SADC	  as	  the	  regional	  body	  implemented	  this	  control	  measure?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Self-­‐assessment	  	   14. Has	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   organization	  undertaken	   self-­‐assessment	   of	   the	   impact	   of	   its	  measures	  to	  manage	  transnational	  threats	  and	  domestic	  political	  crises?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Challenges	  	   15. a)	  What	  are	  the	  major	  challenges	  facing	  the	  EAC	  States	  in	  controlling	  SALW?	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   b)	  If	  you	  were	  asked	  to	  rank	  these	  challenges,	  which	  one	  would	  you	  rate	  as	  the	  most	  persistent?	  	  
PART	  B:	  Domestic	  Political	  Crises	  	  16. Elections	   in	   Africa	   are	   periods	   during	   which	   the	   stability	   and	   security	   of	   African	  states	  hangs	   in	   the	  balance	  due	  to	   the	   threat	  of	  related	  election	  violence.	  How	  has	  this	   sub-­‐regional	   organization	   been	   addressing	   conflicts	   of	   this	   nature	  within	   her	  member	  states?	  	  17. Besides	   using	   formal	   security	   organs	   and	   structures	   of	   the	   sub-­‐regional	  organization,	   what	   other	   (informal)	   mechanisms	   have	   been	   employed	   to	   address	  domestic	   political	   crises	   in	   member	   states?	   [For	   e.g.	   involvement	   of	   extra-­‐
regional	  actors	  and	  other	  members	  of	  the	  international	  community]	  	   18. Have	   the	   political	   and	   diplomatic	   efforts	   of	   individual	  member	   states	   in	   resolving	  domestic	  political	  crises	  enjoyed	  the	  support	  of	  the	  sub-­‐regional	  organization?	  	   19. How	   do	   you	   respond	   to	   the	   view	   that	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   organization	   has	   failed	   to	  respond	  to	  conflicts	  in	  member	  states	  in	  a	  coordinated	  manner?	  	   20. How	   can	   you	   describe	   SADC’s	   role	   in	   addressing	   the	   Zimbabwean	   political	   crisis	  since	  2000?	  	   21. The	   sub-­‐regional	   court,	   the	   SADC	  Tribunal	   ruled	   in	  2008	   that	   the	   land	   reforms	   in	  Zimbabwe	   were	   against	   the	   SADC	   Treaty.	   It	   has	   also	   ruled	   that	   the	   Zimbabwe	  government	   is	   in	  contempt	  of	  court	   for	   ignoring	  their	  rulings.	  Why	  has	   the	  court’s	  rulings	  not	  been	  enforced?	  	   22. Why	   SADC	   did	   not	   invoke	   the	   Mutual	   Defence	   Pact	   to	   respond	   to	   claims	   by	   its	  member	   (the	  DRC)	   in	  2005	   that	   it	  was	  a	   target	  of	  aggression	   from	  a	  non-­‐member	  state	  (Rwanda)?	  	   23. What	  hindrances	  or	  challenges	  stand	  in	  the	  way	  for	  SADC’s	  successful	  management	  of	  domestic	  conflicts	  within	  its	  member	  states?	  	   24. The	  sub-­‐regional	  organization	  has	  put	   in	  place	  a	  set	  of	  protocols,	  agreements,	  and	  strategies	   to	   ensure	   stability	   and	   improve	   security	   in	   the	   sub-­‐region.	  How	  do	  you	  evaluate	  the	  organization’s	  and	  individual	  member	  states	  delivery	  on:	  a. Implementation	  of	  those	  protocols,	  agreements	  and	  agreed	  strategies,	  b. General	  enforcement	  mechanisms.	  	   	  
PART	  C:	  Questions	  Exclusive	  For	  SARPCCO	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1. How	   can	   you	   describe	   the	   interaction	   and	   partnership	   between	   SARPCCO	   and	  SADC?	  	  2. Harmonization	   of	   legislation	   remains	   a	   key	   area	   of	   focus	   in	   the	   efforts	   to	  manage	  SALW.	  What	  is	  the	  status	  of	  implementation	  of	  this	  activity	  in	  this	  sub-­‐region?	  	  3. There	   was	   a	   plan	   to	   launch	   a	   Crime	   Intelligence	   Project	   on	   SALW.	   What	   is	   the	  current	  status	  of	  progress	  on	  this	  plan?	  	   4. Have	  SADC	  member	  states	  undertaken	  the	  computerization	  of	  their	  central	  firearms	  databases?	  	   5. Is	  SARPCCO	  coordinating	  the	  implementation	  of	  an	  arms	  marking	  project	  in	  the	  sub-­‐region?	  	   6. a)	  What	  are	  the	  major	  challenges	  facing	  the	  SADC	  States	  in	  controlling	  SALW?	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  b)	  If	  you	  were	  asked	  to	  rank	  these	  challenges,	  which	  one	  would	  you	  rate	  as	  the	  most	  persistent?	  	   	  
PERSONAL	  PARTICULARS	  	  Name	  of	  the	  Respondent:	  __________________________________________	  	  Designation:	  ____________________________________________________	  	  Organization:	  ___________________________________________________	  	  Date	  of	  Interview:	  ______________________________________________	  	  
THANK	  YOU	  FOR	  YOUR	  KIND	  ASSISTANCE!	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